D. J. v. F. D.

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. J. v. F. D.

D. J. v. F. D.*
(AC 46821)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court ordering the
equitable distribution of real property that he jointly owned with the defen-
dant and ordering the defendant to pay him $2000 as just compensation for
his interest in the property pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-500 (a)).
The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in
determining that he had only a minimal interest in the property. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the plaintiff
had only a minimal interest in the property for purposes of § 52-500 (a)
because that determination was supported by the legislative history, which
indicated that the plaintiff’s one-half fee interest in the property did not
preclude such a finding, and the relevant equitable factors.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its award of just
compensation to the plaintiff for his interest in the property because his
one-half ownership interest did not entitle him to 50 percent of the equity,
and the court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff did not contribute financially
to the property’s purchase, mortgage, taxes, or insurance, that he provided
only $2000 in maintenance expenses, and that his claims of other contribu-
tions to the maintenance of the property were not credible.
Argued May 20—officially released November 19, 2024

Procedural History

Action for, inter alia, the partition of certain of the
parties’ real property, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of New London, where the court,
O’Hanlan, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion to cite in
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as a
party defendant; thereafter, the named defendant filed
a counterclaim; subsequently, the case was tried to the
* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, a protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
D. J. v. F. D.

court, Goodrow, J.; judgment for the named defendant
on the complaint and in part on the counterclaim, from
which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Aimee L. Siefert, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Edward C. Taiman, Jr., for the appellee (named
defendant).
Opinion

MOLL, J. In this partition action, the plaintiff, D. J.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court ordering
the equitable distribution of a parcel of real property
jointly owned by the plaintiff and the defendant F. D.1
and ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff $2000
as just compensation for his interest in the property
pursuant to General Statutes § 52-500 (a).2 On appeal,
the plaintiff contends that the court abused its discre-
tion in determining that (1) he had only a minimal inter-
est in the property and (2) the just compensation owed
to him for his interest in the property was $2000. We
disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
1
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), was cited in as
an additional defendant in March, 2022. In his operative amended complaint
dated March 2, 2022, the plaintiff alleged that MERS may claim an interest
in the property at issue by virtue of a mortgage on the property. Although
MERS had filed an appearance, counsel for MERS did not appear at trial,
and the plaintiff’s and F. D.’s respective counsel represented that the parties
had reached an agreement regarding MERS’ interest in the action. MERS
is not participating in this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to F. D. as the
defendant.
2
General Statutes § 52-500 (a) provides: ‘‘Any court of equitable jurisdic-
tion may, upon the complaint of any person interested, order the sale of
any property, real or personal, owned by two or more persons, when, in
the opinion of the court, a sale will better promote the interests of the
owners. If the court determines that one or more of the persons owning
such real or personal property have only a minimal interest in such property
and a sale would not promote the interests of the owners, the court may
order such equitable distribution of such property, with payment of just
compensation to the owners of such minimal interest, as will better promote
the interests of the owners.’’
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. J. v. F. D.

The following facts, as found by the trial court or as
are undisputed in the record, and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In 2015,
the defendant purchased certain real property in North
Franklin (property). The plaintiff did not contribute
financially to the purchase of the property. The parties
were involved in a romantic relationship prior to the
purchase of the property, and, ‘‘[a]t some point after
the purchase, the plaintiff moved into the home, as did
the plaintiff’s son.’’ The defendant was solely responsi-
ble for the mortgage, taxes, and insurance, and she
made such payments. The plaintiff contributed $400
per month toward groceries and other household items
during most of the time that he lived with the defendant.
The court also found that the value of the plaintiff’s
contribution toward the maintenance of the property
was $2000.
On November 27, 2017, the defendant quitclaimed
the property to the parties as joint tenants with rights
of survivorship. In 2019, the romantic relationship of
the parties ended, and the plaintiff moved from the
property, taking with him some furnishings purchased
by the defendant and making no financial contributions
toward the property thereafter. The parties stipulated
that, at the time of trial, the fair market value of the
home was $280,000, and the mortgage payoff was
$132,000, leaving $148,000 in equity.
On July 7, 2021, the plaintiff commenced the present
action against the defendant. In his operative, two
count, amended complaint dated March 2, 2022, the
plaintiff sought (1) the partition of the property pursu-
ant to General Statutes § 52-495 and (2) an accounting
and contribution from the defendant for expenses
related to the property pursuant to the common law
and/or General Statutes § 52-404 (b). On September 1,
2022, the defendant filed an answer, a special defense
asserting bad faith by the plaintiff, and a one count
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
D. J. v. F. D.

