In re Dynastie D.

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In re Dynastie D.

IN RE DYNASTIE D.*
(AC 48218)
Alvord, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The minor child, who had been adjudicated neglected and committed to
the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families,
appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the petitioner’s motion
for the out-of-state placement of the child. The child claimed, inter alia, that
the court failed to follow the requirements of the statute ((Rev. to 2023)
§ 46b-129 (j) (4)) governing out-of-state placements by the petitioner. Held:
This court concluded that, in determining whether the petitioner has demon-
strated good cause for the out-of-state placement of a child pursuant to
§ 46b-129 (j) (4), the trial court should balance the expected well-being of
the child in the proposed out-of-state placement with that of the child were
he or she to remain in Connecticut, which is an independent determination
from the best interest of the child.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the petitioner
demonstrated good cause pursuant to § 46b-129 (j) (4) for the child’s place-
ment in Florida, as the court properly weighed relevant factors in its good
cause determination and the determination was adequately supported by
evidence in the record.
The trial court properly placed the burden of proof for good cause on the
petitioner as, despite the court’s isolated use of imprecise language in its oral
decision, the challenged language merely reflected the court’s assessment
of the evidence offered by the child to the court as part of its determination
of whether the petitioner had met its burden with respect to good cause,
and the single challenged sentence was not enough to overcome the pre-
sumption that the court knows and has applied the law correctly.
The trial court’s factual findings challenged by the child were not clearly
erroneous, as they were supported by evidence in the record, and there
was ample evidence in the record, not challenged by the child, supporting
the court’s ultimate conclusion that there was good cause to place the child
outside the state.
Argued April 14—officially released July 10, 2025**

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** July 10, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Dynastie D.

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to adjudicate the respondent parents’ minor child
neglected, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Stamford-Norwalk, Juvenile Matters, and
transferred to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Fairfield, Juvenile Matters, where the respondent
parents were defaulted; thereafter, the court, Skyers,
J., rendered judgment adjudicating the minor child
neglected and committing the minor child to the cus-
tody of the petitioner; subsequently, the court granted
the petitioner’s motion for the out-of-state placement
of the minor child, and the minor child appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Karen Oliver Damboise, assistant public defender,
for the appellant (minor child).
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom
were Patrick Kelly-Hauser, assistant attorney general,
and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

WILSON, J. This appeal, brought by the minor child,
Dynastie D., arises from the trial court’s judgment ren-
dered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of
Children and Families, granting her motion for out-of-
state placement of the child.1 On appeal, the child claims
that (1) the trial court failed to follow the statutory
requirements of General Statutes (Rev. to 2023) § 46b-
129 (j) (4),2 and (2) the trial court’s determination that
there was good cause to place the child outside the
1
Although counsel for both the respondent mother and the respondent
father have appearances in this matter, neither has filed a brief or otherwise
participated in the present appeal.
2
General Statutes (Rev. to 2023) § 46b-129 (j) (4) provides in relevant
part: ‘‘The commissioner may place any child or youth so committed to the
commissioner in a suitable foster home or in the home of a fictive kin
caregiver, relative caregiver, or in a licensed child-caring institution or in
the care and custody of any accredited, licensed or approved child-caring
agency, within or without the state, provided a child shall not be placed
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In re Dynastie D.

state was not supported by the evidence. We disagree
and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The
child was born in February, 2023. On the same day,
the Department of Children and Families (department),
which had a prior history with the respondent mother
(mother), invoked a ninety-six hour hold on behalf of
the child. Soon after, the petitioner filed a neglect peti-
tion, as well as a motion for an ex parte order of tempo-
rary custody, which was granted by the court, Maro-
nich, J., and the child was placed with maternal relative
foster parents (foster parents). The court, McLaughlin,
J., sustained the order of temporary custody on Febru-
ary 24, 2023.
Paternity was established on April 20, 2023. Following
the establishment of paternity, in October, 2023, the
petitioner submitted an application pursuant to the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (com-
pact)3 and General Statutes § 17a-1754 for review of the
outside the state except for good cause and unless the parents or guardian
of such child are notified in advance of such placement and given an opportu-
nity to be heard, or in a receiving home maintained and operated by the
commissioner. . . .’’
The legislature has amended § 46b-129 since the events at issue and the
contents of what had been § 46b-129 (j) (4) are now located in General
Statutes § 46b-129 (j) (5). See Public Acts 2024, No. 24-126, § 5. All references
to § 46b-129 in this opinion are to the 2023 revision of the statute, which
was in effect when the motion for out-of-state placement was filed.
3
‘‘As background, Connecticut adopted the [compact] in 1967 and codified
it as § 17a-175. All fifty states, the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin
Islands have enacted the compact. . . . Article I of the compact provides
in relevant part that [i]t is the purpose and policy of the party states to
cooperate with each other in the interstate placement of children to the end
that . . . (a) [e]ach child requiring placement shall receive the maximum
opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment and with persons or
institutions having appropriate qualifications and facilities to provide a nec-
essary and desirable degree and type of care. . . . General Statutes § 17a-
175, art. I (a).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Amanda C., 218 Conn. App. 731, 741–42, 292 A.3d 1269, cert. denied, 347
Conn. 904, 297 A.3d 567 (2023).
4
General Statutes § 17a-175, article III, provides: ‘‘(a) No sending state
shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state
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In re Dynastie D.

child’s paternal grandparents,5 who reside in Florida,
as a long-term placement resource for the child. On
November 30, 2023, the respondent parents (parents)
were defaulted with respect to the neglect petition and
the court, Skyers, J., adjudicated the child neglected
and committed her to the custody of the petitioner.
On December 8, 2023, the petitioner filed a perma-
nency plan recommending termination of parental
rights and adoption or permanent transfer of guardian-
ship to the paternal grandparents. In the study in sup-
port of the permanency plan,6 the petitioner represented
any child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible
adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every require-
ment set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving
state governing the placement of children therein.
‘‘(b) Prior to sending, bringing or causing any child to be sent or brought
into a receiving state for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a
possible adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public
authorities in the receiving state written notice of the intention to send,
bring, or place the child in the receiving state. The notice shall contain:
‘‘(1) The name, date and place of birth of the child.
‘‘(2) The identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian.
‘‘(3) The name and address of the person, agency or institution to or with
which the sending agency proposes to send, bring, or place the child.
‘‘(4) A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and evidence
of the authority pursuant to which the placement is proposed to be made.
‘‘(c) Any public officer or agency in a receiving state which is in receipt
of a notice pursuant to paragraph (b) of this article may request of the
sending agency, or any other appropriate officer or agency of or in the
sending agency’s state, and shall be entitled to receive therefrom, such
supporting or additional information as it may deem necessary under the
circumstances to carry out the purpose and policy of this compact.
‘‘(d) The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought
into the receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiv-
ing state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the
proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of
the child.’’
5
The record reflects that the paternal grandmother’s husband is the stepfa-
ther of the child’s father. We refer to these individuals as the child’s paternal
grandparents, as did the trial court.
6
We note that the study in support of the permanency plan dated October
24, 2023, was admitted as exhibit B at the hearing on the motion for out-
of-state placement. This study corresponds with the permanency plan filed
on December 8, 2023, by the petitioner recommending termination of paren-
tal rights and adoption or permanent transfer of guardianship to the paternal
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In re Dynastie D.

