DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

PAUL DISPAZIO ET AL. v. EUGENE
PACAPELLI ET AL.
(AC 47007)
Elgo, Westbrook and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendants,
rendered following its granting of the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, and from the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion
for sanctions pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 1-25). The plaintiffs claimed,
inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that a release of liability that
they had executed in connection with prior litigation precluded the present
action. Held:

The trial court appropriately rendered summary judgment for the defendants
because it properly determined that there were no genuine issues of material
fact and that the release barred the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants
as a matter of law, as the claims were inchoate claims that were contemplated
at the time of the release, although they may not have manifested themselves
at that time.

The trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the defendants as a sanction
pursuant to Practice Book § 1-25 was not improper because the plaintiffs’
claims were without a basis in law and fact, as they were barred under the
clear and unambiguous terms of the release, and the award, made pursuant
to § 1-25, did not require the court to find that the plaintiffs had acted in
bad faith.
Argued January 8—officially released March 25, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, intentional
misrepresentation, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven,
where the court, Abrams, J., granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment
thereon; thereafter, the court, Abrams, J., granted the
defendants’ motion for sanctions, and the plaintiffs
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Kenneth A. Votre, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Timothy M. Gondek, for the appellees (defendants).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The plaintiffs, Paul DiSpazio and
Maltby Street, LLC (Maltby Street), appeal from the trial
court’s rendering of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, Eugene Pacapelli and other officers and
members of the board of directors of West Cove Marina
Coop, Inc. (West Cove),1 and from its granting of the
defendants’ motion for sanctions. The plaintiffs claim
that the court improperly granted (1) the defendants’
motion for summary judgment because a release of
liability entered into by the plaintiffs for the benefit of
West Cove in connection with prior litigation (2015
release) did not preclude the present action; and (2) the
defendants’ motion for sanctions because the plaintiffs’
claims were not without basis in law or fact and the
court did not make a requisite finding of bad faith.
We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
the court.
The following facts, which are undisputed, and proce-
dural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
West Cove is a cooperative association and Maltby Street
is a former dock unit owner in the association. In 2013,
West Cove brought an action against Maltby Street seek-
ing, inter alia, to foreclose on a statutory lien that West
Cove held in accordance with General Statutes (Rev.
to 2013) § 47-258 on property located at 13 Kimberly
Avenue in West Haven (prior action). See West Cove
Marina Coop, Inc. v. Maltby Street, LLC, Superior
Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-
XX-XXXXXXX-S. Maltby Street filed a counterclaim against
West Cove. In January, 2014, West Cove sold the prop-
erty located at 13 Kimberly Avenue to The City Point
Yacht Club, Inc. In 2015, West Cove and Maltby Street
1
The other defendants are Cynthia Nicoletti, an officer and/or director
of West Cove; Rogers Conant, the president of West Cove; Edward Hyland,
an officer or director of West Cove; and Charles Ambrogio, an officer and/
or director of West Cove.
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

resolved the litigation by way of a settlement agree-
ment.
On July 2, 2015, as part of the settlement agreement,
the plaintiffs executed the 2015 release. The 2015
release provided that the releasors included the plain-
tiffs and that the releasees included ‘‘West Cove . . .
and [its] officers, directors, shareholders, agents, and
legal representatives . . . .’’ It further provided that the
plaintiffs, in exchange for $38,000, agreed to ‘‘remise,
release and forever discharge the said [r]eleasee[s] of
and from all . . . causes of actions . . . which against
the said [r]eleasee[s], the [r]eleasor[s] ever had, now
ha[ve] or hereafter can, shall, or may have, including
but not limited to . . . any and all claims arising out
of or relating to the [r]eleasee[s’] approval, authority,
decision to sell, and sale of the property known as 13
Kimberly Avenue . . . to The City Point Yacht Club,
Inc. . . . in accordance with a purchase and sale agree-
ment between the parties dated January 31, 2014 . . .
including . . . any claim of lack of authority of the
[r]eleasee[s] to receive the proceeds of the sale and
hold or disburse those proceeds as the [a]ssociation
determines is necessary and appropriate . . . .’’
The plaintiffs commenced the present action in
December, 2019. In the complaint, the plaintiffs
asserted four counts alleging intentional misrepresenta-
tion, negligent misrepresentation, statutory theft in vio-
lation of General Statutes § 52-564,2 and conversion.
Each count was premised on the following allegations.
The plaintiffs, holding membership and/or ownership
interests in West Cove, ‘‘made several requests to the
defendants to provide them [with] an accounting and
a synopsis of West Cove’s records so that they could
2
General Statutes § 52-564 provides: ‘‘Any person who steals any property
of another, or knowingly receives and conceals stolen property, shall pay
the owner treble his damages.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