counterclaim seeking an accounting and contribution
from the plaintiff for expenses related to the property.
On September 2, 2022, the plaintiff filed a reply denying
the allegations set forth in the defendant’s special
defense, and, on March 22, 2023, the plaintiff filed an
answer to the defendant’s counterclaim.
On April 20, 2023, the matter was tried to the court,
Goodrow, J. The court heard testimony from the plain-
tiff and the defendant and admitted numerous exhibits
into evidence. Following the close of evidence, the court
asked the parties to state during closing arguments
‘‘exactly what it is each side is requesting the court to
do in this case.’’ The plaintiff’s counsel requested that
the court order a partition by sale and that the proceeds
be split evenly between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The defendant’s counsel requested that the property
not be partitioned by sale and that any required payment
of just compensation to the plaintiff in connection with
the equitable distribution of the property be minimal.
Thereafter, the parties filed posttrial briefs.
On June 30, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
of decision ordering an equitable distribution of the
property and just compensation to be paid to the plain-
tiff. The court found ‘‘the defendant’s testimony gener-
ally credible’’ and ‘‘the plaintiff’s testimony not credi-
ble.’’ More specifically, the court expressly did not
credit the plaintiff’s testimony that (1) ‘‘he paid $60,000
toward the maintenance and upkeep of the . . . prop-
erty,’’ instead finding that ‘‘the value of the plaintiff’s
contribution to the maintenance of the property was
$2000,’’ (2) ‘‘he paid the defendant $4000 when he left
the property,’’ or (3) he contributed $1000 on a monthly
basis toward property expenses, instead finding that
he paid the defendant $400 per month for groceries and
other household expenses during most of the time while
he lived with the defendant and has made no financial
contribution toward the property since he vacated it in
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. J. v. F. D.

2019. The court concluded, pursuant to § 52-500 (a),
3

that ‘‘the plaintiff has only a minimal interest in the
property and a sale would not promote the interests of
the parties as owners’’ because ‘‘the defendant seeks
to remain in the property to provide stability and secu-
rity for herself and her family.’’4 Accordingly, the court
ordered that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff shall transfer his interest
in the property by quitclaim deed to the defendant by
August 30, 2023, and that simultaneously therewith, the
defendant shall transfer to the plaintiff the sum of
[$2000] as just compensation.’’ On July 19, 2023, the
plaintiff filed a motion to reargue, which the court
denied. This appeal followed.
Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims
on appeal, we begin by setting forth the relevant lan-
guage of the partition statute at issue. Section 52-500,
titled in part ‘‘Sale or equitable distribution of real or
3
At trial, the plaintiff was asked, inter alia, about (1) income reported in
his tax filings, (2) his ability to afford making his claimed contributions
toward improvements to the property, (3) the circumstances surrounding
other women transferring property to him, and (4) his ability to produce
bank statements. In response, the plaintiff invoked his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and refused to respond to the questions.
The court instructed the parties to address in their posttrial briefs the
question of ‘‘whether or not the court has the discretion to draw adverse
inferences in a civil action, different from a criminal action, when an individ-
ual asserts their fifth amendment privilege.’’ In her posttrial brief, citing
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 47 L. Ed. 2d 810
(1976), among others, the defendant argued that the fifth amendment does
not forbid the drawing of an adverse inference in a civil action when a party
invokes the privilege when refusing to testify in response to a probative
question. The defendant argued that the court should draw such an inference.
The plaintiff argued that, although the privilege does not prohibit the drawing
of an adverse inference in a civil action, ‘‘this does not negate the work
that [the plaintiff] put in on the property.’’ In its memorandum of decision,
the court stated that it was drawing ‘‘no adverse inference regarding the
assertion by the plaintiff of his constitutional right. Absent any consideration
of such assertion, the plaintiff’s testimony, particularly as to key issues in
dispute, was simply not credible.’’
4
At trial, the defendant testified that she was residing at the property
with her sister and her sister’s family.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
D. J. v. F. D.

