ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson

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ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson

ECR 2, LLC v. RASCHID THOMPSON
(AC 47702)
Alvord, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendant tenant appealed from the trial court’s judgment of possession
for the plaintiff landlord in the plaintiff’s summary process action. The
defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in rejecting his special
defense in which he alleged that he had a right to cure his nonpayment of
rent. Held:

The defendant’s claim that the trial court violated his right to due process
in denying his motion for a continuance of the trial and in refusing to
consider his motion to preclude certain evidence was unavailing, as he failed
to identify, either to the trial court or in his brief to this court, which of his
due process rights were violated, his identification of those rights for the
first time during oral argument to this court was improper, and the record
was inadequate to review any challenge to the trial court’s decision not to
consider his proposed motion to preclude, as the defendant failed to preserve
the record by filing the motion.

This court could not conclude that the trial court erred in relying on a legally
correct definition of wilfulness in rejecting the defendant’s special defense
of equitable nonforfeiture, the defendant having presented no authority
requiring the trial court to apply a specific definition.

The trial court properly rejected the defendant’s claim that he had a right
to cure his nonpayment of rent, as the unambiguous language of the parties’
lease provided that the defendant’s failure to pay his rent on the first of the
month or within nine days thereafter would constitute a default under the
lease and he would immediately forfeit all rights to occupy the apartment,
clearly indicating that there was no right to cure once the defendant
defaulted, and, once the notice to quit had been served on him, any payments
he made were for use and occupancy only.

Argued February 18—officially released May 13, 2025

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Housing
* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
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Session, where the court, Stone, J., denied the defen-
dant’s motions for summary judgment and for a continu-
ance; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Stone,
J.; judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Darren J. Pruslow, with whom was Cyd O. Oppenhei-
mer, for the appellant (defendant).
Richard W. Callahan, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

CRADLE, J. In this summary process action, the
defendant, Raschid Thompson, appeals from the judg-
ment of possession, rendered after a court trial, in favor
of the plaintiff, ECR 2, LLC. On appeal, the
defendant claims that the court (1) violated his
constitutional right to due process by denying his
motion for a continuance of the trial date and refusing
to consider his motion to preclude evidence and
testimony that had not pre-viously been disclosed
by the plaintiff; (2) applied the wrong legal standard in
rejecting his special defense of equitable nonforfeiture;
and (3) erred in rejecting his special defense that he
had a right to cure, and did cure, his nonpayment of
rent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as set forth by the trial court,
and procedural history are relevant to our consideration
of the defendant’s claims on appeal. ‘‘The defendant is
a veteran who was honorably discharged after serving
in the United States Air Force from 1993 to 1997. He
receives [United States Department of] Veterans Affairs
disability benefits as well as rental assistance and [the
assistance of] a case management counselor through
the [United States] Department of Housing and Urban
Development-VA Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) pro-
gram.
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‘‘The plaintiff is the owner-landlord of 51 Whiting
Street, unit 5, in Hamden (premises). The plaintiff
entered into a written lease agreement with the defen-
dant for the use and occupancy of the premises from
December 15, 2023, until November 30, 2024. The total
monthly rent is $1340 per month due on the first of the
month with a nine day grace period. The defendant’s
portion is $93 per month, and HUD-VASH pays the bal-
ance.
‘‘The defendant paid his portion of the prorated rent
upon the signing of the lease in December but did not
immediately move in due to a rodent and cockroach
infestation. He informed the plaintiff’s property man-
ager, Christina Young, of the infestation, which was
promptly remediated. In January, the defendant moved
in and noticed additional issues with the apartment,
including not having a mailbox key and a crack in the
door that allows rodents to enter. As a result of these
problems, the defendant did not pay rent in January.
By February, the defendant still did not have a mailbox
key, and so, did not pay February rent. When he was
assessed a late fee, the defendant complained by phone
to Young. Young told the defendant that he should make
his complaint through the plaintiff’s online portal and
that she would remove the late fee. After the defendant
used the portal to inform the plaintiff only about the
mailbox key, he received a key within twenty-four to
forty-eight hours. After the mailbox key issue was
resolved, the plaintiff reissued the $50 late fee when
the defendant still did not pay February rent.
