Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

CIVIC MIND, LLC v. CITY OF HARTFORD ET AL.
(AC 46508)
Moll, Westbrook and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing its action
against nineteen defendants concerning the defendant city’s allegedly fraud-
ulent solicitation of bids for the redevelopment of a stadium. The plaintiff
claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that it lacked
standing to pursue its claims. Held:

The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claims seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief for lack of standing because the court correctly deter-
mined that the request for proposals issued by the defendant city in connec-
tion with the redevelopment project was not governed by the competitive
bidding requirements of the applicable statute (§ 4b-91) or the applicable
provision of the Hartford Municipal Code (§ 2-548).

The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claims seeking monetary
damages against the defendants other than the city because the root issue
of those claims was that the plaintiff had participated in the request for
proposals and was not awarded a contract, and the rejection of its proposal
did not establish standing for the plaintiff to seek judicial intervention.
Argued May 28—officially released December 17, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, fraud, and
for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford and transferred to the Com-
plex Litigation Docket, where the court, Farley, J.,
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and ren-
dered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Patrick Tomasiewicz, with whom, on the brief, was
Gregory A. Jones, for the appellant (plaintiff).
David R. Roth, for the appellees (defendant city of
Hartford et al.).
Cathleen A. Giannetta, with whom, on the brief, were
Molly M. Wilcox and Michelle Arbitrio, for the appellees
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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

(defendant Capital Region Development Authority et
al.).
Richard F. Wareing, with whom, on the brief, was
Anthony J. Natale, for the appellees (defendant Hart-
ford Sports Group, LLC, et al.).
Donna L. Cook, with whom, on the brief, was Ales-
sandro J. Angelori, for the appellee (defendant Michael
Freimuth).
Opinion

MOLL, J. In this action concerning the redevelopment
of Dillon Stadium (stadium)1 in Hartford, the plaintiff,
Civic Mind, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial
court dismissing its complaint against the nineteen
defendants, including the city of Hartford (city) and
the Capital Region Development Authority (CRDA).2 On
appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
granted motions to dismiss filed by the defendants on
the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue
its claims against the defendants. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as alleged in the plaintiff’s com-
plaint or as established by uncontested evidence sub-
mitted in connection with the defendants’ motions to
dismiss, and procedural history are relevant to our reso-
lution of this appeal. In 2012, the city began efforts to
revitalize the stadium, which was built in 1935 and had
fallen into a state of disrepair. In 2013, after soliciting
bids, the city selected the plaintiff as its ‘‘ ‘preferred
1
The record reflects that Dillon Stadium is currently named Trinity Health
Stadium; however, the parties primarily refer to the stadium by its for-
mer name.
2
The defendants are the city, CRDA, Luke Bronin, Sean Fitzpatrick, Glen-
dowlyn Thames, Julio Concepcion, Andy Bessette, Suzanne Hopgood,
Anthony Lazzaro, Kimberly Hart, David Jorgensen, Michael Matteo, Marcia
Leclerc, Hartford Sports Group, LLC, Bruce Mandell, Joseph Calafiore, Scott
Schooley, Data-Mail, Inc., and Michael Freimuth.
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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

vendor’ . . . .’’ In December, 2013, the plaintiff created
a plan to develop and to manage the stadium, which
included bringing United Soccer League (USL) and W-
League soccer franchises to the city. In February, 2014,
the city terminated the plaintiff from the stadium proj-
ect because, as the plaintiff alleged, the plaintiff’s
founder and principal, Thomas Clynch, ‘‘refused to
accept bribes’’ and to ‘‘cooperate’’ with a ‘‘criminal
scheme’’ orchestrated by the city. In May, 2014, the city
chose Premier Sports Management Group (PSMG) ‘‘to
continue the work of [the plaintiff]’’; however, PSMG’s
principals later were convicted of money laundering
and fraud for illegal activities in connection with the
stadium project.
In November, 2014, Clynch retained Hinckley, Allen &
Snyder, LLP (Hinckley Allen), as legal counsel, and,
shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed an action against,
inter alia, the city and PSMG (2014 action). See Civic
Mind, LLC v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district
of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No.
CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S. Shortly after the commencement of the
2014 action, Luke Bronin became a partner at Hinckley
Allen and announced his candidacy for the mayorship
of the city. In July, 2015, Bronin invited Clynch to his
home to discuss (1) the 2014 action, (2) an ongoing
investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
into the city’s alleged solicitation and fraud, (3) the
city officials who were involved in the scheme, and
(4) Clynch’s plans for the stadium, including securing
professional soccer franchises. Thereafter, concerned
with the firm’s potential conflicts of interest, Clynch
terminated Hinckley Allen as legal counsel. In January,
2016, Bronin began his tenure as the city’s mayor.3
3
The 2014 action was resolved in late 2017, after (1) the trial court,
Moukawsher, J., rendered summary judgment in favor of the city and (2)
the plaintiff withdrew the remainder of its claims. See Civic Mind, LLC v.
Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation
Docket, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (November 8, 2017) (65 Conn. L. Rptr.
470, 471).
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On February 7, 2017, a shared plan was unanimously
adopted by the city, CRDA, Hartford Sports Group, LLC
(HSG), and Bruce Mandell, one of HSG’s owners, ‘‘to
publicly finance [the stadium] to HSG’s specifications.’’
This shared plan was developed using the plaintiff’s
‘‘work [product], know-how, and professional soccer
plans . . . .’’ In March, 2017, ICON Venue Group, a
stadium design firm retained by HSG, performed a site
visit at the stadium in partnership with the city and
CRDA. On April 14, 2017, ICON Venue Group produced
a report containing a comprehensive analysis to develop
the stadium in accordance with USL specifications with
a budget of $10.7 million (ICON report). The ICON
report included internal city documents, vendor quotes,
and a photo of individuals at the stadium, including
Mandell and city representatives.
On August 9, 2017, Michael Freimuth, CRDA’s execu-
tive director, offered the Bronin administration CRDA’s
help ‘‘to develop a plan to repair/upgrade and [reuse
the stadium].’’ On August 22, 2017, Bronin accepted
CRDA’s offer.
On September 15, 2017, on behalf of the city, CRDA
issued a request for proposals (RFP), the stated purpose
of which was to ‘‘[seek] proposals from individuals,
firms and/or organizations authorized to do business in
the [s]tate of Connecticut who are interested in using,
redeveloping and operating [the stadium] and poten-
tially securing a professional sports team for that facil-
ity.’’ The ICON report was not made available to the
public in connection with the RFP.
The RFP expressly delineated five project goals: (1)
‘‘[s]ecur[ing] greater uses of [the stadium] with a strong
preference for a professional sports team’’; (2) ‘‘[p]ro-
vid[ing] for the upgrade and repair of the [s]tadium,’’
accompanied by a nonexhaustive list of renovations
required to the existing facilities; (3) ‘‘[e]stablish[ing]
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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

an operational management program for the [s]tadium’’;
(4) ‘‘[c]ompliment[ing] and assist[ing] Colt Park
renewal and recreational programs operating within
[Colt] Park’’; and (5) ‘‘[s]pur[ring] other community
redevelopment and renewal within the [United States]
National Park area.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) The RFP also
established five selection criteria: (1) ‘‘[p]roposed use
of [the stadium]’’; (2) ‘‘[r]espondent’s experience, tech-
nical competence and financial plan’’; (3) ‘‘[r]espon-
dent’s capacity to perform work’’; (4) ‘‘[p]rivate capital/
public capital program’’; and (5) ‘‘[e]fficacy of revenue
return and economic impact to the [c]ity . . . .’’
In addition, the RFP set forth several submission
requirements, which instructed respondents to provide,
inter alia, (1) a description of proposed use(s) for the
stadium, along with any attendant business and market-
ing plans, (2) a budget and a description of necessary
capital improvements, along with the sources of funding
for such improvements, and (3) a plan to manage and
to operate the stadium, along with proposed operating
proforma reflecting annual revenues and expenses. The
RFP also set forth various general conditions, including:
‘‘7. Issuance of [the] RFP does not obligate CRDA or
the [c]ity . . . to undertake any action. [The] RFP does
not commit CRDA or the [c]ity . . . to award a con-
tract. CRDA reserves the right to use submissions as a
basis for negotiation with one or more respondents and/
or with parties other than those responding to [the]
RFP and/or terms other than those set forth herein.
CRDA reserves the right to waive compliance with and/
or change any terms of [the] RFP.’’
On September 14, 2017, Kimberly Hart, a CRDA board
member and CRDA’s venue director, emailed Clynch
to notify him of the forthcoming RFP. By the October
13, 2017 deadline specified in the RFP, CRDA received
RFP submissions from the plaintiff, HSG, and a third
respondent. HSG’s submission proposed an investment
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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

