Duclos v. Hayes

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Duclos v. Hayes

KATY DUCLOS v. SYLVIA HAYES
(AC 46823)
Moll, Suarez and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s rendering of summary judgment
for the defendant landlord with respect to the plaintiff’s claims of negligence
based on premises liability in connection with her alleged slip and fall on
a front porch stairway leading to a tenant’s apartment. The plaintiff claimed,
inter alia, that the court improperly rendered summary judgment despite
the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant
owed a duty of care to her. Held:

Although the trial court committed error in failing to provide an oral or
written statement of decision containing its conclusion as to each claim of
law raised by the parties and the factual basis therefor, as required by our
rule of practice (§ 64-1 (a)), this court was not precluded from considering
the plaintiff’s claims on the merits because its review was plenary, there
was an adequate record, and it was in the interests of judicial economy and
fairness to the parties to proceed.

The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant, as
there was no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant did not
exercise possession and control of the illumination of an operational light
fixture in the front exterior entryway of the premises, the defendant’s tenant
having exclusive possession and control of the light switch, located inside
his demised apartment, that operated the light fixture, and, therefore, she
did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff.
Argued April 15—officially released August 19, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, personal
injuries sustained as a result of the defendant’s alleged
negligence, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New Haven, where the court, S. Richards,
J., granted the plaintiff’s motion to cite in Eugene Bell
as a defendant; thereafter, the court, S. Richards, J.,
granted the named defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and rendered judgment thereon; subse-
quently, the plaintiff withdrew her claims against the
defendant Eugene Bell and appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
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Duclos v. Hayes

Andrew T. Boivin, with whom, on the brief, was
Alphonse J. Balzano, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).
Ellen M. Costello, for the appellee (named defendant).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The plaintiff, Katy Duclos, appeals from the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor
of the defendant Sylvia Hayes on count one of the plain-
tiff’s second amended complaint sounding in premises
liability arising out of her alleged slip and fall.1 On
appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant
(1) without providing an oral or written statement of
decision and (2) because there were genuine issues of
material fact.2 We conclude that (1) the trial court erred
in failing to issue an oral or written statement of its
decision granting summary judgment, but that this defi-
ciency does not prevent our review of the plaintiff’s
claims on the merits, and (2) there existed no genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the defendant owed
a duty of care to the plaintiff, such that the defendant
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
1
On June 25, 2020, the trial court, S. Richards, J., granted the plaintiff’s
motion to cite in Eugene Bell as a defendant. On August 2, 2023, the plaintiff
withdrew her claims against Bell, and Bell is not participating in this appeal.
Accordingly, in this opinion we refer to Hayes as the defendant and to Bell
by name.
The plaintiff’s motion to cite in Bell stated that Bell, as the tenant of the
premises, ‘‘constitutes a necessary party to the present action because he
may have been the party in possession and control of the subject premises
and the subject defect, and responsible for the injuries and damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff.’’ After the court granted the plaintiff’s motion, the
plaintiff filed (1) an amended complaint, dated June 25, 2020, and (2) a
second amended complaint, dated September 3, 2021, both of which directed
one count to the defendant and one count to Bell. Because the plaintiff
thereafter withdrew the present action against Bell, we refer solely to the
allegations set forth in count one of the second amended complaint through-
out this opinion.
2
We address the plaintiff’s claims in a different order than they are set
forth in her principal appellate brief.
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Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment of the
trial court.
The following facts, which are undisputed, and proce-
dural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. At all relevant times, the defendant owned a
two-story residential building located at 103 Judson
Avenue in New Haven (premises). In September, 2017,
pursuant to a residential lease agreement (lease agree-
ment), the defendant was leasing the first floor apart-
ment of the premises to Eugene Bell.3 Outside of the
first floor apartment, there is a single stair that leads
from the sidewalk to the front porch entryway.4 There
is a lighting fixture installed on the ceiling of the front
porch, and the light switch that operates the lighting
fixture is located inside of the first floor apartment,
which was leased to Bell.
On September 14, 2019, the plaintiff commenced the
present action against the defendant. In her second
amended complaint, dated September 3, 2021 (i.e., the
operative complaint), the plaintiff alleged that, on Sep-
tember 17, 2017, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Bell permit-
ted her to enter onto the premises and she tripped
and fell on the front porch stairway of the premises,
sustaining injuries as a result. The plaintiff further
alleged that (1) she fell because ‘‘there existed a defec-
tive, unsafe, dangerous, and/or hazardous condition in
that there were improper, damaged, and/or neglected
lighting fixtures installed on or about the exterior of
[the] premises, which failed to sufficiently illuminate
3
The lease agreement in effect at the time of the alleged slip and fall,
which both parties submitted as an exhibit in their respective summary
judgment filings, reflects that the lease term began on September 1, 2017,
and ended on August 31, 2018.
4
In the defendant’s affidavit submitted in support of her motion for sum-
mary judgment, filed on September 8, 2021, she averred that the second
floor apartment was accessed through the rear of the building. This averment
went unrebutted.
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Duclos v. Hayes