‘‘The relationship between the defendant and Young
continued to deteriorate and broke down completely
after the defendant called Young a vulgar name when
she texted him about his late rent payments. Thereafter,
Young decided that all communications regarding the
premises would take place through the defendant’s
HUD-VASH counselor. The defendant’s counselor did
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communicate the continuing issues with the premises,
including a clogged kitchen sink and dishwasher, and
malfunctioning outlets, but the defendant did not use
[the] online portal to notify the plaintiff about them,
and no work orders were placed for those issues.
Instead, the defendant contacted [the] Hamden Housing
Authority and asked for an inspection. The inspection
took place on May 9 and confirmed some of the defen-
dant’s complaints, requiring the plaintiff to correct
them.
‘‘The defendant was served a notice to quit by abode
service on March 2, 2024, for ‘nonpayment of rent within
the grace period provided for residential property’ with
a quit date of April 7. The notice also indicated that
any future payments would be accepted ‘for reimburse-
ment of costs and for use and occupancy only . . . .’
A letter was also sent to the New Haven Housing Author-
ity, as the section 8 rental assistance administrator, that
a notice to quit had or would be served on the defendant.
The defendant, however, did not receive the notice [to
quit] until March 10, as he was out of town. Upon
receipt, the defendant reached out to his HUD-VASH
counselor for advice. At some point prior to April 3,
Young communicated to the defendant and his HUD-
VASH counselor that, in addition to the defendant’s
portion of the rent from January to April, he would also
have to pay $375 to reimburse the plaintiff for the legal
fees associated with serving the notice to quit. On April
3, the defendant purchased and mailed to the plaintiff’s
attorney four money orders for $93 each and indicated
that they were for January through April rent. On April
5, Young emailed the defendant and [his] HUD-VASH
counselor, informing them that she had received the
money orders and indicating that they could only be
accepted as use and occupancy payments. She further
indicated that [the] $375 fee remained, which would
increase to $1600 after April 7. The defendant agreed
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to the payments being [for] use and occupancy but has
not paid the $1600 legal fees or $50 late fee. He remains
in possession of the premises.’’
On April 9, 2024, the plaintiff commenced this sum-
mary process action seeking immediate possession or
occupancy of the premises. The plaintiff alleged that it
had served on the defendant a notice to quit on the
ground that he had failed to pay the rent when it was
due or within the grace period provided in the lease,
but, despite that notice, the defendant continued to
remain in possession of the premises and had refused
to vacate it.
On May 1, 2024, the defendant filed a notice with the
court indicating that, on that date, he had served upon
the plaintiff discovery requests for production and inter-
rogatories pursuant to Practice Book § 13-2.
On May 6, 2024, the defendant filed an answer and
special defenses to the plaintiff’s complaint. As to the
allegation that the defendant had failed to pay the full
rent when it was due, the defendant left the plaintiff
to its proof. By way of special defense, the defendant
alleged that he had cured his failure to pay the rent for
the premises on April 3, 2024, before the April 7, 2024
quit date, when he sent four money orders to the plain-
tiff in the amounts of $93 each for the months of January
through April, 2024. The defendant also alleged that the
defense of equitable nonforfeiture precluded eviction
in this case. In support of that defense, the defendant
alleged, inter alia, that his nonpayment of rent was
based on a rodent and cockroach infestation of the
premises, in addition to a failure by the plaintiff to
provide him with a key to his mailbox, despite having
requested one three times. He alleged that, if evicted,
he would lose his housing voucher and that ‘‘[t]he plain-
tiff’s choice to pursue this summary process action
against a disabled veteran with case management, in
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the face of payment of the full arrearage prior to the quit
date, is unethical, immoral, unreasonable, and unkind.’’
The plaintiff denied the defendant’s special defenses.
Also on May 6, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment. The defendant argued that there
was no genuine issue of material fact that he had paid
the arrearage owed to the plaintiff for his nonpayment
of rent in full prior to the quit date and that the only
outstanding amount due to the plaintiff was its claimed
legal fees of $1600. The defendant argued that he was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of
his special defenses—that he had cured his nonpayment
of rent and that the doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture
precluded eviction in this case. On May 7, 2024, the
plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment on the ground that a genuine
issue of material fact existed.
On that same date, May 7, 2024, the court sent notices
to the parties scheduling a hearing on the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff’s objec-
tion thereto, and trial on the summary process com-
plaint for May 23, 2024.
