Pearlman v. Gervolino

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
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2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Pearlman v. Gervolino

CHERYL L. PEARLMAN v. DOUGLAS GERVOLINO
(AC 47514)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff landlord appealed from the trial court’s judgment with respect
to its award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant tenant on the
count of his counterclaim alleging violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) in connection with the plaintiff’s
handling of his security deposit. The plaintiff claimed that the court improp-
erly awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and costs for matters not author-
ized under CUTPA. Held:

The trial court abused its discretion in calculating the amount of attorney’s
fees and costs the defendant was entitled to recover, as pursuant to the
statute (§ 42-110g (d)) providing for an award of attorney’s fees and costs
under CUTPA, such fees and costs are limited to work reasonably performed
by an attorney related to the prosecution of a CUTPA claim and, on review
of the defendant’s affidavit, his request for attorney’s fees included fees for
matters unrelated thereto.
Argued April 16—officially released July 29, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Danbury, where the
defendant filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the case was
tried to the court, Shaban, J.; judgment in part for the
plaintiff on the complaint and judgment in part for the
defendant on the counterclaim; subsequently, the court
granted the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and
denied the plaintiff’s motion to reargue, and the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Cheryl L. Pearlman, self-represented, the appellant
(plaintiff).
Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. The self-represented plaintiff, Cheryl
L. Pearlman, appeals from the judgment of the trial
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Pearlman v. Gervolino

court awarding the defendant, Douglas Gervolino, attor-
ney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-
110a et seq.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the
court improperly awarded the defendant attorney’s fees
and costs not authorized under CUTPA. Specifically,
the plaintiff claims that the court’s award of attorney’s
fees was not limited to those fees associated with the
defendant’s CUTPA claim.2 We agree and, accordingly,
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the
case for a new hearing on the defendant’s motion for
attorney’s fees.3
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to the plaintiff’s appeal.
On July 19, 2022, the defendant entered into a written
lease with the plaintiff for the use and occupancy of
130 Head of Meadow Road in Newtown (premises) from
August 1, 2022, through May 31, 2023, at a rate of $3700
per month. The defendant paid a $7400 security deposit
to the plaintiff to secure the lease. ‘‘Not long after taking
occupancy, problems arose between the parties.’’ The
defendant ‘‘claimed that the premises was unfit for
human habitation and, on that basis, withheld rent for
the . . . months of . . . September and October,
2022.’’ Consequently, the plaintiff commenced a sum-
mary process action seeking possession of the prem-
ises. On October 28, 2022, the court in that action ren-
dered judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff,
1
Pursuant to CUTPA, ‘‘[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce.’’ General Statutes § 42-110b (a).
Attorney’s fees may be awarded for a violation of CUTPA pursuant to
General Statutes § 42-110g (d).
2
The defendant did not file a brief in this appeal. We, therefore, have
considered this appeal on the basis of the record, the plaintiff’s appellate
brief, and the plaintiff’s oral argument before this court.
3
In light of our disposition, we need not address the plaintiff’s additional
claim that the trial court erred by denying her motion to reargue the award
of attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Glory Chapel International Cathedral v. Phila-
delphia Indemnity Ins. Co., 224 Conn. App. 501, 517 n.8, 313 A.3d 1273
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Pearlman v. Gervolino

and the defendant subsequently vacated the premises.
The two months of unpaid rent, however, remained
outstanding, and the plaintiff, in turn, refused the defen-
dant’s request for the return of his security deposit.

Thereafter, on November 23, 2022, the plaintiff com-
menced the underlying action against the defendant,
alleging, inter alia, breach of contract for nonpayment
of rent. The defendant, in turn, filed an answer, special
defenses, and a five count counterclaim. Pertinent to
this appeal, count two of the counterclaim alleged that
the plaintiff failed to place the defendant’s security
deposit into an escrow account in violation of General
Statutes § 47a-21 (h),4 and count five of the counter-
claim alleged multiple violations5 of CUTPA.6 The mat-
ter was tried before the court, Shaban, J., on July 12,
(2024); Doe v. West Hartford, 168 Conn. App. 354, 359 n.5, 147 A.3d 1083
(2016), aff’d, 328 Conn. 172, 177 A.3d 1128 (2018).
4
General Statutes § 47a-21 (h) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) Each landlord
shall immediately deposit the entire amount of any security deposit received
by such landlord from each tenant into one or more escrow accounts estab-
lished or maintained in a financial institution for the benefit of each tenant.
Each landlord shall maintain each such account as escrow agent and shall
not withdraw funds from such account . . . .
(4) (A) The landlord shall provide each tenant with a written notice stating
the amount held for the benefit of the tenant and the name and address of
the financial institution at which the tenant’s security deposit is being held
not later than thirty days after the landlord receives a security deposit from
the tenant or the tenant’s previous landlord or transfers the security deposit
to another financial institution or escrow account. . . .’’
5
Specifically, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s violation of § 47a-
21 (h), as set forth in count two of the counterclaim, constituted a violation
of CUTPA. The remaining CUTPA violations alleged in count five of the
counterclaim consisted of several alleged violations of § 47a-21 (d) related
to the plaintiff’s handling of the security deposit, the plaintiff’s unauthorized
towing of the defendant’s car, and the plaintiff’s ‘‘failure to provide smoke
alarms’’ and ‘‘to maintain the premises in a condition fit for habitation.’’
6
The remaining counts of the counterclaim alleged breach of contract
related to the plaintiff’s handling of the security deposit (count one), harass-
ment and unlawful entry into premises (count three), and trespass to chattel
on the basis of the plaintiff having the defendant’s car towed from the
premises (count four).
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Pearlman v. Gervolino

