Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. Hartford

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. Hartford

PARK SEYMOUR ASSOCIATES, LLC v.
CITY OF HARTFORD ET AL.
PARK SQUIRE ASSOCIATES, LLC v.
CITY OF HARTFORD ET AL.
(AC 47132)
Alvord, Clark and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff in each case, following a consolidated trial on claims that the
defendant board of assessment appeals improperly computed the assess-
ment on certain of their real property because the properties were subject
to tax abatement agreements entered into with the defendant city, appealed
from the trial court’s judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs claimed,
inter alia, that the court erroneously found that they had not proven the
existence of such tax abatement agreements. Held:

This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial
court’s finding that there were no tax abatement agreements between the
parties was clearly erroneous, the plaintiffs having failed to provide an
adequate record for review.
Argued November 19, 2024—officially released February 4, 2025

Procedural History

Appeal, in each case, from the decision of the defen-
dant board of assessment appeals of the named defen-
dant concerning assessments on certain of the plaintiff’s
properties, and seeking reinstatement of an alleged tax
abatement agreement and other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and
transferred to the judicial district of New Britain, where
the cases were consolidated for trial; thereafter, the
cases were tried to the court, Budzik, J.; judgment for
the defendants in each case, from which the plaintiffs
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Robert M. DeCrescenzo, for the appellants (plaintiff
in each case).
Jonathan H. Beamon, senior assistant corporation
counsel, for the appellees (defendants in each case).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. Hartford

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiffs, Park Seymour Associ-
ates, LLC (Seymour), and Park Squire Associates, LLC
(Squire), appeal from the judgments rendered in favor
of the defendants, the city of Hartford (city) and the
city’s Board of Assessment Appeals, after a consoli-
dated trial to the court in these actions brought as
municipal tax appeals pursuant to General Statutes
§ 12-119.1 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial
court’s judgments in favor of the defendants were
improper in that the court made a clearly erroneous
finding that the plaintiffs had not proven the existence
of tax abatement agreements.2 We affirm the judgments
of the trial court.
1
General Statutes § 12-119 provides in relevant part: ‘‘When it is claimed
that a tax has been laid on property not taxable in the town or city in whose
tax list such property was set, or that a tax laid on property was computed
on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly exces-
sive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions
of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property, the owner
thereof . . . may, in addition to the other remedies provided by law, make
application for relief to the superior court for the judicial district in which
such town or city is situated. . . .’’
In the present case, the trial court assumed, without deciding, that § 12-
119 was the proper method by which a taxpayer may challenge the breach
of an alleged tax abatement agreement. Because we do not reach the merits
of the plaintiffs’ claim, we also need not address the propriety of proceeding
pursuant to § 12-119.
2
The plaintiffs also claim on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to
render judgments in favor of the plaintiffs on a theory of equitable estoppel.
In its memorandum of decision, the court noted that the plaintiffs appeared
to be seeking to assert an estoppel claim during trial through testimonial
evidence. The court stated that it was not considering such a claim because
it had not been pleaded. It further stated, on the basis of its factual findings,
that any claim of estoppel would be unavailing.
In their appellate brief, the plaintiffs ignore the procedural grounds on
which the trial court rejected their claim and brief only the merits of their
estoppel claim. We conclude that the court properly declined to address
the unpleaded claim; see Lebanon Historical Society, Inc. v. Attorney Gen-
eral, 209 Conn. App. 337, 351 n.12, 268 A.3d 734 (2021) (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic
that the plaintiff’s claims are limited to the allegations of its complaint’’);
and, therefore, we need not reach its merits. Additionally, the plaintiffs’
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. Hartford