On May 23, 2024, the court, Stone, J., first heard
argument on the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment. After hearing arguments from both parties, the
court orally denied the motion for summary judgment
on the ground that a genuine issue of material fact
existed. The court explained: ‘‘I am going to deny the
motion for summary judgment. I think there is a ques-
tion of fact as to whether the nonpayment was cured
or whether it could be cured. I also recognize that, you
know, under the equitable relief, that findings of fact
have to be made. I understand your position . . . that
there is no question of fact, but as the trier, I am required
to make factual findings regarding whether the equita-
ble doctrine of [non]forfeiture is appropriate in this
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action. So, I am going to deny the motion for summary
judgment.’’1
After the court denied the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, he filed a motion to ‘‘stay further
proceedings in this action until three days from when
the plaintiff has fully and fairly responded to the defen-
dant’s interrogatories and requests for production,
which were mailed and emailed to the plaintiff on May
1, 2024, as per the notice of discovery concomitantly
filed with this court.’’2 The defendant argued that, ‘‘[i]n
support of the motion, the defendant represents that
the plaintiff’s objection to the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment alleges that there is at least one
issue of material fact in dispute in the instant case.
. . . Given that all [of] the facts stated in the plaintiff’s
objection are in accord with the facts stated in the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment . . . one
can only conclude that there are facts outside of the
record upon which the plaintiff will rely.’’ (Citations
omitted.)
The court denied the motion for a continuance from
the bench. The court explained: ‘‘Discovery is appro-
priate, but I think the issues in this case are relatively
narrow, and I think all of the information that you need
you can get during the trial today.’’ In response, counsel
for the defendant stated: ‘‘Your Honor, I just do want
to put my objection to the denial on the record. This
is a due process issue. In summary process, obviously,
a person’s housing is at stake. Due process is very
1
The court issued the following written order as well: ‘‘After hearing the
argument of counsel, the court finds that there remain questions of material
fact, specifically, whether the nonpayment allegation was cured. Addition-
ally, the court must make factual findings to determine any potential equita-
ble relief sought.’’
2
Although the defendant’s motion was titled a motion to stay, and he
purported to seek a stay of the proceedings, he actually sought a continuance
of the trial date. We therefore refer to the defendant’s motion as a motion
for a continuance.
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important. And I would just, again for the record, want
to point out that, in our earlier discussion with the
motion for summary judgment, [opposing] counsel did
state that he plans to put on record of extensive interac-
tions between the property manager and my client. My
discovery motion was narrowly tailored and specifically
asking about interactions between my client and the
property manager or the property manager and the case
manager, which seem very relevant to the trial. My
client is entitled not to have a trial by surprise, and
tend to anticipate what the testimony will be and to be
able to respond, and I do feel that, by going forward
without having that discovery, which again . . . was
narrowly tailored, he had the opportunity to object to
it, really disadvantages my client.’’
After the court denied the defendant’s motion for a
continuance, the defendant then sought permission
from the court to file a motion to preclude undisclosed
evidence and testimony. After counsel for the plaintiff
expressed that he felt ‘‘sandbagged’’ by the defendant’s
motion in that it was being filed on the day of trial,3
3
The following colloquy ensued:
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Before we move forward, Your Honor, I do
not mean to be overly litigious, but I do have one more motion that I would
like to file prior to going to trial. It is a motion to preclude undisclosed
evidence and testimony. I would ask that I be allowed to file that motion
and, if you deny it, to have it on the record.
‘‘The Court: Why didn’t you file that?
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Well, I was in—I have it prepared. . . . I did
not feel this motion was appropriate, given the pending motion for summary
judgment and then the pending motion for [a continuance]. . . .
‘‘The Court: But, counsel, you did know that, if the motion for summary
judgment was denied, that you were going to trial today.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Well, I did not know . . . because I had filed
the motion for [a continuance] and that was pending.
‘‘The Court: But you didn’t file that until this afternoon.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Because there would not have been a need
for a motion for [a continuance] if the motion for summary judgment
was granted.
‘‘The Court: Correct. But attorneys do it all the time in the abundance of
caution if . . . my motion for whatever gets denied, I also have these other
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the court declined to consider the motion due to its
untimeliness.
The court then proceeded on the trial of the matter,
at which the plaintiff introduced the testimony of its
property manager, Young, and its maintenance man-
ager, Eliyahu Katz.4 The defendant testified on his
own behalf.