the external stairway of the premises’’ and (2) the defec-
tive lighting constituted a breach by the defendant of
her duty to use reasonable care to keep and to maintain
the premises in a reasonably safe and good condition.
On December 13, 2019, the defendant filed an answer
denying the plaintiff’s material allegations and asserted
a special defense alleging that the plaintiff’s injuries,
losses, and damages were caused by her own care-
lessness and negligence.5 On January 21, 2020, the plain-
tiff filed a reply denying the defendant’s special defense.
On September 8, 2021, the defendant filed a motion
for summary judgment, arguing that there were no genu-
ine issues of material fact that (1) she did not maintain
control of the allegedly defective lighting fixture, such
that she owed no duty of care to the plaintiff to ensure
that the front porch light was adequately lit, (2) the
lighting on the front porch did not constitute a defective
condition, and (3) she was not on notice of the allegedly
defective condition. Attached to the defendant’s sup-
porting memorandum were various exhibits, including
(1) the lease agreement, (2) the defendant’s supporting
affidavit, (3) a photograph of the front exterior
entryway of the premises, and (4) a transcript excerpt
from the deposition of the plaintiff.
On November 24, 2021, the plaintiff filed a memoran-
dum in opposition to the defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, attached to which was the lease agree-
ment only. The plaintiff argued that the defendant was
5
The defendant’s answer and special defense were directed to the plain-
tiff’s original complaint dated September 9, 2019. The defendant did not
plead further. See Practice Book § 10-61 (‘‘When any pleading is amended
the adverse party may plead thereto within the time provided by Section
10-8 or, if the adverse party has already pleaded, alter the pleading, if desired,
within ten days after such amendment or such other time as the rules of
practice, or the judicial authority, may prescribe, and thereafter pleadings
shall advance in the time provided by that section. If the adverse party fails
to plead further, pleadings already filed by the adverse party shall be regarded
as applicable so far as possible to the amended pleading.’’).
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not entitled to summary judgment because genuine
issues of material fact existed as to ‘‘(1) whether the
defendant retained control of the subject property,
including the exterior entryway/light fixtures, (2)
whether the lease agreement between [the defendant]
and . . . Bell expressly stated the terms of control over
the subject property, including the exterior entryway/
light fixtures, (3) whether the [lease agreement] unam-
biguously conveyed [to Bell] control over the part of
the property at issue in this case, and (4) whether . . .
the defendant . . . was charged with notice, actual or
constructive, of the defect causing injury to the plaintiff,
as alleged.’’
On January 20, 2022, the court, S. Richards, J., heard
argument on the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment. On March 10, 2022, the court granted the defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment and, on April 21,
2022, denied the plaintiff’s subsequent motion to rear-
gue/reconsider and for articulation. This appeal fol-
lowed. Additional procedural history will be set forth
as necessary.
I
We preliminarily address the plaintiff’s claim that the
trial court, in granting the defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, committed error in failing to provide
an oral or written statement of decision containing its
conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties
and the factual basis therefor. We agree that the court
committed error in this regard.6
6
The plaintiff raises a separate claim challenging the denial of her motion
to reargue/reconsider and for articulation, contending that, in denying that
motion, the court compounded its initial failure to articulate the basis of
its summary judgment rendered in the defendant’s favor. Insofar as the
plaintiff moved for articulation prior to filing her appeal and now seeks our
review of the trial court’s denial thereof, we cannot afford such review. See
Brycki v. Brycki, 91 Conn. App. 579, 593–94, 881 A.2d 1056 (2005) (Practice
Book § 66-7 affords review of decision on motion for articulation filed pursu-
ant to Practice Book § 66-5 only, which motion may be filed only after
appeal has been filed); see also Swanson v. Groton, 116 Conn. App. 849,
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Duclos v. Hayes