of approximately $10 million in public funds to recon-
struct the stadium, with CRDA tasked with the develop-
ment thereof and the city tasked with the management
thereof, and a stated goal of securing a USL franchise.
The plaintiff’s submission proposed an investment of
$1.5 million in private funding to upgrade the stadium
and partnerships with (1) a Boston based stadium
design firm, (2) the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic
Conference and Connecticut Association of Schools in
order ‘‘to establish ‘an annual calendar of competitive
and inspiring high school sporting events,’ ’’ and (3)
‘‘Oakwood Soccer, a local, established, premier soccer
club.’’ On November 1, 2017, CRDA held a public forum
in connection with the RFP, which included presenta-
tions from the respondents regarding their proposals.
On December 1, 2017, Freimuth mailed Bronin a letter
accompanied by a memorandum outlining CRDA’s rec-
ommendations regarding the stadium. Following its
review of the three RFP submissions, and notwithstand-
ing certain concerns, ‘‘particularly the scope of capital
improvements and [the] level of public funding
required,’’ CRDA recommended that the city pursue an
agreement with HSG to redevelop the stadium, as it
‘‘believe[d] the proposal offered by [HSG] represent[ed]
the strongest plan moving forward.’’ In contrast, CRDA
determined that the plaintiff’s RFP submission was,
‘‘in essence, a planning proposal that would utilize the
expertise of a nationally known sports facility planner,
but it [was] otherwise [nonresponsive] to the RFP
. . . .’’ On December 14, 2017, the city accepted CRDA’s
recommendation, whereupon the city, CRDA, and HSG
entered into negotiations.
In February, 2018, while negotiations among the city,
CRDA, and HSG were ongoing, CRDA secured $10 mil-
lion in funding for the stadium project from the State
Bond Commission (commission), which funding was
contingent on a signed agreement with a professional
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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

soccer team. Around that time, HSG was awarded a
USL franchise, which was named the Hartford Athletic
and was operated by Hartford Athletic, LLC, an entity
owned by HSG. The city, CRDA, and HSG proceeded
to draft a term sheet, pursuant to which ‘‘the [city]
would enter into a [l]icense [a]greement with [CRDA]
to oversee stadium operations. CRDA [would], in turn,
enter into a [s]tadium [u]se [a]greement with [HSG] to
operate a USL team at the stadium pursuant to terms
agreed to between the [c]ity and HSG as described [in
the term sheet].’’ On March 26, 2018, Bronin presented
the city’s Court of Common Council (council)4 with a
resolution to authorize the city to enter into a license
agreement with CRDA in accordance with the term
sheet, as well as ‘‘other necessary agreements for the
operation and use of [the stadium] in accordance with
the [t]erm [s]heet,’’ which resolution the council
approved on April 9, 2018.
On June 8, 2018, the city and CRDA executed a license
agreement (2018 license agreement). Pursuant to the
2018 license agreement, the city granted CRDA and its
agents ‘‘a license and right of access to the [stadium]
for the purpose of constructing and operating the New
Dillon Stadium5 and activities related thereto.’’ (Foot-
note added.) The 2018 license agreement further pro-
vided, inter alia, that CRDA’s agents ‘‘shall have the
right and license to use New Dillon Stadium for the
presentation of professional soccer and lacrosse as well
as various community events and uses as provided in
[a] [s]tadium [u]se [a]greement to be entered into by
and among the [city, CRDA, and Hartford Athletic, LLC]
4
Pursuant to the city’s charter, ‘‘[t]he legislative power and authority of
the City shall be vested in the Council. . . .’’ Hartford Charter, c. IV, § 1.
5
The 2018 license agreement, in defining ‘‘ ‘New Dillon Stadium,’ ’’ pro-
vided that ‘‘[the stadium] is a former football stadium, and [the city] desires
to construct substantial upgrades and convert [the stadium] into a soccer
stadium that will host, among other things, professional soccer games, enter-
tainment and community events . . . .’’
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. . . . [CRDA] shall construct the New Dillon Stadium
in accordance with the final plans and specifications
ensuring the [New Dillon] Stadium and field are built
to [USL] and ‘FIFA 2 Star’ standards . . . .’’
In July, 2018, notwithstanding the lack of an agree-
ment with a professional soccer team in place, CRDA
began spending some of the $10 million in funds
awarded to it by the commission on the reconstruction
of the stadium, with CRDA expending $4,039,356
between July, 2018, and February 24, 2019. During this
period, HSG and its owners, Mandell, Joseph Calafiore,
and Scott Schooley, contributed approximately $2.3
million toward the redevelopment of the stadium.6
On November 7, 2018, Mandell filed a self-reported
complaint with the State Elections Enforcement Com-
mission (SEEC) to report political contributions made
by himself and by members of his family in the late
summer and early fall of 2018. The complaint repre-
sented that Mandell, along with Calafiore and Schooley,
had entered into an agreement with the city ‘‘to bring
a professional soccer team to play at a municipal sta-
dium’’ and that the city, CRDA, and HSG had entered
into a stadium use agreement.7
On February 13, 2019, Bronin presented the council
with a resolution to authorize the city to amend (1) the
2018 license agreement between the city and CRDA,
and (2) ‘‘terms in a [s]tadium [u]se [a]greement . . . for
the operation and use of [the stadium] by . . . Hartford
Athletic, LLC . . . .’’ Bronin represented to the council
that, ‘‘[i]n April 2018, [the council] authorized the [c]ity
to enter into [the 2018] [l]icense [a]greement with CRDA
6
Additionally, at some point, the Hartford Foundation for Public Giving,
a nonparty to the present action, contributed approximately $1.5 million
toward the redevelopment efforts.
7
In accordance with a voluntary settlement agreement adopted in 2019,
Mandell was required to pay a civil penalty of $45,000 to the SEEC for
making improper political contributions.
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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

to oversee the [s]tadium’s renovations and approved
terms which would form the basis of a tri-party [sta-
dium] [u]se [a]greement . . . between the [c]ity, CRDA
and [HSG, referred to therein as Hartford Athletic, LLC]
for the operation and use of the [s]tadium. [The term
sheet], which outlined the roles and responsibilities of
the parties under the respective agreements was pro-
vided to [the council] at that time.’’ Bronin further repre-
sented to the council that the city ‘‘wishe[d] to modify
the form of agreements going forward with respect to
[the stadium] to clarify the [c]ity’s relationship between
the parties as separate and distinct from each other.
. . . [The city’s] intent has always been that CRDA will
lead the reconstruction efforts at [the stadium] and
provide management services to the [c]ity, and that
the utilization of the facilities at [the stadium] would
constitute an agreement between the [c]ity and [Hart-
ford Athletic, LLC]. To that end, the [c]ity proposes to
clarify CRDA’s [s]tadium operations management func-
tions in an agreement separate and apart from the [sta-
dium] [u]se [a]greement. In the [m]anagement [a]gree-
ment, CRDA would continue its oversight of the
[s]tadium renovations and retain the [s]tadium opera-
tions management and fiduciary role that was outlined
in the . . . [t]erm [s]heet. In turn, the [s]tadium [u]se
[a]greement would be clarified to recognize that this
understanding is and should be between [Hartford Ath-
letic, LLC] and the [city], as the [o]wner of the [s]ta-
dium.’’ On February 13, 2019, the council approved this
resolution.
On February 25, 2019, the city and Hartford Athletic,
LLC, executed a stadium use agreement (2019 stadium
use agreement), which ‘‘set forth the detailed terms
and conditions pursuant to which (i) [Hartford Athletic,
LLC] will use the [s]tadium in accordance with the terms
[thereof] and will play Club Home Games (as defined
[therein]) at the [s]tadium, (ii) [Hartford Athletic, LLC]
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and the [Hartford Athletic] may host other Club Addi-
tional Events (as defined [therein]) at the [s]tadium,
and (iii) the [city], and to the extent provided under
[a separate agreement between the city and CRDA],
[CRDA] will provide the [s]tadium and Stadium Prem-
ises [as defined therein] and its appurtenances for such
games and other events in accordance with the terms
and conditions set forth [therein].’’ The same day, the
city and CRDA executed a stadium renovation and oper-
ation agreement (2019 stadium renovation and opera-
tion agreement), which ‘‘set forth the detailed terms
and conditions pursuant to which [CRDA] shall reno-
vate and operate the [s]tadium . . . .’’8
According to CRDA and the city, the redevelopment
of the stadium was completed in July, 2019.9 The Hart-
ford Athletic began playing its home games at the sta-
dium on July 13, 2019.
On August 9, 2019, the State Contracting Standards
Board (board) ‘‘form[ed] a working group to examine
the procurement processes for the renovation of [the
stadium],’’ which action was prompted by (1) a report
by the State Auditors of Public Accounts, issued in 2019
(2019 SAPA report), regarding the expenditure of public
funds on the stadium project, which report found that
CRDA improperly had spent approximately $4 million
of the funds awarded to it by the commission without
satisfying the attendant requirement that an executed
agreement with a professional soccer team be in place,
(2) two contests filed with the board by Clynch on
behalf of the plaintiff in 2018 regarding the RFP and
8
The 2019 stadium renovation and operation agreement later was
amended on February 1, 2022, ‘‘[t]o reflect the completion of the Renovations
[as defined therein] and certain changes to CRDA’s role with regard to the
operation of the [s]tadium.’’
9
In a personal affidavit filed in support of the HSG defendants’ motion
to dismiss, Mandell averred that the renovation of the stadium was completed
in 2018.
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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

the ‘‘award’’ to HSG, and (3) a discussion during a meet-
ing of the board on December 14, 2018, regarding certain
newspaper reports and the SEEC’s investigation into
Mandell’s improper political contributions in 2018.
In 2020, the board issued its final report on the sta-
dium (2020 final report). The board labeled the RFP and
the ‘‘convoluted procurement process’’ as a ‘‘charade,’’
questioning why the city pursued the RFP and the pro-
curement process rather than, from the outset, licensing
the use of the stadium to HSG and authorizing CRDA
to renovate and to redevelop the stadium and its sur-
rounding area, which, as the board found, ‘‘[i]n the end
. . . is what actually occurred . . . .’’ The board found
that on April 2, 2018, CRDA issued a construction man-
agement RFP to develop the stadium, with a nonparty
named ‘‘Newfield Construction’’ being awarded the con-
tract on June 1, 2018. The board also concluded that
the RFP was deficient in a number of ways, including
that it failed to disclose the estimated costs to all of
the respondents, and provided recommendations to
CRDA to ensure that future procurements provided all
bidders or proposers with a ‘‘level playing field.’’ In
addition, the board concluded that, ‘‘[f]ollowing the RFP
and recommendation of HSG by CRDA to the [c]ity, the
[c]ity effectively abandoned the RFP by substantially
changing the construct of the . . . RFP’’ without pro-
viding notification that it had abandoned the RFP pro-
cess.
On January 31, 2022, the plaintiff commenced the
present action. The first three counts of the plaintiff’s
fifty-six count complaint were directed to the city. In
count one, the plaintiff asserted that the city violated the
competitive bidding requirements of General Statutes
§ 4b-9110 et seq. and/or § 2-546 et seq. of the Hartford
10
Section 4b-91 was amended after September 15, 2017, when the RFP
was issued, by No. 21-104, §§ 4 and 5, of the 2021 Public Acts, No. 21-198,
§ 3, of the 2021 Public Acts, No. 22-39, § 5, of the 2022 Public Acts, and No.
23-204, §§ 435 and 436, of the 2023 Public Acts. One of these public acts
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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