understand a certain distribution of assets and pro-
ceeds’’ resulting from the sale of 13 Kimberly Avenue,
which was ‘‘done and authorized by the defendants.’’
When West Cove sold 13 Kimberly Avenue, ‘‘the pro-
ceeds were not properly distributed.’’ Despite the plain-
tiffs’ requests, ‘‘[t]he defendants individually and per-
sonally have taken steps to conceal their activities
relating to the distribution . . . and have refused to
fully explain or to account for the assets in question
and/or the proceeds from the disbursement and/or sale
of the assets.’’ ‘‘The defendants personally deceived
the plaintiffs and provided scant details, little to no
accounting and made misleading statements and repre-
sentations regarding this transaction to the plaintiffs.’’
On April 14, 2021, the defendants filed an answer and
special defenses in which they claimed, inter alia, that
the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants were barred
by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata.
On July 12, 2022, the defendants moved for summary
judgment on the complaint in its entirety. The defen-
dants argued, inter alia, that the 2015 release precluded
the plaintiffs from bringing the present action. On
March 30, 2023, following oral argument on the defen-
dants’ motion for summary judgment, the court,
Abrams, J., issued an order granting the motion. In
its order, the court stated: ‘‘Upon review of the [2015
release], it is abundantly clear to the court that no
genuine issue exists regarding the fact that it encom-
passes the plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety. To find
otherwise would run counter to the public policy sup-
porting parties resolving their disputes through releases
of claims. The plaintiffs’ arguments that the claims were
not released are conclusory at best. The court feels
compelled to add that it considers the filing of this
lawsuit in the face of the existence [of] the [2015]
release to have tenuous ethical support.’’ The court
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

thereafter rendered summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on the complaint in its entirety.
On May 3, 2023, the defendants, pursuant to Practice
Book § 1-25,3 filed a motion for sanctions, requesting
that the court order the plaintiffs to pay the defendants’
attorney’s fees and costs. The defendants argued, inter
alia, that no good faith basis existed for the plaintiffs’
commencement of the present action and that the
defendants were forced to expend considerable time
and money defending the claims. On August 21, 2023,
after a hearing on the defendants’ motion for sanctions,
the court issued an order granting the motion. In its
order, the court stated: ‘‘The court hereby concludes
that the underlying action was brought ‘without basis
in law and fact’ and orders the plaintiff[s] to pay the
defendant[s] the requested sum of $16,548. Practice
Book § 1-25.’’ This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiffs first claim that the court improperly
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
because the 2015 release did not preclude the present
action. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that they did
not release the present claims against the defendants
because their claims arise out of their shareholder inter-
ests in West Cove, not the sale of 13 Kimberly Avenue.
They further argue that they did not release the claims
at issue because, at some point ‘‘[a]fter the resolution
3
Practice Book § 1-25 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) No party or attorney
shall bring or defend an action, or assert or oppose a claim or contention,
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous. . . .
‘‘(b) . . . [T]he judicial authority, solely on its own motion and after a
hearing, may impose sanctions for actions that include . . . [f]iling of plead-
ings, motions, objections, requests or other documents that violate subsec-
tion (a) . . . .
‘‘(c) The judicial authority may impose sanctions including, but not limited
to, fines pursuant to General Statutes § 51-84; orders requiring the offending
party to pay costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees; and orders
restricting the filing of papers with the court.’’
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

of the prior action, [the plaintiffs] became aware that
the defendants were in the process of liquidating West
Cove’’ and, therefore, their shareholder interests in the
dissolution of West Cove had not yet accrued when the
2015 release was executed.4 We disagree.