The following additional procedural background is
relevant to our resolution of this claim. On March 10,
2022, the court, S. Richards, J., granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment by way of a one word
order that simply stated: ‘‘GRANTED.’’ On March 28,
2022, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue/reconsider
and for articulation of the court’s ruling, to which the
defendant filed an objection on April 8, 2022. On April
21, 2022, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion on the
ground that ‘‘the court’s [March 10, 2022] ruling speaks
for itself.’’
The plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal on
March 28, 2022, and her case proceeded against Bell
until it was withdrawn on August 2, 2023. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed this appeal on August 21, 2023. On
September 6, 2023, pursuant to Practice Book § 64-1
(b), the plaintiff filed a notice with this court seeking
a statement of decision by the trial court on the ground
that the trial court had failed to comply with § 64-1 (a).
In response, on September 21, 2023, the court, Abrams,
J., issued an order wherein it stated: ‘‘Judge Sybil Rich-
ards has retired and is unavailable to provide a deci-
sion.’’
Practice Book § 64-1 (a) mandates, inter alia, that the
judicial authority ‘‘state its decision either orally or in
writing’’ when ‘‘making any . . . rulings that constitute
a final judgment for purposes of appeal under Section
61-1,7 including those that do not terminate the proceed-
ings. The court’s decision shall encompass its conclu-
sion as to each claim of law raised by the parties and
865–66, 977 A.2d 738 (2009) (declining to review appellant’s claim challenging
trial court’s denial of motion for articulation filed prior to appeal). Even if
we were to consider the plaintiff’s claim, however, the claim would be
without merit because, as we conclude herein, the court’s failure to issue
an oral or written statement of decision does not preclude our review of
the plaintiff’s claims on the merits.
7
Practice Book § 61-1 provides: ‘‘An aggrieved party may appeal from a
final judgment, except as otherwise provided by law.’’
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Duclos v. Hayes

the factual basis therefor. If oral, the decision shall be
recorded by an official court reporter or court recording
monitor, and, if there is an appeal, the trial court shall
create a memorandum of decision for use in the appeal
by ordering a transcript of the portion of the proceed-
ings in which it stated its oral decision. The transcript
of the decision shall be signed by the trial judge and
filed with the clerk of the trial court. . . .’’8 (Footnote
added.)

