State v. Mallozzi

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2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 787
State v. Mallozzi

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN MALLOZZI
(AC 46060)
Elgo, Cradle and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been convicted of fourteen counts each of false
statement in absentee balloting and forgery in the second degree,
appealed to this court. The defendant, who was the Democratic city
chairman for the city of Stamford during the 2015 municipal election
cycle, regularly appeared at the Stamford town clerk’s office to ‘‘check
on’’ ballots. L, the Republican town clerk, admitted that she gave certain
absentee ballots to the defendant and his associates, even though deliv-
ering a ballot to an individual other than the applicant was improper.
Other individuals in L’s office accepted applications from the defendant,
even though many of them should have been rejected because they were
not filled out properly. P worked in the town clerk’s office under L’s
supervision, and she prepared ballot sets for the defendant to pick
up and would write the defendant’s initials on the applications. After
receiving a complaint, B, an investigator for the State Elections Enforce-
ment Commission, conducted an investigation, which revealed a
‘‘scheme’’ between the defendant and L involving the submission of
thirty-one fraudulent absentee ballot applications and twenty-six fraudu-
lent absentee ballots to the Stamford town clerk’s office. During the
bench trial in the present case, the trial court directed the state to file
an amended information to add an individual name for each count of
false statement in absentee balloting. K, a handwriting and document
examination expert, testified on behalf of the state. K compared hand-
writing exemplars given by the defendant to the handwritten information
on the ballot applications and opined that there were indications that the
questioned signatures and the defendant’s exemplars shared common
ownership. The trial court denied defense counsel’s request to disclose
a handwriting expert to rebut K’s opinions, as well as his motion to
strike P’s testimony, which was provided during the state’s case-in-
chief, after she asserted her fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination when the defense called her as a witness in the defendant’s
case. The court found the defendant guilty of all charges, and subse-
quently issued a memorandum of decision denying the defendant’s
motion to dismiss. Held:
1. The defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction, which was based on his claim that the state failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he authored the forged signatures, was
unavailing: although the defendant argued that K’s testimony that it
was highly probable that the defendant’s signature exemplars and the
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State v. Mallozzi
questioned documents shared a common author was not a proper eviden-
tiary basis for guilt as to each individual ballot, defense counsel did not
ask at trial that the evidence as to each ballot be limited only to the
counts specifically identifying each ballot, and he did not argue before
the trial court that K’s opinion was an improper consideration in
determining the defendant’s guilt as to each count; moreover, K’s testi-
mony was not the only evidence of the defendant’s guilt, as L testified
that she gave ballots to the defendant and his associates, P confirmed
that she prepared ballots for the defendant to pick up and that she put
his initials on those ballots, and B testified that the ballots that bore
the defendant’s initials appeared to share similar handwriting.
2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
permitted the state to amend its information during trial to include the
names of the alleged victims with respect to each count of false statement
in absentee balloting, which was based on his claim that the state
did not provide good cause for such an amendment, pursuant to the
applicable rule of practice (§ 36-18): the trial court did not permit the
state to amend its information, it directed it to do so, and, accordingly, the
state was not required to show good cause; moreover, the amendment
directed by the court, which was specifically requested by defense coun-
sel earlier in the trial, did not charge an additional or different offense,
and it did not prejudice any substantive rights of the defendant, rather,
the amendment narrowed the charges against the defendant, allowing
defense counsel to focus on the ballots identified in the amended infor-
mation; furthermore, the identities of all of the victims were known to
the defendant because their names were listed in the arrest warrant
affidavit and were contained in K’s case notes, which were disclosed
prior to trial.
3. The trial court properly denied defense counsel’s request during trial to
obtain and disclose a handwriting expert witness to rebut the state’s
expert witness: our rules of practice (§§ 40-13 and 40-26 (2)) require a
defendant to disclose to the state, within forty-five days of a written
request, the names of any witnesses the defendant intends to call at
trial, in addition to any reports or statements of experts made in connec-
tion with the case, and the failure to comply with those rules may result
in the preclusion of specific evidence; moreover, the defendant was
aware of the state’s reliance on K’s opinions since he was arrested,
as K’s opinions were referenced in the arrest warrant affidavit, and,
nevertheless, the defense did not seek to discuss K’s opinions with him
or disclose its own expert to rebut them, and, accordingly, this court
rejected the defendant’s argument that he was ‘‘sandbagged’’ by K’s
testimony; furthermore, defense counsel did not disclose the name of
his intended expert, he did not proffer a curriculum vitae or a summary
of the expert’s proposed opinion, and it was unlikely that a rebuttal
expert could render an opinion in the one hour indicated by defense
counsel as K had spent years examining the evidence in this case and
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4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 787
State v. Mallozzi
provided three days of testimony, and the rebuttal expert’s testimony
would then have necessitated a response by K, which would have dis-
rupted and delayed the proceedings in a manner not contemplated by
defense counsel.
4. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his right
to due process was violated by the lack of a rule of practice that the
state disclose the substance of any expert opinion on which it intended
to rely at trial; the defendant’s claim essentially was alleging a constitu-
tional right to discovery, and, because a criminal defendant has no
general constitutional right to discovery, the defendant’s claim was not
of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right,
and, accordingly, failed under the second prong of the test set forth in
State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233).
5. The defendant’s claim that his right to confrontation under the sixth
amendment to the United States constitution was violated because the
trial court declined to strike P’s testimony was unavailing: the defense
had ample opportunity to cross-examine all aspects of P’s testimony
that were elicited on direct examination, defense counsel questioned P
relating to the investigation by the State Elections Enforcement Commis-
sion in this case, her various communications with B and the written
statement that she provided to him, and, thus, the defense had an
unrestricted opportunity to explore on cross-examination any motive
or bias that P may have had and to impeach any portion of her testimony.
6. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
denied his motion to dismiss on the ground of selective prosecution,
which was based on his claim that the court ignored the allegations of
a ‘‘scheme’’ allegedly involving several individuals, all of whom, the
defendant contends, were similarly situated, and that the only difference
between him and those other individuals was that he was the only one
who exercised his right to counsel: the defendant ignored the difference
between his conduct and that of the other individuals whom he claims
were similarly situated because the defendant was the one who fraudu-
lently filled out the absentee ballot applications and forged the signatures
of the victims; moreover, the defendant’s claim was devoid of any argu-
ment of animus or invidious discrimination on the part of the state.
Argued January 29—officially released June 4, 2024