Municipal Code (code). The plaintiff alleged that, not-
withstanding the city’s representations ‘‘to the public
and all bidders that it would follow the RFP process
under the Connecticut General Statutes and/or the
[code] and proceed in a fair and equitable manner,’’
the city conspired with ‘‘other persons to award the
contract to remodel [the stadium] to an underqualified
and improper bidder that was not in the city’s best
interests.’’ More specifically, the plaintiff alleged that
the city conspired with (1) Mandell and his partners to
have them submit a bid to remodel the stadium using
information that was unavailable to other bidders,
thereby demonstrating favoritism, and (2) CRDA and
its board members to encourage the plaintiff to partici-
pate in the RFP process despite having no intention to
consider the plaintiff’s bid, which, by law, should have
been selected as the winning bid. The plaintiff further
alleged that the city’s ‘‘misrepresentations were intended
to encourage other parties to submit bids for the pur-
pose of validating its sham RFP process.’’
Count two of the complaint sounded in breach of
contract. The plaintiff alleged that (1) the city invited
the plaintiff to submit a bid in reliance on the city’s
representations that ‘‘it would follow the RFP process
under the Connecticut General Statutes and/or the
[code] and proceed in a fair and equitable manner,’’ (2)
the plaintiff submitted a bid in reliance upon the city’s
representations, thereby entering into a contract with
the city pursuant to which (a) the plaintiff and the city
would ‘‘follow the bidding requirements’’ and (b) the
city ‘‘would proceed in a fair and equitable manner in
effectuating the bidding statutes and/or ordinances,’’
amended the portions of the statute cited here—subdivisions (2) and (4) of
§ 4b-91 (a)—as No. 23-204, § 435, of the 2023 Public Acts increased the
estimated cost of the contracts governed by the provisions from $500,000
to $1 million; however, none of these amendments affects our analysis.
Accordingly, in the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision
of the statute.
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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