Practice Book § 64-1 (b) provides: ‘‘If the trial judge
fails to file a memorandum of decision or sign a tran-
script of the oral decision in any case covered by subsec-
tion (a), the appellant may file with the appellate clerk a
notice that the decision has not been filed in compliance
with subsection (a). The notice shall specify the trial
judge involved and the date of the ruling for which no
memorandum of decision was filed. The appellate clerk
shall promptly notify the trial judge of the filing of the
appeal and the notice. The trial court shall thereafter
8
Practice Book § 6-1 (a), the Superior Court counterpart to Practice Book
§ 64-1 (a), similarly mandates that ‘‘[t]he judicial authority shall state its
decision either orally or in writing’’ when ‘‘making any . . . rulings that
constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal under General Statutes
§ 52-263, including those that do not terminate the proceedings. The judicial
authority’s decision shall encompass its conclusion as to each claim of law
raised by the parties and the factual basis therefor. If oral, the decision shall
be recorded by an official court reporter or court recording monitor and,
if there is an appeal, the trial judge shall create a memorandum of decision
for use in the appeal by ordering a transcript of the portion of the proceedings
in which it stated its oral decision. The transcript of the decision shall be
signed by the trial judge and filed in the trial court clerk’s office.’’
General Statutes § 52-263 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon the trial of all
matters of fact in any cause or action in the Superior Court, whether to the
court or jury, or before any judge thereof when the jurisdiction of any action
or proceeding is vested in him, if either party is aggrieved by the decision
of the court or judge upon any question or questions of law arising in the
trial, including the denial of a motion to set aside a verdict, he may appeal
to the court having jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court or of
such judge, or from the decision of the court granting a motion to set aside
a verdict . . . .’’
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Duclos v. Hayes

comply with subsection (a).’’ This court has explained
that the purpose of Practice Book § 64-1 is ‘‘to help
create an adequate record for appellate review.’’ Russo
v. Thornton, 217 Conn. App. 553, 570 n.22, 290 A.3d
387, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 921, 291 A.3d 608 (2023);
see also LaBossiere v. Jones, 117 Conn. App. 211, 215–
16, 979 A.2d 522 (2009). Practice Book § 64-1 also may
serve to reveal whether (1) some controlling decision
or principle of law has been overlooked, (2) there has
been a misapprehension of facts, or (3) the court did
not address a claim of law raised by the movant. See
Practice Book § 11-11.9 The decision contemplated by
Practice Book § 64-1 also may aid the parties in their
decision-making as to how to proceed with the litigation
(or any resolution thereof). Simply put, a trial judge
who fails to comply with this obligation when required,
and certainly when granting a motion for summary judg-
ment, does a disservice to the parties and any reviewing
court.
In the present action, the trial court erred in failing
to provide an oral or written statement of decision
containing ‘‘its conclusion as to each claim of law raised
by the parties and the factual basis therefor,’’ as
required by Practice Book § 64-1 (a).10 Nevertheless, the
9
Practice Book § 11-11 provides: ‘‘Any motions which would, pursuant
to Section 63-1, delay the commencement of the appeal period, and any
motions which, pursuant to Section 63-1, would toll the appeal period and
cause it to begin again, shall be filed simultaneously insofar as such filing
is possible, and shall be considered by the judge who rendered the underlying
judgment or decision. The party filing any such motion shall set forth the
judgment or decision which is the subject of the motion, the name of the
judge who rendered it, the specific grounds upon which the party relies,
and shall indicate on the bottom of the first page of the motion that such
motion is a Section 11-11 motion. The foregoing applies to motions to reargue
decisions that are final judgments for purposes of appeal, but shall not apply
to motions under Sections 16-35, 17-2A and 11-12.’’
10
In her appellate brief, the defendant appears to argue that the plaintiff
has failed to present this court with an adequate record for review because
the plaintiff delayed the filing of her Practice Book § 64-1 (b) notice. We
note that § 64-1 (b) does not set forth a deadline for the filing of such notice.
See Practice Book § 64-1 (b). In any event, the plaintiff filed this appeal on
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Duclos v. Hayes