Procedural History

Amended information charging the defendant with
fourteen counts of the crime of false statement in absen-
tee balloting and fourteen counts of the crime of forgery
in the second degree, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, geographical
area number one, and tried to the court, Randolph, J.;
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State v. Mallozzi

thereafter, the court, Randolph, J., denied the defen-
dant’s motions to strike certain testimony and to dis-
miss; judgment of guilty, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Stephan E. Seeger, with whom, on the brief, was Igor
Kuperman, for the appellant (defendant).
Nathan J. Buchok, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Ferencek, state’s attor-
ney, Laurence G. Tamaccio, assistant state’s attorney,
and Michael C. Bivona, deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

CRADLE, J. The defendant, John Mallozzi, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a
court trial, of fourteen counts of false statement in
absentee balloting in violation of General Statutes § 9-
359a and fourteen counts of forgery in the second
degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-139 (a) (3).
On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his convic-
tion; (2) the court improperly permitted the state to
amend its long form information in the middle of trial;
(3) the court improperly denied defense counsel’s
request to obtain and disclose, in the middle of trial,
an expert witness to rebut the state’s expert witness;
(4) his right to due process was violated by the lack of
a requirement that the state disclose the substance of
any expert opinion upon which it intended to rely at
trial; (5) the court improperly denied his motion to
strike the testimony of a witness, proffered by the prose-
cutor during the state’s case-in-chief, after that same
witness invoked her fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination when she was called to testify by the
defense; and (6) the court improperly denied his motion
to dismiss on the ground of selective prosecution. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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State v. Mallozzi

The following facts, as set forth by the trial court,
and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s
claims on appeal. ‘‘The city of Stamford . . . held
municipal elections in 2015. On the ballot were candi-
dates for the Board of Representatives, the Board of
Education and the Board of Finance. The Stamford
town clerk’s office was responsible for maintaining
election records. During elections, the town clerk’s
office issued absentee ballot applications and ballot
sets (referred to as ‘ballots’).
‘‘In 2015, Donna Loglisci was the Republican town
clerk, an elected public official. She was elected to the
office in 2001 and reelected numerous times. She last
served as town clerk in 2017. She was also the chairman
of the Republican Party in Stamford for six years before
being elected town clerk.
‘‘During the municipal election of 2015, registered
voters who wanted an application for an absentee ballot
could request one from the town clerk’s office. A regis-
tered voter could also obtain an absentee ballot applica-
tion from their party of registration or online from the
Secretary of the State’s office. After filling out the appli-
cation, the voter could return the application to the
town clerk’s office by mail or by dropping it off at
the office.
‘‘In 2015, there was an ‘election office’ within the
town clerk’s office. Applications that arrived at the town
clerk’s office were clocked and date stamped. The town
clerk’s office would then place a district number and
a voter number on the applications. After checking the
applications for completeness, the office would mail or
hand out the actual ballot package to the voter. Absen-
tee ballots had to be returned to the town clerk’s office
by 8 p.m. on election evening. Absentee voting was
permitted for thirty days prior to the election.
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‘‘The ballot package, that is, the ballot set, contained
a ballot, an inner and an outer envelope and instruction
forms. When mailing the ballot back to the town clerk’s
office, the voter would place the ballot into the inner
envelope and then place the inner envelope into the
outer envelope. The inner envelope had to be signed
and dated by the voter. The ballots could then be mailed
or delivered in person to the town clerk’s office.
‘‘When the ballots arrived at the town clerk’s office,
they were date stamped. The ballots were kept in bank-
er’s boxes, marked by district numbers, and placed in
vaults in the town clerk’s office until election day. The
town clerk’s office would not open the envelopes con-
taining the ballots. The office of registrar of voters, a
public office, would open the envelopes on election
day. The office would count the votes and the Secretary
of the State’s office would have to record and certify
a vote count.
‘‘After the registrar retrieved the banker’s boxes con-
taining ballots, the registrar marked its own books,
thereby identifying absentee ballot voters. The books
identifying voters who cast absentee ballots were then
placed at the polls on election day. Voters whose names
and addresses were listed in the books would not be
allowed to vote in person.
‘‘During the 2015 election cycle, the defendant, who
was the [Stamford Democratic City Committee] chair-
man, was regularly in the town clerk’s office ‘checking
on ballots.’ Loglisci had known the defendant through
his political activity for over twenty years. On at least
one occasion, the defendant asked whether he could
get ballots if he had ballot applications from people
who could not vote in person. The office policy allowed
anyone to deliver applications to the town clerk’s office.
But those applications had to be signed by the voter.
If a person requesting a ballot was not the applicant,
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State v. Mallozzi