that both parents agreed to the child being placed in
Florida with the paternal grandparents and stated that
they will eventually relocate to Florida. On December
21, 2023, the child filed an objection to the permanency
plan. At a case status conference held on January 23,
2024, the attorney for the minor child advocated that
the child remain in her current placement. On January
30, 2024, the child withdrew her objection to the perma-
nency plan. On February 6, 2024, the attorney for the
minor child submitted a position letter in which she
represented that ‘‘an agreement has been reached in
that [the department] will amend the permanency plan
to reflect a [termination of parental rights] and an adop-
tion with no placement source identified in the plan.’’
Thereafter, on February 7, 2024, the petitioner filed a
motion to amend the permanency plan to reflect termi-
nation of parental rights and adoption.
At the hearing on the permanency plan on February 9,
2024, the court, McLaughlin, J., approved the amended
permanency plan and ordered the petitioner to file a
petition for termination of parental rights within sixty
days.7 On April 23, 2024, the petitioner notified the court
that the application pursuant to the compact for an
evaluation of the paternal grandparents as a placement
option was approved, the Florida Department of Social
Services was ready to accept placement of the child,
and the paternal grandparents agreed to accept place-
ment of the child and provide her with permanency via
adoption.
grandparents. The permanency plan was later amended to reflect termination
of parental rights and an adoption with no placement source identified in
the plan. An amended study in support of the permanency plan, dated
January 29, 2024, was also filed with the court. The two plans are nearly
identical, with the key difference being the lack of a specific placement
source in the amended study. We continue to refer to exhibit B, the study
in support of the permanency plan dated October 24, 2023, in our discussion
of the child’s claim herein.
7
On February 3, 2025, after the filing of this appeal, the petitioner filed
a petition for the termination of parental rights as to both parents. The
petition remains pending.
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In re Dynastie D.

On April 30, 2024, the petitioner, pursuant to § 46b-
129 (j) (4), filed a motion for the out-of-state placement
of the child with the paternal grandparents in Florida,
asserting that there were no other appropriate relative
resources for the child in Connecticut and that the out-
of-state placement was in the best interest of the child.
The child objected to the motion, arguing that place-
ment in Florida with the paternal grandparents was not
in her best interest. The child stated that she had been
in the care of the foster parents since birth and was
thriving in her current placement. Regarding the pro-
posed placement, the child argued that she had ‘‘not
bonded with the paternal grandparents, [did] not have
a relationship with the paternal grandparents and,
moreover, moving [her] to a new environment and with
new caretakers with whom she has only met in person
during two supervised visitation sessions with the
[respondent] father [(father)] would cause [her] emo-
tional and psychological damage . . . .’’ On June 6,
2024, the child filed a motion for an interactional evalua-
tion, requesting the court to order ‘‘that the child and
her foster parents participate in a foster parent-child
interactional evaluation with a clinical interview per-
formed by a clinical psychologist for purposes of
assessing the attachment bond between the foster par-
ents and the child.’’ The petitioner objected to the
child’s motion as an untimely request for expert discov-
ery. Thereafter, the court denied the child’s motion as
untimely.

A hearing on the motion for out-of-state placement
was held over three days: June 7 and September 13 and
20, 2024. Both the petitioner and the child introduced
several exhibits that were admitted into evidence, and
the court heard testimony from Tania Mayen, the fami-
ly’s social worker; the child’s paternal grandmother; the
child’s foster mother; and the child’s foster father.
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In re Dynastie D.

On October 18, 2024, the court, Skyers, J., granted
the motion for out-of-state placement. In its oral deci-
sion, the court made the following relevant findings:
‘‘[The mother] has not addressed her mental health
needs, her physical health, [intimate partner violence]
and parenting needs, all factors that contributed to her
inability to parent the [child]. [The father] reportedly
was unemployed and transient between New York and
Connecticut. He further reported that he was not in a
position to care for his child. [The father] identified
[the paternal grandmother] as a potential placement
resource for [the child]. At the beginning of this case,
paternity had not yet been established. Therefore, any
assessment as to the suitability of [the] paternal grand-
parents as a resource was deferred until after paternity
had been confirmed. As stated above, paternity was
confirmed April 20th, 2023. . . .
‘‘During the trial, [Mayen] testified that early in the
process the case plan was for [the child] to be placed
with the paternal grandparents in Florida. The parents
acknowledg[ed] that they were unable to care for [the
child], agreed with the department on the proposed
placement and did not object to the plan. They also
indicated that they eventually intended to relocate to
Florida to be closer to [the child] and the paternal
family. [The paternal grandmother] credibly testified
that shortly after being made aware of [the child’s]
paternity, she contacted [the department] so she could
be considered as a resource for long-term placement.
[The paternal grandmother] works as a registered nurse
and lives with [the paternal grandfather] and two sons
. . . in . . . Florida. Her home was assessed by the
state of Florida, and she began the process for approval.
[The paternal grandmother] testified that she would be
able to provide [the child’s] needs and give her perma-
nency. And she communicated that she wanted to adopt
[the child]. . . .
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‘‘[The paternal grandmother] testified that her main
concern would be to provide a stable home for [the
child’s] safety and well-being. She testified that [she is]
willing to have [the child] get to know [the father], but
[the father] would not be living with them. [The paternal
grandmother] had regular and consistent weekly video
calls with [the child] that were facilitated by [the father]
during his visitation time. [The paternal grandmother]
and [the paternal grandfather], along with [the paternal
grandmother’s] two sons, her sister-in-law and [the
father] visited with [the child] in Connecticut in July,
2023. Her last visit with [the child] was in September,
2024, with [the paternal grandfather], her sons and other
extended family in New York. She clearly loves [the
child] and wishes to assume care for her in her home.
[The paternal grandmother] had planned to take [the
child] for a visit in Florida in July . . . 2024. However,
that visit did not take place due to the [court’s] proce-
dural process.
‘‘[The foster mother] credibly testified that she and
her family love [the child]. They have a clear bond with
her. And she and [the foster father] would be willing
to adopt [the child]. The [compact] process began in
July, 2023, and ended April, 2024. The court recognizes
the length of time in the approval process. In addition,
the lengthy court procedural process added to the delay
in decisions regarding [the child’s] permanency.
‘‘[The child] is very fortunate to have two possible
placements. Generally, questions of custodial place-
ment are resolved by determination of what is in the
best interest of the child as shown by a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence. . . . To determine whether a cus-
todial placement is in the best interest of the child, the
court uses its broad discretion to choose a place that
will foster the child’s best interest and sustain growth,
development, well-being, and the continuity and stabil-
ity of his environment. . . .
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In re Dynastie D.

‘‘The court finds that placement with [the] paternal
grandparents is in [the child’s] best interest and will
allow [the child] to maintain a connection with her
paternal family while still hav[ing] the opportunity to
maintain a connection with her [father] and [mother].
[The child] has offered insufficient evidence for the
court to conclude that the decision to place [the child]
with her [paternal] grandparents in Florida is inconsis-
tent with her best interests, nor to conclude that to do
so would be detrimental to her best interest.
‘‘The court would be remiss in not acknowledging
the care the foster parents had given to [the child]. The
. . . foster parents have a loving bond with [the child]
and [it] is clear from the testimony that they have nur-
tured and cared for her during the time of her place-
ment. Indeed, the court notes that it is this loving and
sustaining care that will help [the child] transition more
easily to her paternal . . . grandparents in Florida. The
court therefore grants the [petitioner’s] motion for out-
of-state placement.’’ (Citations omitted.)8
On November 13, 2024, the petitioner filed a motion
requesting the trial court to articulate whether it made
a finding, when it granted the motion for out-of-state
placement, that there was good cause to place the child
8
On November 5, 2024, the child filed a motion for a discretionary stay
of the trial court’s order granting the motion for out-of-state placement. The
court denied the motion on November 7, 2024. On November 8, 2024, the
child filed a motion for review of the trial court’s order denying her motion
for a discretionary stay with this court. On November 12, 2024, this court,
sua sponte, ordered that the trial court’s order granting the petitioner’s
motion for out-of-state placement be stayed pending this court’s resolution
of the child’s motion for review of the trial court’s order denying her motion
for a discretionary stay. On November 15, 2024, this court granted the motion
for review but denied the relief requested and lifted the temporary stay.
One judge dissented from the lifting of the temporary stay pending appeal.
On November 25, 2024, the child filed a motion for reconsideration en banc
of this court’s decision denying her requested relief of an appellate stay of
the trial court’s order granting the motion for out-of-state placement. On
December 18, 2024, this court, with one judge dissenting, denied the motion
for reconsideration en banc.
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In re Dynastie D.