personal property owned by two or more persons,’’
provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any court of equitable
jurisdiction may, upon the complaint of any person
interested, order the sale of any property, real or per-
sonal, owned by two or more persons, when, in the
opinion of the court, a sale will better promote the
interests of the owners. If the court determines that
one or more of the persons owning such real or personal
property have only a minimal interest in such property
and a sale would not promote the interests of the own-
ers, the court may order such equitable distribution of
such property, with payment of just compensation to
the owners of such minimal interest, as will better pro-
mote the interests of the owners. . . .’’ As we discuss
more fully in this opinion, the statute was amended in
2004 to add the final sentence of subsection (a)—to
allow a trial court, upon making the requisite findings,
to order equitable distribution of property—instead of
limiting the remedy in a partition action to partition in
kind or partition by sale (2004 amendment). See Public
Acts 2004, No. 04-93, § 1 (P.A. 04-93).
Additionally, we recognize the long-standing princi-
ple that ‘‘[a] partition action is equitable in nature.
Accordingly, [t]he determination of what equity
requires is a matter for the discretion of the trial court.
. . . In determining whether the trial court has abused
its discretion, we must make every reasonable presump-
tion in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Our
review of a trial court’s exercise of the . . . discretion
vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the
trial court correctly applied the law and could reason-
ably have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) DiCerto v. Jones, 108 Conn.
App. 184, 188–89, 947 A.2d 409 (2008).
I
The plaintiff first claims that, in connection with
ordering the equitable distribution of the property (as
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. J. v. F. D.

opposed to a partition by sale, as he had requested),
the trial court abused its discretion in determining that
he had only a minimal interest in the property for pur-
poses of § 52-500 (a).5 Specifically, as clarified by the
plaintiff’s counsel during oral argument before this
court, the plaintiff argues that, by virtue of his 50 per-
cent fee interest, as reflected in the 2017 quitclaim deed
alone, the court erred in determining that he had only
a minimal interest. We disagree.

Resolving the plaintiff’s claim requires us to construe
the term ‘‘minimal interest,’’ as set forth in § 52-500 (a),
to determine whether it (1) relates solely to a property
owner’s fee interest or (2) contemplates consideration
of any relevant equitable factors in addition to that fee
interest. Thus, we are presented with a question of
statutory interpretation over which our review is ple-
nary. See AAA Advantage Carting & Demolition Ser-
vice, LLC v. Capone, 221 Conn. App. 256, 270, 301 A.3d
1111, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442 (2023),
and cert. denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442 (2023).
‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objec-
tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is
5
We note that the plaintiff does not challenge the trial court’s related
determination that a sale would not promote the interests of the parties.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
D. J. v. F. D.

not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpre-
tive guidance to the legislative history and circum-
stances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative
policy it was designed to implement, and to its relation-
ship to existing legislation and common law principles
governing the same general subject matter.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id.
‘‘[M]inimal interest,’’ as that term is used in § 52-
500 (a), is not statutorily defined, nor is either of the
individual terms ‘‘minimal’’ or, of most import, ‘‘inter-
est.’’ See General Statutes § 52-500 (a). ‘‘Generally, in
the absence of statutory definitions, we look to the
contemporaneous dictionary definitions of words to
ascertain their commonly approved usage.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Wind Colebrook South, LLC
v. Colebrook, 344 Conn. 150, 164, 278 A.3d 442 (2022).
At the time of the 2004 amendment, Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (Merriam-Webster) defined
‘‘interest’’ as (1) a ‘‘right, title, or legal share in some-
thing,’’ (2) ‘‘participation in advantage and responsibil-
ity,’’ (3) ‘‘a charge for borrowed money generally a per-
centage of the amount borrowed,’’ (4) ‘‘the profit in
goods or money that is made on invested capital,’’ and
(5) ‘‘an excess above what is due or expected . . . .’’
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed.
2003) p. 652. Black’s Law Dictionary contemporane-
ously defined ‘‘interest’’ as (1) ‘‘[a]dvantage or profit,
esp. of a financial nature’’ and (2) ‘‘[a] legal share in
something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim to
or right in property . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Black’s
Law Dictionary (7th Ed. 1999) p. 816; see also Black’s
Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004) p. 828 (same). Merriam-
Webster also contemporaneously defined ‘‘minimal’’ as
‘‘relating to or being a minimum: as’’ (1) ‘‘the least possi-
ble,’’ (2) ‘‘barely adequate,’’ and (3) ‘‘very small or slight
. . . .’’ Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, supra,
p. 791.
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. J. v. F. D.