2023. On November 9, 2023, the court issued a memo-
randum of decision in which it found in favor of the
plaintiff on her claim of breach of contract for nonpay-
ment of rent and in favor of the defendant on counts
two and five of his counterclaim.7 With respect to count
two of the counterclaim, the court found that the plain-
tiff, ‘‘by admission through her pleading and her own
testimony,’’ failed to deposit the defendant’s security
deposit into an escrow account, as required by statute.
With respect to count five, the court found that the
plaintiff’s violations of § 47a-21 (h) constituted viola-
tions of CUTPA.8 Specifically, with respect to the
CUTPA violations, the court relied on the plaintiff’s
failure to place the security deposit into an escrow
account in violation of § 47a-21 (h) (1),9 and the plain-
tiff’s failure to provide the defendant with certain infor-
mation regarding his security deposit in violation of
§ 47a-21 (h) (4) (A).10 The court awarded the defendant
$500 in punitive damages on the CUTPA count of the
counterclaim.11 In addition, the court found that, ‘‘[b]ecause
7
In addition, the court found in favor of the defendant on count four of
the counterclaim and in favor of the plaintiff on counts one and three of
the counterclaim. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
8
The court found in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the remaining
CUTPA violations alleged in count five of the defendant’s counterclaim. See
footnote 5 of this opinion.
9
The court reasoned: ‘‘[T]his alone may not constitute a CUTPA violation.
However, coupled with the fact [that] the plaintiff withdrew the deposit
funds that were to have been escrowed for the defendant and then used
them for her own personal expenses, the court finds this constitutes both
a [statutory] violation . . . as well as a CUTPA violation. This was more
than a negligent failure to comply with the statute. It was an unscrupulous,
wilful and voluntary act to use the funds for her own personal expenses
outside of the enumerated uses authorized by the statute. . . . Simply put,
the actions of the plaintiff were unfair to the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.)
10
The court reasoned: ‘‘The failure to provide the information was an
unfair act with respect to the defendant as the funds belonged to him and
he had a right to know where they were being held. By failing to reveal the
information, the plaintiff effectively hid from the defendant her use of the
funds for her personal benefit.’’
11
On appeal, the plaintiff does not challenge the court’s award of puni-
tive damages.
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Pearlman v. Gervolino

the defendant has had to prosecute his counterclaim
to enforce his claims of statutory violations relative
to his security deposit, an award of attorney’s fees is
appropriate. The defendant may pursue such an award
pursuant to Practice Book § 11-2112 if he so [chooses].’’
(Footnote added.)
On November 13, 2023, the defendant filed a motion
for attorney’s fees pursuant to CUTPA. The defendant
submitted with his motion an affidavit of legal fees
(affidavit), which contained an itemized billing state-
ment of counsel’s services.13 The affidavit indicated that
the defendant’s counsel charged $450 per hour, and he
expended 25.9 hours on the defendant’s case, thereby
incurring $11,655 in fees and $369.51 in costs. On
November 28, 2023, the plaintiff filed an objection to
the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees, in which she
argued, inter alia: ‘‘CUTPA allows for [the award of]
‘reasonable [attorney’s] fees’ . . . [which] logically
includes only charges associated with [the CUTPA
claim], i.e., the claimed withholding of the banking/
deposit information for the security deposit, but not
for other matters and claims not associated with [the
CUTPA] claim. The fees requested [by the defendant]
include time expended to respond to all claims by the
plaintiff as well as [all] five counterclaims submitted
by the defendant,’’ several of which ‘‘concern other
matters and . . . [on] which the defendant [did not
prevail].’’
A hearing on the defendant’s motion for attorney’s
fees was scheduled for December 18, 2023, and was
12
Practice Book § 11-21 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[m]otions for attor-
ney’s fees shall be filed with the trial court within thirty days following the
date on which the final judgment of the trial court was rendered. . . .’’
13
During the hearing on the motion for attorney’s fees, the defendant’s
counsel indicated to the court that the affidavit of attorney’s fees that he
filed with the court contained ‘‘the exact billing records that [he gave]
to [the defendant] . . . except . . . in the form of an affidavit instead of
an invoice.’’
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Pearlman v. Gervolino