trial court’s noncompliance with this rule of practice
does not preclude our consideration of the plaintiff’s
claims on the merits because our review is plenary; see
part II of this opinion; and the precise legal analysis
undertaken by the trial court is not essential to this
court’s review of the issues on appeal.11 See DAB Three,
LLC v. Fitzpatrick, 215 Conn. App. 835, 844 n.10, 283
A.3d 1048 (2022) (absence of memorandum of decision
or transcript signed by trial court did not preclude
reviewing court’s consideration of appeal because, inter
alia, ‘‘our standard of review is plenary, and the precise
legal analysis undertaken by the trial court is not essen-
tial to [this court’s] consideration of the issue on appeal’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 345
Conn. 971, 286 A.3d 907 (2023); cf. Claude v. Claude,
143 Conn. App. 307, 309–12, 68 A.3d 1204 (2013) (under
‘‘unique circumstances’’ of case, reversing denial of
plaintiff’s motion to open judgment of nonsuit, which
was subject to abuse of discretion standard of review,
and remanding case for new hearing on motion when
trial judge (1) summarily denied motion, (2) did not file
memorandum of decision following plaintiff’s § 64-1 (b)
notice, and (3) retired before complying with order
issued by this court requiring compliance with § 64-1).
In short, the trial judge’s unavailability as a result of her
retirement, the plenary standard of review applicable
to this appeal, the fact that there is an adequate record
for our plenary review, and the interests of judicial
economy and fairness to the parties prompt us to pro-
ceed with our consideration of the plaintiff’s claims on
the merits.
August 21, 2023, and filed her § 64-1 (b) notice sixteen days later, on Septem-
ber 6, 2023. Thus, insofar as the defendant asserts dilatory conduct on the
part of the plaintiff, we reject that assertion.
11
We note that, during oral argument before this court, both parties agreed
that we could proceed to resolve the merits of the appeal in lieu of a remand
for reconsideration of the defendant’s motion by a different trial judge.
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II
The plaintiff next claims that the trial court improp-
erly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment because genuine issues of material fact existed
as to whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff. We reject this claim.12
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and
legal principles relevant to an appeal from summary
judgment. ‘‘The standard of review of a trial court’s
decision granting summary judgment is well estab-
lished. Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary
judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. . . . The courts are in entire
agreement that the moving party . . . has the burden
of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all
the material facts . . . . When documents submitted
in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to
establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact,
the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit docu-
ments establishing the existence of such an issue. . . .
Once the moving party has met its burden, however,
the [nonmoving] party must present evidence that dem-
onstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.
. . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment is plenary.’’
12
The plaintiff also contends that the summary judgment was improper
because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether (1) the alleged
defective condition existed on the portion of the premises at issue and (2)
the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the alleged defective
condition. Because we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff,
we need not resolve these claims.
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Duclos v. Hayes

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Flanigan,
201 Conn. App. 411, 422–23, 243 A.3d 333, cert. denied,
336 Conn. 901, 242 A.3d 711 (2020). ‘‘A material fact is
a fact that will make a difference in the result of the
case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fiorelli v.
Gorsky, 120 Conn. App. 298, 305, 991 A.2d 1105, cert.
denied, 298 Conn. 933, 10 A.3d 517 (2010).
The plaintiff brought this negligence action sounding
in premises liability. ‘‘In a negligence action, the plaintiff
must meet all of the essential elements of the tort in
order to prevail. These elements are: duty; breach of
that duty; causation; and actual injury.’’ LaFlamme v.
Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 251, 802 A.2d 63 (2002). More-
over, ‘‘to succeed in a traditional negligence action that
is based on premises liability, the plaintiff must prove
(1) the existence of a defect, (2) that the defendant
knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known about the defect and (3) that such defect had
existed for such a length of time that the [defendant]
should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have discov-
ered it in time to remedy it.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Hill v. OSJ of Bloomfield, LLC, 200 Conn.
App. 149, 154–55, 239 A.3d 345 (2020).
With respect to the element of duty, it is well estab-
lished that ‘‘[t]he existence of a duty is a question of
law and only if such a duty is found to exist does
the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant
[breached] that duty in the particular situation at hand.
. . . If a court determines, as a matter of law, that a
defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff can-
not recover in negligence from the defendant. . . .
Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships between
individuals, made after the fact, and imperative to a
negligence cause of action. The nature of the duty, and
the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined
by the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the
individual.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
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Duclos v. Hayes