outside the state, as required by § 46b-129 (j) (4). In its
articulation, issued November 13, 2024, the court fur-
ther found that ‘‘[t]he foster parents were aware that
the paternal grandmother was being evaluated as a
placement resource. Both parents . . . were in agree-
ment with placing [the child] in Florida with the paternal
grandmother. The [compact] application was approved
April 23, 2024. [The child] has met the paternal grand-
mother and the extended family. [The child] has had
in person visits with the paternal grandmother, [the
paternal] grandfather and their two sons. In addition,
[the child] has weekly virtual visits with the paternal
grandmother.’’ The court then stated that ‘‘[t]he same
facts that the court used in its finding of best interests
do hereby support the finding of good cause. The court
finds there is good cause for placing the child outside
the state of Connecticut to be with her paternal grand-
parents in the state of Florida because it will allow [the
child] the opportunity to maintain a connection with her
[paternal] grandparents and extended paternal family.’’
This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The child first claims that the court failed to follow
the statutory requirements of § 46b-129 (j) (4). In con-
nection with this claim, the child raises two distinct
subclaims: that the court (1) failed to apply the proper
standard in determining good cause because ‘‘[t]he
court did not discuss, nor apparently consider, [the
child’s] attachment to her . . . foster parents, the pos-
sible harm that the change in placement would cause,
or any other factors, other than maintaining a connec-
tion with the parents, whose approved permanency plan
was termination of parental rights’’ and (2) impermissi-
bly shifted the burden of proof from the petitioner to
her.9 For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
9
The child additionally claims that the court impermissibly made findings
without the benefit of expert testimony. This claim appears in her principal
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In re Dynastie D.

A
We first address the child’s claim that the court
improperly applied the good cause standard under
§ 46b-129 (j) (4). Before we reach the merits of the
child’s claim, we must first interpret the phrase ‘‘good
cause’’ as used in § 46b-129 (j) (4), as doing so is neces-
sary to our resolution of the child’s claim. The interpre-
tation of ‘‘good cause’’ in this context is an issue of
first impression for this court.
As this involves an issue of statutory interpretation,
our review is plenary. See Reverse Mortgage Solutions,
Inc. v. Widow(er), Heir(s) and/or Creditors of the
Estate of Beryl E. Rowland, 231 Conn. App. 761, 770,
334 A.3d 1054 (2025). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur
fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to
the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other
words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner,
the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the
facts of [the] case, including the question of whether
the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to
determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs
us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such
text and considering such relationship, the meaning of
such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield
absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of
the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sicignano v.
Pearce, 228 Conn. App. 664, 682, 325 A.3d 1127 (2024),
cert. denied, 351 Conn. 908, 330 A.3d 881 (2025).
Our analysis begins with the text of § 46b-129 (j) (4),
which provides in relevant part: ‘‘The commissioner
appellate brief as part of her primary claim that the court failed to follow
the statutory requirements of § 46b-129 (j) (4). We address this claim in part
II of this opinion, as it is intertwined with the child’s claim that the court’s
determination as to good cause was not supported by the evidence.
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In re Dynastie D.

may place any child or youth so committed to the com-
missioner in a suitable foster home or in the home of
a fictive kin caregiver, relative caregiver, or in a licensed
child-caring institution or in the care and custody of any
accredited, licensed or approved child-caring agency,
within or without the state, provided a child shall not
be placed outside the state except for good cause and
unless the parents or guardian of such child are notified
in advance of such placement and given an opportunity
to be heard, or in a receiving home maintained and
operated by the commissioner. . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 2023) § 46b-129 (j) (4).
The phrase ‘‘good cause’’ is not defined in § 46b-129
(j) (4), nor anywhere in title 46b of the General Statutes.
In the absence of any statutory definition, we construe
the term ‘‘good cause’’ in accordance with the com-
monly approved usage of the language. See Pasquar-
iello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 281 Conn. 656, 665, 916 A.2d
803 (2007). At the time that § 46b-129 (j) (4) was
amended to include a requirement of ‘‘good cause’’ for
out-of-state placements, ‘‘good cause’’ was defined to
mean a ‘‘[s]ubstantial reason, one that affords legal
excuse’’ or a ‘‘[l]egally sufficient ground or reason.’’
Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed. 1968) p. 822. Thus, the
statute prescribes that the petitioner must demonstrate
a ‘‘[l]egally sufficient ground or reason’’ to warrant the
out-of-state placement of the child. This definition, how-
ever, provides little guidance as to its application in
this context.
In seeking to clarify what may constitute good cause
as the term is used in § 46b-129 (j) (4), we are mindful
that the silence of the statute itself provides some inter-
pretive guidance. For example, in the context of visita-
tion orders pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56 (b),
this court has construed the lack of a statutory defini-
tion to indicate that the term implicates the discretion
of the trial court. See Cardona v. Padilla, 230 Conn.
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In re Dynastie D.

App. 534, 552, 330 A.3d 912 (2025). In so concluding,
this court observed that ‘‘child custody determination[s]
[are] dependent on the factual circumstances of a given
case’’ as well as the established principle that ‘‘decision-
making in family disputes requires flexible, individual-
ized adjudication of the particular facts of each case
without the constraint of objective guidelines.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 551–52. Likewise,
whether to place a child outside the state is a fact
intensive inquiry for the trial court, ‘‘which has the
parties before it and is in the best position to analyze
all of the factors which go into the ultimate conclusion
that [there is good cause to support the out-of-state
placement].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Ava W., 336 Conn. 545, 589, 248 A.3d 675 (2020); see
id. (discussing posttermination visitation orders). Thus,
we conclude that the lack of a specific statutory defini-
tion of ‘‘good cause’’ here suggests that the legislature
intended for the court to exercise its broad discretion
in determining, when considering the particular factual
circumstances of each case, what ‘‘[l]egally sufficient
ground or reason’’ or good cause warrants the out-of-
state placement of a child.10 See, e.g., Kelsey v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 711, 723, 189 A.3d 578
(2018) (in context of habeas proceeding, concluding
that lack of specific statutory contours as to statutory
phrase suggests that legislature intended for court to
exercise its discretion).
The discretion of the trial court, however, must be
exercised within the context of the applicable statutory
provision. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 202 Conn. App. 21, 33, 244 A.3d 171 (2020) (‘‘[i]n
attempting to synthesize a more fulsome definition of
10
Therefore, to the extent that the child invites this court to articulate
mandatory factors the trial court must consider in determining good cause,
we decline to do so. See In re D’Andre T., 201 Conn. App. 396, 408–409,
242 A.3d 766, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 902, 242 A.3d 480 (2020).
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good cause as that term is used [in the statute], we are
mindful that the statute itself provides some interpre-
tive guidance’’), aff’d, 343 Conn. 424, 274 A.3d 85 (2022).
Section 46b-129 (j) (4) applies in the narrow circum-
stance where the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies seeks to place a child committed to the commis-
sioner’s care and custody outside of the state. In other
words, although ‘‘[g]enerally, questions of custodial
placement are resolved by a determination of what is
in the best interest of the child . . . as shown by a
fair preponderance of the evidence’’; (internal quotation
marks omitted) In re Haley B., 81 Conn. App. 62, 65, 838
A.2d 1006 (2004); § 46b-129 (j) (4) imposes an additional
requirement of ‘‘good cause’’ where a child has been
removed from the care of her parent or guardian and
committed to the petitioner, who then seeks to place
the child outside the state.