the ballot should have been mailed to the applicant’s
address. To deliver ballots to [an individual] other than
the applicant was improper. . . . Loglisci admitted she
gave ballots to [individuals] other than the applicants
. . . she provided ballots to the defendant . . . .
‘‘Loglisci’s office also received applications from the
defendant. Her office accepted applications even though
many of them should have been rejected because they
were not filled out properly. Diane Pesiri worked in the
town clerk’s office under . . . Loglisci. She prepared
ballot sets for the defendant to pick up. When employ-
ees in the office either saw or were told that [the defen-
dant] delivered applications, Pesiri would write the ini-
tials of [the defendant], JM, or on one occasion JL, on
the upper right-hand corner of the applications. How-
ever, the initials JM or JL placed in the upper right-
hand corner did not necessarily mean that Pesiri saw the
defendant come into the office to deliver applications.
‘‘On multiple occasions, the town clerk’s office pro-
cessed applications that did not contain required infor-
mation. The office had the authority to reject ballot
applications, including applications containing only the
name and address of the applicant. Moreover, the town
clerk had the authority to reject applications that con-
tained only the name, address and signature of the appli-
cant. All applications required that a box be checked
stating the reason the applicant wanted an absentee
ballot. Loglisci accepted numerous incomplete and
invalid applications. Among them were applications on
which the putative applicant listed no reason for want-
ing to receive an absentee ballot. Compounding the
town clerk’s missteps, the office would enter into its
logbook the reasons an applicant wanted an absentee
ballot when the putative applicant failed to check off
any reason. In other words, the town clerk’s office
sometimes created reasons when the applications con-
tained none.
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State v. Mallozzi

‘‘Loglisci admitted that she broke the law when she
gave ballots to people who were not applicants. She
handed ballot sets to a Mr. Figueroa who was not an
applicant. She handed ballot sets to a Mr. Giraldo who
was not an applicant. Both were associates of the defen-
dant. On more than one occasion she provided ballot
sets to the defendant. . . .
‘‘Isen Hoti became a registered voter in the early
2000s. At the time of trial, he remembered voting two
or three times. He always voted in person. He denied
signing an absentee ballot application for the 2015
municipal election and stated the signature on the appli-
cation was not his. The signatures on the envelopes in
which the ballots were placed were not his. He gave
no one permission to fill out an absentee ballot applica-
tion for him. He gave no one permission to vote on his
behalf. . . .
‘‘Hoti’s true signature appeared on the voter registra-
tion card. However, the voter registration card signature
did not match the signatures on the ballot application
nor the signatures on the ballot sets. The town clerk’s
office placed the initials ‘JM’ on Hoti’s application,
which indicates that the defendant or one of his associ-
ates delivered the application. . . .
‘‘Scott Branfuhr is a legal investigator for the State
Elections Enforcement Commission [(SEEC)]. He has
been involved in over 400 investigations. On December
3, 2015, the [SEEC] received a complaint from the Stam-
ford Republican Registrar of Voters, Lucy Corelli, a
public official. . . . Corelli alleged that an individual
named Shkadran Hoti voted twice in the 2015 Stamford
municipal election . . . once by absentee ballot and
once by voting in person. Shkadran Hoti explained that
he arrived at his polling place to vote in person but was
denied because he was marked off as having already
voted by absentee ballot. He protested and was allowed
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State v. Mallozzi

