In re Matthew W.

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In re Matthew W.

IN RE MATTHEW W.*
(AC 47853)
Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed from the judgment of the trial court termi-
nating her parental rights with respect to her minor child. The mother
claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that she had failed
to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning
of the statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (E)). Held:

The trial court’s unchallenged factual findings, including its findings regard-
ing the respondent mother’s transience, mental health issues and substance
abuse, were sufficient to support its determination that the petitioner, the
Commissioner of Children and Families, had proven, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the mother had failed to achieve such degree of personal
rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E), as would encourage the belief
that, within a reasonable time, she could assume a responsible position in
the child’s life.

Argued January 9—officially released February 28, 2025**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Bridgeport, Juvenile
Matters, and tried to the court, Skyers, J.; judgment
terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from
which the respondent mother appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent mother).
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** February 28, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Matthew W.

Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).
Rebecca A. Rebollo, attorney for the minor child.
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The respondent mother, Johnna W.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating
her parental rights to her minor child, Matthew W.1 On
appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly
determined that she had failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E).2 We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts, either as found by
the court or as appear in the record, are relevant to the
respondent’s appeal. The respondent has struggled with
her mental health since childhood. ‘‘[S]he was in and
out of psychiatric hospitals from an early age. She is
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
bipolar disorder, and anxiety. [The respondent] has a
history of substance abuse and has utilized both inpa-
tient and outpatient treatments . . . to address the
issue. She . . . continued to [abuse] substances up
until the time of her incarceration in November, 2022.
‘‘[The respondent] is the mother of five children, none
of [whom has] been consistently in her care. Her oldest
child, [D], was born [in December, 2004]. [D] was
removed from [the respondent’s] care and placed with
her maternal aunt . . . in 2007. Her second child, [R],
was born [in February, 2008]. Guardianship of [R] was
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of the putative father, John
Doe, who is not involved in this appeal. Accordingly, all references to the
respondent in this opinion are to the respondent mother.
2
The attorney for the minor child has filed a statement adopting the
appellate brief of the petitioner.
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awarded to [the respondent’s] maternal grandmother
. . . on October 24, 2008 . . . . The third child, [J],
was born [in December, 2016]. [J] was removed from
[the respondent’s] care at birth due to testing positive
for cocaine and marijuana. The Department of Children
and Families [(department)] transferred guardianship
of [J] to [the respondent’s] maternal aunt . . . on May
4, 2022. The fourth child, [T], was removed from [the
respondent’s] care at birth due to issues related to sub-
stance abuse, mental health, and intimate partner vio-
lence. [The respondent’s] parental rights [to T] were
terminated on July 27, 2022, pursuant to a petition filed
by [the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families]. [T] was adopted in November, 2022.’’
Matthew was born in February, 2023. The respondent
‘‘does not know the identity of Matthew’s father. At the
time of his birth, [the respondent] was incarcerated at
York Correctional Institution and hospitalized at Yale
New Haven Hospital.’’ On February 3, 2023, a hospital
social worker reported to the department that the
respondent was unable to care for Matthew, as she was
‘‘exhibiting some signs of paranoia,’’ including making
‘‘comments about her fear of staff raping the baby.’’
The petitioner invoked an administrative ninety-six
hour hold on behalf of Matthew that same day. On
February 6, 2023, the petitioner filed a neglect petition
as to Matthew, and she sought and obtained an order
of temporary custody, which the court, McLaughlin,
J., later sustained on February 10, 2023.
‘‘On March 23, 2023, the court ordered [the respon-
dent] to attend inpatient substance abuse treatment at
New Prospects in Bridgeport . . . . In May, 2023, [the
respondent] was discharged from New Prospects.
Thereafter, she moved to a shelter and was [required
to wear] a [global positioning system] monitoring
device. Due to concerns regarding her behavior, her
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In re Matthew W.

bond was increased, and [the respondent] was reincar-
cerated at York Correctional [Institution] on May 25,
2023.’’