As a preliminary matter, we note the well established
standard that governs our review of a trial court’s deci-
sion to grant a motion for summary judgment. ‘‘Practice
Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any
other proof submitted show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding
a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. . . . [T]he moving party . . . has
the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue
as to all the material facts . . . . When documents sub-
mitted in support of a motion for summary judgment
4
The plaintiffs additionally argue that, pursuant to Audubon Parking
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 812,
626 A.2d 729 (1993) (Audubon) (court properly summarily enforced release
agreement executed in midst of litigation), and Matos v. Ortiz, 166 Conn.
App. 775, 797–98, 144 A.3d 425 (2016) (court improperly summarily enforced
release agreement executed prior to commencement of litigation because
claims had not yet fully accrued at time of execution), the court was not
authorized to summarily enforce the 2015 release in the present matter. In
Matos, this court explained that ‘‘[w]e have never extended Audubon to
agreements that, when made, remained wholly outside the court’s domain
because no one had yet invoked the court’s jurisdiction through service of
a summons and complaint. That initial invocation of the court’s authority
distinguishes an agreement to settle litigation—which may be summarily
enforced by [an] Audubon motion—from a preemptive release of claims—
which may be enforced through a motion for summary judgment or by
presentation at trial as a special defense.’’ Id., 808. In the present matter,
the defendants did not file an Audubon motion. Rather, they filed a motion
for summary judgment in which they argued that the plaintiffs’ claims were
barred by the terms of the 2015 release. Accordingly, Audubon and Matos
have no bearing on whether the court properly granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment in this case.
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit
documents establishing the existence of such an issue.
. . . Once the moving party has met its burden, how-
ever, the [nonmoving] party must present evidence that
demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual
issue. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to
grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Water-
bury v. Brennan, 228 Conn. App. 206, 212, 325 A.3d
237, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 923, 325 A.3d 1094 (2024).
The following additional principles guide our review
of whether the 2015 release barred the plaintiffs’ claims
against the defendants. ‘‘A release agreement is a con-
tract. It is well settled that a release, being a contract
whereby a party abandons a claim to a person against
whom that claim exists, is subject to rules governing
the construction of contracts. . . . A trial court has
the inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement
agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the
agreement are clear and unambiguous. . . . Although
ordinarily the question of contract interpretation, being
a question of the parties’ intent is a question of fact
. . . [w]here there is definitive contract language, the
determination of what the parties intended by their
contractual commitments is a question of law. . . .
The court’s determination as to whether a contract is
ambiguous is a question of law; our standard of review,
therefore, is de novo. . . .
‘‘A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear
and conveys a definite and precise intent. . . . The
court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where
ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . .
Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance differ-
ent interpretations of the language in question does not
necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambigu-
ous. . . . In contrast, a contract is ambiguous if the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

intent of the parties is not clear and certain from the
language of the contract itself. . . . [A]ny ambiguity in
a contract must emanate from the language used by
the parties. . . . The contract must be viewed in its
entirety, with each provision read in light of the other
provisions . . . and every provision must be given
effect if it is possible to do so. . . . If the language of
the contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, the contract is ambiguous.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dunn v.
Etzel, 166 Conn. App. 386, 392–93, 141 A.3d 990 (2016).
The plaintiffs first argue that their present claims
arise out of their shareholder interests in the disburse-
ment of West Cove’s assets and proceeds rather than
out of the sale of 13 Kimberly Avenue and, therefore, the
2015 release did not release their claims.5 We disagree.
The 2015 release provided that the plaintiffs agreed
to ‘‘release . . . any and all claims arising out of or
relating to’’ the sale of 13 Kimberly Avenue, including
claims related to the releasees’ authority to receive,
hold, or disburse the proceeds of that sale. (Emphasis
added.) The language of the [2015] release is clear and
unambiguous. There is no genuine dispute of material
fact that the defendants are releasees under the 2015
release.6 The record does not support the plaintiffs’
5
The plaintiffs rely on Yanow v. Teal Industries, Inc., 178 Conn. 262, 281,
422 A.2d 311 (1979) (issue was ‘‘whether the trial court was correct in
sustaining the defendants’ motion for summary judgment . . . on the
ground that . . . derivative claims . . . could only be brought by one who,
unlike the plaintiff, was a shareholder of [an entity] acting on behalf of [that
entity] at the time of suit’’), to support their argument that they had a right
to bring claims against the defendants based on their shareholder rights.
The court in the present matter, however, granted summary judgment on
the ground that the 2015 release precluded the plaintiffs’ claims. Whether
the plaintiffs could maintain derivative claims against the defendants is not
at issue on appeal, and Yanow is therefore inapplicable.
6
Although, in response to the defendants’ requests for admissions, the
plaintiffs denied that ‘‘the defendants are among the releasees of the 2015
release,’’ they admit that the defendants are ‘‘officers, directors, sharehold-
ers, agents or legal representatives of West Cove’’ and that the 2015 release
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