to vote after completing an affidavit in which he stated
he did not vote by absentee ballot.
‘‘Branfuhr compared the absentee ballot application
signatures of Isen Hoti and Shkadran Hoti to the signa-
tures on their voter registration cards. Isen’s signature
on his voter registration card did not match the signa-
ture on the absentee ballot application. Shkadran’s sig-
nature on his voter registration card did not match the
signature on the absentee ballot application.
‘‘Branfuhr then obtained all ballot applications con-
taining the initials JM or JL. He also obtained voter
registration cards for each individual whose application
contained the initials JM or JL. None of the signatures
on the absentee ballot applications were similar to the
true signatures of those same individuals on their voter
registration cards.
‘‘A total of thirty-one applications were marked with
the initials JM or JL. The handwriting was similar on
all of the applications. Branfuhr’s investigation revealed
what he called a ‘scheme’ between [the defendant], as
chairman of the Stamford Democratic City Committee
and Loglisci, the Stamford town clerk. The ‘scheme’
involved the submission of thirty-one fraudulent absen-
tee ballot applications and twenty-six fraudulent absen-
tee ballots to the Stamford town clerk’s office. The goal
of the scheme was to count the fraudulent ballots as
valid votes, first to be recorded by the registrar of vot-
ers, a public office. Ultimately, the Secretary of the
State’s office, a governmental entity, records the results
of the election.
‘‘Branfuhr said the case was the most ‘severe’ case
he had seen in his nine year career with the [SEEC].
The [SEEC] found [the defendant], Loglisci and Pesiri
liable, but only [the defendant’s] matter was referred
to the state’s attorney’s office for prosecution. Branfuhr
explained that [the defendant’s] conduct constituted
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State v. Mallozzi

felonies but Loglisci’s conduct constituted misdemean-
ors. The [SEEC] suspends enforcement actions when
criminal matters are pending. The [SEEC] plans further
enforcement action against Loglisci. . . .
‘‘Greg Kettering is a handwriting and document exam-
ination expert. Kettering retired from the state police
Forensic [Science] Laboratory in 2021. He was the chief
handwriting and document examiner for the state of
Connecticut. He had extensive specialized training in
handwriting and document analysis and had conducted
at least 1500 examinations. Handwriting analysis is a
highly specialized discipline, and experts are trained
to look at different fundamentals of handwriting. The
fundamentals include slant, shape, space, use of mar-
gins, use of baseline, feather strokes, termination strokes,
entry strokes, and the size of letters compared to other
letters. In comparing handwriting submissions, Ketter-
ing examined, among other indicators, ‘speed, propor-
tion, pressure and design.’ He spent approximately forty
hours on every suspect ballot submission.
‘‘Kettering compared handwriting samples, referred
to as ‘exemplars,’ given by [the defendant] to the hand-
written information, referred to as ‘entries,’ on the
absentee ballot applications. ([The defendant] provided
handwriting samples by writing the names in print and
cursive of each of the questioned absentee ballot appli-
cants.) Kettering also compared the handwritten infor-
mation on the applications to the signatures on the
applications.
‘‘1. There were ‘indications’ that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Isen Hoti’ and the defendant’s exemplars share
common authorship. There were indications that the
questioned entries in the Isen Hoti application and the
defendant’s exemplars share common authorship.
‘‘2. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Patricia Velaj’ and the defendant’s exemplars
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State v. Mallozzi

share common authorship. There were indications that
the questioned entries of Patricia Velaj and the defen-
dant’s exemplars share common authorship.
‘‘3. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Nedzmije Vrzivoli’ and the defendant’s exem-
plars share common authorship. There were indications
that the questioned entries of Nedzmije Vrzivoli and the
defendant’s exemplars share common authorship.

‘‘4. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Blerim Vrzivoli’ and the defendant’s exemplars
share common authorship. There were indications that
the questioned entries of Blerim Vrzivoli and the defen-
dant’s exemplars share common authorship.

‘‘5. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Gjinji Agron’ and the defendant’s exemplars
share common authorship. There were indications that
the questioned entries of Gjinji Agron and the defen-
dant’s exemplars share common authorship.

‘‘6. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Avdi Gjinji’ and the defendant’s exemplars share
common authorship. There were indications that the
questioned entries of Avdi Gjinji and the defendant’s
exemplars share common authorship.

‘‘7. There were indications that the questioned entries
of ‘Tone Shtufag’ and the defendant’s exemplars share
common authorship. However, the questioned Tone
Shtufag signature could not be ‘intercompared’ to the
defendant’s exemplars.

‘‘8. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Martha Pepaj’ and the defendant’s exemplars
share common authorship. There were indications that
the questioned entries of Martha Pepaj and the defen-
dant’s exemplars share common authorship.
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State v. Mallozzi

‘‘9. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Josephine Mallozzi’ and the defendant’s exem-
plars share common authorship. There were indications
that the questioned entries of Josephine Mallozzi and
the defendant’s exemplars share common authorship.
‘‘10. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Linda Tomaj’ and the defendant’s exemplars
share common authorship. There were indications that
the questioned entries of Linda Tomaj and the defen-
dant’s exemplars share common authorship.
‘‘11. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Alexander Velaj’ and the defendant’s exemplars
share common authorship. There were indications that
the questioned entries of Alexander Velaj and the defen-
dant’s exemplars share common authorship.
‘‘12. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Avni Ukperaj’ and the defendant’s exemplars
share common authorship. There were indications that
the questioned entries of Avni Ukperaj and the defen-
dant’s exemplars share common authorship.
‘‘13. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Isaku Toshe’ and the defendant’s exemplars
share common authorship. There were indications that
the questioned entries of lsaku Toshe and the defen-
dant’s exemplars share common authorship.
‘‘14. There were indications that the questioned signa-
ture of ‘Isaku Burim’ and the defendant’s exemplars
share common authorship. There were indications that
the questioned entries of lsaku Burim and the defen-
dant’s exemplars share common authorship.
‘‘The state did not charge the defendant in each instance
in which signatures and entries of other individuals and
the defendant’s exemplars shared common authorship.
In each individual instance in which there were indica-
tions of common authorship, the evidence falls far short
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14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 787
State v. Mallozzi

of a definite conclusion. However, in all instances
taken together, it was virtually certain and highly proba-
ble that the exemplars, entries and signatures shared
a common author.’’ (Emphasis altered.)