On June 3, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of
decision concluding that the plaintiff had proven the
allegations of its complaint and rejecting the defen-
dant’s special defenses. As to his defense that he had
the right to cure, and did cure, his nonpayment by
sending payments for the outstanding rent to the plain-
tiff prior to the quit date, the court found that, pursuant
to the lease agreement, the plaintiff was required to
allow the defendant an opportunity to cure his nonpay-
ments within nine days after the beginning of each
month when his portion of the rent became due. The
court further found that, ‘‘[o]nce the notice to quit,
which stated that any future payments would be for
use and occupancy only, was served, however, the
defendant’s opportunity to cure was extinguished.’’ As
to the defendant’s second special defense of equitable
nonforfeiture, the court found that the defendant did
not act with clean hands and therefore that his nonpay-
ment of rent was wilful. The court therefore rendered
judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff but
stayed the execution of the judgment through July 31,
motions that could have been heard and at least considered, and [the]
plaintiff’s counsel could have had an opportunity to review them and respond
to them or at least be able to say something today before trial started, but
we’re here right now. It is almost three o’clock on the day of trial.’’
The court concluded: ‘‘I mean, you had an opportunity, you knew that it
was a possibility that your motion for summary judgment could be denied
and that you were potentially going to go to trial today . . . and you chose
not to file your motion to preclude. So, I’m not going to consider that at
this time.’’
4
Katz also was a principal of the plaintiff.
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2024, and ordered the defendant to continue to make
use and occupancy payments to the plaintiff.5 This
appeal followed.
I
The defendant first claims that the court violated
his constitutional right to due process by denying his
motion for a continuance of the trial and refusing to
consider his motion to preclude evidence and testimony
that had not previously been disclosed by the plaintiff.6
When the trial court denied his motion for a continu-
ance, the defendant argued, inter alia, that ‘‘[t]his is a
due process issue. In summary process, obviously, a
person’s housing is at stake. Due process is very
important.’’ The defendant essentially reiterates that
argument to this court, arguing that he has a constitu-
tional right to housing as a ‘‘welfare entitlement . . . .’’
Even if we were to credit the defendant’s argument that
he has a constitutional property interest in subsidized
housing, he failed to identify, either to the trial court
or in his brief to this court, which of his due process
rights were violated. At oral argument before this court,
the defendant asserted for the first time that his consti-
tutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination
had been violated. ‘‘[I]t is well settled that arguments
cannot be raised for the first time at oral argument.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaccaro v. Shell
Beach Condominium, Inc., 169 Conn. App. 21, 46 n.28,
5
On July 18, 2024, the parties entered into a stipulation that the defendant
would pay $93 each month for use and occupancy of the premises while
this appeal is pending.
6
The defendant argues, for the first time in his reply brief, that the court’s
denial of his motion for a continuance and failure to consider his motion
to preclude constituted an abuse of discretion. ‘‘[I]t is . . . a well established
principle that arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Commissioner of Correction,
211 Conn. App. 77, 101, 271 A.3d 1058, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 924, 275 A.3d
1213, cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. Quiros, U.S. , 143 S. Ct. 335,
214 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2022).
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148 A.3d 1123 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 917, 154
A.3d 1008 (2017). Additionally, the defendant did not file
a motion to preclude previously nondisclosed evidence
with the trial court.7 The record is therefore inadequate
to review on appeal any challenge to the court’s decision
not to consider the defendant’s proposed motion. See
Nedder v. Nedder, 226 Conn. App. 817, 822 n.2, 320
A.3d 180 (2024) (‘‘[i]t is a well established principle of
appellate procedure that the appellant has the duty of
providing this court with a record adequate to afford
review’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). The defen-
dant’s claim that his right to due process was violated
therefore fails.
II
The defendant next claims that the court applied the
wrong legal standard in rejecting his special defense
of equitable nonforfeiture. Specifically, the defendant
argues that the court used an incorrect definition of
‘‘wilful.’’ We are not persuaded.
‘‘The doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture is a defense
implicating the right of possession that may be raised
in a summary process proceeding, and is based on the
principle that [e]quity abhors . . . a forfeiture. . . .