omitted.) Demond v. Project Service, LLC, 331 Conn.
816, 834, 208 A.3d 626 (2019).
Generally, ‘‘[t]he test for the existence of a legal duty
of care entails (1) a determination of whether an ordi-
nary person in the defendant’s position, knowing what
the defendant knew or should have known, would antic-
ipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered
was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis
of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant’s
responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend
to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in
the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Canniz-
zaro v. Marinyak, 312 Conn. 361, 366, 93 A.3d 584
(2014). ‘‘The general rule regarding premises liability
in the landlord-tenant context is that landlords owe a
duty of reasonable care as to those parts of the property
over which they have retained control . . . . [L]and-
lords [however] generally [do] not have a duty to keep
in repair any portion of the premises leased to and in
the exclusive possession and control of the tenant.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baldwin v. Curtis,
105 Conn. App. 844, 848–49, 939 A.2d 1249 (2008). ‘‘Thus,
the dispositive issue in deciding whether a duty exists
is whether the [defendant] has any right to possession
and control of the property. . . . Retention of control
is essentially a matter of intention to be determined in
the light of all the significant circumstances. . . . The
word control has no legal or technical meaning distinct
from that given in its popular acceptation . . . and
refers to the power or authority to manage, superintend,
direct or oversee.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Sweeney v. Friends of Hammonasset, 140 Conn. App.
40, 50, 58 A.3d 293 (2013). ‘‘[P]ossession cannot be fairly
construed as anything short of the exercise of dominion
and control similar to and in substitution for that which
ordinarily would be exerted by the owner in posses-
sion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Silano v.
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14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Duclos v. Hayes

Cumberland Farms, Inc., 85 Conn. App. 450, 454, 857
A.2d 439 (2004).
As stated previously, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged
that ‘‘there existed a defective, unsafe, dangerous, and/
or hazardous condition in that there were improper,
damaged, and/or neglected lighting fixtures installed
on or about the exterior of said premises, which failed
to sufficiently illuminate the external stairway of the
premises . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Although the
plaintiff frames on appeal the issue of duty in general
terms of possession and control of the front porch area
containing the lighting fixture at issue, we distill the
plaintiff’s allegations regarding duty into the following
two parts: (1) whether the defendant had a duty to
maintain a functioning lighting fixture in the ceiling
above the external entryway; and (2) whether the defen-
dant had a duty of assuring actual illumination of that
fixture. See Pergament v. Green, 32 Conn. App. 644,
650, 630 A.2d 615 (‘‘A fundamental tenet in our law is
that the plaintiff’s complaint defines the dimensions of
the issues to be litigated. [T]he right of a plaintiff to
recover is limited to the allegations of [her] complaint.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 228
Conn. 903, 634 A.2d 296 (1993). We address these in turn.
First, to the extent that the complaint alleged that
the lighting fixture was damaged or neglected, it is
undisputed that a lighting fixture was installed and that
it was operational at all relevant times, and, therefore,
we need not reach the issue of whether the defendant
had a duty to install and maintain a functioning lighting
fixture in the ceiling above the front external entryway.
In her affidavit in support of her motion for summary
judgment, the defendant averred that the lighting fixture
‘‘at all times was operational, in good repair, and capa-
ble of providing adequate illumination of the [external]
entryway to . . . Bell’s first floor apartment’’ and ‘‘was
at no time during [her] ownership of [the premises]
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Duclos v. Hayes

inoperable, damaged or neglected.’’ In support of her
motion, the defendant also attached a transcript excerpt
from the deposition of the plaintiff, which included,
inter alia, the following colloquy between the defen-
dant’s attorney and the plaintiff:
‘‘Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether or not
that light was functional?
‘‘A. No, I do not.
***
‘‘Q. Did you ever ask [Bell] whether the light on the
porch worked?
‘‘A. No.
‘‘Q. So you don’t have any knowledge of whether or
not it was a working light bulb in that light?
‘‘A. I had no idea.
‘‘Q. And he never said anything to you about whether
the light worked?
‘‘A. No.’’
Second, concerning whether the defendant had a duty
of actual illumination of that fixture, the defendant
averred in her affidavit that ‘‘Bell had exclusive control
over whether the light . . . was activated to provide
light to the entry area’’ and ‘‘[t]hat at all times during
the tenancy of . . . Bell he paid utilities, including elec-
tricity for the first floor apartment . . . and had the
ability to light the [external] entryway area at any time
he chose to do so.’’
Having properly framed the issue in two parts, we
conclude that the defendant satisfied her burden, as
the moving party, of demonstrating that the lighting
fixture above the external entryway was, at all relevant
times, not damaged or neglected and that Bell retained
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Duclos v. Hayes