These definitions provide little, if any, guidance in
resolving whether the term ‘‘minimal interest,’’ as set
forth in § 52-500 (a), relates solely to a property owner’s
fee interest or contemplates the consideration of equita-
ble factors in addition thereto. Because we consider
either interpretation to be reasonable, we conclude that
the meaning of ‘‘minimal interest,’’ for purposes of § 52-
500 (a), is not plain and unambiguous. See Gonzalez v.
O & G Industries, Inc., 322 Conn. 291, 303, 140 A.3d 950
(2016) (‘‘[t]he test to determine ambiguity is whether
the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Having concluded that the term ‘‘minimal interest’’
is ambiguous, we turn to the relatively scant legislative
history and the circumstances surrounding the enact-
ment of the 2004 amendment to § 52-500 (a) for guid-
ance.6 See AAA Advantage Carting & Demolition Ser-
vice, LLC v. Capone, supra, 221 Conn. App. 270. During
a Judiciary Committee hearing regarding the 2004
amendment, Attorney Deborah Fuller, a representative
from the external affairs division of the Judicial Branch,
who appeared in support of Senate Bill No. 290, 2004
Sess., titled ‘‘An Act Concerning Partition Actions,’’
which was part of the Judicial Branch’s legislative pack-
age, testified that the 2004 amendment ‘‘would provide
judges hearing partition actions with more flexibility to
resolve those cases.’’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee
Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 4, 2004 Sess., p. 1174. In addition
to the two possible modes of relief then available to a
trial court in a partition action (i.e., partition in kind
and partition by sale), the 2004 amendment sought to
6
As stated previously, § 52-500 was amended in 2004 to add the final
sentence of subsection (a) to allow a trial court in a partition action—upon
finding that (1) one or more property owners has only a ‘‘minimal interest’’
in the property and (2) a sale would not promote the interests of the owners—
to order equitable distribution of the property, with payment of just compen-
sation to the owner(s) of such minimal interest. See P.A. 04-93.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
D. J. v. F. D.

provide a third mode of relief, namely, the ability to
order—upon finding that one or more property owners
has only a ‘‘minimal interest’’ in the property and that
a sale of the property would not promote the interest
of the owners—that a party’s ‘‘minimal interest’’ be
bought out for just compensation in exchange for a
quitclaim deed. Id. This third mode of relief, which
already existed in marital dissolution actions, was pro-
posed in direct response to a decision by our Supreme
Court in Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 255 Conn. 47, 761
A.2d 1283 (2000). See Conn. Joint Standing Committee
Hearings, supra, p. 1174, remarks of Deborah Fuller.
By way of background, in Fernandes, the parties had
purchased certain real property and held title thereto
as joint tenants. Fernandes v. Rodriguez, supra, 255
Conn. 49–50. The plaintiff brought a partition action,
seeking a partition in kind or, alternatively, a partition
by sale. Id., 49. Following a trial, the trial court found
that the defendant’s interest was minimal. Id., 51–52.
In support thereof, the court found that the defendant
had paid less than 7 percent of the down payment
toward the purchase of the property and subsequently
had contributed little or nothing to the property. Id., 51.
Whereupon the court found that the defendant should
recover (1) his net share of certain rental proceeds, (2)
the amount he paid toward the closing costs, and (3)
10 percent of the equity in the property. Id. The court
ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant a sum cer-
tain and that the defendant execute and deliver to the
plaintiff a quitclaim deed relinquishing his interest in the
property. Id., 52. On appeal to this court, the defendant
claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had exceeded its
authority in ordering equitable distribution by payment
of money rather than ordering a partition by sale or in
kind. Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 54 Conn. App. 444, 445,
735 A.2d 871 (1999), rev’d, 255 Conn. 47, 761 A.2d 1283
(2000). We concluded that, based on the underlying
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. J. v. F. D.

findings that ‘‘one owner had only a minimal interest
in the property and that the other had a substantial
interest and resided on the property,’’ the judgment
requiring the payment of money in exchange for a con-
veyance of title was proper. Id., 453.
Our Supreme Court disagreed and held that, in a
partition action, pursuant to §§ 52-495 and 52-500, as
those statutes then existed, a trial court did not have
the equitable power to order, as relief, the payment of
money from one property owner to another holding a
minimal interest in exchange for a quitclaim deed to
the real property. Fernandes v. Rodriguez, supra, 255
Conn. 53–55. Instead, the court held that the trial court
was limited to the then existing statutory remedies of
partition in kind or partition by sale. Id., 57.
With this judicial decision as the impetus to the pro-
posed legislation allowing for the ‘‘equitable distribu-
tion of [the] property, with payment of just compensa-
tion to the owners of [a] minimal interest’’; Senate Bill
No. 290; when asked during the previously mentioned
Judiciary Committee hearing by then Senator Andrew J.
McDonald whether the Judicial Branch was concerned
‘‘about how far the definition of ‘minimal’ might be
taken,’’ Attorney Fuller replied: ‘‘[W]e think that the
judges can probably determine that. . . . I’m not sure
how you would statutorily define it, if you tried to put
something in the definition as opposed to a case-by-
case basis. I mean, I don’t know if you could put a
percentage on it. . . . I think that the judges would be
capable of making that determination . . . .’’ Conn.
Joint Standing Committee Hearings, supra, p. 1175.
Attorney Fuller further testified that the interest
involved would not be limited to a property owner’s
fee interest. See id.; see also id., p. 1176 (‘‘I think the
judge would have to consider . . . if there were other
factors, they would have to consider that . . . . I think
it would be an equitable solution and . . . they would
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
D. J. v. F. D.

