Lombardi v. Westport

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Lombardi v. Westport

KENNETH LOMBARDI v. TOWN OF WESTPORT
(AC 47490)
Alvord, Elgo and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, a retired firefighter who had been employed by the defendant
town’s fire department, appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the
defendant, rendered following its granting of the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly con-
cluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim alleging that the defendant had breached the terms
of a pension plan. Held:

The trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment, as there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff was
not entitled to a disability retirement pension on the basis that he did not
have certifications from at least three physicians that he was disabled so
as to be permanently disqualified from service of all duties as a regular full-
time firefighter, which was required by the plain and unambiguous language
of the pension plan.
Argued March 5—officially released May 13, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for breach of contract,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Clark,
J., granted the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the
plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Thomas W. Bucci, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Cindy M. Cieslak, with whom, on the brief, was
Michael J. Rose, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The plaintiff, Kenneth Lombardi, appeals
from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court
in favor of the defendant, the town of Westport. On
appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
concluded that there were no genuine issues of material
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Lombardi v. Westport

fact as to the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim alleging
that the defendant breached the terms of a pension
plan. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.1
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff commenced the
present action in October, 2022. In his single count
complaint, filed on October 27, 2022, the plaintiff
alleged in relevant part as follows. The plaintiff was
employed by the defendant as a firefighter for thirty-
seven years. On March 31, 2017, the plaintiff notified
the defendant’s personnel director, Ralph Chetcuti, that
he would be retiring, effective May 1, 2017. The plaintiff
requested a disability retirement pension on account
of an ear injury, resulting in hearing loss, that he had
sustained while performing his duties as a firefighter
in 2004. Chetcuti subsequently informed the plaintiff
that he did not qualify for a disability retirement pen-
sion. On April 30, 2017, the plaintiff rescinded his notice
of retirement. However, following an exchange between
the Westport Uniformed Firefighters Association and
Chetcuti, the plaintiff reinstated his request for a disabil-
ity retirement pension and retired effective June 1, 2017.
The plaintiff’s entitlement to a disability retirement
pension is set forth in a collective bargaining agreement
between the defendant and the Westport Firefighter’s
Local 1081, International Association of Firefighters,
AFL-CIO (pension plan), which is administered by the
defendant’s Fire Pension Board (board). Under the pen-
sion plan, a covered individual is entitled to a disability
retirement pension ‘‘[u]pon certification by [at] least
three (3) physicians appointed by the [board]’’ that he
‘‘is disabled so as to be permanently disqualified from
1
The plaintiff also claims that the court erred in concluding that the
plaintiff was collaterally estopped from bringing the present action. Because
we affirm the court’s determination that there were no genuine issues of
material fact with respect to the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, we
need not address that alternative contention.
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Lombardi v. Westport

service of all duties as a regular full time firefighter,
such disability having occurred during actual perfor-
mance of duty, or resulting from the effects of any
injury received, disease contracted, or exposure
endured while in the actual discharge of his duties
. . . .’’ To aid in its determination of whether the plain-
tiff qualified for a disability retirement pension, the
board accepted and considered medical evaluations
from two physicians selected by the plaintiff, who
opined that the plaintiff ‘‘suffered from permanent hear-
ing disabilities rendering him unfit for duty as a fire-
fighter.’’ In addition, the board referred the plaintiff to
Craig Hecht, a physician, for an independent examina-
tion. ‘‘Hecht’s findings were consistent with the conclu-
sions of [the other two physicians], except [for] Hecht’s
conclusion that the plaintiff could perform ‘90 percent
of his job responsibilities’ . . . .’’ In December, 2017,
the board denied the plaintiff’s request for a disability
retirement pension.
In his complaint, the plaintiff asserted a claim of
breach of contract. In support of his claim, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, acting through the board,
‘‘wrongfully denied the plaintiff the disability retirement
pension to which he was entitled under the [pension
plan].’’ The defendant filed an answer and special
defenses in December, 2022, and the plaintiff filed a
reply thereafter.
In August, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiff
had not established entitlement to a disability retire-
ment pension under the terms of the pension plan. The
motion was accompanied by a memorandum of law
and exhibits, including the pension plan document. In
its memorandum of law, the defendant argued that ‘‘the
[board] is entitled to deference when it determined
that the plaintiff did not meet the requirements of the
[pension] plan; to wit, that he failed to produce the
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Lombardi v. Westport