and (3) the city breached this contract by engaging
in fraud and showing favoritism toward HSG and its
owners. In the alternative, in count three, the plaintiff
asserted a claim of promissory estoppel, alleging that
it relied on the city’s misrepresentations that the city
‘‘would follow the RFP process under the Connecticut
General Statutes and/or the [code] and proceed in a
fair and equitable manner’’ in submitting its bid.
In count four of the complaint, the plaintiff asserted
a claim of fraud against CRDA. The plaintiff alleged
that, notwithstanding CRDA’s representation ‘‘to the
public and all bidders that it would follow the RFP
process under the Connecticut General Statutes and
proceed in a fair and equitable manner,’’ CRDA con-
spired with the city, HSG, and others to award the
contract to remodel and to develop the stadium to HSG
and its owners notwithstanding the merits of the plain-
tiff’s bid, which, by law, should have been the successful
bid, thereby demonstrating fraud and favoritism. Addi-
tionally, the plaintiff alleged that ‘‘CRDA’s misrepresen-
tations were intended to encourage other parties to
submit bids for the purpose of validating its sham RFP
process.’’
The remaining fifty-two counts of the plaintiff’s com-
plaint asserted claims of (1) conspiracy to commit
fraud, (2) tortious interference with a business expec-
tancy, (3) conspiracy to commit tortious interference
with a business expectancy, and (4) violations of the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Gen-
eral Statutes § 42-110a et seq., with each count directed
to one of CRDA, HSG, Data-Mail, Inc., or the various
individual defendants. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
In support of these counts, the plaintiff alleged that the
RFP was a ‘‘sham . . . process’’ intended to conceal
the defendants’ collective scheme to ensure that HSG
was awarded a contract to redevelop the stadium.
In addition, in support of each count of its complaint,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ misconduct
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caused it harm in the form of (1) costs and fees it
incurred in developing its RFP submission and (2) lost
profits that would have resulted ‘‘from its successful
bid that rightfully belonged to it.’’ As relief, the plaintiff
sought (1) money damages against all of the defendants,
except for the city, (2) injunctive relief (a) prohibiting
any additional development of the stadium, (b) voiding
the agreement between the city and HSG, and (c) order-
ing a new procurement, conducted under the proper
procedures, to develop the stadium, and (3) any addi-
tional relief deemed just and proper by the court.
On May 23, 2022, motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s
complaint, accompanied by memoranda of law and
exhibits, were filed by, respectively, (1) the city, Bronin,
Sean Fitzpatrick, Glendowlyn Thames, and Julio Con-
cepcion (collectively, city defendants),11 (2) CRDA,
Hart, Andy Bessette, Suzanne Hopgood, Anthony Laz-
zaro, David Jorgensen, Michael Matteo, and Marcia
Leclerc (collectively, CRDA defendants),12 (3) HSG,
Mandell, Calafiore, Schooley, and Data-Mail, Inc. (col-
lectively, HSG defendants),13 and (4) Freimuth.14 The
11
The plaintiff alleged that (1) Bronin was the city’s mayor and, prior to
the beginning of his tenure as the city’s mayor, a partner at Hinckley Allen,
(2) Fitzpatrick was a CRDA board member and the city’s director of develop-
ment services, (3) Thames was a CRDA board member and the president
of the council, and (4) Concepcion was a state representative and a former
council majority leader.
12
The plaintiff alleged that (1) Hart was a CRDA board member and
CRDA’s venue director, (2) Bessette was a CRDA board member and CRDA’s
venue committee chair, (3) Hopgood was a CRDA board member and CRDA’s
board chair, (4) Lazzaro was a CRDA board member and CRDA’s deputy
director and general counsel, (5) Jorgensen and Matteo were CRDA board
members and served on CRDA’s venue committee, and (6) Leclerc was a
CRDA board member and the chairwoman of CRDA’s venue committee.
13
The plaintiff alleged that (1) Mandell was the president of Data-Mail,
Inc., and a co-owner of HSG, (2) Calafiore and Schooley were partnered
with Mandell and were co-owners of HSG, and (3) Data-Mail, Inc., was
‘‘indistinguishable from . . . HSG in terms of operation, personnel, and
funds such that the independence of the two corporations had never begun
and adhering to the fiction of separate identities would only defeat justice
and equity.’’
14
The plaintiff alleged that Freimuth was a CRDA board member and
CRDA’s executive director. Freimuth did not join the motion to dismiss
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defendants collectively claimed that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the present
action on the ground that the plaintiff did not have
standing to raise claims concerning the award of a con-
tract pursuant to the RFP because it had no legal or
equitable right in any such contract. Insofar as the plain-
tiff sought money damages in connection with its
remaining claims, the defendants further collectively
asserted that the plaintiff lacked standing to claim such
damages.15 On July 7, 2022, the plaintiff filed memo-
randa of law in opposition to the defendants’ respective
motions to dismiss, along with appended exhibits, and,
on July 29, 2022, reply briefs were filed by, respectively,
the city defendants, the CRDA defendants, the HSG
defendants, and Freimuth.
On August 31, 2022, the court, Farley, J., heard argu-
ment on the motions to dismiss. On December 7, 2022,
the court ordered the parties to file simultaneous sup-
plemental briefs to address further the applicability of
the code to the RFP, which supplemental briefs were
filed on January 6, 2023.
On May 4, 2023, the court issued a memorandum of
decision granting the defendants’ respective motions
to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff lacked stand-
ing. The court first concluded that, insofar as the plain-
tiff was seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the
plaintiff lacked standing because, as the defendants argued,
its claims ‘‘rest[ed] upon the core allegation that it par-
ticipated in a government procurement process and
was not awarded a contract.’’ Quoting Ardmare Con-
struction Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn. 497, 502, 467 A.2d
filed by the CRDA defendants but, instead, filed a separate motion to dismiss.
On May 24, 2022, Freimuth filed a corrected memorandum of law accompa-
nying his motion to dismiss.
15
Additionally, (1) the defendants collectively claimed that the plaintiff’s
claims were moot and (2) the individual CRDA defendants and Freimuth
claimed that they were entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to General
Statutes § 1-125.
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674 (1983), the court determined that ‘‘[a]n unsuccessful
bidder ‘has no legal or equitable right in the contract
. . . [and] no right to judicial intervention.’ ’’ The court
then rejected an argument raised by the plaintiff that its
allegations of fraud and favoritism in the RFP process
afforded it standing, concluding that (1) there is a lim-
ited exception to the rules of standing that enables
an unsuccessful bidder in a government procurement
process that is subject to competitive bidding laws to
present claims regarding the award of a public contract
‘‘where fraud, corruption or acts undermining the objec-
tive and integrity of the bidding process existed’’; (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); but (2) the RFP was not
subject to the competitive bidding requirements of
either § 4b-91 or § 2-548 of the code, and the plaintiff
cited no authority to support the proposition that an
unsuccessful bidder in a government procurement pro-
cess that is not governed by competitive bidding laws
may challenge the award of a government contract by
alleging fraud or favoritism. The court further con-
cluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue its
remaining claims for money damages against the CRDA
defendants, Freimuth, the HSG defendants, and the indi-
vidual city defendants.16 This appeal followed.17 Addi-
tional facts and procedural history will be set forth as
necessary.
On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the court improp-
erly concluded that it lacked standing to bring its claims
16
In a footnote, citing Blesso Fire Systems, Inc. v. Eastern Connecticut
State University, 245 Conn. 252, 713 A.2d 1283 (1998), the court further
concluded that, ‘‘[e]ven if the RFP [were] subject to competitive bidding
requirements, the plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief are moot because the
[RFP] process was abandoned and no contract for the redevelopment and
operation of [the stadium] was awarded to an RFP participant.’’ The court
briefly iterated this conclusion at the end of its decision. The court declined
to reach any other alternative grounds for dismissal that the defendants had
raised in their respective motions to dismiss.
17
On May 24, 2023, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a, the plaintiff
filed an application for certification to appeal with our Supreme Court,
which application was denied on May 31, 2023.
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against the defendants.18 The plaintiff maintains that,
contrary to the court’s determinations, (1) the RFP was
subject to the competitive bidding requirements of (a)
§ 4b-91 and (b) § 2-548 of the code, such that it had
standing to assert its claims seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief on the basis of its allegations that the
RFP process was marred by fraud and favoritism, and
(2) it had standing to assert its other claims against the
defendants, other than the city, seeking money dam-
ages.19 We disagree.
Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims,
we set forth the governing standard of review. ‘‘A
motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face
of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . .
[O]ur review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion
and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss
will be de novo. . . . In undertaking this review, we
are mindful of the well established notion that, in
determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdic-
tion, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be
indulged. . . .
‘‘Our courts have acknowledged that [t]rial courts
addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction . . . may encounter different situations,
18
The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly concluded that its
claims were moot on the basis of its determinations that the RFP had been
‘‘abandoned and no contract for the redevelopment and operation of [the
stadium] was awarded to an RFP participant.’’ See footnote 16 of this opinion.
Additionally, two alternative grounds for affirmance have been raised on
appeal, namely, that (1) the plaintiff’s claims were moot because the stadium
has been fully developed and (2) the individual CRDA defendants and Frei-
muth are entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 1-
125. The plaintiff argues that these alternative grounds for affirmance are
without merit. Our conclusion that the court properly dismissed the plain-
tiff’s complaint for lack of standing is dispositive of this appeal, and, there-
fore, we need not address either the court’s mootness analysis or the alterna-
tive grounds for affirmance.
19
For ease of discussion, we address the plaintiff’s claims in a different
order than that in which they are set forth in its principal appellate brief.
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depending on the status of the record in the case. . . .
[L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in
any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone;
(2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supple-
mented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution
of disputed facts. . . . Different rules and procedures
will apply, depending on the state of the record at the
time the motion is filed. When a trial court decides a
jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to
dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must
consider the allegations of the complaint in their most
favorable light. . . . In this regard, a court must take
the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including
those facts necessarily implied from the allegations,
construing them in a manner most favorable to the
pleader. . . .
‘‘In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by
undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in
support of the motion to dismiss . . . [or] other types
of undisputed evidence . . . the trial court, in
determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these
supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclu-
sively presume the validity of the allegations of the
complaint. . . . Rather, those allegations are tempered
by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undis-
puted facts]. . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence
submitted in support of a defendant’s motion to dismiss
conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and
the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with
counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court
may dismiss the action without further proceedings.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Fountain of Youth Church, Inc. v. Fountain, 225 Conn.
App. 856, 867–68, 317 A.3d 106 (2024). In the present
case, no additional proceedings to resolve contested
jurisdictional facts were requested or conducted;
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rather, as the court stated, it ‘‘consider[ed] the allega-
tions of the complaint, construed favorably to the plain-
tiff, as well as the affidavits and documents submitted
by the parties to the extent they reflect[ed] undis-
puted facts.’’
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the court
properly concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing
to pursue its claims against the defendants. ‘‘A trial
court’s determination of whether a plaintiff lacks stand-
ing is a conclusion of law that is subject to plenary
review on appeal. . . . The question of whether a party
has standing to bring an action implicates the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. . . . Standing is the legal
right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot
rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he
[or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity,
some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or
equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of
the controversy. . . . When standing is put in issue,
the question is whether the person whose standing is
challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication
of the issue . . . . Standing requires no more than a
colorable claim of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes
. . . standing by allegations of injury [that he or she
has suffered or is likely to suffer]. Similarly, standing
exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected inter-
ests. . . .
‘‘Standing is established by showing that the party
claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is
classically aggrieved. . . . The fundamental test for
determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a
well-settled twofold determination: first, the party
claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate
a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject
matter of the challenged action], as distinguished from
a general interest, such as is the concern of all members
of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming
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aggrievement must successfully establish that this spe-
cific personal and legal interest has been specially and
injuriously affected by the [challenged action]. . . .
Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as
distinguished from a certainty, that some legally pro-
tected interest . . . has been adversely affected.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Martinelli v. Martinelli, 226 Conn. App. 563, 572–73,
319 A.3d 198 (2024).
I
We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial
court improperly determined that the RFP was not gov-
erned by the competitive bidding requirements of (1)
§ 4b-91 or (2) § 2-548 of the code, such that the plaintiff
lacked standing to assert its claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief. This claim fails.
‘‘As a matter of common law, an unsuccessful bidder
on a state or municipal contract has no contractual
right that would afford standing to challenge the award
of a contract. [A] bid, even the lowest responsible one,
submitted in response to an invitation for bids is only
an offer which, until accepted . . . does not give rise
to a contract between the parties. . . . An unsuccess-
ful bidder, therefore, has no legal or equitable right in
the contract. Not unlike any other person whose offer
has been rejected, the disappointed bidder has no right
to judicial intervention. . . .
‘‘Moreover, no statute grants unsuccessful bidders
standing to challenge the award of a state contract.
. . . In particular, state and local competitive bidding
laws have not been enacted in order to protect bidders.
These laws serve to guard against abuses in the award
of contracts such as favoritism, fraud or corruption and
are enacted solely for the benefit of the public and in no
sense create any rights in those who submit bids. . . .
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‘‘Despite these substantial constraints, we have rec-
ognized a limited exception to the rules of standing in
order to provide a means of protecting the public’s
interest in properly implemented competitive bidding
processes.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Connecticut Associated Builders &
Contractors v. Hartford, 251 Conn. 169, 178–79, 740
A.2d 813 (1999). Specifically, judicial intervention is
proper ‘‘only where fraud, corruption or favoritism has
influenced the conduct of the bidding officials or when
the very object and integrity of the competitive bidding
process is defeated by the conduct of [the bidding]
officials.’’ Spiniello Construction Co. v. Manchester,
189 Conn. 539, 544, 456 A.2d 1199 (1983). As our
Supreme Court has further explained, ‘‘[i]n [Spiniello
Construction Co.], we recognized that our prior deci-
sions had the effect of preventing judicial review of
potentially meritorious claims concerning the imple-
mentation and execution of competitive bidding stat-
utes. We also acknowledged the fact that the group most
benefitted by the statute—the public—had no effective
means of protecting their interests. We substantially
adopted the position . . . that [t]he public interest in
preventing the granting of contracts through arbitrary
or capricious action can properly be vindicated through
a suit brought by one who suffers injury as a result of
the illegal activity, but the suit itself is brought in the
public interest by one acting essentially as a private
attorney general. . . . Thus, we held that where fraud,
corruption or acts undermining the objective and integ-
rity of the bidding process existed, an unsuccessful
bidder did have standing under the public bidding stat-
ute [at issue].’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freed-
man, supra, 191 Conn. 504–505. ‘‘Our policy to limit
standing so as to deny some claims brought by unsuc-
cessful and precluded bidders is designed to protect
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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