On June 21, 2023, the court, Maronich, J., adjudicated
Matthew neglected, committed him to the care and cus-
tody of the petitioner, and ordered final specific steps
for the respondent.3 Matthew was placed in a nonrela-
tive foster home with the same foster parents who
adopted Matthew’s sibling, T, in November, 2022. ‘‘Mat-
thew is well bonded with his foster parents and receives
love and support from them. The foster parents are
ready, willing, and able to adopt Matthew.’’

The petitioner filed the underlying petition for termi-
nation of the respondent’s parental rights on June 23,
2023, alleging that the respondent had failed to rehabili-
tate within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E).

The respondent ‘‘was referred to Connecticut Valley
Hospital from July, 2023, to September, 2023, for compe-
tency restoration. Upon discharge from Connecticut
Valley Hospital, she went back to York Correctional
Institution. She was released from York [Correctional
Institution] in September, [2023]. After her criminal
charges were resolved, she was placed on probation
for a period of two years.
3
The final specific steps required, inter alia, that the respondent keep all
appointments set by or with the department; cooperate with the department’s
home visits; let the department know where she resides; take part in counsel-
ing and make progress toward individual treatment goals; submit to a sub-
stance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about treatment;
not use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine; get and maintain adequate
housing and a legal income; comply with any criminal court orders and
follow her conditions of probation; visit Matthew as often as permitted; sign
releases allowing the department to communicate with service providers
to check on her attendance, cooperation, and progress toward identified
goals; and cooperate with the service providers recommended for counsel-
ing, in-home support services, substance abuse assessment or treatment,
and intimate partner violence services.
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‘‘Upon [her release from incarceration, the respon-
dent] reported that she did not have stable housing.
She reported that she was residing with friends in both
New York and Connecticut. Her communication with
the department was inconsistent. [The respondent] tes-
tified that she recently obtained housing that she shared
with two other adults. However, her living arrange-
ments were never observed or evaluated by the depart-
ment.
‘‘[The respondent] was referred to [Connecticut
Renaissance (CT Renaissance)] for a mental health and
substance abuse assessment. . . . [The respondent]
completed the intake in October, 2023, but struggled
with her attendance at the eight week program. She
eventually completed the program [shortly before the
trial in February, 2024]. . . . [The respondent] also was
previously referred by the department to engage in men-
tal health treatment, substance abuse counseling and
resource management while her case was pending
with [T].
‘‘[The respondent’s] first successful visit with Mat-
thew was in November, 2023. She was referred to the
Boys and Girls Village Quality Parenting Center [(par-
enting center)]. At the [parenting center] program, she
would be able to have visitation [with Matthew] and
parent coaching. [The respondent] had weekly visits
at [the parenting center] with Matthew beginning in
December, 2023.’’
On December 7, 2023, the court approved a perma-
nency plan of termination of parental rights and adop-
tion. On January 23, 2024, Robert Guerrera, a psychia-
trist employed by CT Renaissance, conducted a
psychological evaluation of the respondent and diag-
nosed her with bipolar disorder, cannabis use disorder,
and stimulant use disorder. In his written evaluation,
Guerrera noted that the respondent was three months
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pregnant at the time of the evaluation and that she had
‘‘elected not to take medications during her pregnancy
unless absolutely necessary.’’ He also noted that the
respondent continued to use marijuana daily despite
her pregnancy and that she was encouraged to ‘‘reduce
or abstain from cannabis use during her pregnancy.’’
On February 21, 2024, the court, Skyers, J., held a
trial on the termination of parental rights petition. The
court heard testimony from Karla Jimenez, an employee
at the parenting center who observed the respondent’s
visits with Matthew; Nadia Mondestin, a licensed alco-
hol and substance abuse counselor employed by CT
Renaissance; Denise Fuzie and Erica Laguerre, the
department social workers assigned to Matthew’s case;
and the respondent. The court admitted ten exhibits
into evidence, including records from CT Renaissance
and the parenting center; Guerrera’s psychological eval-
uation; the social study in support of termination of
parental rights; the study in support of the permanency
plan; court updates from the department; a copy of the
court-ordered specific steps; and a copy of the respon-
dent’s criminal history establishing that the respondent
had been convicted of larceny in 2012 and assault in
2017, and found in violation of probation in 2018 and
2022.
Jimenez testified that, when the respondent began
the six month parenting center program in November,
2023, the respondent was homeless. Jimenez explained
that the respondent’s interactions with Matthew at the
parenting center ‘‘were positive. But it did take some
time for Matthew to adjust [to] having visits with his
mother’’ because ‘‘[h]e was not familiar with [her].’’
Jimenez also noted that the respondent occasionally
used profanity during the visits, although the respon-
dent was ‘‘okay’’ with Jimenez’ attempts to redirect her.
Mondestin testified about the respondent’s participa-
tion in the cognitive behavioral therapy group for her
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In re Matthew W.