Equitable principles barring forfeitures may apply to
summary process actions for nonpayment of rent if: (1)
the tenant’s breach was not [wilful] or grossly negligent;
(2) upon eviction the tenant will suffer a loss wholly
disproportionate to the injury to the landlord; and (3)
the landlord’s injury is reparable. . . . Regarding the
first requirement, we have explained that [wilful] or
7
We note that the record does not reflect, nor does the defendant argue,
that the court prevented the defendant from filing his motion to preclude.
The court simply declined to consider the defendant’s proposed motion due
to its untimeliness. The defendant should have filed his motion to properly
preserve his claim on appeal. See Practice Book § 61-10 (a). He failed to
do so.
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gross negligence in failing to fulfill a condition prece-
dent of a lease bars the application of the doctrine of
equitable nonforfeiture. . . . In circumstances involv-
ing the nonpayment of rent, we have construed strictly
this threshold requirement in deciding whether to grant
equitable relief.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Boccanfuso v. Daghoghi, 337 Conn.
228, 239–40, 253 A.3d 1 (2020).
In addressing the defendant’s claim of equitable non-
forfeiture, the court explained: ‘‘[The defendant] claims
that his intentional withholding of rent was based on his
housing conditions and his ignorance of the prohibition
against self-help. The defendant further asserts that,
once he received the notice to quit, he sought advice,
and paid use and occupancy for January through April.
He maintains that, as a disabled veteran with case man-
agement who will likely become homeless if evicted,
the pursuit of summary process is unethical, immoral,
unreasonable and unkind. The defendant has not estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence that the
court should exercise its equitable powers under these
circumstances. . . .
‘‘In the present case, the defendant has not produced
any evidence that his intentional nonpayment of rent
was accompanied by a good faith intent to comply with
the lease or a good faith dispute over the meaning of the
lease. The lease provides the procedure for reporting
housing condition issues to the plaintiff. Section 3.2 of
the lease agreement requires the defendant to ‘report
any damage or problem immediately upon discovery’
and indicates that the plaintiff’s compliance with or
response to ‘any oral request regarding security or non-
security matters doesn’t waive the strict requirement
for written notices under this Lease Contract. You must
promptly notify us in writing of: water leaks; electrical
problems; malfunctioning lights; broken or missing
locks or latches; [and] other conditions that pose a
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hazard to the property, or your health, or safety.’ The
defendant not only signed the lease containing this pro-
vision but actually used the procedure to resolve his
mailbox key issue. The defendant told Young that he
did not pay February rent and should not have a late
fee because he had not yet received a mailbox key. She
informed him that he needed to use the online portal
to make a request and removed the late fee. Once the
defendant did, the plaintiff resolved the mailbox key
issue in twenty-four to forty-eight hours. But, even after
the reason for the withholding, his lack of a mailbox
key, was fully resolved, the defendant still did not pay
his February rent. In fact, he did not pay February rent
until after the notice to quit was issued. The defendant’s
actions do not demonstrate a good faith intent to com-
ply with the lease. The defendant was well aware of
the process for prompt remediation of any housing con-
ditions, but he presented no evidence that he ever
sought to engage in that process again. Instead, he
waited another nearly [two and one-half] months, not
to request redress of his housing problems through the
online portal, but to file a complaint with the Hamden
Housing Authority. . . .
‘‘The defendant does not claim that he is not required
to pay his portion of the rent, nor could he claim, or
prove, that the plaintiff breached the lease agreement.
The defendant chose not to use the plaintiff’s official
reporting system after the mailbox key issue was
resolved, which would have triggered the plaintiff’s obli-
gations to fix any issues. He was so aggressive toward
Young that she refused to interact with him directly.
Even if the defendant and Young could not communi-
cate with each other, due to the defendant’s own
actions, nothing prevented him from continuing to use
the online portal to seek resolution of his housing condi-
tion issues. Such actions demonstrate that the defen-
dant’s nonpayment was wilful, and he was not acting
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with clean hands. Therefore, the defendant’s second
special defense fails.’’ (Citations omitted.)