twin goals that serve the public interest in various,
sometimes conflicting, ways. The standing rules aim to
strike the proper balance between fulfilling the pur-
poses of the competitive bidding statutes and pre-
venting frequent litigation that might result in extensive
delay in the commencement and completion of govern-
ment projects to the detriment of the public.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Associated
Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 180.
Pursuant to the foregoing legal principles, the plain-
tiff had no standing to assert claims predicated on the
fact that it was not awarded a contract flowing from
the RFP, unless the aforementioned limited exception
to the standing rules applied. This limited exception,
however, contemplates the existence of a competitive
bidding process, the integrity of which has been com-
promised. See id., 179 (‘‘we have recognized a limited
exception to the rules of standing in order to provide
a means of protecting the public’s interest in properly
implemented competitive bidding processes’’ (empha-
sis added)); Spiniello Construction Co. v. Manchester,
supra, 189 Conn. 544 (judicial intervention is proper
‘‘only where fraud, corruption or favoritism has influ-
enced the conduct of the bidding officials or when the
very object and integrity of the competitive bidding
process is defeated by the conduct of [the bidding]
officials’’ (emphasis added)). Thus, notwithstanding the
plaintiff’s allegations of fraud and favoritism vis-à-vis
the RFP, the threshold inquiry is whether the RFP was
subject to the statutory or municipal competitive bid-
ding requirements at issue. For the reasons that follow,
we agree with the trial court and conclude that neither
the statutory nor municipal competitive bidding require-
ments applied to the RFP.
These claims require us to interpret statutory and
municipal ordinance provisions, thereby raising ques-
tions of statutory interpretation subject to plenary
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review. See Townsend v. Commissioner of Correction,
226 Conn. App. 313, 331, 317 A.3d 1147 (2024) (interpre-
tation of statutes raises question of law requiring exer-
cise of plenary review); Mention v. Kensington Square
Apartments, 214 Conn. App. 720, 729–30, 280 A.3d 1195
(2022) (interpretation of ordinances raises question of
law requiring exercise of plenary review). ‘‘When con-
struing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the
legislature. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. . . . It is a basic tenet
of statutory construction that [w]e construe a statute
as a whole and read its subsections concurrently in
order to reach a reasonable overall interpretation.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Townsend v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 331.
The principles of statutory construction also apply to
our examination of municipal ordinances. See Mention
v. Kensington Square Apartments, supra, 730 (‘‘[w]e
interpret and construe local ordinances according to
the principles of statutory interpretation’’ (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
A
Turning our attention first to § 4b-91, the plaintiff
maintains that the court incorrectly determined that
the competitive bidding requirements of the statute did
not apply to the RFP. We are not persuaded.
The pertinent statutory provision at issue is § 4b-91
(a), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘(2) Except as
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provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection,20 every
contract for the construction, reconstruction, alter-
ation, remodeling, repair or demolition of any public
building or any other public work by the state that is
estimated to cost more than one million dollars shall be
awarded to the lowest responsible and qualified general
bidder who is prequalified pursuant to section 4a-100
on the basis of competitive bids in accordance with the
procedures set forth in this chapter, after the awarding
authority has invited such bids by posting notice on the
State Contracting Portal. The awarding authority shall
indicate the prequalification classification required for
the contract in such notice. . . .
‘‘(4) Every contract for the construction, reconstruc-
tion, alteration, remodeling, repair or demolition of any
public building or any other public work by a public
agency that is paid for, in whole or in part, with state
funds and that is estimated to cost more than one mil-
lion dollars shall be awarded to a bidder that is prequali-
fied pursuant to section 4a-100 after the public agency
has invited such bids by posting notice on the State
Contracting Portal . . . . The awarding authority or
public agency, as the case may be, shall indicate the
prequalification classification required for the contract
in such notice. . . .’’ (Footnote added.)
In concluding that § 4b-91 did not apply to the RFP,
the court reasoned that the RFP did not seek bids for
‘‘ ‘the construction, reconstruction, alteration, remodel-
ing, repair or demolition of’ [the stadium]’’ or ‘‘specify
any ‘other public work’ to be performed’’ but, instead,
‘‘sought submissions by persons ‘interested in using,
redeveloping and operating [the stadium].’ . . . Rather
than asking the respondents to bid on a proposed use,
redevelopment and operation of the [stadium], the RFP
20
We note that subdivision (3) of § 4b-91 (a) is not relevant to the facts
of this case.
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asked the respondents to submit their own proposals
for the use, redevelopment and operation of the [sta-
dium] and expressed a preference for proposals that
included a professional sports team. There were only
the vaguest categories of submission requirements and
none that were amenable to competitive bidding. In
this open-ended format, the responses could not be
expected to reflect the uniformity required for competi-
tive bidding. The RFP made this clear by providing in
its terms that ‘[i]ssuance of this RFP does not obligate
CRDA or the city . . . to undertake any action.’ Neither
the city nor CRDA was committed to award a contract,
and the RFP even reserved the right to use the respon-
dents’ submissions as a basis for negotiation with other
respondents and nonrespondents on other terms.’’
Moreover, the court observed that the RFP did not
set forth a prequalification requirement. As the court
summarized, ‘‘[s]imply stated, this was not a competi-
tive bidding process contemplated by § 4b-91.’’
The plaintiff contests the court’s determination that
the RFP did not invite bids for ‘‘the construction, recon-
struction, alteration, remodeling, repair or demolition’’
of the stadium or ‘‘any other public work . . . .’’21
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff main-
tains that ‘‘[t]he very purpose of the RFP . . . was to
determine what materials and labor may be needed to
meet the requested goals of construction, remodeling,
21
The plaintiff relies on subdivision (2) of § 4b-91 (a) in asserting this
argument, whereas the court, in its decision, cited subdivision (4) in conclud-
ing that the competitive bidding requirements of the statute were inapplica-
ble. This discrepancy is of no moment. Both subdivisions concern contracts
‘‘for the construction, reconstruction, alteration, remodeling, repair or demo-
lition of any public building or any other public work,’’ as well as require
bidders to be prequalified pursuant to General Statutes § 4a-100, with the
awarding authority or the public agency, as the case may be, directed to
indicate the necessary prequalification classification in a certain notice.
General Statutes § 4b-91 (a) (2) and (4). As we conclude in this opinion,
the RFP did not solicit bids for such contracts. For these reasons standing
alone, neither subdivision applied to the RFP.
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and repair of [the stadium], along with other types of
‘public work.’ ’’ In support of its position, the plaintiff
points out that the RFP (1) provided facts regarding
the stadium, including size, turf type, bleacher seating,
and parking, (2) specified that one of the five project
goals was ‘‘[p]rovid[ing] for the upgrade and repair of
the [s]tadium,’’ while identifying necessary renovations
that included upgrading the playing field, replacing or
refurbishing the bleachers, and upgrading the lighting
and sound systems, (3) directed respondents to propose
budgets and descriptions of ‘‘ ‘capital improvements
necessary’ ’’ for the identified uses, as well as the
sources of funding for such improvements, and (4)
included an aerial photo, site photos, and a site plan.
Additionally, the plaintiff discounts the court’s reliance
on the absence of a prequalification requirement in the
RFP, contending that the lack of such a requirement
‘‘does not invalidate the RFP entirely, but only indicates
how improperly CRDA conducted the RFP to begin
with.’’
Having carefully reviewed the RFP, we conclude that
the RFP did not fall within the ambit of § 4b-91. The
RFP did not solicit bids for work to be performed on
the stadium in accordance with an established plan
with comprehensive specifications for respondents to
utilize in developing their submissions; instead, the RFP
invited respondents to submit their own proposed
plans, taking into account baseline criteria identified
in the RFP, for the redevelopment of the stadium. Put
another way, the RFP did not invite respondents to
bid on a contract for ‘‘the construction, reconstruction,
alteration, remodeling, repair or demolition of any pub-
lic building or any other public work’’; General Statutes
§ 4b-91 (a) (2) and (4); but, rather, sought proposed
plans that potentially would serve as the bedrock for the
future redevelopment of the stadium. Our conclusion
is further bolstered by the RFP’s provisions that (1) the
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issuance of the RFP ‘‘[did] not obligate CRDA or the
[c]ity . . . to undertake any action’’ or ‘‘commit CRDA
or the [c]ity . . . to award a contract’’ and (2) CRDA
reserved the right to use RFP submissions in negotia-
tions with other respondents and/or others who did
not respond to the RFP, as such provisions are not
indicative of a solicitation governed by the competitive
bidding requirements of § 4b-91 (a). Moreover, the RFP
made no mention of the prequalification requirement
that would apply were it subject to the statutory com-
petitive bidding provisions, which further informs our
analysis and weighs in favor of interpreting the RFP to
fall outside of the scope of § 4b-91 (a).22
In sum, we conclude that the court properly deter-
mined that the RFP was not subject to the competitive
bidding requirements of § 4b-91.
B
We next consider the plaintiff’s contention that the
court incorrectly determined that the competitive bid-
ding requirements of § 2-548 of the code did not apply
to the RFP. This contention also fails.
Section 2-546 of the code, titled ‘‘Methods of source
selection,’’ provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[u]nless oth-
erwise authorized by the Charter of the City or this
Code, all Contracts . . . shall be awarded by one (1)
of the following methods: (A) Competitive Offers as set
forth in Section 2-548 of this Article, which shall include
competitive bidding and competitive proposals . . . .’’
Section 2-548 of the code, titled ‘‘Competitive solicita-
tions,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘(A) Conditions for
22
The plaintiff asserts that, ‘‘[e]ven if the RFP [were] not a ‘competitive
bid,’ the very nature of the services requested required that CRDA and the
city follow § 4b-91.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) As we have concluded, however,
the RFP sought proposed plans created by respondents for the stadium’s
redevelopment. In other words, the RFP did not request ‘‘services’’ to be
performed, beyond the submission of proposed redevelopment plans.
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use. All Agreements, in an amount in excess of the
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00) threshold
established by the Charter of the City, shall be awarded
through the competitive solicitation process estab-
lished under this Article . . . .’’ ‘‘Agreement’’ is defined
by the code to mean ‘‘an arrangement between the City
and other parties regarding a course of action set out
in a Contract, Purchase Order23 or memorandum of
understanding.’’ (Footnote added.) Hartford Municipal
Code § 2-537 (B). ‘‘Contract’’ is defined by the code in
relevant part as ‘‘a written arrangement between the
City and other competent parties to perform or not
to perform specific work24 pertaining to Services and
Professional Services25 or as otherwise set forth in this
23
‘‘Purchase orders’’ are defined by the code in relevant part to mean
‘‘dual purpose instruments which may serve as: (1) A commercial agreement
documenting a purchase transaction for the acquisition of Commodities,
Services or Construction Items, in accordance with the requirements of this
Article and the Regulations and Policies, as proposed by the Purchasing
Agent, and a financial tool evidencing the encumbrance of funds and authori-