On the basis of the foregoing, the court found the
defendant guilty of all charges and rendered judgment
accordingly. The court thereafter sentenced the defen-
dant to a total effective sentence of thirteen months of
incarceration, execution suspended, followed by two
years of probation, and ordered the defendant to pay
a fine of $35,000. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the evidence pre-
sented at trial was insufficient to support his convic-
tion.1 Notably, the defendant does not argue that the
state failed to prove a specific element of the crimes
of which he was convicted.2 Rather, the defendant
argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was the author of the forged signatures.
In other words, the defendant seems to contend that
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
1
For jurisprudential reasons, we address the sufficiency of the evidence
claim first, although this differs from the order that the claims were presented
by the defendant in his principal appellate brief.
2
General Statutes § 9-359a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is
guilty of false statement in absentee balloting when he intentionally makes
a false written statement in or on or signs the name of another person to
the application for an absentee ballot or the inner envelope accompanying
any such ballot, which he does not believe to be true and which statement
or signature is intended to mislead a public servant in the performance of
his official function. . . .’’
General Statutes § 53a-139 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is guilty
of forgery in the second degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or
injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument
or issues or possesses any written instrument which he knows to be forged,
which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or represent
if completed . . . (3) a written instrument officially issued or created by
a public office, public servant or governmental instrumentality . . . .’’
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State v. Mallozzi

because the state failed to prove identity.3 We are unper-
suaded.
‘‘[T]he question of identity of a perpetrator of a crime
is a question of fact that is within the sole province of
the [trier of fact] to resolve. . . . To determine whether
the evidence was sufficient to establish the essential
element of identity, we apply a two part test. First, we
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether
upon the facts so construed and the inferences reason-
ably drawn therefrom, the [trier of fact] reasonably
could have concluded that the cumulative force of the
evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
. . . . In doing so, we are mindful that the trier of fact
is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences
that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . .
The trier [of fact] may draw whatever inferences from
the evidence or facts established by the evidence it
deems to be reasonable and logical.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Abraham,
343 Conn. 470, 476, 274 A.3d 849 (2022).
The defendant argues that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support his conviction because Kettering’s
report concluded that, when reviewing each ballot indi-
vidually, there were indications that the defendant was
the author but there was not enough evidence to reach
a definite conclusion. The defendant argues that Ketter-
ing’s testimony that, based upon the totality of the evi-
dence, it was ‘‘highly probable that the [defendant’s]
signature exemplars and the question[ed] documents
shared a common author,’’ was not a proper evidentiary
basis for guilt as to each individual ballot.
‘‘[Although] [e]vidence [that] is offered and admitted
for a limited purpose only . . . cannot be used for
3
We note that the defendant devotes only two paragraphs of his appellate
brief to his sufficiency claim.
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another and totally different purpose’’; (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) State v. Robles, 348 Conn. 1, 21,
301 A.3d 498 (2023); the finder of fact ‘‘is [otherwise]
free to consider all of the evidence adduced at trial in
evaluating the defendant’s culpability, and presumably
does so . . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Sabato, 321 Conn. 729, 742,
138 A.3d 895 (2016).
Defense counsel did not, at trial, ask that the evidence
as to each ballot be limited only to the counts specifi-
cally identifying each ballot. Although defense counsel
objected to Kettering’s testimony as to common author-
ship based on the totality of the ballot documents on
other grounds, he did not argue to the trial court that
Kettering’s opinion was an improper consideration in
determining the defendant’s guilt as to each count.
In support of his claim, the defendant cites State v.
Juan A. G.-P., 346 Conn. 132, 180, 287 A.3d 1060 (2023),
for the proposition that, ‘‘[w]hen charges involve differ-
ent victims, the [trier of fact] must also . . . separately
consider the charges relating to each victim, and the
evidence pertaining to each victim must be clearly dis-