exclusive possession and control of the light switch that
operated the lighting fixture, as it was located inside
of his demised apartment. These evidentiary submis-
sions by the defendant were sufficient to meet her bur-
den of establishing that no genuine issue of material
fact exists as to possession and control of the light
switch and, therefore, she did not owe a duty to the
plaintiff.
We further conclude that, once the burden had shifted
to her, the plaintiff did not ‘‘present evidence that dem-
onstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Flanigan,
supra, 201 Conn. App. 423. As previously stated in this
opinion, the sole evidence provided by the plaintiff in
opposing the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
was the lease agreement, which the defendant also had
submitted. The plaintiff argues that, because the lease
agreement ‘‘only identifies the demised premises as the
‘[1st] floor’ and does not more particularly or specifi-
cally define, delineate, describe, or identify the demised
premises,’’ there is a genuine issue of material fact as
to who retained possession and control of the external
entryway. The plaintiff also contends that ‘‘the lease
[agreement] does not provide or indicate that the front
porch area outside the apartment was part of the first
floor nor does it provide that the lighting on the front
porch area was under [Bell’s] control and his responsi-
bility.’’ Instead, in the plaintiff’s view, the fact that para-
graph 21 of the lease agreement provides that ‘‘[Bell]
will not block any of the sidewalks, hallways, doorways,
or decks (front or back) with anything and [Bell] will not
use them except to come and go from [his] residence,’’
demonstrates that the front porch area was not part of
the demised premises but rather a common area within
the defendant’s possession and control because the
lease agreement directed what could be done with such
area by Bell.
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0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
Duclos v. Hayes

Insofar as the plaintiff focuses her attention on pos-
session and control of the front exterior entryway con-
taining the allegedly defective lighting fixture, the plain-
tiff misses the mark. As we have explained, the issue
here, properly framed, is whether a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to possession and control of the
illumination of the lighting fixture itself. The plaintiff
adduced no evidence to rebut the defendant’s evidence
demonstrating that whether the lighting fixture was
activated was in the exclusive control of Bell, rather
than the defendant.13
We acknowledge that, ‘‘if the terms of control are
not express between the parties, the question of who
retains control over a specific part of the property is
an issue of fact and a matter of intent that can be
determined only in light of all the relevant circum-
stances.’’ LaFlamme v. Dallessio, supra, 261 Conn. 257.
The issue with the plaintiff’s reliance on this principle,
in conjunction with the fact that the lease agreement
does not definitively express that Bell was in possession
and control of the external entryway, is that there is
no factual dispute that the light switch was located
inside Bell’s apartment.
In sum, we conclude that there is no genuine issue
of material fact that the defendant did not exercise
possession and control of the illumination of the other-
wise operational lighting fixture in the front exterior
entryway and, therefore, did not owe a duty of care to
13
To the extent that the plaintiff suggests that the defendant had a duty
to install a lighting fixture that turned on automatically when it became
dark or with motion, rather than one that was operated by a light switch
inside of Bell’s apartment, we reject this notion. The plaintiff has cited no
legal authority or evidentiary submission (e.g., a contractual obligation, a
building or housing code provision, or other legislative fiat) to support a
contention that the defendant had a duty to install sensored or timed exterior
lighting, and we decline to impose such a duty, as a matter of law, on the
defendant.
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Duclos v. Hayes

the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court properly rendered
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.