substance abuse issues. Mondestin explained that the
respondent began the group therapy, which was sup-
posed to take place once a week for eight weeks, in
October, 2023. The respondent, however, was unable
to complete that program until February, 2024, because
‘‘[s]he struggled with her attendance’’ due, in part, to
her inability to obtain stable housing. Despite the
respondent’s struggles, Mondestin acknowledged that
the respondent ‘‘did make progress in taking care of
herself. . . . [N]ot having someplace stable to stay, you
know that [takes] a toll on . . . decision making. But
apart from that, she has tried.’’ Mondestin also testified
that the respondent was not taking medication for her
conditions because she was approximately three
months pregnant at the time of the trial. Mondestin
noted that the respondent’s probation officer was sup-
posed to submit a recommendation for the respondent
to engage in additional individual outpatient therapy
‘‘to help make sure that the [respondent’s] symptoms
are not flaring up’’ while she was not taking her medica-
tion. Mondestin further explained that, with bipolar dis-
order, ‘‘[y]ou could have good days. You could have
bad days. You could be very depressed. And, you know,
so these are the things that we want to look out for
and help her.’’ During cross-examination, Mondestin
explained that the respondent was subjected to random
drug tests as part of the CT Renaissance program and
that she had tested positive for marijuana.
Fuzie, who was assigned to Matthew’s case in Febru-
ary, 2023, testified that the issues identified by the
department in regard to the respondent’s previous chil-
dren were ‘‘her unstable mental health, extensive sub-
stance [abuse] history, [intimate partner violence], par-
enting, as well as housing.’’ While Fuzie was assigned
to Matthew’s case, her communication with the respon-
dent ‘‘was inconsistent due to [the respondent being]
in and out of different programs.’’ Fuzie referred the
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respondent to the parenting center because it provided
visitation as well as parenting coaching.
Laguerre, who previously had worked with the
respondent in T’s case in 2021, testified that the depart-
ment had identified several issues for the respondent
to address in T’s case, including her mental health,
substance abuse, intimate partner violence, employ-
ment, and resource management due to her lack of
stable housing. She further testified that, although the
department had recommended mental health services
for the respondent in T’s case, the respondent ‘‘was
inconsistent with [that] treatment.’’ Laguerre also was
assigned to Matthew’s case in December, 2023, and she
testified that she communicated with the respondent
‘‘pretty frequently, via text or phone calls’’ regarding
visitation and monthly meetings at the parenting center.
When asked about the respondent’s progress with her
substance abuse treatment through CT Renaissance,
Laguerre noted that the respondent was not consistent
with that program or her mental health treatment.
The respondent testified that she was residing with
three other individuals in a three bedroom apartment
in Bridgeport, that she continued to use marijuana, and
that she wanted to ‘‘be a productive mother. A proactive
mother. A determined mother. I have done so many
things that I’m not proud of in my past. You know . . .
I felt like I haven’t had a chance to be a mother, to step
up to be a mother. I was kind of frightened. I was young.
I had . . . like no stability at all. So, now that I’m actu-
ally progressing in a lot of changes that I’ve made I
decided that I feel like I’m suitable to making that [hap-
pen]. I know it doesn’t justify what happened in the
past, but I feel like I’m ready to be a mother and stay
for treatment and therapy with my child, not just alone.’’
When asked how things are different with Matthew
as opposed to her previous children, the respondent
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explained: ‘‘I am getting proper treatment, which is
adjusting my mental status, which is making me a little
bit more leveled. I am okay with my living situation
now that . . . I did find an apartment, which is great.
I did engage in treatment and still [am engaging] . . .
on my own with treatment even though it’s not manda-
tory for me to do. I chose to [do it]. I just [chose] to
also do family therapy with my son. These are things
that I’ve never [sought] . . . for my other children. And
I’m not trying to shun them all. And I do apologize, but
I feel like I deserve a chance. And this for me right now
is a big pull for me. Like, I feel amazing. I did this much
work myself.’’
During cross-examination, the respondent claimed
to have been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and
PTSD but denied being diagnosed with bipolar disorder.
She explained that ‘‘[b]ipolar [disorder] could be [mis-
taken for] PTSD . . . .’’ When asked about her decision
not to take medication due to her pregnancy, the
respondent stated: ‘‘Well, [Guerrera] stated that my
moods were not medication doable. So, like he’s been
putting me on medication. He told me if I get off the
medication and I feel depressed or [something], which
I most likely will because it’s postpartum. I am looking
. . . to [get] back on a different medication besides
Latuda, I felt like Latuda wasn’t helping me. And I told
him that.’’
As to her living arrangements, the respondent testi-
fied that her housing situation was temporary and that
she would not want to bring Matthew to her apartment.
On redirect examination, the respondent testified that
her ‘‘ultimate plan for housing’’ was to find a studio
apartment, though she also explained, ‘‘I’ve seen a lot
of loft studios, which were in my budget range. We’re
unable to still have money left if Matthew needs any-
thing. So, that’s . . . my living situation.’’
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On May 28, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of
decision and rendered judgment terminating the
respondent’s parental rights. In the adjudicatory portion
of its decision,4 the court found by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) the department made reasonable
efforts to locate the respondent and to reunify her with
Matthew, (2) the respondent was unwilling or unable
to benefit from reunification services, and (3) the
respondent had failed to rehabilitate within the meaning
of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E).5 In finding that the respondent
was unable or unwilling to benefit from the depart-
ment’s reunification efforts, the court stated that the
respondent ‘‘was either incarcerated or in and out of
treatment programs from the time of Matthew’s birth
until September, 2023. . . . She has not demonstrated
any period of stability that would demonstrate her abil-
ity to care for the needs of Matthew.’’
As to the respondent’s failure to rehabilitate, the
court stated that the respondent’s ‘‘parental rights were
4
‘‘A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two
phases, adjudication and disposition. . . . If the trial court determines that
a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional
phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termina-
tion is in the best interest of the child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Timothy B., 219 Conn. App. 823, 835, 296 A.3d 342, cert. denied, 349
Conn. 919, 318 A.3d 439 (2023).
5
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
Court, upon notice and hearing . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to
this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Depart-
ment of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the
parent and to reunify the child with the parent . . . unless the court finds
in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts . . . (2) termination is in the best interest of the child,
and (3) . . . (E) the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is
neglected, abused or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to
achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of
the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the
child and such parent’s parental rights of another child were previously
terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children
and Families . . . .’’
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In re Matthew W.

