Lalli v. New Haven

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2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 863
Lalli v. New Haven

JOHN M. LALLI, JR., ET AL. v.
CITY OF NEW HAVEN
(AC 47153)
Suarez, Clark and Bear, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiffs, all retired police officers who had previously worked for the
defendant city, appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendant
on their complaint alleging, inter alia, breach of a collective bargaining
agreement between the defendant and a union governing the defendant’s
police force. On appeal, the plaintiffs, former members of the union, claimed
that the court improperly determined that the plaintiffs, as retirees and not
active employees, were not entitled to retroactive wages pursuant to the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Held:
The trial court properly determined that the defendant did not breach the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, as the agreement unambigu-
ously provided that, to be eligible for retroactive wages, a member of the
union must be an active employee on the date of distribution, and all but
one of the plaintiffs had retired prior to the first distribution date.
Argued January 8—officially released February 25, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven and tried to
the court, Wilson, J.; judgment for the defendant, from
which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed.
William J. Ward, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Claire M. McNamara, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

BEAR, J. The plaintiffs, thirty-seven retired New
Haven police officers,1 appeal from the judgment of the
The complaint named as plaintiffs John M. Lalli, Jr., Steven Manware,
1

Michael Wuchek, Jeffrey Goodwin, Jason Salgado, Craig Miller, Roy Davis,
Huey Young, Darcia Siclari, Elvin Rivera, Elisa Tuzzoli, Douglas Harkins,
David Runlett, Elsa Berrios, Hector Valentin, Brian Jackson, Dennis O’Con-
nell, Tammi Means, David Rivera, Mary Helland, Lucille Roach, Brendan
Hosey, Curtis Williams, Leslee Witcher, Dietrich Hernandez, Peter McKoy,
Garry Monk, Odino Rasile, Michael Torre, Terrence McNeil, John Palmer,
Jon Young, Jeffrey Suchy, Steven Teague, Jason Minardi, Michael MastroPe-
tre, and Arpad Tolnay.
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Lalli v. New Haven

trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the city
of New Haven. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the
court improperly determined that the defendant did
not breach the terms of a 2016 collective bargaining
agreement by determining that the plaintiffs, as retirees
and not active employees, were not entitled to retroac-
tive wages. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the
judgment of the court.
The following facts, as set forth by the court in accor-
dance with the terms of a stipulation of facts between
the parties, and procedural history are relevant. ‘‘Each
of the plaintiffs are former members of the union gov-
erning the defendant’s police force. The terms of
employment were set forth in a collective bargaining
agreement [(agreement)] between the defendant and
the union. The [agreement] that was in effect on July
1, 2011, expired on June 30, 2016 [(2011 agreement)].
The defendant and the union were unable to negotiate
a new [agreement] prior to June 30, 2016. Pursuant to
General Statutes § 7-475, the plaintiffs were required to
continue to work at the rate of pay detailed in the
2011 [agreement] until a new [agreement] was ratified.
Ratification of a new [agreement], effective for the
period from July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2022, occurred on
September 16, 2019 [(2016 agreement)]. All the plaintiffs
retired after June 30, 2016; however, thirty-four of the
thirty-seven police officers retired prior to the ratifica-
tion of the 2016 [agreement]. The three plaintiffs who
retired after the ratification of the 2016 [agreement]
were Dennis O’Connell, Mary Helland, and Garry Monk.
These three plaintiffs retired when the terms and condi-
tions of the ratified 2016 [agreement] were known to
them.
‘‘The 2016 [agreement] provides the following lan-
guage regarding eligibility for retroactive wages: ‘In
order to be eligible for these payments, members must
be an active employee on the date of distribution.’ . . .
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Lalli v. New Haven

For the time period from July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2022,
the language of the 2016 [agreement] provides for retro-
active wage increases as follows: ‘A. The wage sched-
ules on June 30, 2016 shall be increased by two and
one-quarter (2.25%) percent to be effective and retroac-
tive to July 1, 2016. B. The wage schedules on June
30, 2017 shall be increased by two (2%) percent to be
effective and retroactive to July 1, 2017. C. The wage
schedules on June 30, 2018 shall be increased by two
(2%) [percent] to be effective and retroactive to July 1,
2018. D. Effective July 1, 2019 the wage schedules on
June 30, 2019 shall be increased by two and one-quarter
(2.25%) percent to be effective and retroactive to July
1, 2019.’ . . . The 2016 [agreement] provides for the
retroactive wages to be paid as follows: one-third of
the retroactive amount to be paid on November 14,
2019, one-third of the retroactive amount to be paid on
July 1, 2020, and the final third to be paid in July of 2021.