argument that their claims against the defendants are
unrelated to the sale of 13 Kimberly Avenue and the
defendants’ authority to disburse the proceeds from
that sale. Although the plaintiffs’ claims concern their
shareholder interests in the disbursement of West
Cove’s assets and proceeds, the only asset at issue is
13 Kimberly Avenue and the only proceeds at issue are
those generated by the sale of that property. Thus, the
plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants directly origi-
nated from the sale of 13 Kimberly Avenue and the
disbursement of those proceeds.
The plaintiffs further argue that their shareholder
interests concerning the dissolution of West Cove had
not yet accrued when the 2015 release was executed
because the plaintiffs did not become aware that West
Cove was liquidating until after the resolution of the
prior action. Therefore, the plaintiffs argue that they
did not release the present claims in the execution of
the 2015 release. The defendants, on the other hand,
contend that ‘‘[t]here are no causes of action or factual
allegations within the complaint which seek damages
related to an alleged ‘dissolution’ of West Cove as an
entity.’’ The defendants further argue that the plaintiffs’
claims were ‘‘specifically contemplated by the [2015]
release and, as such, cannot be held to have been
unknown at the time of its execution.’’ We agree with
the defendants.
Our Supreme Court has stated that, ‘‘[e]xcept in very
rare instances, the settlement and release of a claim
does not cover claims based on events that have not
yet occurred. . . . The usual general release, then, is
not ordinarily construed to include in its coverage
claims based upon occurrences which have their begin-
ning after the instrument is executed. . . . For that
lists ‘‘ ‘West Cove . . . and their officers, directors, shareholders, agents,
and legal representatives’ ’’ as releasees. Accordingly, the plaintiffs necessar-
ily admit that the defendants are releasees.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

reason, language covering future claims and unknown
claims in releases is ordinarily construed to cover only
inchoate claims that are in being at the time of release
but which have not yet manifested themselves.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mul-
doon v. Homestead Insulation Co., 231 Conn. 469, 481–
82, 650 A.2d 1240 (1994). A claim is ‘‘much more
analogous to an inchoate [claim] that [is] in being at
the time of release but which [has] not yet manifested
[itself] than it is to [an] unforeseeable subsequent injury
. . . [when the] consequence was likely within the con-
templation of the parties when they agreed to bar all
claims . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Duni v. United Technologies Corp.,
239 Conn. 19, 29, 682 A.2d 99 (1996).

Here, the plain language of the 2015 release clearly
precluded subsequent claims, as it expressly provides
that the plaintiffs released all causes of action that they
‘‘ever had . . . or hereafter can, shall, or may have’’
against the defendants related to the sale of 13 Kimberly
Avenue. (Emphasis added.) The plain language also
clearly precluded the claims at issue because it included
‘‘any claim of lack of authority of the [r]eleasee[s] to
. . . hold or disburse those proceeds’’ from the sale.
(Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs maintain that this
unambiguous language did not release their rights as
shareholders to pursue claims related to the disburse-
ment of proceeds from the sale. At the time that the
plaintiffs executed the 2015 release, however, they were
aware that they held shareholder interests in West Cove,
that West Cove had sold 13 Kimberly Avenue, and that
West Cove would likely disburse the proceeds from
that sale. Yet the 2015 release contained no exceptions
or provisions intended to preserve the plaintiffs’ claims
against the defendants relating to their shareholder
interests in the disbursement of the proceeds. In fact,
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

the 2015 release expressly precluded such claims. Con-
sequently, the claims at issue concerning the disburse-
ment of proceeds from the sale of 13 Kimberly Avenue
constitute inchoate claims that were contemplated at
the time of release although they may not have mani-
fested themselves at that time.
Furthermore, whether West Cove’s alleged dissolu-
tion began after the execution of the 2015 release is
irrelevant because the plaintiffs, in their complaint,
make no claims or allegations relating to the dissolution
or liquidation of West Cove. Rather, the plaintiffs’ claims
are premised solely on allegations that the defendants
improperly disbursed proceeds from the sale of 13
Kimberly Avenue and failed to fully account to the plain-
tiffs on the disbursement. The sale of 13 Kimberly Ave-
nue took place before the plaintiffs executed the 2015
release, and the disbursement of the proceeds gener-
ated from that sale was clearly contemplated at the
time that the plaintiffs released all claims related to the
sale. Thus, we agree with the trial court that there are
no genuine issues of material fact and the 2015 release
barred the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants as
a matter of law. Summary judgment was therefore
appropriate.
II
The plaintiffs additionally claim that the court
improperly granted the defendants’ motion for sanc-
tions because (1) their claims were not without basis
in law and fact;7 and (2) the court did not make a
requisite finding of bad faith. We are not persuaded.
7
The plaintiffs argue that the court improperly awarded sanctions to the
defendants because they had probable cause to bring the action. In support
of their argument that the court could not award sanctions if the plaintiffs
had probable cause, the plaintiffs state that ‘‘[t]he trial court appears to
order attorney’s fees pursuant to Practice Book § 10-5 and [General Statutes]
§ 52-99.’’ Practice Book § 10-5 and § 52-99 permit the court to order the
payment of expenses if a party made allegations or denials ‘‘without reason-
able cause . . . .’’ The court in the present matter, however, expressly
awarded sanctions pursuant to Practice Book § 1-25. Because Practice Book
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