terminated with respect to her son, [T], in 2022 . . . .
[H]er history of transient living, her long-standing
untreated mental health and [substance abuse issues]
have demonstrated that she has not been able to address
her challenges to achieve a level of personal rehabilita-
tion. Although [the respondent] attended treatment and
most recently completed the CT Renaissance sessions,
she remains in no better position to serve as a caretaker
for Matthew. Therefore, the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that she’’ failed to rehabilitate
within the meaning of the statute.6
In the dispositional phase, the court considered and
made written findings regarding the seven best interest
factors set forth in § 17a-112 (k).7 Specifically, the court
6
We note that the court’s reasoning as to the adjudicatory ground for
termination of the respondent’s parental rights is only a single paragraph
consisting of three sentences. We emphasize that a court should set forth
its reasoning and make express findings as to the specific facts on which
it relies in reaching its ultimate determination. Indeed, a complete and
thorough statement of the court’s factual findings in child protection cases
‘‘provides the best illustration that the trial court properly considered all of
the elements of § 17a-112 (j) in arriving at its ultimate conclusion that the
respondent’s parental rights should be terminated.’’ In re Jayce O., 323
Conn. 690, 693 n.3, 150 A.3d 640 (2016). Issuing a comprehensive decision
also facilitates appellate review of the judgments rendered in these signifi-
cant cases.
7
General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[I]n determining
whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall
consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness,
nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the
parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with
the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms
of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual
or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled
their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of
the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s
person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control
of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed
significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent
has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the
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found that the respondent’s ‘‘substance abuse and
untreated mental health issues that led to the termina-
tion [of] her rights with respect to her son [T] in 2022,
are still prevalent now’’ and that she ‘‘has failed to
sufficiently adjust her circumstances, conduct or condi-
tions to make it in the best interest of the child to
be reunified with her in the foreseeable future. [The
respondent] has been incarcerated during much of this
case and there is little evidence that she has continued
to address her substance abuse or mental health issues.
[Her] parental rights with respect to [T] were terminated
in 2022. She has been unable or unwilling to sufficiently
address the reasons why her children were removed
from her care, and she is not able to provide Matthew
with a safe, permanent and stable home environment
where he would be able to thrive.’’
On the basis of these subordinate findings, the court
found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the termi-
nation of the respondent’s parental rights was in the
best interest of the child. The court stated that ‘‘Matthew
is . . . a happy child. He is very bonded and attached
to his foster parents. He looks to them for support and
comfort. He is [nearly eighteen months] old and has
been with his current foster parents for all of his life.
He needs a permanent home where he can continue to
flourish and grow. His foster parents are committed to
ensuring that he is in a safe, loving and stable home.
The foster parents have expressed that they are willing
foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which
the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to
reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to
incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the mainte-
nance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other
custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been
prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by
the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the
unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of
the parent.’’
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In re Matthew W.