continued to January 23, 2024, by request of the plaintiff.
On the morning of the January 23, 2024 hearing, the
plaintiff filed a motion for an additional continuance
on the basis that she was ‘‘out of state.’’ The court
denied her request for an additional continuance,14 and
the hearing on the defendant’s motion for attorney’s
fees proceeded in the plaintiff’s absence. Following the
hearing, the court issued a written order indicating that
‘‘[t]he defendant appeared at the hearing, and the court
considered the defendant’s motion for [attorney’s] fees
. . . [and] also reviewed the plaintiff’s objection [to the
defendant’s motion] and had defense counsel address
any specific objections raised [therein].’’ The court,
‘‘[h]aving reviewed the bases of the defendant’s motion
. . . [found that] the defendant has set forth a legal
basis for his claim for attorney’s fees and [costs] in the
defense of the plaintiff’s action and the prosecution of
his counterclaims.’’ (Citations omitted.) Accordingly,
the court awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and
costs in the amount of $12,024.51, which included all
the fees and costs set forth in the defendant’s affidavit.
On February 14, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to
reargue the award of attorney’s fees, asserting, inter
alia, that ‘‘[t]he court abused its discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees to the defendant [related to] counts [for]
which [he is] not entitled’’ to recover fees. The court
denied the plaintiff’s motion to reargue. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court abused
its discretion in ‘‘awarding attorney’s fees and costs
14
In a written order issued on the same date, the court stated: ‘‘[The]
plaintiff was previously granted a continuance on December 12, 2023. Fur-
ther, notice of the today’s hearing was issued on December 13, 2023, yet
the plaintiff waited until the day of the hearing to move for an additional
continuance. As noted on the judicial form for continuances, such motions
are to be made at least three days before the scheduled event. Lastly, other
than indicating that she is out of state, the movant provides no reason as
to how and why she is prevented from attending the hearing.’’
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Pearlman v. Gervolino

not authorized under CUTPA.’’ Specifically, the plaintiff
argues that an award of attorney’s fees under CUTPA
is limited to those fees related to successful CUTPA
claims, and that the court, ‘‘[b]y indiscriminately award-
ing all fees requested by the defendant that were
included [in his affidavit],’’ improperly calculated the
amount of fees and costs the defendant was entitled to
recover under CUTPA.15 We agree.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review
and the legal principles relevant to the plaintiff’s claim.
‘‘[W]e review an award of attorney’s fees under the
abuse of discretion standard of review. This standard
applies to the amount of fees awarded . . . and also
to the trial court’s determination of the factual predicate
justifying the award. . . . Under the abuse of discre-
tion standard of review, [w]e will make every reason-
able presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s
ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discre-
tion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited
to the questions of whether the trial court correctly
applied the law and reasonably could have reached
the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Noyes v. Antiques at Pompey Hollow, LLC,
144 Conn. App. 582, 597, 73 A.3d 794 (2013).
General Statutes § 42-110g (d) provides in relevant
part that ‘‘[i]n any action brought by a person under
[CUTPA], the court may award . . . costs and reason-
able attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably per-
formed by an attorney . . . .’’ This court has held that
§ 42-110g (d) ‘‘relates solely to claims related to the
prosecution of a CUTPA claim and not to all claims.’’
Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, 57 Conn. App. 189,
200, 752 A.2d 1098 (2000). Accordingly, ‘‘[i]n the absence
of abuse of discretion, the court can award attorney’s
15
The plaintiff has not challenged the reasonableness of the hourly rate
charged by the defendant’s counsel.
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Pearlman v. Gervolino