‘‘The defendant did not make payments on November
14, 2019, to any of the plaintiffs for retroactive wages
identified for periods of time they were still employed
as police officers for the defendant, with the exception
of O’Connell, who did not retire until November 19,
2019, and received a wage increase on November 15,
2019, consistent with the 2016 [agreement]. The defen-
dant also did not pay the plaintiffs for any difference in
wages relating to sick leave, time allowed, and vacation
payout, which the plaintiffs believe were impacted by
the retroactive wage increase as contained in the 2016
[agreement]. The plaintiffs also have not received any
increase in pension benefits that they believe were
impacted by the retroactive wage increase found within
the 2016 [agreement]. Lastly, the parties also stipulated
to the definition of ‘retroactive’ as ‘applying to a period
prior to enactment.’ ’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omit-
ted.)
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Lalli v. New Haven

The plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging, inter alia,
breach of contract.2 The parties entered into a stipula-
tion of facts. In a November 27, 2023 memorandum of
decision, the court held that ‘‘[t]he 2016 [agreement]
unambiguously requires that a union member be an
active employee on the date of distribution in order
to receive retroactive wage payments. The thirty-four
plaintiffs that retired prior to the ratification of the 2016
[agreement] are not entitled to retroactive wages, as
they were not ‘active employees’ on the dates of distri-
bution. The plaintiffs Helland and Monk retired after
the ratification but prior to the distribution date of the
first payment. Accordingly, they also do not meet the
requirements set out to receive retroactive wage pay-
ments. O’Connell, who also retired after the ratification,
was eligible for a portion of the retroactive wages as
evidenced by receiving the first payment; however, he
lost his eligibility when he retired on November 19, 2019,
prior to the distribution dates for the two additional
retroactive wage payments. Accordingly, the court con-
cludes that the defendant is not liable for retroactive
payments or any further distributions to the plaintiffs
. . . .’’ This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improp-
erly determined that they were not entitled to retroac-
tive wage payments pursuant to the 2016 agreement.
Specifically, they contend that ‘‘[s]imply because they
retired prior to the enactment of the 2016 [agreement]
does not mean the [defendant] can ignore the stipulated
meaning of retroactive and refuse to pay money earned
by these police officers during the retroactive period
2
The complaint also alleged unjust enrichment. The court rejected this
claim, determining that the plaintiffs asserted the claim under the theory
of negligent misrepresentation and that it ‘‘does not consider this contention
because the plaintiffs allege no negligent misrepresentation claim and have
not explained how this theory relates to their claim of unjust enrichment
beyond this bare assertion.’’ On appeal, the plaintiffs’ brief focuses on the
court’s rejection of their breach of contract claim.
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6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 863
Lalli v. New Haven

under that agreement’’ and that, ‘‘when employees retire
within the effective dates of a contract that provides
retroactive wages for periods worked under an expired
contract, those retired employees are entitled to said
retroactive wages.’’ We are not persuaded.
We begin with the following relevant legal principles
and standards. ‘‘Principles of contract law guide our
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.’’3
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russo v. Water-
bury, 304 Conn. 710, 720, 41 A.3d 1033 (2012). ‘‘[T]he
intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and
reasonable construction of the written words and . . .
the language used must be accorded its common, natu-
ral and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be
sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract.
. . . Where the language of the contract is clear and
unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect
according to its terms. . . . [When] there is definitive
contract language, the determination of what the parties
intended by their . . . commitments is a question of
law [over which our review is plenary].’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Fiorillo v. Hartford, 212 Conn.
App. 291, 301–302, 275 A.3d 628 (2022).
The 2016 agreement provides for the distribution of
one third of the retroactive wage payments to be paid,
respectively, on November 14, 2019, July 1, 2020, and
in July, 2021. It further provides that, ‘‘[i]n order to be
eligible for these payments, members must be an active
employee on the date of distribution.’’
In support of their argument, the plaintiffs rely on
the meaning of the word ‘‘retroactive,’’ as stipulated by
the parties to be defined as ‘‘applying to a period prior
‘‘The elements of a breach of contract action are the formation of an
3

agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other
party and damages.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosenthal v. Bloom-
field, 178 Conn. App. 258, 263, 174 A.3d 839 (2017).
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Lalli v. New Haven