zation or notice to proceed, if specifically set forth, for the transaction in
question. . . .
‘‘(2) A financial tool only for the encumbrance of funds for a transaction
and/or authorization or notice to proceed, in support of other forms of
agreement, under circumstances as determined in the sole discretion of the
Purchasing Agent. . . .’’ Hartford Municipal Code § 2-537 (FF).
24
‘‘Work’’ is defined by the code to mean ‘‘all the effort necessary to
provide the Commodities and Services necessary to effectuate the terms of
any Agreement under this Article.’’ Hartford Municipal Code § 2-537 (RR).
25
‘‘Services or contractual services’’ is defined by the code in relevant
part to mean ‘‘the furnishing of labor, time, or effort by a Contractor, not
involving the delivery of a specific end product other than reports, which
are merely incidental to the required performance. . . . Moreover, this term
shall include services for which a Contractor is conferred a benefit by the
City, whether or not compensated by the City. . . .’’ Hartford Municipal
Code § 2-537 (MM).
‘‘Contractor’’ is defined by the code in relevant part to mean ‘‘any person
having a Contract or Purchase Order with the City or any of its Agencies.
. . .’’ Id., § 2-537 (I).
‘‘Professional services’’ is defined by the code in relevant part to mean ‘‘any
infrequent, technical and/or unique functions performed by independent
contractors whose occupation is the rendering of such services. . . .’’ Id.,
§ 2-537 (BB).
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Chapter. . . . Whenever the term ‘Agreement’ is used
in this Chapter it shall mean a Contract, Purchase Order
or memorandum of understanding depending on the
context. . . .’’ (Footnotes added.) Id., § 2-537 (H).
Subsection (B) of § 2-548 of the code, titled ‘‘Request
for response,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘A Request for
Response shall be issued and shall include Specifica-
tions,26 Scope of Services, System Requirements or any
other descriptions of the Commodity,27 Service, Con-
struction28 or Lease, and all proposed and/or mandatory
contractual terms, special terms and conditions applica-
ble to the Procurement,29 other legal and regulatory
requirements. . . .’’ (Footnotes added.) ‘‘Request for
response’’ is defined by the code as ‘‘any competitive
26
‘‘Specification’’ is defined by the code to mean ‘‘a detailed written
description of the physical or functional characteristics, or of the nature of
a Commodity, Service or Construction Item. It may include a description
of any requirement for inspecting, testing, or preparing a Commodity, Service
or Construction Item for delivery. Said Specifications are to be attached to
or, otherwise, made a part of the solicitation.’’ Hartford Municipal Code § 2-
537 (OO).
27
‘‘Commodities’’ is defined by the code to mean ‘‘an article of trade, a
movable article of value, something that is bought or sold; any movable or
tangible thing that is produced or used as the subject of barter or sale.
When used alone the term ‘Commodities’ shall include equipment, materials
and supplies.’’ Hartford Municipal Code § 2-537 (F).
28
‘‘Construction’’ is defined by the code to mean ‘‘the process of building,
altering, repairing, improving, or demolishing any Infrastructure Facility,
including any public structure, public building, or other public improvements
of any kind to City property or other property or space in which the City
has an interest. It does not include the routine operation, routine repair,
or routine maintenance of any existing Infrastructure Facility, including
structures, buildings or real property.’’ Hartford Municipal Code § 2-537 (G).
29
‘‘Procurement’’ is defined by the code to mean in relevant part ‘‘buying,
purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise acquiring any Commodities, Ser-
vices, real or personal property or Construction or obtaining a benefit from
the City even in the event the City is not responsible for compensation. It
also includes all functions that pertain to the obtaining of any Commodity,
Service, property or Construction, including description of requirements,
selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and award of a Contract
or Purchase Order, and all phases of contract administration. . . .’’ Hartford
Municipal Code § 2-537 (AA).
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process utilized for soliciting a response. A Request for
Response may be in the form of a Request for Bid,
Request for Proposals or other solicitation method and
includes all associated documents, whether attached
or incorporated by reference.’’ Hartford Municipal Code
§ 2-537 (KK).
In concluding that the code did not apply to the RFP,
the court determined that ‘‘[t]he RFP did not seek pro-
posals to perform ‘specific work’ under a contract as
contemplated by § 2-537 (H) [of the code]. The RFP
asked respondents to provide specifications such as
proposed uses, cost estimates and sources of funding,
rather than itself providing a ‘detailed written descrip-
tion’ of specifications to the respondents, in accordance
with §§ 2-537 (OO) and 2-548 (B) [of the code], and
asking respondents for a price. The process did not seek
the provision of goods or services within established,
detailed specifications, and request respondent bids
from which the city would award a contract to a respon-
dent. Hartford [Municipal] Code § 2-548.’’
The court also observed that, although ‘‘ ‘competitive
negotiation[s]’ ’’ were authorized under the code, such
negotiations ‘‘presuppos[ed] the existence of a ‘compet-
itive solicitation’ under § 2-548 [of the code]. It is not
an alternative to that process.’’ The court further stated
that, ‘‘while the RFP reference[d] CRDA’s right to nego-
tiate with the respondents after receipt of their
responses, it [went] much further . . . and reserve[d]
CRDA’s right to use respondents’ submissions as a basis
for negotiating with nonrespondents.’’
Additionally, the court determined that the contracts
executed following the RFP did not support the plain-
tiff’s position that the RFP was subject to the competi-
tive bidding requirements of the code. The court stated
that (1) the term sheet contemplated (a) a license agree-
ment between the city and CRDA for the operation
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and use of the stadium and (b) a sublicense agreement
between CRDA and HSG to enable HSG to utilize the
stadium to operate a professional soccer team, (2) the
city and CRDA entered into the 2018 license agreement,
but CRDA never executed a license agreement with
HSG, and (3) ‘‘on the strength of the term sheet, HSG
made substantial investments to support the redevelop-
ment of the stadium and on February 25, 2019, the
HSG created entity, Hartford Athletic, [LLC] obtained
a license directly from the city to use the stadium . . .
and acquired the right to name the stadium.’’ The court
continued: ‘‘The fact that these license agreements ulti-
mately materialized sometime after the RFP process
does not retroactively transform the RFP into a compet-
itive solicitation under . . . § 2-548 [of the code] or
. . . § 4b-91. The undisputed fact is that following the
RFP process and CRDA’s suggestion that the city negoti-
ate with HSG to redevelop [the stadium], the city and
CRDA decided to go in a different direction and have
CRDA oversee the redevelopment of the stadium. The
city and CRDA entered into [the 2018] license agree-
ment entrusting CRDA . . . with that responsibility. As
the [board] concluded [in the 2020 final report], CRDA
and the city ‘essentially abandoned’ the RFP.
‘‘The plaintiff focuses specifically on the [2019 sta-
dium use agreement] between the city and Hartford
Athletic, [LLC], but that agreement bears no resem-
blance to a contract to redevelop and operate [the sta-
dium]. Nor is it governed by . . . § 4b-91 because it
does not involve the ‘construction, reconstruction,
alteration, remodeling, repair or demolition’ of [the sta-
dium]. Nor is it an ‘Agreement’ under . . . § 2-537 (B)
[of the code] because it does not involve the provision
of any services to the city for a price paid by the city
. . . . The [2018] license [agreement] with CRDA and
[the 2019 stadium use agreement with] Hartford Ath-
letic, [LLC], were not contracts subject to competitive
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bidding laws and were not the product of the RFP
process, which, as the [board] concluded, the city and
CRDA abandoned.’’ (Citation omitted.)
As the court summarized, ‘‘CRDA and the city imple-
mented a process that essentially reversed the role of
the parties by seeking proposals from the respondents
that would help establish the scope of work and how
it could be financed.’’ The court continued: ‘‘[T]he RFP
. . . was not intended to constitute a ‘competitive solic-
itation’ within the scope of the city’s procurement ordi-
nances. At most, [the RFP] may have facilitated future
competitive processes related to the redevelopment of
[the stadium], such as those that CRDA subsequently
implemented to procure the reconstruction of the sta-
dium.’’30
The plaintiff asserts that, contrary to the court’s
determination, the RFP was a ‘‘competitive solicitation’’
under the code because (1) the RFP solicited bids for
an ‘‘Agreement,’’ as defined in the code, in excess of
$25,000, (2) the RFP satisfied the ‘‘minimum require-
ments’’ to constitute a ‘‘Request for Response’’ under
the code, as it delineated (a) ‘‘details necessary for a
competitor to develop a plan for the stadium’s develop-
ment,’’ (b) the project’s five goals, and (c) additional
details about, inter alia, information respondents had
to provide in their submissions and how a successful
respondent would be selected, (3) the code incorpo-
rates ‘‘ ‘negotiating’ ’’ into the bidding process, such that
30
In the 2020 final report, the board suggested that CRDA should have
considered issuing a Request for Information (RFI), rather than the RFP, if
the RFP was intended to be an ‘‘advisory exercise.’’ The court noted that
the board’s advice ‘‘ha[d] merit’’; however, the court concluded that, ‘‘even
if inaptly named,’’ the RFP did not constitute a competitive solicitation
under the code. The plaintiff maintains on appeal that, pursuant to the code,
CRDA and the city could have issued an RFI if they were not seeking to
initiate a competitive bidding process. For the reasons set forth in part I B
of this opinion, we agree with the court that, although the RFP may have
been ‘‘inaptly named,’’ it nevertheless did not fall within the ambit of the
code’s competitive bidding requirements.
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the RFP’s terms concerning negotiation did not militate
against the RFP being construed as a competitive bid-
ding process, and (4) following the RFP, contracts were
executed providing for the redevelopment of the sta-
dium by HSG, with ‘‘HSG . . . [beginning] construction
and work on [the stadium] based on contracts issued
by the city—contracts whether verbal or written—and
which amounted to over $10 million in taxpayer
money.’’ We are not persuaded.
The plaintiff’s first two contentions are unavailing
for the same reasons that we set forth in part I A of
this opinion in support of our conclusion that the RFP
was not subject to the competitive bidding requirements
of § 4b-91. In short, the RFP did not invite bids for a
contract entailing ‘‘specific work’’ to be performed in
accordance with a developed plan accompanied by
‘‘[s]pecifications’’ to be utilized by respondents in pre-
paring their bids; Hartford Municipal Code §§ 2-537 (H)
and 2-548 (B); rather, as the court determined, ‘‘CRDA
and the city implemented a process that essentially
reversed the role of the parties by seeking proposals
from the respondents that would help establish the
scope of work and how it could be financed.’’
Additionally, we reject the plaintiff’s proposition that
the negotiation provisions of the RFP weigh in favor
of construing the RFP to be governed by the municipal
bidding requirements of the code. Section 2-549 (A) of
the code, titled ‘‘Competitive negotiations with Candi-
dates and revisions to offers,’’ provides: ‘‘As provided
in the request for response and under regulations or
policies, discussions may be conducted, by the Purchas-
ing Agent or a Designee, with the participation of the
Using Agency, where practicable, with Candidates who
submit responses determined to be reasonably suscepti-
ble of being selected for award for the purpose of refine-
ment and clarification to assure full understanding of,
and responsiveness to, the solicitation requirements.’’
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As the court recognized, the RFP did not merely allow
for negotiations with RFP respondents; instead, it
authorized CRDA to use RFP submissions to negotiate
with one or more respondents, as well as with entities
that did not submit proposals in response to the RFP.
Thus, as the court determined, the RFP’s negotiation
terms were more expansive than the provisions of § 2-
549 (a) of the code. This distinction bolsters our conclu-
sion that the RFP was not subject to the code’s competi-
tive bidding requirements.