The following facts, as found by the trial court, are
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. ‘‘On February
21, 1997, Seymour Associates Limited Partnership (SA)
entered into a written tax abatement agreement (1997
abatement agreement) with the [city] concerning the
real property and improvements at 142, 158-170, 167,
169-171 and 180 Seymour Street in Hartford (Seymour
Street properties). . . . The 1997 abatement agree-
ment had an express term of fifteen consecutive fiscal
years. . . .
‘‘In July of 2003, Park Squire Associates Partnership
(PSAP) entered into a written tax abatement agreement
(2003 abatement agreement) with the [city] concerning
the real property and improvements at 23-31 Squire
Street in Hartford and 457-495 Park Street in Hartford
(Squire/Park Street properties). . . . The Seymour
Street properties and the Squire/Park Street properties
together are hereinafter referred to collectively as the
‘subject properties.’ The 2003 abatement agreement had
an express term of fifteen years, beginning with the
2003 grand list and ending with the 2017 grand list. . . .
The subject properties consist of small, one and two
bedroom apartment buildings generally marketed as
low to moderate income rental housing.
‘‘On May 29, 2012, SA sold its interest in the Seymour
Street properties to Park Broad Investments, LLC (PBI),
for one dollar. . . . Section 9.1 (g) of the May 29th
agreement between SA and PBI includes a reference
to assigned contracts included in ‘Exhibit 6.2’ to the
contract, but no such exhibit was entered into evidence.
On May 29, 2012, PSAP sold its interest in the Squire/
Park Street properties to PBI. . . . On September 4,
2014, PSAP quitclaimed its interest in the Squire/Park
Street properties to Squire. . . . On March 13, 2014,
unpleaded claim, like their principal claim on appeal, is unreviewable
because the record is inadequate, as discussed further in this opinion.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. Hartford

SA quitclaimed its interest in the Seymour Street proper-
ties to Seymour. . . . At the time Seymour and Squire
acquired ownership of the subject properties, the sub-
ject properties were in need of substantial repair and
had significant back taxes owed to [the city]. Seymour
and Squire paid the back taxes . . . and invested sub-
stantial amounts of money, $400,000 to $600,000,
according to [Carlos] Valinho, [the sole member of both
Seymour and Squire], to improve the condition of the
subject properties. Generally, the subject properties are
now successfully rented to tenants by Seymour and
Squire.
‘‘On June 27, 2013, Yasha Escalera, Director of [the
city’s] Housing and Property Management Division,
wrote to Veronica Curioso at Seymour stating that Sey-
mour was required to comply with the terms of the
1997 abatement agreement (including reducing rents,
improving the condition of the units, and renting units
to low to moderate income individuals) and stating
that the [1997] abatement agreement was subject to an
annual review to ensure Seymour’s compliance. . . .
On March 18, 2014, Miriam Rodriguez of [the city’s]
Housing Division wrote to [Valinho] thanking him for
his ‘renewal application’ for tax abatements on the Sey-
mour Street properties and stating that the tax abate-
ments had expired at the end of grand list year 2012.
. . . On August 18, 2015, Kiana Gamble at [the city’s]
Assessment and Collection Division wrote to [Valinho]
and informed him that the tax abatement on the Sey-
mour Street properties for the 2014 grand list would be
$72,093.74. . . .
‘‘In calendar year 2016, Seymour and Squire began
to have difficulty getting tax abatements on the subject
properties for grand list year 2015. . . . On May 26,
2017, [Valinho] wrote to Sean Fitzpatrick at the [city]
inquiring as to why abatements on the subject proper-
ties were not being approved. . . . In his May 26 letter,
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. Hartford

[Valinho] asserts that tax abatement ‘renewals’ had
been approved for the subject properties and speculates
that the possible reason for [the city’s] delay in approv-
ing further abatements was that ‘the city can’t locate
certain documents and therefore we need to pay the
full tax amount.’ . . . Valinho claims that Seymour and
Squire are owed tax abatements on the subject proper-
ties for grand list years 2015, 2016, and 2017 in accor-
dance with the 1997 and 2003 abatement agreements.’’
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted.)
The court, Budzik, J., held a trial on May 11, 2023.
Valinho testified, and eleven exhibits were entered into
evidence. The court also reviewed stipulations of facts.
On November 2, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
of decision. The court stated that ‘‘Valinho testified at
trial that he was assured by [city] officials that [the city]
would honor the 1997 and 2003 abatement agreements
originally signed with SA and PSAP and that [the city]
would provide tax abatement on the subject properties
through grand list year 2017.’’ The trial court credited
Valinho’s testimony only to the extent that it concluded
that ‘‘Valinho had some communications with [city offi-
cials] regarding tax abatements for the subject proper-
ties.’’ The court further concluded that ‘‘Valinho, Sey-
mour, and Squire failed to present any credible evidence
as to exactly what those discussions were, what agree-
ments, if any, were reached, and whether the persons
[Valinho] was dealing with had any authority, real or
apparent, to legally bind’’ the city. The court stated that
‘‘Valinho also testified that he would not have purchased
the subject properties without an assurance from the
[city] that it would honor the 1997 and 2003 abatement
agreements through grand list year 2017. The court does
not credit [Valinho’s] testimony on this point.’’
The court stated that ‘‘[§] 32-12 (b) (9) of the Hartford
Code of Ordinances requires . . . all tax abatement
agreements to be approved by the city council. . . .
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. Hartford