The parties agree, as do we, that good cause and best
interest of the child are not synonymous. See Felician
Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc. v. Historic
District Commission, 284 Conn. 838, 850, 937 A.2d 39
(2008) (‘‘[t]he use of the different terms . . . within
the same statute suggests that the legislature acted with
complete awareness of their different meanings . . .
and that it intended the terms to have different mean-
ings’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although the
factual basis of a good cause determination may overlap
with that of the best interest determination, we recom-
mend that trial courts evaluate these issues indepen-
dently. See, e.g., In re Joel H., Docket No. CP-18-023577-
A, 2024 WL 575942, *12 (Conn. Super. January 24, 2024).
By requiring a showing of a good cause for justification
of an out-of-state placement, which is distinct from the
typical best interest of the child determination associ-
ated with custody placements, the legislative intent
behind the words ‘‘good cause’’ suggests that such a
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determination would involve a weighing of the well-
being of the child if placed outside the state with that
of the child if she remained in Connecticut.
Several trial courts have had occasion to make a
good cause determination in this context, which we
find instructive. In In re Joel H., supra, 2024 WL 575942,
the trial court considered the petitioner’s petitions for
termination of parental rights for two children, Saria
and her half-sibling Joel, as well as the petitioner’s
motion for out-of-state placement of Saria. Id., *1. In
that case, Joel had been adjudicated neglected in 2018
and removed from his mother’s care in 2019. Id. Saria,
who shared the same mother as Joel, was born in 2021.
Id. Soon after her birth, an order of temporary custody
was granted, and she was adjudicated neglected and
committed to the custody of the petitioner. Id. In 2023,
Joel moved to a new, out-of-state placement in Florida,
with his paternal half-sibling’s mother, S. Id., *5. The
trial court granted the termination of the parental rights
of the children’s mother, as well as the parental rights
of the children’s respective fathers. Id., *1. The court
then addressed the petitioner’s motion for out-of-state
placement, which sought to place Saria with S in Flor-
ida. Id., *12. The court observed that this placement
would permit Joel and Saria to be together. Id. In con-
cluding that the petitioner had shown good cause for the
out-of-state placement, the court considered whether
S was a suitable and worthy guardian, that Saria had
visited with and was comfortable with S, that Saria
would be placed with Joel and his half-siblings, and
that S was willing to foster bonds between the children
and their biological and prior foster families. Id. The
court also acknowledged the position of the nonparty
foster parents, who submitted a letter in opposition to
the motion for out-of-state placement and expressed
their wish for Saria to remain in their care, but con-
cluded that ‘‘[t]heir love and care for Saria, however,
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do not override the statutory analysis set forth above.’’
Id., *12 n.3.
In In re Caydence B., Docket No. CP-16-011676-A,
2016 WL 7975675 (Conn. Super. November 28, 2016), the
court considered, in addition to the petitioner’s neglect
petition, a motion for out-of-state placement filed by
the intervening paternal aunt. Id., *2. In considering the
motion, the court evaluated the quality of the child’s
relationships in Connecticut as well as in the proposed
placement state, finding that ‘‘[p]lacing the child with
[the paternal aunt], however, would make contact with
her parents and all of her Connecticut relatives more
difficult. The child has lived all her life in Connecticut
and in the home of maternal grandparents from birth
until the [order of temporary custody]. She has many
paternal and maternal relatives in this state, and the
connectivity of family and kin would thus seem to be
strongest in this state.’’ Id., *6. This was outweighed,
however, by the suitability of the paternal aunt, who
had ‘‘consistently shown herself to be ready to care for
the child and committed to providing her with perma-
nency if necessary’’ and had a strong bond with the
child. Id., *7. The court weighed the suitability of the
paternal aunt against that of the only possible Connecti-
cut placement option, the maternal great-grandmother,
who ‘‘show[ed] significantly less commitment to the
child in comparison to the [paternal aunt], as well as
raising substantial doubt about her readiness, willing-
ness, and desire to provide a permanent home for the
child . . . .’’ Id. In finding good cause to place the child
outside the state with the paternal aunt, the court neces-
sarily referred to its own findings and credibility deter-
minations from witness testimony. Id., *8.
Finally, in In re Christopher C., Docket No. CP-23-
013514-A, 2024 WL 3665347 (Conn. Super. July 2, 2024),
aff’d, 232 Conn. App. 104, cert. denied, 352 Conn. 903
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(2025), the trial court denied a father’s motion for out-
of-state placement of his child with the child’s paternal
grandmother. The court found that no good cause
existed to place the child outside the state nor was the
placement in the child’s best interest. Id., *3. In reaching
its conclusion as to good cause, the court weighed the
testimony and evidence presented before it, which dem-
onstrated several concerns raised as to the suitability
of the proposed placement, such as the paternal grand-
mother’s judgment, level of collaboration with the
department, and ability to protect the child, and that
the placement would separate the child from his half-
sibling. Id., *2–3.
In each of these cases, the court balanced the well-
being of the child if placed outside the state with that
of the child if the child were to have remained in Con-
necticut.11 In doing so, the court appropriately consid-
ered different, case specific facts. Essential to the
court’s good cause analysis in each case were the
court’s own assessments of the child’s current and/or
proposed placements, which required credibility deter-
minations and a weighing of the evidence before it.
On the basis of the authorities we have discussed
and the legal principles arising therefrom, we conclude
that, in determining whether the petitioner has demon-
strated good cause pursuant to § 46b-129 (j) (4), the
trial court should balance the expected well-being of
the child in the proposed out-of-state placement with
that of the child were she to remain in Connecticut.
Although it is impossible to provide a comprehensive
list of circumstances that could satisfy the good cause
standard, a trial court properly may elect to consider
11
We note that in In re Christopher C., supra, 2024 WL 3665347, and In
re Caydence B., supra, 2016 WL 7975675, the party moving for out-of-state
placement pursuant to § 46b-129 (j) (4) was one other than the petitioner.
As the moving party here is the petitioner, as contemplated by the statute,
that difference has no bearing on the merits of this appeal.
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a number of factors in determining whether a petitioner
has met its evidentiary burden of establishing good
cause to place the child outside the state. As examples,
which are neither exclusive nor all-inclusive, a trial
court may wish to consider the suitability of the pro-
posed out-of-state placement; the quality of the child’s
relationships with individuals in Connecticut or geo-
graphically close to Connecticut and within the pro-
posed out-of-state placement; the child’s or the parent’s
preferences where appropriate; the strength of the emo-
tional bond between the child and the current in-state
placement; the opportunity for the child to form a bond
with the proposed placement; and the impact the out-
of-state placement may have on the child. Trial courts
should, of course, evaluate these considerations inde-
pendently from their best interest of the child determi-
nation.12
12
The child argues that, in this case, ‘‘[r]emand is appropriate because
this court is setting forth, for the first time, the standard and potential
considerations for trial courts to consider when evaluating good cause in
a motion for out-of-state placement. See In re Ava W., [supra] 336 Conn.
[588–89].’’ The petitioner argues that, should this court set forth further
guidance for trial courts in considering a motion for out-of-state placement,
remand is not necessary because, unlike in In re Ava W., this court is not
setting forth a new standard but, rather, only providing additional, permissive
considerations under the pre-existing standard of good cause pursuant to
§ 46b-129 (j) (4). We agree with the petitioner. In In re Ava W., supra, 545,
our Supreme Court held, for the first time, that a trial court has the authority
to consider a motion for posttermination visitation when the court considers
termination of parental rights. Id., 572–73. The court also set forth the
applicable legal standard, derived from the authority granted to trial courts
by statute, and potential factors for trial courts to consider when evaluating
these motions. Id., 588–89. The court further concluded that ‘‘remand is
appropriate in the present case because we are setting forth, for the first
time, the standard and potential considerations for trial courts to consider