be looking at the whole picture, not just the money that
somebody put into it, by any means.’’).
During the legislative debate in the Senate, Senator
McDonald stated that the 2004 amendment ‘‘allows fur-
ther discretion and opportunity for a judge of the Supe-
rior Court to consider all of the merits and equitable
considerations of an action and potentially avoiding
needless expenses associated with a partition sale.’’ 47
S. Proc., Pt. 4, 2004 Sess., pp. 1130–31.
During the legislative debate in the House of Repre-
sentatives, in an exchange with no other hypothetical
facts provided, Representative Robert M. Ward inquired
whether a ‘‘50 percent interest’’ is a ‘‘minimal interest’’
under the 2004 amendment. 47 H.R. Proc., Pt. 7, 2004
Sess., p. 2026. Representative Christopher R. Stone, who
moved for the bill’s adoption; id., p. 2023; responded
that ‘‘the definition of minimal interest is not contained
in the bill and it would be determined by the court
under the totality of the circumstances.’’ Id., 2026. Rep-
resentative Stone went on to state: ‘‘[I]n my opinion
. . . [a] 50 percent interest would not be a minimal
interest . . . and would most likely be handled in
another way, most likely a sale.’’ Id. Representative
Ward then stated, ‘‘I just thought it was important to
get on the record for legislative intent that minimal
interest was meant to be what the word means in com-
mon English, a relatively small interest.’’ Id. Representa-
tive Ward proceeded to convey his opinion that a 5
percent or 8 percent interest would be a minimal inter-
est, whereas a 35 percent or a 50 percent interest would
be ‘‘a substantial interest . . . .’’ Id., pp. 2026–27.
Thereafter, Representative Robert Farr stated: ‘‘I just
want to add to the legislative history here that it isn’t
just the size [of one’s interest in property]. It’s also, I
think, the cost of the sale. . . . I think the cost [of the
sale] has to [be] weigh[ed] . . . as one of the factors
as well [as] the percentages. We grappled with trying
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. J. v. F. D.

to put some definition in the statute and decided, since
. . . the court is a court of equity in these cases, that
we felt it was best to leave the discretion to the court
to determine when it’s most reasonable to do this
. . . .’’ Id., p. 2028.
Our review of the legislative history of the 2004
amendment to § 52-500 (a) leads us to conclude that
the legislature intended for a trial court to determine
whether an individual holds a ‘‘minimal interest’’ in
property on the basis of the totality of the circumstances
and not merely on the basis of the owner’s fee interest.
The legislative history reflects that a property owner’s
fee interest is but one factor for a court to consider in
determining whether the owner’s interest in the prop-
erty is minimal. Stated differently, one’s fee interest as
reflected in the relevant deed is not dispositive.
Although there are a few legislative comments to sug-
gest that a 50 percent ownership interest would not be
‘‘minimal,’’ these legislative comments only go so far in
providing interpretive guidance. That is, the comments
were made in the context of hypotheticals with all other
things being equal. In this connection, we recognize
that in many, if not most, circumstances, a one-half
ownership interest likely would not result in a court’s
determination that such interest is minimal for purposes
of § 52-500 (a). Nevertheless, it bears repeating that
‘‘ ‘[t]he determination of what equity requires is a matter
for the discretion of the trial court’ to be determined
on a case-by-case basis. . . . DiCerto v. Jones, supra,
108 Conn. App. 188 n.3.’’ Cavanagh v. Richichi, 212
Conn. App. 402, 416, 275 A.3d 701 (2022).
In addition, the fact that the 2004 amendment was
enacted in response to Fernandes v. Rodriguez, supra,
255 Conn. 47, in which each owner held an undivided
one-half fee interest in the property; Fernandes v.
Rodriguez, 90 Conn. App. 601, 609 n.5, 879 A.2d 897,
cert. denied, 275 Conn. 927, 883 A.2d 1243 (2005), cert.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
D. J. v. F. D.