to be a long-term resource for him.’’ Accordingly, the
court terminated the respondent’s parental rights and
appointed the petitioner as Matthew’s statutory parent.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the respondent does not challenge any of
the court’s subordinate findings as being clearly errone-
ous. Rather, her sole claim is that the court improperly
determined that she had failed to rehabilitate within
the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E). Specifically, she
claims that, ‘‘[w]hen considering events up until the
time of trial, the evidence was insufficient to support
the trial court’s determination that the [petitioner] had
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondent had failed to rehabilitate such that she
could not assume a responsible role in the life of the
child within a reasonable time considering the age and
needs of the child.’’ We disagree.
We begin our analysis with the applicable standard of
review and relevant legal principles regarding a parent’s
failure to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j). ‘‘[The]
standard of review of a trial court’s finding that a parent
has failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation . . . is
one of evidentiary sufficiency, that is, whether the trial
court could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts
established and the reasonable inferences drawn there-
from, that the cumulative effect of the evidence was
sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion].’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Zarirai S., 229 Conn.
App. 239, 246, 326 A.3d 1148 (2024). When applying
this standard,8 ‘‘[t]he evidence must be given the most
8
Although the respondent claims that the ‘‘evidentiary sufficiency is an
improper standard of review in child protection cases,’’ she also recognizes
that, as an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by our Supreme
Court’s decision in In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015), in
which the court held that evidentiary sufficiency is the proper standard of
review. Id., 587–88; see, e.g., Stamford Property Holdings, LLC v. Jashari,
218 Conn. App. 179, 198 n.12, 291 A.3d 117 (‘‘[a]s an intermediate appellate
court, we are bound by Supreme Court precedent and are unable to modify
it’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 347 Conn. 901, 296
A.3d 840 (2023).
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favorable construction in support of the [judgment] of
which it is reasonably capable. . . . In other words,
[i]f the [trial court] could reasonably have reached its
conclusion, the [judgment] must stand, even if this court
disagrees with it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Niya B., 223 Conn. App. 471, 490, 308 A.3d 604,
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024).
‘‘An important corollary to these principles is that
the mere existence in the record of evidence that would
support a different conclusion, without more, is not
sufficient to undermine the finding of the trial court.
Our focus in conducting a review for evidentiary suffi-
ciency is not on the question of whether there exists
support for a different finding—the proper inquiry is
whether there is enough evidence in the record to sup-
port the finding that the trial court made.’’ (Emphasis
in original.) In re Jayce O., 323 Conn. 690, 716, 150 A.3d
640 (2016).
‘‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112] refers
to the restoration of a parent to [her] former construc-
tive and useful role as a parent. . . . [I]n assessing
rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the par-
ent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life,
but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care
for the particular needs of the child at issue. . . . An
inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires us to
obtain a historical perspective of the respondent’s child-
caring and parenting abilities. . . . Although the stan-
dard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show
more than any rehabilitation. . . . Successful comple-
tion of the petitioner’s expressly articulated expecta-
tions is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner’s claim
that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilita-
tion. . . . [E]ven if a parent has made successful
strides in her ability to manage her life and may have
achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such
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improvements, although commendable, are not disposi-
tive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period
of time, she could assume a responsible position in
the life of her children.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Zarirai S., supra, 229
Conn. App. 254–55.
‘‘During the adjudicatory phase of a termination pro-
ceeding, a court generally is limited to considering only
evidence that occurred before the date of the filing of
the petition or the latest amendment to the petition,
often referred to as the adjudicatory date. . . . Never-
theless, it may rely on events occurring after the [adjudi-
catory] date . . . [in] considering the issue of whether
the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that
the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life
within a reasonable time. . . .
‘‘Furthermore, [i]t is well established that a respon-
dent’s failure to acknowledge the underlying personal
issues that form the basis for the department’s concerns
indicates a failure to achieve a sufficient degree of per-
sonal rehabilitation. . . . [A]s a general proposition,
the failure to acknowledge and make progress in
addressing the issues that led to a child’s removal may
be one of many contributing factors to a court’s determi-
nation that a parent has failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) In re A. H., 226
Conn. App. 1, 17–18, 317 A.3d 197, cert. denied, 349
Conn. 918, 317 A.3d 784 (2024).
Construing the record in the manner most favorable
to sustaining the judgment, as we must; see In re Niya
B., supra, 223 Conn. App. 490; we conclude that the
evidence reasonably supports the court’s ultimate
determination that the respondent had failed to rehabili-
tate within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E). As the
respondent acknowledges, the primary obstacles to her
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reunification with Matthew were her ‘‘transience and
her mental health and substance abuse issues.’’ The
evidence in the record supports the court’s determina-
tion that these issues persisted and that the respondent
therefore remained in no better position to care for
Matthew.