requisite three [independent medical examinations] by
board-appointed doctors all finding him disabled from
all regular duties. This fact is not disputed, nor is it
disputable, by the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s failure to
establish the necessary prerequisite to a disability pen-
sion is fatal to his claim.’’ The plaintiff filed a memoran-
dum of law in opposition to the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, which was accompanied by exhib-
its, including the physicians’ medical reports, and the
plaintiff’s affidavit. The defendant filed a reply.
The trial court, Clark, J., held oral argument on the
defendant’s motion in November, 2023. On March 15,
2024, the court issued its memorandum of decision,
granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
on two separate grounds; see footnote 1 of this opinion;
one of which was that the plaintiff did not meet ‘‘the
clear and unambiguous qualifying language that the
[board] and/or [defendant] is bound by contractually.’’
In making its decision, the court further recounted that
‘‘the evidence presented demonstrates that the qualify-
ing language for a disability pension requires certain
verification of the disability through an independent
medical report ordered by the [board]’’ and ‘‘the action
of the [board] and/or the [defendant] in not awarding
a disability pension to the plaintiff is not arbitrary or
some abuse of discretion or misapplication of the appli-
cable contract/pension.’’ This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in
granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the court
improperly concluded that no genuine issue of material
fact existed as to the plaintiff’s entitlement to a disabil-
ity retirement pension. We disagree.
‘‘As a preliminary matter, we note the well established
standard that governs our review of a trial court’s deci-
sion to grant a motion for summary judgment. Practice
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Lombardi v. Westport

Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any
other proof submitted show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding
a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. . . . [T]he moving party . . . has
the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue
as to all the material facts . . . . When documents sub-
mitted in support of a motion for summary judgment
fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit
documents establishing the existence of such an issue.
. . . Once the moving party has met its burden, how-
ever, the [nonmoving] party must present evidence that
demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual
issue. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to
grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Water-
bury v. Brennan, 228 Conn. App. 206, 212, 325 A.3d
237, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 923, 325 A.3d 1094 (2024).
‘‘It is axiomatic that a collective bargaining agreement
is a contract. . . . For that reason, [p]rinciples of con-
tract law guide our interpretation of collective bar-
gaining agreements.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 215. ‘‘Although ordinarily the
question of contract interpretation, being a question of
the parties’ intent, is a question of fact . . . [w]here
there is definitive contract language, the determination
of what the parties intended by their contractual com-
mitments is a question of law. . . . [T]he interpretation
and construction of a written contract present only
questions of law, within the province of the court . . .
so long as the contract is unambiguous and the intent
of the parties can be determined from the agreement’s
face. . . . Contract language is unambiguous when it
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Lombardi v. Westport

has a definite and precise meaning about which there
is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion. . . .
A court will not torture words to import ambiguity
where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambigu-
ity, and words do not become ambiguous simply
because lawyers or laymen contend for different mean-
ings. . . . When only one interpretation of a contract
is possible, the court need not look outside the four
corners of the contract . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 213–14.
The pension plan in the present case plainly and
unambiguously provides that a participant is entitled
to receive and will be granted a disability retirement
pension: ‘‘Upon certification by [at] least three (3) phy-
sicians appointed by the [board] that a Participant is
disabled so as to be permanently disqualified from
service of all duties as a regular full time firefighter,
such disability having occurred during actual perfor-
mance of duty, or resulting from the effects of any
injury received, disease contracted, or exposure
endured while in the actual discharge of his duties
. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) In addition, it is undisputed
that one of the three physicians, Hecht, determined
that the plaintiff could perform 90 percent of his job
responsibilities and did not certify that the plaintiff
was disabled so as to be permanently disqualified from
service of all duties as a regular full-time firefighter.
Accordingly, there exists no genuine issue of material
fact that the plaintiff was not entitled to a disability
retirement pension on the basis that he did not have
certifications from at least three physicians.2 Therefore,
2
In arguing that there existed a genuine issue of material fact, the plaintiff
also asserts that the trial court erred in stating that ‘‘[t]he only evidence
submitted by either party for consideration is the report of [Hecht] . . . .’’
In addition, the plaintiff argues that ‘‘the trial court erred in finding that there
is no independent medical report ordered by the [board] which confirms
the disability of the plaintiff.’’ Regardless of any misstatements made by the
trial court, there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the plain-
tiff’s claim.
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the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.