denied, 547 U.S. 1027, 126 S. Ct. 1585, 164 L. Ed. 2d
312 (2006); bolsters our conclusion that a one-half fee
interest may be deemed, if the totality of the circum-
stances warrants, a minimal interest for purposes of
the equitable contribution option set forth in § 52-500
(a). In sum, guided by the legislative history, we reject
the plaintiff’s assertion that his one-half fee interest in
the property precludes, as a matter of law, a determina-
tion that his interest in the property was minimal for
purposes of § 52-500 (a).7
We note that taking the plaintiff’s position to its logi-
cal conclusion would deprive the court of the additional
equitable discretion that the legislature gave the court
when it enacted the 2004 amendment to § 52-500 (a),
while providing no real benefit to the plaintiff. That is,
if a one-half interest in real property could not, as a
matter of law, be considered a ‘‘minimal interest’’ for
purposes of § 52-500 (a), a trial court, in crafting a
remedy, would be limited, as it was prior to the 2004
amendment, to ordering either a partition in kind or a
partition by sale. See Fernandes v. Rodriguez, supra,
255 Conn. 57 (prior to 2004 amendment creating third
mode of relief, court reaffirmed that partition by divi-
sion and partition by sale were only two modes of relief
available to trial court in partition action). Forcing the
parties to remain in an ownership relationship would
not be a legally permissible option. See Geib v. McKin-
ney, 224 Conn. 219, 224, 617 A.2d 1377 (1992) (‘‘ ‘No
person can be compelled to remain the owner with
another of real estate, not even if he becomes such
by his own act; every owner is entitled to the fullest
enjoyment of his property, and that can come only
7
We note that in Zealand v. Balber, 205 Conn. App. 376, 257 A.3d 411
(2021), this court upheld the trial court’s determination that, notwithstanding
that the plaintiff was a tenant in common with a one-half fee interest in the
property at issue, the plaintiff’s interest was minimal pursuant to § 52-500
(a); however, this court did not engage in a statutory analysis of the term
‘‘minimal interest’’ in that decision. Id., 385–88.
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. J. v. F. D.

through an ownership free from dictation by others as
to the manner in which it may be exercised. Therefore
the law afforded to every owner with another relief by
way of partition . . . .’ Johnson v. Olmsted, 49 Conn.
509, 517 (1882) . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.)). Thus, in
the plaintiff’s view, the court would have to choose
between a partition in kind, which likely is impractica-
ble in the context of a parcel that includes a physical
structure such as a house, and a partition by sale. A
partition by sale likely would lead to the same result
for the party seeking partition (in this case, the plaintiff)
as he would achieve through the statute’s third mode
of relief, i.e., equitable distribution (the option exer-
cised by the trial court). Here, had the trial court
ordered a partition by sale, the court would have had
the discretion to award the plaintiff the same amount
he complains of now as just compensation. See, e.g.,
Fernandes v. Rodriguez, supra, 255 Conn. 60 (in context
of partition by sale, trial court may distribute sale pro-
ceeds in accordance with equitable interest of each
party). Other than vindicating some other motive, it is
not clear how a partition by sale would benefit the
plaintiff, as he still would be entitled to only his equita-
ble share of the sale proceeds.8 By contrast, the defen-
dant clearly would be harmed because she would be
required to vacate her home and find a new place for
her and her family to live using the proceeds from the
sale. The legislative history makes clear that § 52-500
(a) was amended to give the court the equitable discre-
tion to avoid such an anomalous result.
Finally, and relatedly, we note that our conclusion
is consistent with the well settled principle, in the parti-
tion by sale context, that, simply because a party owns
by title an undivided one-half interest in property, ‘‘it
does not follow that he or she will necessarily be enti-
tled to equal shares of the moneys obtained from the
8
See footnote 5 of this opinion.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
D. J. v. F. D.