to enactment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The
4

definition of the word retroactive, however, does not,
by itself, entitle the plaintiffs to retroactive wage pay-
ments. Rather, the 2016 agreement requires that an indi-
vidual be an ‘‘active employee’’ on the date of distribu-
tion in order to receive the retroactive wage payments
distributed on those dates.
The agreement uses the adjective ‘‘active’’ to precede
the term ‘‘employee’’ thereby indicating current employ-
ment status. See Garcia v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 334,
343, 972 A.2d 706 (2009) (‘‘[T]he adjectives that precede
the term employee in . . . the agreement—‘fulltime,
permanent’ and ‘probationary’—indicate current
employment status. A retiree undoubtedly would not
have either a full-time, permanent or a probationary
status.’’ (Emphasis in original.)). Additionally, ‘‘[w]e
ordinarily look to the dictionary definition of a word
4
The plaintiffs also argue that § 7-475, which provides that, ‘‘[i]n the event
an agreement expires before a new agreement has been approved by the
municipal employer and the employee organization, the terms of the expired
agreement shall remain in effect until such time as a new agreement is
reached and approved,’’ cannot ‘‘be interpreted to mean that if an employee
retires between contracts with a municipality, he should not receive retroac-
tive wages specifically identified for periods of time he was still an employee
of said municipality.’’ The language of § 7-475, however, is not at issue;
rather, the question presented is whether the court properly determined
that the defendant did not breach the terms of the agreement between
the parties.
The plaintiffs additionally argue that the defendant must recalculate the
impact that the retroactive wage increase would have on pension benefits.
The parties had agreed in the stipulation that, if the trial court found the
defendant liable for any or all retroactive wage payments to the plaintiffs,
only then will the defendant be required to recalculate pension benefits
owed. Because we affirm the judgment of the trial court, the plaintiffs cannot
prevail on this argument.
The plaintiffs further argue that there is no evidence to support (1) a
claim that they could have anticipated that the defendant would fail to pay
them retroactive wages and (2) the defendant’s assertion in the trial court
that the plaintiffs were cherry picking contractual language. These argu-
ments have no bearing on the interpretation of the language of the contract
and therefore we will not review them further.
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Lalli v. New Haven

to ascertain its commonly approved usage. . . . Web-
ster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993), for
example, defines the term employee as ‘1: one employed
by another [usually] in a position below the executive
level and [usually] for wages 2: in labor relations: any
worker who is under wages or salary to an employer
and who is not excluded by agreement from consider-
ation as such a worker . . . .’ . . . See also Black’s
Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004) (defining employee as
‘[a] person who works in the service of another person
[the employer] under an express or implied contract of
hire, under which the employer has the right to control
the details of work performance’). These definitions
make it evident that . . . the currency of the relation-
ship is paramount.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 345; see
also Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America,
Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 167–68, 92 S. Ct. 383, 30 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1971)
(‘‘An ‘employee,’ according to all standard dictionaries,
according to the law as the courts have stated it, and
according to the understanding of almost everyone . . .
means someone who works for another for hire. . . .
The ordinary meaning of ‘employee’ does not include
retired workers; retired employees have ceased to work
for another for hire.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omit-
ted.)).
Therefore, according to the terms of the 2016 agree-
ment, only active employees, which term does not
include retirees, on the date of distribution can receive
retroactive wage payments. The 2016 agreement pro-
vides for three dates of distribution: November 14, 2019,
July 1, 2020, and July, 2021. Thirty-four of the thirty-
seven plaintiffs retired prior to the ratification of the
2016 agreement and under the provisions of the 2011
agreement and were not entitled to retroactive wage
payments under the 2016 agreement. The plaintiffs Hel-
land and Monk retired after the ratification of the 2016
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Lalli v. New Haven

agreement but before the first distribution date. The
thirty-four plaintiffs in addition to Helland and Monk
all retired prior to the first distribution date of Novem-
ber 14, 2019, and were not active employees as of that
distribution date or any subsequent distribution dates
and, therefore, were not entitled to receive any retroac-
tive wage payments. The remaining plaintiff, O’Connell,
retired on November 19, 2019, and therefore was enti-
tled to and received the first distribution of retroactive
wage payments on November 14, 2019, but was not
eligible for the remaining retroactive wage payments
because he was retired as of the second and third distri-
bution dates. Because the defendant’s actions regarding
the distribution of the retroactive wage payments to
the plaintiffs did not violate the terms of the 2016 agree-
ment, we conclude that the court properly found for
the defendant on the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.