In the present case, the court considered events
occurring after the adjudicatory date in June, 2023, in
determining that the respondent had failed to achieve
a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. As to the
respondent’s transiency issue, Laguerre testified that, in
T’s case, the department had identified the respondent’s
lack of stable housing and her mental health and sub-
stance abuse issues as the issues she needed to address
and that the respondent had been inconsistent in the
recommended treatments at that time. Both Laguerre
and Jimenez testified that the respondent remained
homeless in November, 2023, when the respondent
began visitation at the parenting center. Mondestin like-
wise testified about the respondent’s lack of stable
housing during that time, explaining that her struggles
with attendance at CT Renaissance were attributable
to her lack of stable housing. The respondent herself
testified that her living situation at the time of trial
was temporary and unsuitable for Matthew, and she
acknowledged that she was unable to afford a suitable
dwelling while also providing for Matthew’s needs. Con-
sistent with this evidence, the court found that the
respondent ‘‘ha[d] not demonstrated any period of sta-
bility that would demonstrate her ability to care for the
needs of Matthew.’’ Accordingly, the court’s finding that
the respondent’s history of transiency remained unre-
solved is supported by the evidence in the record. See,
e.g., In re Lil’Patrick T., 216 Conn. App. 240, 257, 284
A.3d 999 (record provided evidentiary basis for court’s
finding that ‘‘the respondent would likely not be able,
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In re Matthew W.