No copy of a tax abatement agreement between Sey-
mour and/or Squire and the [city] was entered into
evidence at trial. Indeed [Valinho] did not testify that
he recalled signing such an agreement.’’ (Citations omit-
ted.) Finally, the court noted the city’s policy that ‘‘[a]ll
tax abatement agreements are non-transferable and
non-assignable without [the] written consent of the
[m]ayor of the [city].’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) The court stated that ‘‘[t]here was no evidence
presented at trial that the mayor . . . ever provided
written consent to transfer or assign any rights under
any abatement agreement to Seymour or Squire.’’
On the basis of these facts, the court concluded that
‘‘both Seymour and Squire have failed to present suffi-
cient facts to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that there was any tax abatement agreement between
Seymour and/or Squire and the [city] that covered the
grand list years at issue, 2015–2017.’’ The court first
noted that there was no credible evidence presented
at trial showing any tax abatement agreement that was
‘‘approved by the . . . city council or entered into by
a person with authority to bind’’ the city. The court
stated that Valinho’s testimony ‘‘as to assurances or
discussions with [city] employees with respect to tax
abatement on the subject properties were much too
inchoate and vague for the court to conclude that any
kind of binding agreement was entered into . . . .’’ The
court noted that Valinho ‘‘could not even say with clarity
with whom at the [city] he claims to have made a con-
tract.’’
Second, the court determined that ‘‘there was no
credible evidence introduced at trial demonstrating that
SA’s or PSAP’s rights under the 1997 and/or 2003 abate-
ment agreements were transferred or assigned to Sey-
mour or Squire and no written consent from the mayor
. . . to any such transfer or assignment was entered
into evidence. Indeed, the 1997 abatement agreement
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. Hartford

had an express term of fifteen years and thus any rights
PSAP (or any successor) had under that agreement
ended in 2012.’’ Third, the court stated that, although
Escalera’s June, 2013 letter ‘‘provides sufficient evi-
dence that, for unknown reasons, [the city] decided to
give Seymour the benefit of the 1997 abatement agree-
ment for the 2014 grand list year, there is no evidence
that that decision automatically extended to grand list
years 2015–2017, or that [Escalera] (who did not testify
at trial) had any authority to create an enforceable,
contractual obligation for [the city] to provide tax abate-
ment to Seymour and/or Squire for grand list years
2015–2017.’’ The court also noted that Escalera’s letter
made clear that Seymour was required to comply with
other terms and that any abatement would be subject
to annual review. Accordingly, the court stated that,
even if it were to conclude that Escalera had authority
to bind the city, which it did not so conclude, Seymour
had presented no credible evidence that it complied
with the terms of Escalera’s letter. Accordingly, the
court rendered judgments in favor of the defendants.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court’s finding
that there were no tax abatement agreements between
the parties was clearly erroneous.3 We decline to reach
the merits of this claim because the plaintiffs have failed
to provide an adequate record for review.
‘‘Factual findings are subject to a clearly erroneous
standard of review. . . . It is well established that [a]
finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly
erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the
whole record. . . . A finding of fact is clearly errone-
ous when there is no evidence in the record to support
Although the plaintiffs did not include a standard of review in their
3

appellate brief, the plaintiffs’ counsel, during oral argument before this court,
identified the clearly erroneous standard of review as applicable to the
plaintiffs’ claim.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. Hartford