The defendant contends that, in so ruling, the court
applied an incorrect legal standard in determining
whether his nonpayment of rent was wilful. ‘‘The ple-
nary standard of review applies to the preliminary issue
of whether the court applied the correct legal standard
in evaluating [a defendant’s] special defense.’’8 (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Milford Redevelopment &
Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593,
616, 325 A.3d 971 (2024), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 902,
329 A.3d 239 (2025).
Our Supreme Court has held that ‘‘[a] court of equity
will apply the doctrine of clean hands to a tenant seek-
ing . . . equitable relief; thus, a tenant whose breach
was [wilful] or grossly negligent will not be entitled to
relief. . . . It is axiomatic that, [when] a [party] seeks
equitable relief, he must show that his conduct has been
fair, equitable and honest as to the particular contro-
versy in issue.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Boccanfuso v. Daghoghi, supra, 337
Conn. 245. ‘‘[A] tenant’s intentional nonpayment of rent
does not require a finding that the nonpayment is wilful
under the equitable nonforfeiture doctrine if nonpay-
ment is accompanied by a good faith intent to comply
8
Ordinarily, ‘‘[w]e employ the abuse of discretion standard when
reviewing a trial court’s decision to exercise its equitable powers.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Boccanfuso v. Daghoghi, supra, 337 Conn. 239.
The defendant has made clear, however, that his challenge to the court’s
rejection of his equitable defense is limited to his claim that the court applied
the incorrect legal standard. Specifically, in his appellate brief, the defendant
states: ‘‘The defendant acknowledges that, when the question before the
Appellate Court is whether the trial court’s choice to withhold equitable
relief was unreasonable or unjust, the proper standard of review is abuse
of discretion. . . . However, this is not the question before this court. The
question before this court is whether the [trial] court applied the correct
legal standard in determining whether the defendant was entitled to equitable
relief and, under such circumstances, plenary review is required.’’ (Citation
omitted; emphasis in original.)
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ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson

with the lease or a good faith dispute over the meaning
of a lease.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 241–
42. ‘‘[W]e [also] have previously noted that wilful is a
word of many meanings, and its construction [is] often
. . . influenced by its context . . . .’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 246–47.
Consistent with the aforementioned principles, the
court found that the defendant did not act with clean
hands and did not demonstrate a good faith intent to
comply with the lease in that he did not notify the
plaintiff of his issues with the conditions of the premises
in writing as required by the lease. The defendant con-
tends that the court should have based its wilfulness
determination on whether his nonpayment was ‘‘ ‘not
without just cause or excuse’ ’’ or whether it constituted
‘‘ ‘mere neglect’ ’’ in that he relied on the advice of his
HUD-VASH counselor. Although those may have been
alternative measures of the defendant’s wilfulness, the
defendant has cited no authority, nor are we aware of
any, that requires the trial court to apply a specific
definition of wilfulness. Accordingly, we cannot con-
clude that the trial court’s reliance on a recognized and
legally correct definition of wilfulness constituted error.
III
The defendant finally claims that the court erred in
rejecting his special defense that he had a right to cure,
and did cure, his nonpayment of rent. We disagree.
In addressing the defendant’s argument that he cured
his nonpayment of rent, the court reasoned: ‘‘The defen-
dant contends in his first special defense that he had
the right to cure, and did cure, his nonpayment prior
to the April 7 quit date when he sent four money orders
to the plaintiff’s counsel via certified mail for his portion
of rent that was due for January through April. He
argues that the court should apply the contract law
principle articulated in Centerplan Construction Co.,
LLC v. Hartford, 343 Conn. 368, [412, 274 A.3d 51]
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ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson

(2022), that, when a contract is silent as to notice and
cure rights, the right to cure is implied unless expressly
waived.
‘‘That principle is inapplicable to this case, as the
lease agreement is not silent as to the defendant’s notice
and cure rights. Section 1.3 of the lease agreement states
that the defendant ‘must pay your rent on or before the
1st day of each month within 10 days of grace period.
. . . If you don’t pay rent on time, you’ll be delinquent
and all remedies under this Lease Contract will be
authorized.’ Similarly, section 4.2 of the lease agreement
states: ‘You’ll be in default under this lease agreement
if you do not make every rent payment by the tenth
(10th) calendar day of the month when such payment
is due or if you . . . [violate] any terms of this Lease
Contract including but not limited to the following viola-
tions: failure to pay rent or other amounts that you owe
when due . . . . If you are in default for any reason,
we, at our option, pursue any and all remedies available
to us pursuant to Connecticut law.’ These provisions
are consistent with General Statutes § 47a-15a,9 which
defines a grace period as the nine day time period after
the first day that rent is due and unpaid.