when evaluating whether posttermination visitation should be ordered
within the context of a termination proceeding. See Cefaratti v. Aranow,
321 Conn. 593, 625, 141 A.3d 752 (2016) (remanding case after adopting new
standard to afford plaintiff opportunity to present evidence).’’ In re Ava W.,
supra, 588–89. Here, unlike the court in In re Ava W., we are not setting
forth a new legal standard; rather, we are clarifying the existing good cause
standard by providing permissive factors for trial courts to consider in their
good cause determination. Accordingly, we need not remand for further
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B
Having addressed the parties’ arguments as to the
good cause standard, we now address the merits of the
child’s claim that the court improperly applied the good
cause standard under § 46b-129 (j) (4) when it ‘‘utiliz[ed]
the factor of establishing and maintaining a connection
with the paternal family, over and above the maternal
family.’’ Specifically, the child argues that the court
improperly failed to consider ‘‘[the child’s] attachment
to her Connecticut relative foster parents, the possible
harm that the change in placement would cause, or any
other factors, other than maintaining a connection with
the parents, whose approved permanency plan was ter-
mination of parental rights.’’
We begin with our standard of review. This claim
challenges a trial court’s determination of whether the
petitioner has satisfied good cause which, as discussed
previously, requires a weighing of various facts and
circumstances offered to justify the out-of-state place-
ment, including an evaluation of any witness testimony.
Because such determination invokes the discretion of
the trial court, it is reversible only for an abuse of
discretion. ‘‘In determining whether there has been an
abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the
court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . [G]reat
weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because
of [the court’s] opportunity to observe the parties and
the evidence. . . . [Appellate courts] are not in a posi-
tion to second-guess the opinions of witnesses, profes-
sional or otherwise, nor the observations and conclu-
sions of the [trial court] when they are based on reliable
evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Marie J., 219 Conn. App. 792, 820, 296 A.3d 308 (2023).
We first address the child’s interpretation of the
court’s judgment; namely, that in determining good
consideration in accordance with the potential considerations we set
forth herein.
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cause, the court solely relied on the fact that placing
the child outside the state would provide her with the
opportunity to know her parents.13 We disagree.
In its oral ruling, the court made findings as to the
suitability of the paternal grandmother as a guardian,
including her ability to provide for the child and to give
her permanency; the opportunity for the child to form
a bond with the paternal grandmother over virtual and
in person visits; and the quality of relationships in either
state when determining that the out-of-state placement
would afford the child better opportunity to stay in
contact with her parents and paternal family. The court
also acknowledged the strength of the emotional ties
between the foster parents and the child, as well as
their willingness to provide permanency for the child.
13
We address the child’s claim that this finding by the court was speculative
and clearly erroneous in part II of this opinion.
Further, to the extent that the child argues that it was improper for the
court to consider whether the out-of-state placement would afford the child
the opportunity to maintain a connection with her parents, we disagree. In
arguing such, the child asserts that the ‘‘[t]ermination of parental rights is
the complete severance by the court of the legal relationship, with all its
rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child’s parent[s].’’
Indeed, our Supreme Court has held such in the context of ascertaining the
standing of a respondent parent appealing from a posttermination visitation
order. See In re Ava W., supra, 336 Conn. 558 (concluding that respondent
mother whose parental rights had been terminated and who filed request
for posttermination visitation during course of termination proceeding did
have standing to challenge court’s posttermination visitation order). The
court’s consideration of the child’s opportunity to maintain a connection
with her parents here, however, was ‘‘not premised on an individual’s consti-
tutional or statutory rights as a parent’’; id., 565; but, rather, focused on
‘‘the child’s welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support’’ as part
of its determination of good cause. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
564. Although the petitioner sought to end the legal relationship between
the child and her parents, as demonstrated by the permanency plan and the
recent filing of the petition for termination of parental rights, the record
indicates that both the parents and the petitioner expect supervised visitation
to occur, following the child’s placement with the paternal grandparents.
See part II of this opinion. Thus, where the termination of parental rights
has not yet occurred, or the issue of posttermination visitation has not yet
been reached, we cannot conclude that the court erred in considering the
opportunity for the child to maintain a connection with her parents.
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Moreover, the court found that the foster parents’ ‘‘lov-
ing and sustaining care . . . will help [the child] transi-
tion more easily to her paternal . . . grandparents in
Florida,’’ implicitly considering the impact the out-of-
state placement would have on the child. In sum, it is
evident from the court’s findings that it carefully
weighed the relevant characteristics of each placement
option, thereby balancing the well-being of the child if
placed outside the state with that of the child if she
remained in Connecticut.
Having concluded that the court properly weighed
relevant factors in its determination, and given our dec-
lination to set forth mandatory factors herein; see foot-
note 10 of this opinion; we construe the child’s
remaining claim as a claim that the court abused its
discretion when making its good cause determination
by failing to credit certain evidence over other evidence
it did credit in making its good cause determination.14
Specifically, the child claims that the trial court ‘‘uti-
liz[ed] the factor of establishing and maintaining a
connection with the paternal family, over and above
the maternal family.’’ (Emphasis added.)
‘‘It is well established that a decision to credit certain
evidence over other evidence is exclusively within the
14
The child also argues that the court should have considered factors
such as ‘‘the possible harm that the change in placement would cause . . . .’’
We have previously declined to set forth mandatory factors pursuant to a
good cause determination in this context. See footnote 10 of this opinion.
Further, consistent with our conclusion herein, our review of the record
demonstrates that the trial court properly weighed relevant factors in its
determination of good cause based on the evidence before it. Although
evidence was presented about the child’s transition to the paternal grandpar-
ents, implicating the impact the placement may have on the child, the child
fails to point to any evidence in the record as to the ‘‘possible harm’’ arising
from this out-of-state placement. In the absence of such evidence, the court
would have had to resort to speculation. See In re Selena O., 104 Conn.
App. 635, 644–45, 934 A.2d 860 (2007) (‘‘[i]f the court’s conclusions or findings
of fact rest on speculation rather than on sufficient evidence, they are clearly
erroneous’’).
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province of the trial court. . . . Weaver v. Sena, 199
Conn. App. 852, 860, 238 A.3d 103 (2020); see also Wood-
bridge Crossing Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Fergu-
son, 229 Conn. App. 99, 104, 325 A.3d 1205 (2024) ([i]t
is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to weigh
the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses and determine whether to accept some, all
or none of a witness’ testimony . . . ); M. C. v. A. W.,
226 Conn. App. 444, 466, 319 A.3d 183 (2024) (Insofar
as the defendant invites us to reconsider the evidence
that was before the court, [w]e note that it is not the
function of this court to review the evidence to deter-
mine whether a conclusion different from the one
reached could have been reached. . . . Thus, [a] mere
difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our
intervention.). Likewise, it is not the province of this
court to reweigh the evidence before the court or to
substitute our judgment in this matter. F. S. v. J. S.,
223 Conn. App. 763, 794, 310 A.3d 961, cert. denied, 350
Conn. 903, 323 A.3d 344 (2024); see also In re Blake P.,
222 Conn. App. 693, 707, 306 A.3d 1130 (2023)
([a]lthough there may be evidence in the record that
would support the [plaintiff’s] position, it is not the role
of [an appellate] court to examine that evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court).’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cardona v. Padilla,