tinguished.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Juan
A. G.-P. does not hold that the trier of fact is precluded
from considering all evidence presented at trial when
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant as
to each victim. Indeed, the court referenced instruction
2.6-11, now instruction 2.2-6, of the Connecticut model
criminal jury instructions, which provides that the jury
‘‘may find that some of the evidence applies to more
than one count of the information. The evidence, how-
ever, must be considered separately as to each element
in each count.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Thus, as stated herein, where there has been no limita-
tion on the admission of evidence, it is the obligation
of the trier of fact to consider all of the evidence in its
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determination of whether the state has met its burden
of proof.
Moreover, as the state aptly points out, Kettering’s
testimony that the totality of the evidence proved that
the author of the exemplars also authored the ballots
at issue was not the only evidence of the defendant’s
guilt. In addition to Kettering’s findings that the ballots
and the defendant’s exemplars contained indications
of common authorship, Loglisci testified that she gave
ballots to the defendant and his associates, Pesiri con-
firmed that she prepared ballots for the defendant to
pick up and that she put his initials on those ballots,
and Branfuhr testified that the ballots that bore the
defendant’s initials appeared to share similar handwrit-
ing. On the basis of that evidence, which demonstrated
that the ballots in question had been given to the defen-
dant and the handwriting on them was similar to the
defendant’s handwriting, the court reasonably could
have inferred that the defendant was the individual who
forged them. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim that
there was insufficient evidence to support his convic-
tion fails.
II
The defendant next claims that the court improperly
permitted the state to amend its information in the
middle of trial to include the names of the alleged vic-
tims of each count of false statement in absentee bal-
loting. We disagree.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to this claim. On January 30, 2019, the defendant
was arrested by warrant on fourteen counts of false
statement in absentee balloting and fourteen counts of
forgery in the second degree. The arrest warrant affida-
vit contained the names of thirty-four individuals on
whose behalf the ballots in question were submitted
to the Stamford town clerk’s office. According to the
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affidavit, SEEC investigators attempted to contact
those individuals and the SEEC investigators learned
that fourteen of them, who are identified in the affidavit,
did not complete absentee ballot applications or vote
by absentee ballot in 2015. It was averred in the affidavit
that, according to Kettering, those fourteen ballots, and
the defendant’s exemplars, contained indications of
common authorship. Each count of the state’s original
information specified the date, place and nature of the
charged offense but did not identify the names of any
of the individuals that appeared on the ballots and ballot
applications in question.
On the first day of trial, after the clerk read the infor-
mation into the record, defense counsel orally moved
to dismiss all of the charges against the defendant on
the grounds that the information was deficient in that
none of the counts identified the individuals on whose
behalf the allegedly fraudulent documents were filed,
and the forgery counts failed to include a citation to
the specific subdivision of § 53a-139 (a) under which
the defendant was being charged. The court explained
that the defendant had an opportunity to file a bill of
particulars, but failed to do so, and denied the defen-
dant’s motion as untimely.
On the second day of trial, the prosecutor orally
moved to amend the state’s information to include ‘‘the
alphanumerical designation for the subsection’’ of the
forgery statute pursuant to which the defendant was
being charged. In other words, whereas the original
information charged the defendant with forgery in the
second degree in violation of § 53a-139, the amended
information charged the defendant with forgery in the
second degree in violation of § 53a-139 (a) (3). Defense
counsel had no objection to the state’s amendment but
renewed his ‘‘objection’’ as to the lack of individual
names associated with each count of the information.
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The court indicated that ‘‘it would certainly be neces-
sary in order for the court to make factual findings, to
know which individuals the counts refer.’’ The prosecu-
tor objected on the ground that the identity of the victim
was not an element of the offenses charged and, there-
fore, was not required to be included in the information.
The prosecutor assured the court that the state would
present evidence as to the identity of victims. The court
replied, ‘‘[t]hat’s what the court wanted to know,’’ and
continued with the trial.