fees under CUTPA only for those expenses that were
related to the prosecution of a CUTPA claim.’’ Id.; see
also Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 Conn.
App. 589, 626 n.26, 43 A.3d 722, cert. denied, 305 Conn.
920, 47 A.3d 389 (2012), and cert. denied, 305 Conn.
920, 47 A.3d 389 (2012).
In Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, supra, 57 Conn.
App. 192, the plaintiff brought an action against the
defendants, Laverne Brown and the city of Hartford,
for breach of two separate home improvement con-
tracts, one private contract with Brown, and the other
contract with the city. Brown, in turn, asserted a coun-
terclaim consisting of three counts, one of which alleged
a violation of CUTPA. Id., 193. Brown prevailed on her
CUTPA counterclaim and moved for an award of attor-
ney’s fees, upon which ‘‘the court ordered Brown’s
counsel to provide an itemized account of the time and
expense required to litigate the CUTPA claim.’’ Id., 200.
Brown subsequently submitted a bill totaling $19,413.50,
which the trial court awarded to Brown as attorney’s
fees under CUTPA. Id. On cross appeal to this court,
Brown claimed that the trial court improperly calcu-
lated her attorney’s fees. Specifically, she contended
that, pursuant to § 42-110g (d), ‘‘she [was] entitled to all
attorney’s fees incurred in the defense of [the plaintiff’s]
action and the prosecution of her counterclaim.’’
(Emphasis in original.) Id. This court disagreed and
concluded that the trial court properly limited its award
of attorney’s fees solely to the fees Brown ‘‘incurred in
the pursuit of her CUTPA claim’’ and properly excluded
the ‘‘fees [related to] her other counterclaims.’’ Id.
In Heller v. D. W. Fish Realty Co., 93 Conn. App. 727,
734–36, 890 A.2d 113 (2006), this court further clarified
the scope of attorney’s fees recoverable under CUTPA.
In that case, the plaintiffs brought an action against
the defendant for breach of contract, negligence, and
violations of CUTPA. Id., 730. After prevailing on all
claims, the plaintiffs sought to recover attorney’s fees
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Pearlman v. Gervolino

under CUTPA. Id., 734. In response, the trial court
‘‘ordered the plaintiffs to submit evidence as to the
portion of the fees requested specifically related to the
CUTPA [claim],’’ which the plaintiffs were unable to do
because of the close factual connection between the
claims. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 735.
Because the plaintiffs were unable to apportion the
fees, the trial court, relying on Jacques All Trades Corp.,
denied their motion for attorney’s fees. Id. In reversing
the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees, this court
distinguished cases in which the factual basis of a
CUTPA claim is integral to, rather than separate from,
the facts underlying other claims. Specifically, this court
held that the trial court improperly relied on Jacques
All Trades Corp. in ordering the plaintiffs to apportion
their attorney’s fees among their claims because, ‘‘[i]n
the present case, the plaintiffs’ breach of contract and
negligence claims were related to their CUTPA claim
because they depended on the same facts.’’ Id., 735; see
also Taylor v. King, 121 Conn. App. 105, 131, 994 A.2d
330 (2010) (‘‘when the facts underlying the CUTPA
claim are indistinguishable from those facts relating to
other claims, § 42-110g (d) encompasses claims related
to the prosecution of a CUTPA claim . . . not only one
claim explicitly labeled as a CUTPA claim’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, in the present case, the defendant’s award of
attorney’s fees pursuant to § 42-110g (d) was limited to
those fees related to the prosecution of the CUTPA
count of his counterclaim. Our review of the defendant’s
affidavit, however, reveals that his request for attorney’s
fees was not limited to only those fees. For example,
some of the fees listed therein were incurred by coun-
sel’s ‘‘[r]eview of [the summary process] case’’ and
‘‘[r]esearch [of] mortgage and federal eviction morato-
rium’’ and the filing of an unsuccessful motion to open
in the summary process action. These fees appear to
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Pearlman v. Gervolino

be wholly unrelated to the defendant’s CUTPA claim.
The affidavit also includes numerous fees related to
counsel’s review of the pleadings, filing and amending
of the counterclaim, and correspondence with the
defendant and opposing party. These itemized entries,
however, do not apportion the corresponding fees
among the defendant’s various counts of his counter-
claim. And, although certain entries appear to relate
solely to the defendant’s CUTPA count of his counter-
claim,16 these services were billed in conjunction with
more general services relating to the entire litigation,
such as ‘‘trial preparation’’ and ‘‘[r]eview of new plead-
ings.’’ In calculating the defendant’s award of attorney’s
fees, however, the court included in its award all the
costs and fees set forth in the defendant’s affidavit.
Because the court did not limit its award of attorney’s
fees to those fees incurred on the defendant’s CUTPA
claim, but, rather, expressly awarded the defendant all
‘‘attorney’s fees and [costs incurred] in the defense of
the plaintiff’s action and the prosecution of his counter-
claims,’’ we conclude that the court abused its discre-
tion in calculating the amount of attorney’s fees and
costs the defendant was entitled to recover under
CUTPA.17
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for a new hearing on the defendant’s motion for attor-
ney’s fees.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
16
Namely, several itemized entries in the affidavit concern the defendant’s
objection to the plaintiff’s motion to strike the CUTPA count of the counter-
claim.
17
In the plaintiff’s brief to this court, she suggests that the trial court
‘‘sought to punish [her] by awarding additional fees to the defendant beyond
what was authorized by law’’ because she had failed to appear at the January
23, 2024 hearing. The record is devoid of any evidence to support the
plaintiff’s contention. We emphasize that ‘‘[t]he term abuse of discretion
does not imply a bad motive or wrong purpose but merely means that the
ruling appears to have been made on untenable grounds.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, 207 Conn. App.
707, 774, 264 A.3d 130, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911, 264 A.3d 94 (2021).