supra, 230 Conn. App. 547–48.
We, therefore, will not substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court relating to its good cause determi-
nation in this matter.
In the present case, we conclude from our review of
the record that the trial court properly weighed relevant
factors in reaching its good cause determination. We
recognize that the trial court’s explanation of that find-
ing was somewhat abbreviated in comparison with its
best interest finding. When ruling on a motion for out-
of-state placement, the better practice is for the trial
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court to make specific and independent findings related
to best interest and good cause respectively. Here, in
making its good cause finding, the court referred to
findings it had made in connection with the issue of
best interest, which, as we stated previously in this
opinion, may involve similar subordinate findings, but
are nonetheless legally distinct. We are satisfied that
the findings set forth in the court’s oral ruling and its
articulation of that ruling not only find support in the
record but adequately support a determination that
there was good cause for granting the motion. See part
II of this opinion. Accordingly, we cannot say that the
court abused its discretion by concluding that the peti-
tioner demonstrated good cause.
C
We next address the child’s claim that the court
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on the issue
of good cause from the petitioner to her. In support of
this claim, the child relies on an isolated sentence in
the court’s oral decision: ‘‘[The child] has offered insuf-
ficient evidence for the court to conclude that the deci-
sion to place [the child] with her [paternal] grandpar-
ents in Florida is inconsistent with her best interests.’’
The child argues that this one sentence, coupled with
the court’s failure to explicitly state that the burden of
proof rested on the petitioner, demonstrates that the
court improperly shifted the burden from the petitioner
to her.15 The petitioner counters that, ‘‘[w]hen read as
15
In its analysis of this claim, the child makes several arguments concern-
ing the evidence before the court. Specifically, the child argues that she
attempted to introduce evidence establishing that there was no good cause
to support the out-of-state placement of the child and attempted to elicit
relevant testimony regarding, inter alia, the attachment of the child to her
foster parents and the criminal charges of the father. We observe that the
child does not claim that the court erred in any of its evidentiary rulings.
On the contrary, in the child’s reply brief, she states that she ‘‘does not
appeal whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for
evaluation or sustaining objections to the questions regarding attachment.’’
Therefore, we view these arguments to pertain solely to the alleged harm
that flowed from the court’s alleged improper burden shifting. In light of
our rejection of that claim, we need not address these arguments further.
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a whole, the trial court’s oral decision and articulation
demonstrate that it held the [petitioner] to [her] bur-
den.’’ We agree with the petitioner.
We begin our analysis with the standard of review
for claims that the court has misallocated the burden
of proof. ‘‘The question of whether a trial court has
held a party to a less exacting standard of proof than
the law requires is a legal one. . . . Accordingly, our
review is plenary. . . . Similarly, plenary review
applies to a question of misallocation of a burden of
proof. . . . Furthermore, if it is not otherwise clear
from the record that an improper standard was applied,
the appellant’s claim will fail on the basis of inadequate
support in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) In re J.R., 161 Conn. App. 563, 569–70, 127 A.3d
1155 (2015).
We are mindful that ‘‘an opinion must be read as a
whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to
discern the parameters of its holding. . . . Further-
more, [w]e read an ambiguous trial court record so
as to support, rather than contradict, its judgment.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Jason R., 306 Conn. 438, 453, 51 A.3d 334 (2012).
The following details, as set forth in the court’s oral
decision and articulation, inform our resolution of the
child’s claim. At the outset of its oral decision, the
court stated that ‘‘[b]efore the court is the [petitioner’s]
motion pursuant to § 46b-129 (j) (4) seeking an order
to approve an out-of-state placement for [the child]
. . . .’’ Similarly, at the beginning of its articulation,
the court identified the motion as the petitioner’s and
referenced the same statute. Thus, the court correctly
identified the moving party as well as the statute that
applies to children committed to the care and custody
of the petitioner and governs their placement by the
petitioner. The plain language of the statute is explicit
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in identifying which party carries the burden of proof.
Section 46b-129 (j) (4) expressly states that ‘‘[t]he com-
missioner may place any child or youth so committed
to the commissioner . . . within or without the state,
provided a child shall not be placed outside the state
except for good cause . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Gen-
eral Statutes (Rev. to 2023) § 46b-129 (j) (4). The court’s
explicit reference to the applicable statute undermines
the child’s argument. See In re Denzel W., 225 Conn.
App. 354, 376, 315 A.3d 346 (considering court’s citation
to controlling authority as support for conclusion that
court placed burden on proper party), cert. denied, 349
Conn. 918, 317 A.3d 1 (2024). Although the court did
not recite the allocation of the burden of proof in its
oral decision or subsequent articulation, its citation to
the statute implicitly indicated that it was aware of and
applied the proper burden of proof here. See In re M.
S., 226 Conn. App. 857, 865, 319 A.3d 833 (‘‘our Supreme
Court has never required the talismanic recital of spe-
cific words or phrases if a review of the entire record
supports the conclusion that the trial court properly
applied the law’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 349 Conn. 920, 320 A.3d 978 (2024).
After referencing the relevant statute, the court made
several findings relating to its determination of the best
interest of the child. These findings primarily referred to
evidence offered by the petitioner, including testimony
from Mayen and the paternal grandmother; exhibit C,
the unified home study prepared by the state of Florida
evaluating the paternal grandparents’ home; and infor-
mation reflected in both exhibit A, the social study in
support of the neglect petition, and exhibit B, the social
study in support of the permanency plan. The court
then acknowledged the appropriate standard of proof
that applies to determinations of the best interest of
the child and concluded that the child’s out-of-state
placement with the paternal grandparents was in her
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best interest. In concluding such, the court considered
that the out-of-state placement ‘‘will allow [the child]
to maintain a connection with her paternal family while
still hav[ing] the opportunity to maintain a connection
with her [parents].’’ Here, the court referenced the peti-
tioner’s theory of good cause that it sought to establish
at the hearing on the motion for out-of-state place-
ment.16 Thus, ‘‘[t]he court’s decision . . . relate[d] the
petitioner’s evidence to the legal grounds that the peti-
tioner sought to establish, implying that it was the peti-
tioner who bore the burden of establishing those
grounds.’’ See In re J.R., supra, 161 Conn. App. 570.
The court then stated: ‘‘The minor child has offered
insufficient evidence for the court to conclude that
the decision to place [the child] with her [paternal]
grandparents in Florida is inconsistent with her best
interests, nor to conclude that to do so would be detri-
mental to her best interest.’’ (Emphasis added.) In its
subsequent articulation addressing whether it made a
good cause finding in accordance with § 46b-129 (j) (4),
the court concluded that ‘‘[t]he same facts that the court
used in its finding of best interests do hereby support
the finding of good cause. The court finds there is good
cause for placing the child outside the state of Connecti-
cut to be with her paternal grandparents in the state
of Florida because it will allow [the child] the opportu-
nity to maintain a connection with her [paternal] grand-
parents and extended paternal family.’’
After our careful review of the record, we are satisfied
that, despite the court’s isolated use of the imprecise
16
During the petitioner’s closing argument at the hearing, it argued before
the court that ‘‘there is good cause to place the child outside the state
with the paternal grandparents.’’ Specifically, the petitioner referred to the
evidence demonstrating that the paternal grandparents will allow the child
to maintain a connection with her parents, such as testimony regarding the
parents’ agreement to the child’s out-of-state placement, the intention of
the paternal grandmother to allow supervised visitation between the child
and the parents, and the father’s consistent visitation with the child.
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In re Dynastie D.