within a reasonable time, to provide stable housing’’),
cert. denied, 345 Conn. 962, 285 A.3d 387 (2022).
As to her mental health issues, the evidence estab-
lished that, after successfully completing inpatient
treatment for mental health and substance abuse issues
at New Prospects in May, 2023, the respondent was
unable to remain in New Prospects’ shelter due to issues
with her behavior. Although the respondent testified
that she was ‘‘getting proper treatment, which [was]
adjusting [her] mental status,’’ she also denied that she
suffered from bipolar disorder and stated that she was
not taking medication. In addition, the respondent testi-
fied that Guerrera had ‘‘stated that [her] moods were
not medication doable,’’ whereas Guerrera specifically
stated in his psychological evaluation that the respon-
dent had stopped taking medication for her bipolar
disorder because she was three months pregnant. The
respondent thus denied her well documented diagnosis
of bipolar disorder and was unable to treat her condi-
tions with medication due to her pregnancy, which indi-
cates a failure to acknowledge and an inability to
address her underlying mental health issues. See, e.g.,
In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 589, 122 A.3d 1247
(2015) (parent’s ‘‘failure to acknowledge the underlying
personal issues that form the basis for the department’s
concerns indicates a failure to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); In re A. H., supra, 226 Conn. App. 17
(same).
The same is true as to the respondent’s substance
abuse issues. Guerrera noted that the respondent had
last used ecstasy in April, 2023, which was during the
time that she was receiving inpatient treatment at New
Prospects. He also noted, however, that, despite being
three months pregnant in January, 2024, the respondent
‘‘continue[d] to smoke marijuana daily.’’ Although Guer-
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In re Matthew W.

rera advised the respondent to abstain from using mari-
juana, the respondent admitted at trial that she contin-
ued to use marijuana, and Mondestin confirmed that
the respondent tested positive for marijuana on multiple
occasions while engaged in the CT Renaissance pro-
gram. The respondent’s continued use of marijuana,
despite being advised to refrain from doing so while
pregnant, demonstrates a failure to acknowledge or
address her underlying substance abuse issues.
The respondent nevertheless argues that the record
establishes that she had addressed her ‘‘transience and
her mental health and substance abuse issues’’ in that
she had (1) completed the CT Renaissance program,
(2) ‘‘obtained housing and was willing to [allow] the
department [to examine] the housing,’’ (3) participated
‘‘in weekly visitation with Matthew through’’ the parent-
ing center, and (4) ‘‘cooperated with probation and
avoided involvement with the criminal justice system
. . . .’’ In short, although the respondent argues that
some of the evidence in the record could have sup-
ported a different conclusion than the one reached by
the court, that simply ‘‘is not relevant to our analysis
. . . . [T]he mere fact that there was evidence in the
record that would have supported a different finding
is not enough to call into question the sufficiency of
the evidence that does provide support for the court’s
finding.’’ In re Jayce O., supra, 323 Conn. 718. For this
reason, the evidence identified by the respondent does
not undermine our conclusion that there is sufficient
evidence to support the court’s finding that she failed to
rehabilitate within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E).
Finally, the respondent argues that the court improp-
erly based its decision on her history rather than on
her abilities at the time of trial.9 In support of her argu-
ment, the respondent highlights the court’s reference
9
The respondent also argues that ‘‘[t]he trial court’s failure to grant addi-
tional time for the respondent to address secondary concerns, such as
employment, is contrary to the statutory language that insists the respondent
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In re Matthew W.