Following the third day of trial, the court, through
the clerk of the court, contacted both counsel, and
directed the state to file an amended information to
add an individual name for each count of the charge
of false statement in absentee balloting. On the morning
of the fourth day of trial, the court explained: ‘‘The
court made such contact because . . . the court deter-
mined that it would be inappropriate for the court to
fill in the names of the individuals whose signatures
were allegedly forged. So, the court was not going to
select fourteen names out of the number of alleged
forged signatures. The court instructed [the clerk] to
inform counsel that the court needed names for each
of the counts. Specifically, the counts alleging false
statement [in] absentee balloting.’’ Defense counsel
acknowledged that the amendment was ‘‘exactly what
[he] asked’’ the state to do on the first and second days
of trial but, nevertheless, objected to the amendment
on the grounds that the state failed to demonstrate good
cause for the amendment, as required by Practice Book
§ 36-18, and that the defendant would be prejudiced by
it on the fourth day of trial.4
4
Defense counsel also argued that he had no notice or opportunity to be
heard as to six of the names added to the state’s amended information. He
never identified those six names, and the defendant has not reasserted that
argument on appeal.
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The court overruled defense counsel’s objection on
the grounds that the defendant had been apprised that
Branfuhr had identified thirty-one suspect ballots and
that the state was pursuing charges on fourteen of those
ballots, all of which were identified in the arrest warrant
affidavit. The court also noted that none of the wit-
nesses who already had testified could have ‘‘testified
about signatures in any significant way . . . .’’
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court ‘‘erred
in allowing the state to amend its long form information
[in the middle] of trial, where the state did not provide
a ‘good cause’ for such an amendment’’ pursuant to
Practice Book § 36-18. Section 36-18 provides in rele-
vant part: ‘‘After commencement of the trial for good
cause shown, the judicial authority may permit the pros-
ecuting authority to amend the information at any time
before a verdict or finding if no additional or different
offense is charged and no substantive rights of the
defendant would be prejudiced. . . .’’ Here, the court
did not permit the state to amend its information; it
directed the state to do so. Accordingly, the state was
not required to show good cause.
Moreover, the amendment directed by the court,
which was specifically requested by defense counsel
earlier in the trial, did not charge an additional or differ-
ent offense, nor did it prejudice any substantive rights
of the defendant. Indeed, the amendment narrowed the
charges against the defendant, allowing defense coun-
sel to focus on the specific ballots identified in the
amended information. As the court aptly found, the
identities of all of the victims were known to the defen-
dant since the date of his arrest because their names
were listed in the arrest warrant affidavit. The defen-
dant also was apprised of those identities when Ketter-
ing’s case notes were disclosed to defense counsel prior
to trial. The defendant does not contend otherwise.
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Accordingly, the defendant’s claim that the court improp-
erly permitted the state to amend its information is
unavailing.
III
The defendant next claims that the court improperly
denied him ‘‘an opportunity to obtain and disclose a
handwriting expert where the state’s handwriting
expert’s testimony at trial diverged from the findings in
his previously disclosed report and where the expert’s
conclusions at trial were completely different from
those in the disclosed report.’’ We are not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to this claim. As noted herein, the defendant was
arrested by warrant in January, 2019, and the warrant
affidavit identified Kettering as the document examiner
at the state laboratory who was examining the ballots
at issue. According to the affidavit, as of December 1,
2017, Kettering ‘‘was still going through them due to
the large number of ballots but he could say it appears
the same individual filled out the majority of the ballots
sent up but would need handwriting samples from a
suspect in order to complete the comparison.’’ The affi-
davit later set forth Kettering’s conclusion that ‘‘ ‘the
totality of the case points strongly toward [the defen-
dant] as having authored the ballots in question.’ ’’
Prior to trial, the state timely disclosed its intent
to call Kettering as an expert witness on handwriting
analysis and provided to defense counsel Kettering’s
case notes related to the ballots in question. In Ketter-
ing’s case notes, he set forth his analysis and conclu-
sions as to each of the ballots in question. As to several
of them, he found that there were ‘‘ ‘indications’ ’’ of
common authorship with the exemplars provided by
the defendant, but he further concluded that those indi-
cations, as to each individual ballot, were not sufficient
to form a definite conclusion.
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On February 9, 2022, the state filed a motion seeking
disclosure of the defendant’s intention to offer expert
testimony.5 The defendant neither disclosed an expert
of his own, nor did the defense seek to speak to Ketter-
ing regarding his opinions in this case.
On the third day of trial, the prosecutor called Ketter-
ing as the state’s final witness. Defense counsel objected
to Kettering testifying as an expert witness on the
ground that ‘‘the trier of fact may himself determine
handwriting.’’ The court overruled defense counsel’s
objection. That day, the prosecutor began his direct
examination of Kettering. Due to scheduling issues,
there was a one month delay until the trial resumed.
When the trial resumed, Kettering’s direct examination
continued and he explained his analyses for each of
the fourteen ballots identified in the state’s amended
information, concluding that there were indications of
common authorship between those ballots and the
handwriting exemplars provided by the defendant. He
explained the various levels of certainty that handwrit-
ing experts ascribe to their findings and that those levels
are determined based upon the number of similarities
between the compared samples. He testified that, when
comparing the handwriting on each of the ballots at
issue to the exemplars provided by the defendant, there
were indications of common authorship but, due to the
5
Practice Book § 40-26 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon written request
by the prosecuting authority filed in accordance with Section 41-5 and
without requiring any order of the judicial authority, the defendant, subject
to Section 40-40 et seq., shall promptly, but no later than forty-five days
from the filing of the request, unless such time is extended by the judicial
authority for good cause shown, disclose in writing to the prosecuting
authority the existence of and make available for examination and copying
in accordance with the procedures of Section 40-7 the following items . . .
(2) Any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the case,
including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests,
experiments or comparisons, which the defendant intends to offer in evi-