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
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2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Pearlman v. Gervolino

CHERYL L. PEARLMAN v. DOUGLAS GERVOLINO
(AC 47514)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff landlord appealed from the trial court’s judgment with respect
to its award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant tenant on the
count of his counterclaim alleging violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) in connection with the plaintiff’s
handling of his security deposit. The plaintiff claimed that the court improp-
erly awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and costs for matters not author-
ized under CUTPA. Held:

The trial court abused its discretion in calculating the amount of attorney’s
fees and costs the defendant was entitled to recover, as pursuant to the
statute (§ 42-110g (d)) providing for an award of attorney’s fees and costs
under CUTPA, such fees and costs are limited to work reasonably performed
by an attorney related to the prosecution of a CUTPA claim and, on review
of the defendant’s affidavit, his request for attorney’s fees included fees for
matters unrelated thereto.
Argued April 16—officially released July 29, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Danbury where the
defendant filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the case was
tried to the court, Shaban, J.; judgment in part for the
plaintiff on the complaint and judgment in part for the
defendant on the counterclaim; subsequently, the court
granted the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and
denied the plaintiff’s motion to reargue, and the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Cheryl L. Pearlman, self-represented, the appellant
(plaintiff).
Opinion

CRADLE, C. J. The self-represented plaintiff, Cheryl
L. Pearlman, appeals from the judgment of the trial
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Pearlman v. Gervolino

court awarding the defendant, Douglas Gervolino, attor-
ney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-
110a et seq.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the
court improperly awarded the defendant attorney’s fees
and costs not authorized under CUTPA. Specifically,
the plaintiff claims that the court’s award of attorney’s
fees was not limited to those fees associated with the
defendant’s CUTPA claim.2 We agree and, accordingly,
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the
case for a new hearing on the defendant’s motion for
attorney’s fees.3
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to the plaintiff’s appeal.
On July 19, 2022, the defendant entered into a written
lease with the plaintiff for the use and occupancy of
130 Head of Meadow Road in Newtown (premises) from
August 1, 2022, through May 31, 2023, at a rate of $3700
per month. The defendant paid a $7400 security deposit
to the plaintiff to secure the lease. ‘‘Not long after taking
occupancy, problems arose between the parties.’’ The
defendant ‘‘claimed that the premises was unfit for
human habitation and, on that basis, withheld rent for
the . . . months of . . . September and October,
2022.’’ Consequently, the plaintiff commenced a sum-
mary process action seeking possession of the prem-
ises. On October 28, 2022, the court in that action ren-
dered judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff,
1
Pursuant to CUTPA, ‘‘[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade or commerce.’’ General Statutes § 42-110b (a).
Attorney’s fees may be awarded for a violation of CUTPA pursuant to
General Statutes § 42-110g (d).
2
The defendant did not file a brief in this appeal. We, therefore, have
considered this appeal on the basis of the record, the plaintiff’s appellate
brief, and the plaintiff’s oral argument before this court.
3
In light of our disposition, we need not address the plaintiff’s additional
claim that the trial court erred by denying her motion to reargue the award
of attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Glory Chapel International Cathedral v. Phila-
delphia Indemnity Ins. Co., 224 Conn. App. 501, 517 n.8, 313 A.3d 1273
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and the defendant subsequently vacated the premises.
The two months of unpaid rent, however, remained
outstanding, and the plaintiff, in turn, refused the defen-
dant’s request for the return of his security deposit.