The plaintiff’s final contention is that contracts were
executed following the RFP for the redevelopment of
the stadium by HSG, which illustrated that the RFP was
a competitive bidding process under the code.31 The
plaintiff maintains that the written contracts that fol-
lowed the RFP were subject to the code’s competitive
bidding requirements. We disagree. The record contains
undisputed evidence that (1) the city and CRDA (a)
executed the 2018 license agreement, pursuant to which
the city entrusted CRDA with the responsibility of man-
aging the redevelopment of the stadium, and (b) later
executed the 2019 stadium renovation and operation
agreement, which was amended on February 1, 2022,
and which contained the ‘‘detailed terms and condi-
tions’’ governing CRDA’s renovation and operation of
31
The plaintiff raises this claim in the section of its principal appellate
brief addressing the court’s determination that the RFP was not governed
by the code’s competitive bidding requirements; however, in its reply briefs
to the appellate briefs filed by the city defendants and the HSG defendants,
respectively, the plaintiff appears to rely on the contracts executed following
the RFP to challenge the court’s determination that the RFP was not subject
to § 4b-91, as well. The court determined that the contracts executed follow-
ing the RFP did not establish that the RFP was a competitive bidding process
under either § 4b-91 or the code. Assuming that the plaintiff’s claim properly
encompasses the court’s reasoning regarding the statutory competitive bid-
ding requirements, our rationale for rejecting this claim vis-à-vis the code’s
competitive bidding requirements applies equally to reject this claim as to
the statutory competitive bidding requirements.
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the stadium, including CRDA’s duty to enter into con-
struction agreements for the purpose of redeveloping
the stadium, and (2) the city and Hartford Athletic,
LLC, a nonparty to this action that is owned by HSG,
executed the 2019 stadium use agreement, pursuant to
which the city authorized Hartford Athletic, LLC, to
utilize the stadium to play professional soccer games.32
Nothing in the terms of these contracts provided for
HSG to redevelop the stadium. Moreover, although
these contracts detailed CRDA’s obligation to manage
the stadium’s redevelopment, they did not involve the
performance or nonperformance of ‘‘specific work per-
taining to Services and Professional Services or as oth-
erwise set forth in [chapter 2 of the code],’’ and, there-
fore, did not constitute ‘‘Contract[s],’’ as defined by the
code. Hartford Municipal Code § 2-537 (H); see also id.,
§§ 2-546 (A) and 2-548 (A). Similarly, these contracts
were not ‘‘Agreement[s]’’ governed by the code’s com-
petitive bidding requirements because they did not con-
stitute ‘‘arrangement[s] between the City and other par-
ties regarding a course of action set out in a Contract’’;
id., § 2-537 (B); or, as we have explained, meet the
definition of ‘‘Contract[s]’’ under the code. See id., § 2-
537 (H); see also id., § 2-548 (A). In summation, these
contracts were not awarded through the code’s compet-
itive bidding procedures,33 and, therefore, they do not
provide support for the plaintiff’s position that the RFP
was a competitive bidding process under the code.
32
Copies of these contracts were appended to the city defendants’ memo-
randum of law in support of their motion to dismiss.
33
The board, in essence, reached the same conclusion in the 2020 final
report, stating in relevant part: ‘‘Since . . . Mandell and [HSG] had an inter-
est in bringing a Tier 2 professional soccer team to a renovated . . . sta-
dium, why not just license the use of the stadium to [HSG]? Why not allow
CRDA to do what it does best which is to renovate and redevelop [the]
stadium and the surrounding area? In the end, this is what actually occurred
here. Why the charade of an RFP and a convoluted procurement process?
This question is not answered by this report but may be best left to the
[l]egislature and others in the [e]xecutive branch to answer or remedy
a solution.’’
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The plaintiff further claims that, in its complaint, it
alleged that contracts, whether written or oral, were
executed following the RFP providing for HSG to rede-
velop the stadium, which allegations were unrebutted
by the defendants and supported by evidence submitted
in connection with the defendants’ respective motions
to dismiss. We are not persuaded.
In addressing the plaintiff’s arguments, we remain
mindful that when, as in the present case, ‘‘the com-
plaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established
by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to
dismiss . . . [or] other types of undisputed evidence
. . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional
issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed
facts and need not conclusively presume the validity
of the allegations of the complaint. . . . Rather, those
allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by
the [supplementary undisputed facts]. . . . If affidavits
and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss conclusively establish that
jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to under-
mine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or
other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action
without further proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Fountain of Youth Church, Inc. v.
Fountain, supra, 225 Conn. App. 868.
In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, ‘‘[o]n Febru-
ary 29, 2019 . . . the city . . . and HSG executed the
contracts for the development of [the stadium]’’; how-
ever, this allegation is not entitled to a presumption of
validity in light of the undisputed evidence in the record
reflecting that the 2019 stadium use agreement, as
opposed to a redevelopment contract, was executed by
the city and Hartford Athletic, LLC, rather than with
HSG, on February 25, 2019. Additionally, the plaintiff
alleged that Mandell’s self-reported complaint to the
SEEC in 2018 represented that HSG and the city had
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‘‘entered into an agreement . . . to bring a professional
soccer team to play at a municipal stadium . . . with
[CRDA] to serve as an administrator for the project.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neither this allega-
tion nor the self-reported complaint, a copy of which
is part of the record, suggested that HSG was contractu-
ally charged with redeveloping the stadium; rather, the
self-reported complaint reflected the plans, as contem-
plated by the term sheet, for HSG to operate a profes-
sional soccer team at the stadium. The plaintiff further
alleged that, as the 2019 SAPA report found, CRDA
improperly spent more than $4 million in bond funds
‘‘on . . . [s]tadium construction as CRDA advanced
the construction of the stadium to Mandell’s specifica-
tions despite not having executed contracts.’’ As the
plaintiff itself acknowledged, it was CRDA that man-
aged the stadium’s construction efforts, and nothing
in this allegation implied that HSG was contracted to
redevelop the stadium.34 The plaintiff also alleged that
the city and CRDA ‘‘wilfully proceeded with their prede-
termined plans for [the stadium], which now exists as
a privatized soccer stadium managed by HSG.’’ Again,
nothing in this allegation reasonably can be construed
to suggest that HSG was a party to a contract to rede-
velop the stadium. Finally, we note that the complaint
contains numerous, general allegations that the city or
CRDA awarded a contract to redevelop the stadium to
HSG and that the city executed such a contract with
34
The plaintiff appended to its memoranda of law in opposition to the
defendants’ respective motions to dismiss a personal affidavit of Clynch,
who averred in relevant part that, in response to Freedom of Information
Act requests, he had received ‘‘numerous emails documenting that . . .
Calafiore, on behalf of HSG, during the time frame of 2017 through 2018
developed plans and estimates for renovating and constructing [the sta-
dium].’’ Although the development of plans and estimates concerning the
redevelopment of the stadium may be indicative of HSG’s being involved
in discussions as to how the stadium should be redeveloped, it does not
suggest that HSG, in fact, contracted with the city to handle the redevelop-
ment of the stadium as alleged by the plaintiff.
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HSG. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, these general allegations cannot reason-
ably be construed as asserting that any agreements
beyond those in the record, regardless of whether they
were memorialized in writing, were executed between
the city and HSG to redevelop the stadium.35 For these
reasons, we conclude that the court properly deter-
mined that the RFP was not subject to the code’s com-
petitive bidding requirements.
To summarize, ‘‘[n]ot unlike any other person whose
offer has been rejected’’; (internal quotation marks
omitted) Connecticut Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 179; the plaintiff had
no standing to seek judicial intervention stemming from
its failure to be awarded a contract in connection with
the RFP. Pursuant to the limited exception to the stand-
ing rules, the plaintiff’s allegations of fraud and favorit-
ism tainting the RFP process would have afforded it
standing if the RFP were subject to the competitive
bidding requirements of § 4b-91 and/or the code; how-
ever, such requirements did not apply to the RFP.
35
Relatedly, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly found that
CRDA had solicited bids for construction contracts vis-à-vis the stadium
in April, 2018, which, the plaintiff posits, runs contrary to its unrebutted
allegations and is unsupported by the record. As we have concluded, how-
ever, insofar as the plaintiff alleged that the city executed a contract with
HSG for the redevelopment of the stadium, those allegations were tempered
by the undisputed evidence in the record reflecting that the city contracted
with CRDA to handle the redevelopment of the stadium and contracted
with Hartford Athletic, LLC, by way of the 2019 stadium use agreement. In
addition, in the 2020 final report, which the plaintiff attached as an exhibit
to its memoranda of law in opposition to the defendants’ respective motions
to dismiss, the board found that, following an RFP process, CRDA selected
a nonparty to the present action named ‘‘Newfield Construction’’ to perform
the renovation work at the stadium. Furthermore, in both the 2019 stadium
use agreement and the 2019 stadium renovation and operation agreement,
the term ‘‘Contractor’’ is defined to mean ‘‘Newfield Construction, Inc.’’
Thus, there was unrebutted evidence in the record reflecting that CRDA
solicited bids and awarded a contract concerning the redevelopment of the
stadium to a nonparty.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly dis-
missed, for lack of standing, the plaintiff’s claims seek-
ing injunctive and declaratory relief.
II
The plaintiff also claims that the trial court improp-
erly concluded that it lacked standing to pursue its
claims seeking money damages against the individual
city defendants, the CRDA defendants, Freimuth, and
the HSG defendants.36 We are not persuaded.
In dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against the individ-
ual city defendants, the CRDA defendants, and Frei-
muth, the court stated that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s claims . . .
all seek money damages based on various common-law
and statutory torts. The damages sought include both
lost profits associated with the alleged lost opportunity
to redevelop [the stadium] and the costs associated with
responding to the RFP. While the plaintiff concedes
that its standing to sue the city is limited to claims for
injunctive relief, the plaintiff argues that its standing to
pursue its money damages claims . . . is distinct from
its standing to sue the city and CRDA. The plaintiff
argues that these claims do not seek money damages
based on a flawed bidding process, but rather for tor-
tious acts that happened contemporaneously with the
bidding process. This theoretical distinction is not
borne out by the substance of the complaint. The claims
for money damages . . . are cloaked in the elements
of traditional tort claims, but there is no escaping the
36
The plaintiff asserted claims of (1) fraud against CRDA, (2) civil conspir-
acy to commit fraud against (a) the individual city defendants, (b) the
CRDA defendants, (c) Freimuth, and (d) the HSG defendants, (3) tortious
interference with a business expectancy against (a) the individual city defen-
dants, (b) the CRDA defendants, and (c) Freimuth, (4) civil conspiracy to
commit tortious interference with a business expectancy against (a) the
individual city defendants, (b) the CRDA defendants, (c) Freimuth, (d) HSG,
and (e) Data-Mail, Inc., and (5) a violation of CUTPA against (a) Bronin and
(b) the HSG defendants.
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fact that they all center on one essential wrong—that
the RFP was a sham. Whether the plaintiff was tor-
tiously lured into a sham RFP or wrongfully deprived
of the award of a redevelopment contract, all the claims
arise directly out of a government solicitation process.
The plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that
an unsuccessful bidder who lacks standing to sue the
government agency responsible for the solicitation may
nevertheless sue individual public officials and agencies
who were involved in the process.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In addition, relying on Lawrence Bru-
noli, Inc. v. Branford, 247 Conn. 407, 722 A.2d 271
(1999), the court determined that, even if the plaintiff
had standing to pursue equitable relief, ‘‘there is no
standing to assert claims for money damages arising
out of the plaintiff’s unsuccessful participation in a gov-
ernment procurement process.’’
The court further concluded that the plaintiff lacked
standing to assert its claims against the HSG defendants,
which claims ‘‘rest[ed] on the same essential core as
the claims asserted against the other defendants, alleg-
ing that the HSG defendants participated in a sham
procurement process with the preordained outcome
that HSG would be chosen to redevelop [the stadium].’’
The court determined ‘‘that the HSG defendants’ status
as nongovernmental parties [did] not change the stand-
ing analysis. The only legal interest the plaintiff ha[d]
in asserting claims arising out of a government procure-
ment process is the public interest underlying the state
and municipal bidding statutes and ordinances. . . .
The limitations on standing afforded to unsuccessful
bidders asserting claims against the soliciting govern-
mental agency apply as well in the context of claims
against competitors because the legal interest is the
same. There is no legal interest in obtaining a public
contract and the plaintiff’s claims for money damages
against the successful bidder seek to enforce such an
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interest. Moreover, the policy concerns underlying the
standing limitations applicable to claims against govern-
ment entities are the same in this context. Affording
standing to unsuccessful bidders for money damage
claims against successful bidders interferes with the
public’s interest in the government procurement pro-
cess. The standing limitations are intended to strike the
proper balance between fulfilling the purposes of the
competitive bidding statutes and preventing frequent
litigation that might result in extensive delay in the
commencement and completion of government proj-
ects to the detriment of the public. . . . Maintaining
that balance requires circumscribing claims against suc-
cessful bidders with the same limitations imposed upon
claims against the awarding governmental entity.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The plaintiff asserts that, in dismissing the remaining
claims at issue, the court relied on the ‘‘faulty premise
that the [plaintiff] did not have standing because all
[of] the claims flowed from the RFP. . . . [T]his con-
clusion did not properly evaluate the [plaintiff’s] stand-
ing under the principles of classical aggrievement
. . . .’’ The plaintiff maintains that if, as the court con-
cluded, the RFP was not a competitive bidding process,
then it was not an ‘‘ ‘unsuccessful bidder’ ’’ but, instead,
‘‘a traditional plaintiff that must establish classical
aggrievement . . . .’’ The plaintiff further posits that it
alleged that it suffered harm independent of the award
of any contract following the RFP. Specifically, the
plaintiff maintains that it alleged that all of the defen-
dants fraudulently misrepresented the nature of the
RFP process, including that it was a ‘‘true bidding pro-
cess’’ with a contract being awarded to the ‘‘ ‘winning’
bidder,’’ thereby inducing it to submit a bid as part of
a ‘‘ ‘sham’ ’’ RFP and causing it harm in the form of
costs and fees that it had incurred in developing its bid.
Additionally, with respect to its claim alleging a CUTPA
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Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