‘‘By the provisions of the lease agreement and state
law, the plaintiff was required to allow the defendant
an opportunity to cure his nonpayments within nine
days after the beginning of each month when his portion
of the rent payments became due. The plaintiff could
have chosen to accept payment after the 10th day but
before the notice to quit was served. Once the notice
to quit, which stated that any future payments would
9
General Statutes § 47a-15a (a) provides: ‘‘If rent is unpaid when due and
the tenant fails to pay rent within nine days thereafter or, in the case of a
one-week tenancy, within four days thereafter, the landlord may terminate
the rental agreement in accordance with the provisions of sections 47a-23
to 47a-23b, inclusive. For purposes of this section, ‘grace period’ means the
nine-day or four-day time periods identified in this subsection, as applicable.’’
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be for use and occupancy only, was served, however,
the defendant’s opportunity to cure was extinguished.
. . . Because the defendant did not pay his rent portion
prior to service of the notice to quit, his special defense
must fail.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote added.)
The defendant claims that the court erroneously found
that the lease agreement was not silent as to notice and
cure rights and, therefore, erred in holding that he had
no common-law right to cure. The defendant’s claim
‘‘presents a question of contract interpretation because
a lease is a contract, and, therefore, it is subject to
the same rules of construction as other contracts. . . .
Although ordinarily the question of contract interpreta-
tion, being a question of the parties’ intent, is a question
of fact . . . [when] there is definitive contract lan-
guage, the determination of what the parties intended
by their . . . commitments is a question of law [over
which our review is plenary]. . . .
‘‘The intent of the parties as expressed in [writing]
is determined from the language used interpreted in
the light of the situation of the parties and the circum-
stances connected with the transaction. . . . [T]he
intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and
reasonable construction of the written words and . . .
the language used must be accorded its common, natu-
ral, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be
sensibly applied to the subject matter of the [writing].’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Gateway Development/East Lyme, LLC v. Duong, 227
Conn. App. 38, 46, 321 A.3d 489 (2024).
In arguing that the court erroneously found that the
lease agreement was not silent as to the right to cure,
the defendant asserts that the court erred in treating
the nine day grace period contained in the lease agree-
ment as a cure period. He contends that a grace period
is not a cure period. Because the defendant has pro-
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ECR 2, LLC v. Thompson

vided no more than a conclusory statement in this
regard, unaccompanied by any legal authority, we
decline to address this argument. See MacDermid, Inc.
v. Leonetti, 328 Conn. 726, 748, 183 A.3d 611 (2018)
(actual analysis, not mere assertions, is required for
briefing to be adequate).
Moreover, the unambiguous language of the lease
agreement provided notice to the defendant that his
failure to pay his rent on the first of each month or
within nine days thereafter would constitute a default
of the agreement and that, ‘‘if [his] rent [was] delinquent,
[he] immediately forfeit[ed] all rights to occupy the
apartment any longer . . . .’’ That language clearly
indicates that, outside of the nine day grace period,
there is no right to cure once a tenant defaults on his
rent obligation. See Gateway Development/East Lyme,
LLC v. Duong, supra, 227 Conn. App. 47–48 (plain and
unambiguous language of sublease agreement made
clear that pretermination notice and cure period were
not required in context of default for nonpayment of
rent where agreement provided that, ‘‘if the defendants
fail to pay rent within ten days after it is due, the plaintiff
may ‘immediately initiate’ legal action to recover pos-
session of the premises, ‘without prior notice’ to the
defendants’’). We therefore conclude that the defen-
dant’s argument that he had a right to cure his nonpay-
ment of rent is unavailing.10
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
10
The defendant argues in his reply brief that the provision of General
Statutes § 47a-23 that requires a landlord to give a defaulting tenant three
days notice in the notice to quit must be read to mean that ‘‘the time
between the service of the notice [to quit] and the quit date is the mandatory
reasonable time to cure said breach.’’ Not only does this court not consider
claims made for the first time in a reply brief; see Lewis v. Commissioner
of Correction, 211 Conn. App. 77, 101, 271 A.3d 1058 (arguments cannot be
raised for first time in reply brief), cert. denied, 343 Conn. 924, 275 A.3d
1213, cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. Quiros, U.S. , 143 S. Ct. 335,
214 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2022); but this argument has no basis in the law.