Thereafter, on November 23, 2022, the plaintiff com-
menced the underlying action against the defendant,
alleging, inter alia, breach of contract for nonpayment
of rent. The defendant, in turn, filed an answer, special
defenses, and a five count counterclaim. Pertinent to
this appeal, count two of the counterclaim alleged that
the plaintiff failed to place the defendant’s security
deposit into an escrow account in violation of General
Statutes § 47a-21 (h),4 and count five of the counter-
claim alleged multiple violations5 of CUTPA.6 The mat-
ter was tried before the court, Shaban, J., on July 12,
(2024); Doe v. West Hartford, 168 Conn. App. 354, 359 n.5, 147 A.3d 1083
(2016), aff’d, 328 Conn. 172, 177 A.3d 1128 (2018).
4
General Statutes § 47a-21 (h) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) Each landlord
shall immediately deposit the entire amount of any security deposit received
by such landlord from each tenant into one or more escrow accounts estab-
lished or maintained in a financial institution for the benefit of each tenant.
Each landlord shall maintain each such account as escrow agent and shall
not withdraw funds from such account . . . .
(4) (A) The landlord shall provide each tenant with a written notice stating
the amount held for the benefit of the tenant and the name and address of
the financial institution at which the tenant’s security deposit is being held
not later than thirty days after the landlord receives a security deposit from
the tenant or the tenant’s previous landlord or transfers the security deposit
to another financial institution or escrow account. . . .’’
5
Specifically, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s violation of § 47a-
21 (h), as set forth in count two of the counterclaim, constituted a violation
of CUTPA. The remaining CUTPA violations alleged in count five of the
counterclaim consisted of several alleged violations of § 47a-21 (d) related
to the plaintiff’s handling of the security deposit, the plaintiff’s unauthorized
towing of the defendant’s car, and the plaintiff’s ‘‘failure to provide smoke
alarms’’ and ‘‘to maintain the premises in a condition fit for habitation.’’
6
The remaining counts of the counterclaim alleged breach of contract
related to the plaintiff’s handling of the security deposit (count one), harass-
ment and unlawful entry into premises (count three), and trespass to chattel
on the basis of the plaintiff having the defendant’s car towed from the
premises (count four).
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2023. On November 9, 2023, the court issued a memo-
randum of decision in which it found in favor of the
plaintiff on her claim of breach of contract for nonpay-
ment of rent and in favor of the defendant on counts
two and five of his counterclaim.7 With respect to count
two of the counterclaim, the court found that the plain-
tiff, ‘‘by admission through her pleading and her own
testimony,’’ failed to deposit the defendant’s security
deposit into an escrow account, as required by statute.
With respect to count five, the court found that the
plaintiff’s violations of § 47a-21 (h) constituted viola-
tions of CUTPA.8 Specifically, with respect to the
CUTPA violations, the court relied on the plaintiff’s
failure to place the security deposit into an escrow
account in violation of § 47a-21 (h) (1),9 and the plain-
tiff’s failure to provide the defendant with certain infor-
mation regarding his security deposit in violation of
§ 47a-21 (h) (4) (A).10 The court awarded the defendant
$500 in punitive damages on the CUTPA count of the
counterclaim.11 In addition, the court found that, ‘‘[b]ecause
7
In addition, the court found in favor of the defendant on count four of
the counterclaim and in favor of the plaintiff on counts one and three of
the counterclaim. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
8
The court found in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the remaining
CUTPA violations alleged in count five of the defendant’s counterclaim. See
footnote 5 of this opinion.
9
The court reasoned: ‘‘[T]his alone may not constitute a CUTPA violation.
However, coupled with the fact [that] the plaintiff withdrew the deposit
funds that were to have been escrowed for the defendant and then used
them for her own personal expenses, the court finds this constitutes both
a [statutory] violation . . . as well as a CUTPA violation. This was more
than a negligent failure to comply with the statute. It was an unscrupulous,
wilful and voluntary act to use the funds for her own personal expenses
outside of the enumerated uses authorized by the statute. . . . Simply put,
the actions of the plaintiff were unfair to the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.)
10
The court reasoned: ‘‘The failure to provide the information was an
unfair act with respect to the defendant as the funds belonged to him and
he had a right to know where they were being held. By failing to reveal the
information, the plaintiff effectively hid from the defendant her use of the
funds for her personal benefit.’’
11
On appeal, the plaintiff does not challenge the court’s award of puni-
tive damages.
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the defendant has had to prosecute his counterclaim
to enforce his claims of statutory violations relative
to his security deposit, an award of attorney’s fees is
appropriate. The defendant may pursue such an award
pursuant to Practice Book § 11-2112 if he so [chooses].’’
(Footnote added.)
On November 13, 2023, the defendant filed a motion
for attorney’s fees pursuant to CUTPA. The defendant
submitted with his motion an affidavit of legal fees
(affidavit), which contained an itemized billing state-
ment of counsel’s services.13 The affidavit indicated that
the defendant’s counsel charged $450 per hour, and he
expended 25.9 hours on the defendant’s case, thereby
incurring $11,655 in fees and $369.51 in costs. On
November 28, 2023, the plaintiff filed an objection to
the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees, in which she