sale. Equities must be considered and, if established,
must be liquidated before distribution is ordered.’’
Levay v. Levay, 137 Conn. 92, 96, 75 A.2d 400 (1950);
see Hackett v. Hackett, 42 Conn. Supp. 36, 40, 598 A.2d
1112 (1990), aff’d, 26 Conn. App. 149, 598 A.2d 1103
(1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 905, 600 A.2d 1359
(1992); see also, e.g., Cavanagh v. Richichi, supra, 212
Conn. App. 413 (‘‘[b]ecause a partition action is an equi-
table action, the court has the authority to determine an
unequal award on the basis of the evidence presented,
including the value of the property and the equitable
interests’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Having concluded that the term ‘‘minimal interest,’’
as set forth in § 52-500 (a), contemplates consideration
of both a property owner’s fee interest and any relevant
equitable factors, we turn to our review of the trial
court’s determination that the plaintiff had a minimal
interest in the property. At the outset, we observe that
the court made several significant factual findings to
support that determination, none of which the plaintiff
meaningfully contests on appeal. Specifically, the court
found that (1) in 2015, the defendant purchased the
property with no financial assistance from the plaintiff,
(2) the defendant alone paid the mortgage, taxes, and
insurance on the property, (3) the plaintiff, along with
his son, moved in with the defendant at some point
after the purchase of the property, (4) the plaintiff paid
the defendant $400 per month for groceries and other
household expenses, and he contributed $2000 toward
the maintenance of the property, (5) in 2019, the plaintiff
vacated the property, taking with him some furnishings
purchased by the defendant, (6) the plaintiff did not
make a purported $4000 payment to the defendant upon
moving out of the property, and (7) the plaintiff has
not made any financial contributions toward the prop-
erty after moving out in 2019. In light of these findings,
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. J. v. F. D.

and mindful that ‘‘we must make every reasonable pre-
sumption in favor of the correctness of its action’’;
(internal quotation marks omitted) DiCerto v. Jones,
supra, 108 Conn. App. 189; we conclude that the court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that, notwith-
standing his status as a joint tenant of the property,
the plaintiff had a minimal interest in the property for
purposes of § 52-500 (a). See Zealand v. Balber, 205
Conn. App. 376, 385–86, 257 A.3d 411 (2021) (upholding
trial court’s determination that plaintiff, tenant in com-
mon, had minimal interest in property, which was sup-
ported by findings that (1) defendant was ‘‘ ‘sole source
of providing the moneys’ ’’ to purchase property, to
make improvements to property, to purchase furnish-
ings, artwork, and other artifacts, and to take on mort-
gage debt and other expenses, (2) property was not
parties’ principal residence and was used in limited
capacity for approximately three and one-half years,
and (3) parties had not reached agreement as to disposi-
tion of property if they parted ways).
To support his position that the court incorrectly
determined that he had a minimal interest in the prop-
erty, the plaintiff principally relies on Fusco v. Austin,
141 Conn. App. 825, 64 A.3d 794 (2013). His reliance is
misplaced. In Fusco, the trial court determined that the
plaintiff’s joint tenancy did not constitute a minimal
interest in the property, ‘‘particularly in view of the fact
that [the plaintiff] lived on the property for twenty-three
years and acquired his interest at the same time the
defendant acquired her interest.’’ Id., 833–34. Moreover,
the court further ‘‘specifically found that during the
period of the parties’ cohabitation, their contributions
to the property were relatively equal’’; id., 834; and that,
at the time of the closing, the parties had executed
an agreement providing in relevant part that, ‘‘if the
property is sold, the defendant will receive 55 percent
of the net proceeds and the plaintiff will receive 45
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 17

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 19
D. J. v. F. D.

percent of the net proceeds, subject to either party’s
claim for verified costs for property improvements.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 827. In stark
contrast to the trial court’s findings in Fusco, in the
present case, (1) the parties, who were in a romantic
relationship, lived together at the property for approxi-
mately four years, (2) the defendant purchased the
property and paid the mortgage, taxes, and insurance
for the property without financial assistance from the
plaintiff, who acquired his interest in the property by
way of a quitclaim deed a couple of years after the
purchase, (3) the parties’ contributions to the property
were far from equal, and (4) there was no evidence of
any agreement setting forth the parties’ respective
rights and responsibilities concerning the property.
Thus, Fusco does not advance the plaintiff’s position.
In sum, we conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the plaintiff had a mini-
mal interest in the property for purposes of § 52-500 (a).
II
The plaintiff next claims that the trial court abused
its discretion in awarding him, pursuant to § 52-500
(a), $2000 in just compensation for his interest in the
property, which equates to 1.35 percent of the $148,000
in equity in the property. The plaintiff maintains that
the court failed ‘‘to consider the ownership percentages
of the parties . . . and the amount of monthly contri-
bution [the plaintiff] provided while living in the resi-
dence.’’ We are not persuaded.
‘‘In a partition action, a court is required to balance
the equities between the parties. . . . [I]t is not always
true that each tenant in common or joint tenant is enti-
tled to equal shares in the real estate. . . . Because a
partition action is an equitable action, the court has the
authority to determine an unequal award on the basis
of the evidence presented, including the value of the
Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. J. v. F. D.