it . . . or when although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed . . . . Our authority, when reviewing
the findings of a judge, is circumscribed by the defer-
ence we must give to decisions of the trier of fact, who
is usually in a superior position to appraise and weigh
the evidence. . . . The question for this court . . . is
not whether it would have made the findings the trial
court did, but whether in view of the evidence and
pleadings in the whole record it is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meineke Bris-
tol, LLC v. Premier Auto, LLC, 227 Conn. App. 64,
72–73, 319 A.3d 826 (2024).
‘‘As the appellant, the [plaintiff] has the burden of
providing this court with a record from which this court
can review any alleged claims of error.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) J. M. v. E. M., 216 Conn. App. 814,
821, 286 A.3d 929 (2022). Practice Book § 61-10 (a)
provides: ‘‘It is the responsibility of the appellant to
provide an adequate record for review. The appellant
shall determine whether the entire record is complete,
correct and otherwise perfected for presentation on
appeal.’’ ‘‘The general purpose of [the relevant] rules
of practice . . . [requiring the appellant to provide a
sufficient record] is to ensure that there is a trial court
record that is adequate for an informed appellate review
of the various claims presented by the parties. . . .
It is not an appropriate function of this court, when
presented with an inadequate record, to speculate as
to the reasoning of the trial court or to presume error
from a silent record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Meineke Bristol, LLC v. Premier Auto, LLC,
supra, 227 Conn. App. 73.
In the present case, on December 1, 2023, the plain-
tiffs, through their counsel, filed with the Office of the
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. Hartford

Appellate Clerk a certificate regarding transcripts indi-
cating that, pursuant to Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (3),
no transcripts were necessary for the resolution of this
appeal. Despite making this certification, the plaintiffs,
in their appellate briefing, rely on Valinho’s testimony
in support of their claim that the trial court’s finding
that there were no agreements between the parties was
clearly erroneous. Specifically, they argue that Valinho’s
‘‘uncontroverted testimony’’ at trial verifies his alleged
discussions held with city representatives.4 The plain-
tiffs’ failure to provide this court with transcripts of the
trial renders impossible any meaningful evaluation of
the entirety of the evidence presented to the court. See
Meineke Bristol, LLC v. Premier Auto, LLC, supra, 227
Conn. App. 74–75 (‘‘In connection with a claim that
requires this court to review the evidence presented at
trial . . . we must consider the evidence as a whole,
including evidence of a testimonial nature. In the
absence of a complete transcript, we would have to
resort to speculation to resolve [the appellant’s] claim
that the court erred in determining that it failed to prove
its breach of contract cause of action.’’); J. M. v. E. M.,
supra, 216 Conn. App. 822 (‘‘[i]n the absence of the
4
In their appellate brief, the plaintiffs rely on the testimony at trial as
follows: ‘‘Pursuant to the uncontroverted testimony of [Valinho] at trial,
before [Squire] purchased the [Squire/Park Street] properties, he held numer-
ous discussions with representatives of the [city], including [Escalera], [the
city’s] Director of Housing and Property Management at the time. During
those discussions, the parties agreed that should [Squire] purchase the
[Squire/Park Street] properties and pay the outstanding property tax arrear-
age on the properties which were amassed by a prior owner of the [Squire/
Park Street] properties, the [city] would agree to a new ten year abatement
agreement. [Squire] purchased the [Squire/Park Street] properties and satis-
fied the outstanding tax arrearage. The defendants put forth no evidence
at trial to controvert these facts. [Squire] and the defendants had a meeting
of the minds and exchanged documents that evidenced offer and acceptance
of the renewed tax agreements. [Squire] and the [city] therefore entered
into a new abatement agreement for the [Squire/Park Street] properties.’’
The plaintiffs similarly rely on Valinho’s testimony in their argument with
respect to Seymour and the Seymour Street properties.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
Park Seymour Associates, LLC v. Hartford

transcript, we are left to speculate as to whether the
court’s findings are clearly erroneous, which we cannot
do’’); Margarum v. Donut Delight, Inc., 210 Conn. App.
576, 579, 270 A.3d 169 (2022) (failure to provide tran-
scripts of evidentiary portion of trial proceedings ren-
dered impossible review of appellate claim challenging
jury’s factual finding).
‘‘As we have repeatedly stated, [o]ur role is not to
guess at possibilities, but to review claims based on a
complete factual record . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Margarum v. Donut Delight, Inc.,
supra, 210 Conn. App. 580. Accordingly, we are unable
to address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim because
they have not provided this court with an adequate
record for review.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.