argued, inter alia: ‘‘CUTPA allows for [the award of]
‘reasonable [attorney’s] fees’ . . . [which] logically
includes only charges associated with [the CUTPA
claim], i.e., the claimed withholding of the banking/
deposit information for the security deposit, but not
for other matters and claims not associated with [the
CUTPA] claim. The fees requested [by the defendant]
include time expended to respond to all claims by the
plaintiff as well as [all] five counterclaims submitted
by the defendant,’’ several of which ‘‘concern other
matters and . . . [on] which the defendant [did not
prevail].’’
A hearing on the defendant’s motion for attorney’s
fees was scheduled for December 18, 2023, and was
12
Practice Book § 11-21 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[m]otions for attor-
ney’s fees shall be filed with the trial court within thirty days following the
date on which the final judgment of the trial court was rendered. . . .’’
13
During the hearing on the motion for attorney’s fees, the defendant’s
counsel indicated to the court that the affidavit of attorney’s fees that he
filed with the court contained ‘‘the exact billing records that [he gave]
to [the defendant] . . . except . . . in the form of an affidavit instead of
an invoice.’’
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continued to January 23, 2024, by request of the plaintiff.
On the morning of the January 23, 2024 hearing, the
plaintiff filed a motion for an additional continuance
on the basis that she was ‘‘out of state.’’ The court
denied her request for an additional continuance,14 and
the hearing on the defendant’s motion for attorney’s
fees proceeded in the plaintiff’s absence. Following the
hearing, the court issued a written order indicating that
‘‘[t]he defendant appeared at the hearing, and the court
considered the defendant’s motion for [attorney’s] fees
. . . [and] also reviewed the plaintiff’s objection [to the
defendant’s motion] and had defense counsel address
any specific objections raised [therein].’’ The court,
‘‘[h]aving reviewed the bases of the defendant’s motion
. . . [found that] the defendant has set forth a legal
basis for his claim for attorney’s fees and [costs] in the
defense of the plaintiff’s action and the prosecution of
his counterclaims.’’ (Citations omitted.) Accordingly,
the court awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and
costs in the amount of $12,024.51, which included all
the fees and costs set forth in the defendant’s affidavit.
On February 14, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to
reargue the award of attorney’s fees, asserting, inter
alia, that ‘‘[t]he court abused its discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees to the defendant [related to] counts [for]
which [he is] not entitled’’ to recover fees. The court
denied the plaintiff’s motion to reargue. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court abused
its discretion in ‘‘awarding attorney’s fees and costs
14
In a written order issued on the same date, the court stated: ‘‘[The]
plaintiff was previously granted a continuance on December 12, 2023. Fur-
ther, notice of the today’s hearing was issued on December 13, 2023, yet
the plaintiff waited until the day of the hearing to move for an additional
continuance. As noted on the judicial form for continuances, such motions
are to be made at least three days before the scheduled event. Lastly, other
than indicating that she is out of state, the movant provides no reason as
to how and why she is prevented from attending the hearing.’’
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not authorized under CUTPA.’’ Specifically, the plaintiff
argues that an award of attorney’s fees under CUTPA
is limited to those fees related to successful CUTPA
claims, and that the court, ‘‘[b]y indiscriminately award-
ing all fees requested by the defendant that were
included [in his affidavit],’’ improperly calculated the
amount of fees and costs the defendant was entitled to
recover under CUTPA.15 We agree.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review
and the legal principles relevant to the plaintiff’s claim.
‘‘[W]e review an award of attorney’s fees under the
abuse of discretion standard of review. This standard
applies to the amount of fees awarded . . . and also
to the trial court’s determination of the factual predicate
justifying the award. . . . Under the abuse of discre-
tion standard of review, [w]e will make every reason-
able presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s
ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discre-
tion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited
to the questions of whether the trial court correctly
applied the law and reasonably could have reached
the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Noyes v. Antiques at Pompey Hollow, LLC,
144 Conn. App. 582, 597, 73 A.3d 794 (2013).
General Statutes § 42-110g (d) provides in relevant
part that ‘‘[i]n any action brought by a person under
[CUTPA], the court may award . . . costs and reason-
able attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably per-
formed by an attorney . . . .’’ This court has held that
§ 42-110g (d) ‘‘relates solely to claims related to the
prosecution of a CUTPA claim and not to all claims.’’
Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, 57 Conn. App. 189,
200, 752 A.2d 1098 (2000). Accordingly, ‘‘[i]n the absence
of abuse of discretion, the court can award attorney’s
15
The plaintiff has not challenged the reasonableness of the hourly rate
charged by the defendant’s counsel.
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fees under CUTPA only for those expenses that were
related to the prosecution of a CUTPA claim.’’ Id.; see
also Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 Conn.
App. 589, 626 n.26, 43 A.3d 722, cert. denied, 305 Conn.
920, 47 A.3d 389 (2012), and cert. denied, 305 Conn.
920, 47 A.3d 389 (2012).
In Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, supra, 57 Conn.
App. 192, the plaintiff brought an action against the