language that forms the basis for the child’s claim, the
court properly placed the burden of proof on the peti-
tioner. The challenged language merely reflects the
court’s assessment of the evidence offered by the child
to the court as part of its determination of whether
the petitioner had met its burden with respect to good
cause. See In re Denzel W., supra, 225 Conn. App. 378
(‘‘[t]he challenged language reflects the trial court’s
rejection of the respondent’s evidence of personal reha-
bilitation after it had determined that the petitioner had
met her burden with respect to this issue’’). Moreover,
this single sentence is not enough to overcome the
presumption ‘‘that the trial court knows and has applied
the law correctly . . . .’’ Havis-Carbone v. Carbone,
155 Conn. App. 848, 867, 112 A.3d 779 (2015); see also
Reinke v. Sing, 186 Conn. App. 665, 700, 201 A.3d 404
(2018) (‘‘[O]ur appellate courts do not presume error
on the part of the trial court. . . . Rather, we presume
that the trial court, in rendering its judgment . . .
undertook the proper analysis of the law and the facts.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)). The child’s claim
of improper burden-shifting, therefore, fails.
II
The child also claims that the court’s determination
of good cause was not supported by the evidence.17 We
disagree.
17
In the context of arguing that the court improperly applied § 46b-129
(j) (4) in determining whether there was good cause, the child asserts an
alternative argument that, to the extent that the finding of good cause is
based on a best interest of the child finding, the trial court failed to analyze
any of the relevant factors that are part of a best interest determination
and that the best interest finding was not supported by the evidence. We
view this as an argument in support of her claim that the court improperly
applied § 46b-129 (j) (4) in determining whether there was good cause, as
opposed to raising a new, separate claim. See Curley v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
220 Conn. App. 732, 744, 299 A.3d 1133 (‘‘[a] claim is an entirely new legal
issue, whereas, [g]enerally speaking, an argument is a point or line of reason-
ing made in support of or in opposition to a particular claim’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 914, 303 A.3d 260 (2023).
Because of our conclusion herein that good cause and best interest of the
child are separate inquiries, although they may share a factual basis, we
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We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of
review and relevant legal principles. It is well estab-
lished that appellate review of a trial court’s findings
of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard
of review. See In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 488,
940 A.2d 733 (2008). ‘‘A finding is clearly erroneous
when either there is no evidence in the record to support
it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. . . .
‘‘On appeal, our function is to determine whether the
trial court’s conclusion was factually supported and
legally correct. . . . In doing so, however, [g]reat
weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because
of [the court’s] opportunity to observe the parties and
the evidence. . . . We do not examine the record to
determine whether the trier of fact could have reached
a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . [Rather]
every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the
trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id.
We refer to the factual findings made by the trial
court discussed previously in this opinion. In support
of its findings, the court had before it the following
testimony and documentary evidence relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. At the hearing on the petition-
er’s motion for out-of-state placement, Mayen testified
as to the child’s relationship with her paternal grandpar-
ents. She testified that the paternal grandparents had
been in ‘‘consistent communication’’ with the depart-
ment, had visited the child in person three times, and
had maintained weekly virtual visits. Mayen testified
that, when visiting in person with the paternal grand-
mother, the child was ‘‘very friendly, very comfortable,
[and] she would extend her arms to be carried. [The
need not reach this argument. Nonetheless, upon review of the record and
relevant legal principles, we are not persuaded that the court’s best interest
determination was legally inadequate or unsupported by the evidence.
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In re Dynastie D.