property and the equitable interests of the parties. . . .
Additionally, as our Supreme Court has explained in
the context of our government takings jurisprudence,
[t]he question of what is just compensation is an equita-
ble one rather than a strictly legal or technical one.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Cavanagh v. Richichi, supra, 212 Conn. App. 413–14.
When determining just compensation, a trial court
does not merely consider the parties’ ownership per-
centages, but, rather, ‘‘[the] court may take into consid-
eration contributions, including improvements, that the
parties have made to the subject property in its determi-
nation of just compensation. See, e.g., Zealand v.
Balber, [supra, 205 Conn. App. 393–94] (‘[i]n light of
those contributions, the court awarded the plaintiff
$25,000 as just compensation’); Young v. Young, 137
Conn. App. 635, 651, 49 A.3d 308 (2012) (trial court
properly considered plaintiff’s expenditures related to
upkeep, including mortgage payments, household
repairs and grounds maintenance and taxes, against
countervailing claims for use and occupancy); Hackett
v. Hackett, 26 Conn. App. 149, 150, 598 A.2d 1103 (1991)
(following partition sale, party may ‘be compensated
out of the proceeds from the sale of the parties’ jointly
owned property for his past payments for mortgage,
insurance, taxes, improvements and repairs’), cert.
denied, 221 Conn. 905, 600 A.2d 1359 (1992).’’ Cavanagh
v. Richichi, supra, 212 Conn. App. 416–17. In Fernandes
v. Rodriguez, supra, 90 Conn. App. 601, for example,
the trial court found the monetary contributions of each
party toward the purchase of the property at issue to be
particularly relevant to its determination of the equities
and, despite the plaintiff’s status as a joint tenant,
awarded him a 5 percent equitable interest in the prop-
erty. Id., 610–12.
Here, the court found that the plaintiff did not contrib-
ute financially to the property’s purchase, mortgage,
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21
D. J. v. F. D.

taxes, or insurance and that he participated financially
only to the extent of (1) $2000 in maintenance expenses
and (2) $400 per month for groceries and other house-
hold expenses during most of the time that he lived
with the defendant (a period during which his son also
lived in the home). Moreover, the court expressly did
not credit the plaintiff’s claims of various contributions
to the maintenance of the property. In light of these
findings based on the evidence presented, we conclude
that the court did not abuse its discretion in making
its award of just compensation.
Insofar as the plaintiff argues that his one-half title
ownership interest in the property as a joint tenant
entitles him to 50 percent of the equity, that argument
has been squarely rejected by our appellate courts. See
id., 609 (‘‘One of the defendant’s principal arguments
on appeal is that the court’s initial finding that each
party possessed a one-half interest in the property as
joint tenants required the court to award him one half
of the proceeds of the partition sale. This contention
finds no support in the case law.’’ (Footnote omitted.));
see also Levay v. Levay, supra, 137 Conn. 96 (‘‘Although
each party was the owner of an undivided one-half
interest in the property, it does not follow that he or
she will necessarily be entitled to equal shares of the
moneys obtained from the sale. Equities must be consid-
ered . . . .’’); Zealand v. Balber, supra, 205 Conn. App.
387 (‘‘it is not always true that each tenant in common
. . . is entitled to equal shares in the property’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, we previously have
affirmed monetary awards of single-digit equitable
interests in the context of one-half ownership interests.
See, e.g., Zealand v. Balber, supra, 379–80, 393–94
(awarding plaintiff just compensation constituting
approximately 5.7 percent equitable interest, despite
plaintiff’s status as tenant in common with one-half
ownership interest); Fernandes v. Rodriguez, supra,
Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
D. J. v. F. D.

90 Conn. App. 609, 612 (awarding plaintiff 5 percent
equitable interest following sale of property, despite
plaintiff being joint tenant with one-half ownership
interest).
In sum, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in its award of just compensation to the
plaintiff for his interest in the property.
The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded
for the purpose of setting a new date by which (1) the
plaintiff shall transfer his interest in the property by
quitclaim deed to the defendant, and (2) simultaneously
therewith, the defendant shall transfer to the plaintiff
the sum of $2000 as just compensation.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.