violation against Bronin, the plaintiff contends that it
alleged that Bronin, while employed as an attorney for
Hinckley Allen prior to his tenure as the city’s mayor,
learned of Clynch’s plans to bring a professional soccer
franchise to the city and used that information gleaned
from his attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff
to ‘‘undermine [the plaintiff’s] position, leverage HSG’s
bargaining position, and then obtain state funds for the
city . . . .’’ We do not agree.
‘‘It is well established that the interpretation of plead-
ings is always a question of law for the court . . . .
Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of the
pleadings therefore is plenary. . . . Furthermore, we
long have eschewed the notion that pleadings should be
read in a hypertechnical manner. Rather, [t]he modern
trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe
pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly
and technically. . . . [T]he complaint must be read in
its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading
with reference to the general theory [on] which it pro-
ceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties.
. . . Our reading of pleadings in a manner that
advances substantial justice means that a pleading must
be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly
means, but carries with it the related proposition that
it must not be contorted in such a way so as to strain
the bounds of rational comprehension.’’ (Emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hepburn
v. Brill, 348 Conn. 827, 848, 312 A.3d 1 (2024).
Having carefully reviewed the plaintiff’s complaint,
we agree with the court that, notwithstanding the vari-
ous legal theories asserted, the plaintiff’s claims ‘‘all
center[ed] on one essential wrong—that the RFP was
a sham.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In sub-
stance, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants against
which it sought money damages engaged in conduct
that tricked it into participating in a solicitation process
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44 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Civic Mind, LLC v. Hartford

that, as a result of fraud and favoritism tarnishing it,
did not result in a contract awarded in its favor. We are
not persuaded by the plaintiff’s attempts to deconstruct
its claims. Whether the plaintiff was harmed as a result
of lost profits or costs and expenses incurred in partici-
pating in the RFP, the root issue, as alleged in support
of each count of the plaintiff’s complaint, is that the
plaintiff participated in the RFP and was not awarded
a contract. As we determined in part I of this opinion,
‘‘[n]ot unlike any other person whose offer has been
rejected’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Connecti-
cut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford,
supra, 251 Conn. 179; the plaintiff had no standing to
seek judicial intervention under the circumstances of
this case.
In sum, we conclude that the court properly dis-
missed, for lack of standing, the plaintiff’s remaining
claims seeking money damages against the individual
city defendants, the CRDA defendants, Freimuth, and
the HSG defendants.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.