paternal grandmother] walked around with her, and
she welcomed that . . . they embraced each other. Her
children were also participating in the visit, and they
were very affectionate toward [the child]. [The child]
responded very well to the family.’’ Exhibit H, a court
update prepared by the department and dated April 23,
2024, provides that the child had ‘‘become familiar and
now developed and maintained a relationship with’’ the
paternal grandparents. Mayen testified that the way the
child responded to her paternal grandmother formed
the basis of her assessment that the child and the pater-
nal grandmother have a relationship and a bond.
The paternal grandmother similarly testified as to the
visits between her and the child, both virtually and
in person in Connecticut. The paternal grandmother
testified to her parenting plan for the child, childcare
arrangements, and her intention regarding contact with
the child’s parents. The paternal grandmother stated
that, if it was permitted, she would consent to the par-
ents having supervised visits with the child. The pater-
nal grandmother also testified that she had been in
communication with the foster mother about the child
and had received photos of her. The paternal grand-
mother indicated a willingness to continue communica-
tion with the foster parents, testifying that she would
be open to staying in communication with the foster
parents to learn things about the child, such as her
favorite foods, that may be useful to know if the child
is placed with her.
Mayen testified that the department believed that it
was in the child’s best interest to be placed with the
paternal grandparents because they have ‘‘been nothing
but forthcoming, very consistent with providing docu-
mentation, anything we need they’ve gone above and
beyond, even to the point where if I can’t give [the
paternal grandmother] information, she will go out of
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her way to look for that with higher ups. Also to main-
tain the relationship between the parents, [the paternal
grandmother] would like for [the child] to get to know
her biological parents, and both parents have notified
the department that they are willing to move to Florida,
obtain jobs, and be a part of their family, of course,
while [the paternal grandmother] is always supervising
their visits and interactions.’’ Exhibit C, the unified
home study prepared by the Florida Department of
Children and Families, provides that the paternal grand-
parents ‘‘anticipate [that] [the child’s] father may also
move down to Florida once the baby is placed down
here, giving them the support of the biological father
as well.’’ Exhibit D, the running narrative document,
includes Mayen’s observations during a supervised visit
between the child, the father, the paternal grandmother,
and her two sons. The document provides that, during
the visit, the paternal grandmother inquired about a
program to assist the father in securing a job, to which
the father agreed and would ‘‘start making calls to see
about an apprentice job that can lead to bigger and
better and ultimately transfer [and/or] do that job in
Florida and be closer to [the child] and his family.’’
The court also heard testimony regarding the current
foster parents, with whom the child had been living
since shortly after her birth. Mayen testified that, from
her visits with the child in her current foster placement,
she has assessed that there were no concerns with the
placement, that the child was thriving, and that all her
needs were being met. The foster mother testified to
her daily routine with the child and the quality time
that the child spends with the foster parents. Exhibit
A, the study in support of the neglect petition prepared
by the department and dated April 26, 2023, described
the foster parents as ‘‘nurturing towards [the child]’’
and indicated that they ‘‘ensure that all of her needs
are met.’’ Similarly, exhibit B, the study in support of
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the permanency plan, further provides that ‘‘[t]he foster
parents love and care for [the child] deeply. [The child]
always appears happy and dressed appropriately during
home visits. [The] foster parents are willing to [be] a
long-term resource for [the child] if reunification does
not occur or in the event that placement with [the]
paternal grandmother is not viable.’’
The foster mother testified to her history of interac-
tions with the parents, based on her having had the
child in her care since birth. She described her relation-
ship with the father as ‘‘a little tense’’ and the circum-
stances generally as ‘‘a tense situation.’’ The foster
mother stated that there was ‘‘a lot of miscommunica-
tion back and forth’’ between her and the father. The
foster mother testified that the father questioned her
about whether she and the foster father were taking
care of the child and doing the right thing for her. When
asked what her plan would be regarding maintaining a
relationship with the parents and extended families if
she continued to be a long-term resource for the child,
the foster mother testified that she thinks ‘‘we need to
. . . sit down and come to an agreement. I have no
problem with them. [The child] deserves to know all
her family. . . . We wouldn’t even mind . . . taking a
trip down to Florida so that she can spend time with
her [paternal] grandmother.’’
The foster mother further testified that she communi-
cated with the paternal grandmother on occasion and
had spoken to Mayen about ‘‘trying to build that rela-
tionship so that [the paternal grandmother] can get to
know [the child].’’ The foster mother stated that she
had previously had FaceTime calls with the paternal
grandmother and would send her pictures from various
events in the child’s life, such as birthdays and holidays.
When asked why, if the child is stable and thriving
in her current placement, the child needs to be moved,
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Mayen testified that ‘‘[t]he department would like for
[the child] to maintain a relationship with her biological
parents, and [the paternal grandmother] wants that for
[the child]. The parents want that for [the child]. And
it would just be a lot easier if, when [the parents] move,
that [the child] is already placed with . . . [the] pater-
nal grandparents and be able to carry on that relation-
ship. As of right now, [the parents] do not feel comfort-
able with the current foster parent, which creates a
barrier between their relationships.’’ When asked what
her concerns are regarding the child remaining with
the foster parents, Mayen testified that ‘‘[m]y only con-
cern is [that] she will not be able to have the same
relationship with her biological parents as she would
if she was with [the paternal grandmother].’’
Notwithstanding all of that evidence, the child chal-
lenges two subsidiary findings of fact made by the court
as clearly erroneous and contends that these erroneous
findings undermine its ultimate conclusion that there
was good cause to place the child outside the state. We
address each of the child’s contentions in turn.
First, the child argues that the court’s finding that
the foster parents’ ‘‘loving and sustaining care . . . will
help [the child] transition more easily to her paternal
. . . grandparents in Florida’’ is clearly erroneous as
‘‘[t]here [is] no evidence in the record, either elicited
through testimony or in the exhibits entered at trial,
that because of the care [the child] had received, it
would be an easy transition to the paternal grandpar-
ents.’’ We disagree with the child’s interpretation of the
court’s finding. The court did not find that the transition
would be easy but rather it would be made easier by
the foster parents’ loving and sustaining care. Indeed,
the court had ample testimony before it to support
this finding. The paternal grandmother and the foster
mother both testified to the ongoing communication
between the two of them to build the relationship
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between the paternal grandmother and the child. The
paternal grandmother testified that, should the child be
placed in Florida, she would be open to the foster par-
ents visiting and staying in contact with the child. She
also testified that she would be open to staying in com-
munication with the foster parents to learn things about
the child, such as her favorite foods, that may be useful
to know if the child is placed with her. This evidence
supports the reasonable inference that the foster par-
ents’ love and care will facilitate the child’s transition
to living with the paternal grandparents. See Camozzi
v. Pierce, 230 Conn. App. 616, 625, 331 A.3d 159
(‘‘[u]nder the clearly erroneous standard of review, a
finding of fact must stand if, on the basis of the evidence
before the court and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from that evidence, a trier of fact reasonably
could have found as it did’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 921, 333 A.3d 103
(2025). Consequently, we do not conclude that the
court’s finding is clearly erroneous.
Second, the child argues that the court’s finding ‘‘that
the parents would actually move to Florida and/or
would maintain a relationship with [the child]’’ is clearly
erroneous as it was not based on any evidence in the
record but rather was ‘‘pure speculation.’’ We again
disagree with the child’s interpretation of the court’s
finding. Specifically, the court found that the parents
‘‘indicated that they eventually intended to relocate to
Florida to be closer to [the child] and the paternal
family.’’ The court’s finding was confined to the parents’
intentions to move to Florida. There was ample evi-
dence in the record supporting this finding. At trial,
Mayen testified that ‘‘both parents have notified the
department that they are willing to move to Florida,
obtain jobs, and be a part of their family, of course,
while [the paternal grandmother] is always supervising
their visits and interactions.’’ Similarly, when asked
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whether her son would move to Florida with the inten-
tion of being closer to the child, the paternal grand-
mother testified, ‘‘[p]ossibly. Yes.’’ Much of the docu-
mentary evidence before the court reflects that same
intention. Exhibit B, the study in support of the perma-
nency plan, and similar language in exhibit D, the run-
ning narrative document, provides that the parents ‘‘are
both in agreement with [the child] being placed in Flor-
ida with her paternal grandparents.’’ Exhibit B further
states that the parents ‘‘continue to state [that] they
will eventually relocate to Florida and would like to be
closer to [the child] and [the paternal] family.’’ Exhibit
C, the unified home study prepared by the Florida
Department of Children and Families, similarly states
that ‘‘[the] father has stated [that] he will move down
to Florida once the child is placed with his parents, in
order to get his life together’’ and that the paternal
grandparents ‘‘anticipate [the child’s] father may also
move down to Florida once the baby is placed down
there, giving them the support of the biological father
as well.’’ Without engaging in speculation, the court
was free to draw reasonable and logical inferences from
the evidence and facts proven. In light of the ample
evidence supporting the court’s finding that the parents
have ‘‘indicated that they eventually intended’’ to move
to Florida, we cannot conclude that the court’s finding
is clearly erroneous.
In sum, we conclude that the specific factual findings
challenged by the child are not clearly erroneous. Fur-
ther, as discussed previously, there was ample evidence
in the record, unchallenged by the child, supporting the
trial court’s ultimate conclusion that there was good
cause to place the child outside the state.18
18
We reiterate that our review here is governed by the clearly erroneous
standard and, as such, we ‘‘do not examine the record to determine whether
the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Davonta V., supra, 285 Conn. 488.
Notwithstanding our conclusion herein, we echo the acknowledgement by
the trial court in its oral decision of the admirable efforts by the foster
parents in caring for the child.
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Although, as we have stated previously in this opin-
ion, the child also challenges the court’s good cause
finding because it was made in the absence of expert
testimony, we are not persuaded that expert testimony
was necessary. See footnote 9 of this opinion. The trial
court would have been free to accept, reject, or partially
rely on any relevant expert testimony had it been
offered and admitted; see In re Niya B., 223 Conn. App.
471, 497, 308 A.3d 604, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310
A.3d 960 (2024); however, such expert testimony is not
a precondition to the court’s own evaluation of the
factual record before it. Section 46b-129 (j) (4) does
not impose any such requirement nor does the child
cite to any binding authority supporting her proposition
that, as a matter of law, expert testimony was needed
to support the court’s judgment in granting the motion
for out-of-state placement. The appellate courts of this
state have repeatedly held that, in the context of termi-
nation of parental rights cases and in considering custo-
dial placements, expert testimony is not required to
support a trial court’s determination as to the child’s
best interest. See In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 400,
852 A.2d 643 (2004); In re Santiago G., 154 Conn. App.
835, 857 n.19, 108 A.3d 1184, cert. denied, 315 Conn.
927, 109 A.3d 922, aff’d, 318 Conn. 449, 121 A.3d 708
(2015). Like a best interest finding, a good cause finding
is a highly fact specific inquiry, and we reject the notion
that our trial court judges lack the ability to weigh
the evidence and make correct determinations in this
regard. ‘‘Expert testimony is necessary when the sub-
ject in question is beyond the field of ordinary knowl-
edge and experience for a judge.’’ In re Alexander T.,
81 Conn. App. 668, 676, 841 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 268
Conn. 924, 848 A.2d 472 (2004). Our review of the court’s
findings supports our conclusion that they were all
within the province of the fact finder. Although the
child raises several arguments as to the court’s findings
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regarding the child’s transition,19 the record in this case
was sufficient to support the court’s findings without
testimony from an expert. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court did not err when it found that the peti-
tioner demonstrated good cause.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

19
We note that the child briefly mentions in her appellate brief that
‘‘[w]hether [the child] should continue to have a relationship with her parents
is also clearly within the province of an expert.’’ The child provides no
analysis beyond this conclusory assertion, nor does she cite any relevant
authority to support this claim. Accordingly, the child’s claim is inadequately
briefed. ‘‘Claims are inadequately briefed when they are merely mentioned
and not briefed beyond a bare assertion. . . . Claims are also inadequately
briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no men-
tion of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record
. . . . ’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Estate of Rock v. University
of Connecticut, 323 Conn. 26, 33, 144 A.3d 420 (2016).