‘‘[W]e review the trial court’s granting of a motion
for sanctions and attorney’s fees for an abuse of discre-
tion. . . . Under the abuse of discretion standard of
review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption
in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only
upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus,
our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions
of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and
reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it
did. . . .
‘‘Pursuant to Practice Book § 1-25, the trial court has
the authority to impose sanctions and award attorney’s
fees where a party files a document that violates § 1-
25 (a), which provides in relevant part that [n]o party
. . . shall bring . . . an action . . . unless there is a
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) M.
B. v. S. A., 194 Conn. App. 721, 726, 222 A.3d 559 (2019).
The plaintiffs argue that their claims had a basis in
law and fact because they did not release the claims
at issue in this case. We have concluded in part I of
this opinion, however, that the 2015 release clearly pre-
cluded their claims and have therefore rejected the
predicate for the plaintiffs’ argument in this regard.
When the court granted the defendants’ motions for
summary judgment and sanctions, it considered the
2015 release and, in the context of Practice Book § 1-25,
found that the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants
were without a basis in law and fact and had ‘‘tenuous
ethical support’’ because those claims were barred
under the clear and unambiguous terms of the 2015
release. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discre-
tion in granting the defendants’ motion for sanctions
§ 1-25 authorizes the court to impose sanctions when a party brings an
action without basis in law and fact, we construe the plaintiffs’ probable
cause argument as an argument that their action had a basis in law and fact.
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

against the plaintiffs and ordering them to pay attor-
ney’s fees to the defendants pursuant to § 1-25 for filing
a frivolous action.
The plaintiffs nevertheless argue that the court
improperly awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants
because it failed to make a finding that the plaintiffs
had acted in bad faith in pursuing the present action
against the defendants. We disagree.
Our Supreme Court has explained that trial courts
have two sources of authority to impose sanctions.
‘‘One source of the trial court’s authority to impose
sanctions is the court’s inherent power. We have long
recognized that, apart from a specific rule of practice
authorizing a sanction, the trial court has the inherent
power to provide for the imposition of reasonable sanc-
tions, to compel the observance of its rules. . . . In
addition, our rules of practice, adopted by the judges
of the Superior Court in the exercise of their inherent
rule-making authority . . . also [provide] for specific
instances in which a trial court may impose sanctions.’’
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamil-
ton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 9–10, 776 A.2d 1115 (2001).
If a trial court invokes its inherent authority to
impose sanctions, ‘‘Connecticut . . . prohibits the
award of such fees to the prevailing party unless such
award is premised on statutory directives or is pursuant
to contract. An exception to this doctrine may be suc-
cessfully invoked if the losing party has acted in bad
faith and/or vexatiously or wantonly acted for oppres-
sive reasons.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Jacques v. Jacques, 223 Conn. App. 501, 507, 309 A.3d
372 (2024). ‘‘[I]n order to impose sanctions under the
bad faith exception, the trial court must find both that
the litigant’s claims were entirely without color and
that the litigant acted in bad faith. . . . The court must
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
DiSpazio v. Pacapelli

make these findings with a high degree of specificity
. . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 511.
In the present matter, the court did not exercise its
inherent authority to impose sanctions to compel the
observance of its rules. Rather, the court awarded sanc-
tions pursuant to Practice Book § 1-25, which expressly
permits the court to ‘‘impose sanctions including, but
not limited to . . . orders requiring the offending party
to pay costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees
. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 1-25 (c).
Thus, because the court awarded attorney’s fees pursu-
ant to our rules of practice, the court was not required
to make a finding that the plaintiffs acted in bad faith.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.