defendants, Laverne Brown and the city of Hartford,
for breach of two separate home improvement con-
tracts, one private contract with Brown, and the other
contract with the city. Brown, in turn, asserted a coun-
terclaim consisting of three counts, one of which alleged
a violation of CUTPA. Id., 193. Brown prevailed on her
CUTPA counterclaim and moved for an award of attor-
ney’s fees, upon which ‘‘the court ordered Brown’s
counsel to provide an itemized account of the time and
expense required to litigate the CUTPA claim.’’ Id., 200.
Brown subsequently submitted a bill totaling $19,413.50,
which the trial court awarded to Brown as attorney’s
fees under CUTPA. Id. On cross appeal to this court,
Brown claimed that the trial court improperly calcu-
lated her attorney’s fees. Specifically, she contended
that, pursuant to § 42-110g (d), ‘‘she [was] entitled to all
attorney’s fees incurred in the defense of [the plaintiff’s]
action and the prosecution of her counterclaim.’’
(Emphasis in original.) Id. This court disagreed and
concluded that the trial court properly limited its award
of attorney’s fees solely to the fees Brown ‘‘incurred in
the pursuit of her CUTPA claim’’ and properly excluded
the ‘‘fees [related to] her other counterclaims.’’ Id.
In Heller v. D. W. Fish Realty Co., 93 Conn. App. 727,
734–36, 890 A.2d 113 (2006), this court further clarified
the scope of attorney’s fees recoverable under CUTPA.
In that case, the plaintiffs brought an action against
the defendant for breach of contract, negligence, and
violations of CUTPA. Id., 730. After prevailing on all
claims, the plaintiffs sought to recover attorney’s fees
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under CUTPA. Id., 734. In response, the trial court
‘‘ordered the plaintiffs to submit evidence as to the
portion of the fees requested specifically related to the
CUTPA [claim],’’ which the plaintiffs were unable to do
because of the close factual connection between the
claims. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 735.
Because the plaintiffs were unable to apportion the
fees, the trial court, relying on Jacques All Trades Corp.,
denied their motion for attorney’s fees. Id. In reversing
the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees, this court
distinguished cases in which the factual basis of a
CUTPA claim is integral to, rather than separate from,
the facts underlying other claims. Specifically, this court
held that the trial court improperly relied on Jacques
All Trades Corp. in ordering the plaintiffs to apportion
their attorney’s fees among their claims because, ‘‘[i]n
the present case, the plaintiffs’ breach of contract and
negligence claims were related to their CUTPA claim
because they depended on the same facts.’’ Id., 735; see
also Taylor v. King, 121 Conn. App. 105, 131, 994 A.2d
330 (2010) (‘‘when the facts underlying the CUTPA
claim are indistinguishable from those facts relating to
other claims, § 42-110g (d) encompasses claims related
to the prosecution of a CUTPA claim . . . not only one
claim explicitly labeled as a CUTPA claim’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, in the present case, the defendant’s award of
attorney’s fees pursuant to § 42-110g (d) was limited to
those fees related to the prosecution of the CUTPA
count of his counterclaim. Our review of the defendant’s
affidavit, however, reveals that his request for attorney’s
fees was not limited to only those fees. For example,
some of the fees listed therein were incurred by coun-
sel’s ‘‘[r]eview of [the summary process] case’’ and
‘‘[r]esearch [of] mortgage and federal eviction morato-
rium’’ and the filing of an unsuccessful motion to open
in the summary process action. These fees appear to
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be wholly unrelated to the defendant’s CUTPA claim.
The affidavit also includes numerous fees related to
counsel’s review of the pleadings, filing and amending
of the counterclaim, and correspondence with the
defendant and opposing party. These itemized entries,
however, do not apportion the corresponding fees
among the defendant’s various counts of his counter-
claim. And, although certain entries appear to relate
solely to the defendant’s CUTPA count of his counter-
claim,16 these services were billed in conjunction with
more general services relating to the entire litigation,
such as ‘‘trial preparation’’ and ‘‘[r]eview of new plead-
ings.’’ In calculating the defendant’s award of attorney’s
fees, however, the court included in its award all the
costs and fees set forth in the defendant’s affidavit.
Because the court did not limit its award of attorney’s
fees to those fees incurred on the defendant’s CUTPA
claim, but, rather, expressly awarded the defendant all
‘‘attorney’s fees and [costs incurred] in the defense of
the plaintiff’s action and the prosecution of his counter-
claims,’’ we conclude that the court abused its discre-
tion in calculating the amount of attorney’s fees and
costs the defendant was entitled to recover under
CUTPA.17
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for a new hearing on the defendant’s motion for attor-
ney’s fees.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
16
Namely, several itemized entries in the affidavit concern the defendant’s
objection to the plaintiff’s motion to strike the CUTPA count of the counter-
claim.
17
In the plaintiff’s brief to this court, she suggests that the trial court
‘‘sought to punish [her] by awarding additional fees to the defendant beyond
what was authorized by law’’ because she had failed to appear at the January
23, 2024 hearing. The record is devoid of any evidence to support the
plaintiff’s contention. We emphasize that ‘‘[t]he term abuse of discretion
does not imply a bad motive or wrong purpose but merely means that the
ruling appears to have been made on untenable grounds.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, 207 Conn. App.
707, 774, 264 A.3d 130, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911, 264 A.3d 94 (2021).