to her ‘‘history of transient living, her long-standing
untreated mental health and abuse of substances
. . . .’’ We are not persuaded that this reference to
the respondent’s history demonstrates that the court
improperly focused on the respondent’s history rather
than on her present abilities.
As this court has explained, ‘‘the court in a termina-
tion of parental rights hearing should consider all poten-
tially relevant evidence, no matter the time to which it
relates. . . . In order for the court to make a determi-
nation as to the respondent’s prospects for rehabilita-
tion, the court was required to obtain a historical per-
spective of the respondent’s child caring and parenting
abilities. . . . Because the parent-child relationship is
at issue, all relevant facts and family history should be
considered by the trial court when deciding whether
to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. . . . The
entire picture of that relationship must be considered
whenever the termination of parental rights is under
consideration by a judicial authority.’’ (Emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Gabriel C., 196 Conn. App. 333, 367, 229 A.3d 1073, cert.
denied, 335 Conn. 938, 248 A.3d 708 (2020).
In the present case, the court properly considered
the respondent’s history with the department and her
does not need to show full and complete rehabilitation at the time of the
termination trial.’’ ‘‘[U]nder § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E), a parent’s rights may be
terminated without the provision of specific steps’’ and ‘‘the petitioner may
seek a simultaneous adjudication of neglect and a judgment terminating
parental rights.’’ In re Jayce O., supra, 323 Conn. 712. Accordingly, when
the petitioner seeks to terminate a parent’s parental rights pursuant to § 17a-
112 (j) (3) (E), the statute imposes no requirement that the parent be afforded
any amount of time to demonstrate sufficient rehabilitation. In the present
case, however, the respondent was provided with specific steps and allowed
time to rehabilitate, as the trial on the petition to terminate her parental
rights did not occur until more than six months after it was filed. Thus,
because the respondent was afforded more time than the statute requires,
her argument is unavailing.
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inability to address the issues giving rise to the termina-
tion of her parental rights as to another child in evaluat-
ing the respondent’s current prospects for rehabilita-
tion. See, e.g., In re Christopher B., 117 Conn. App.
773, 787–88, 980 A.2d 961 (2009) (‘‘court properly exer-
cised its discretion in considering evidence of the
department’s involvement with the respondent and [her
child] before the . . . petition, and in according appro-
priate weight to that evidence’’). Indeed, that is pre-
cisely what the court was required to do. See In re
Anna Lee M., 104 Conn. App. 121, 128, 931 A.2d 949 (‘‘for
the court to make a determination as to the respondent’s
prospects for rehabilitation, the court was required to
obtain a historical perspective of the respondent’s child
caring and parenting abilities’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 939, 937 A.2d
696 (2007). Moreover, the court set forth the correct
legal standard, stating that ‘‘[t]he ultimate issue the
court must evaluate is whether the parent has gained
the insight and ability to care for his or her child given
the age and needs of the child within a reasonable time.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Given the court’s
analysis and its citation to the correct legal standard, we
are not persuaded that its discussion of the respondent’s
‘‘history of transient living, her long-standing untreated
mental health and [her] abuse of substances’’ demon-
strates that the court improperly focused on the respon-
dent’s history with the department. See, e.g., In re Fayth
C., 220 Conn. App. 315, 325, 297 A.3d 601 (‘‘court’s
analysis of the respondent’s failure to achieve sufficient
personal rehabilitation evinces the use of a correct legal
standard, as the court detailed the respondent’s lack
of engagement in services that were aimed at rehabilita-
tion and inability to care for the needs of [the child]
within a reasonable time, cited the correct legal stan-
dard, and repeated that standard in its conclusion’’),
cert. denied, 347 Conn. 907, 298 A.3d 275 (2023). Instead,
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In re Matthew W.

the court properly considered the respondent’s history
as part of ‘‘[t]he entire picture’’ of the parent-child rela-
tionship, including her present prospects for rehabilita-
tion, as the statute requires. (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Gabriel C., supra, 196 Conn. App. 367.
In sum, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence
to support the court’s determination that the petitioner
had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
respondent had failed to achieve such degree of per-
sonal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief, that
within a reasonable time, considering Matthew’s age
and needs, she could assume a responsible position in
his life.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.