dence at trial or relating to the anticipated testimony of a person whom the
defendant intends to call as a witness.’’
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limited number of similarities, ‘‘the evidence falls far
short of . . . a definite conclusion.’’ Kettering further
explained, however, that when comparing all of the
handwriting on all of the ballots to the exemplars, he
found approximately 178 similarities, making it ‘‘virtu-
ally certain [and] highly probable’’ that the ballots in
question and the defendant’s exemplars shared a com-
mon author.
On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned
Kettering at length as to the findings contained in his
case notes and the lack therein of any findings based
upon an examination of all of the ballots and exemplars.
Defense counsel orally moved to strike Kettering’s testi-
mony ‘‘as it pertains to any conclusion that’s not found
in [Kettering’s] reports.’’ Defense counsel argued that
‘‘[t]he reports were disclosed to us, we’re entitled to
rely on them,’’ and ‘‘we were never provided with a
formal Practice Book compliant disclosure for an
expert. . . . [T]his is the first time anybody is hearing
anything about these types of conclusions.’’ In response,
the prosecutor argued that the state had disclosed Ket-
tering on its witness list months earlier, and, ‘‘[i]f there
were questions that [defense counsel] wanted to ask
[Kettering], he was free to do so.’’ The court denied
the defendant’s motion to strike and defense counsel
continued with cross-examination of Kettering.
After the luncheon recess on the fifth day of trial,
defense counsel indicated that he would like to call his
own expert witness to respond to Kettering’s opinion
that his comparison of the handwriting on all of the
ballots to the exemplars indicated that it was ‘‘virtually
certain [and] highly probable’’ that they shared a com-
mon author. Defense counsel argued that he had ‘‘not
seen this conclusion, this methodology anywhere in any
of the documents we’ve been provided with, and it’s
the polar opposite conclusion of the ones that this wit-
ness has come to, and we’ve had in our hands for a
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long time. I think the record is clear that the first time
anybody’s ever heard about that was yesterday. So, in
anticipation of counsel being late on this, I’d like the
record to reflect that everything in front of me, and all
the reports, point to a different conclusion that this
court may consider.’’6
In response, the prosecutor argued that Kettering’s
examination of the documents and his conclusion was
known to the defendant when he was arrested in 2019
and defense counsel could have discussed Kettering’s
findings with him at any time since then, but he never
sought to do so. The prosecutor argued that the defen-
dant had not disclosed an expert and only provided the
state with a witness list on the third day of trial. The
prosecutor noted that Kettering testified that he spent
one and one-half years investigating this case and writ-
ing his report and that it was disingenuous to contend
that a defense expert could render an opinion at trial in
only one hour that rebuts Kettering’s testimony, which
spanned three days.
6
Defense counsel stated his ‘‘intention . . . to attempt to call our own
expert for the purposes of clarifying the procedural rules and the [standard
industry procedures] that the current witness is operating under, and
whether or not such a conclusion is viable.’’ Defense counsel explained to
the court, inter alia, that he had been ‘‘diligently searching since yesterday
night’’ and that ‘‘it’s very difficult to get an expert to do anything, especially
on short notice. I may have an outside chance of providing limited one hour
of testimony, limited both in time and also in substance, [it] would not be
an expert witness, if I can, in fact, get them here—[it] would not be an
expert witness. It would be doing charts and his own analysis. No opinions
on that would be delivered. But there’s been some sophisticated terms and
themes have arisen in this case, including natural range of variation, what
needs to be documented [and] [w]hat doesn’t need to be documented. Fol-
lowing of procedures, the cut and paste of the suite docs that I think
would certainly inform the court and go beyond . . . the average individual,
especially with respect to averaging the way this witness has testified on aver-
age.
‘‘So, I’d like to inform the court that we’d like to call our expert. I’d like
to provide a [curriculum vitae] to counsel, as early as the break, or by the
end of the day for that limited testimony, which, further complicating things,
I believe I can only have the witness appear by Zoom.’’
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The court denied defense counsel’s request to present
a defense expert. In so doing, the court reasoned that,
when the state discloses an expert witness, it typically
means that the state is going to rely heavily on expert
testimony to prove its case and that anticipated reliance
should prompt the defense to retain its own expert
witness so it is prepared to challenge the testimony of
the state’s expert. The court noted that ‘‘[t]his case is
essentially seven years old. There has been no expert
disclosed to the state.’’ The court further noted that the
anticipated testimony of a defense expert could not take
the one hour that was proposed by defense counsel.7
The defendant claims that the court abused its discre-
tion in denying defense counsel’s request to present a
defense expert. Our rules of practice require a defen-
dant to disclose to the state, within forty-five days of
a written request, the names of any witnesses the defen-
dant intends to call at trial; Practice Book § 40-13;8 in
7
Specifically, the court reasoned: ‘‘What counsel is suggesting is, we want
to bring in an expert to ask this question. Have you ever heard of this
aggregate theory? Now let’s explore the answers. No, I’ve never heard of
it. Do you think that that aggregate theory is a bogus theory? I’ve never
heard of it.
‘‘And, so, where does it go from there? Do you think if this expert used
the aggregate theory, his conclusions are suspect? Well, I would have to
see the entire, basically, experiment to determine whether I would have
come out the same way, whether he used that theory or not.
‘‘You’d have to do the whole thing over again to see if it makes a difference
whether this expert used what has been deemed an aggregate theory, and
the other expert would have to testify, he used another kind of theory, or
didn’t use another theory at all.
‘‘So, when you know who your opponent is, you prepare for your opponent.
You don’t have to know every point he’s going to throw, to use a boxing
analogy. You know my opponent is so and so. It’s likely that the expert you
call may be familiar with the state’s expert.
‘‘But, the seminal question would be, have you ever heard of this aggregate
theory? And, then, where you go from there will lead to having to conduct
the analysis all over again. That request is denied.’’
8
Practice Book § 40-13 (b) provides: ‘‘Upon written request by the prose-
cuting authority, filed in accordance with Section 41-5 and without requiring
any order of the judicial authority, the defendant, subject to Section 40-40
et seq., shall promptly, but no later than forty-five days from the filing of
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addition to, inter alia, ‘‘[a]ny reports or statements of
experts made in connection with the case . . . .’’ Prac-
tice Book § 40-26 (2).9 The failure to comply with those
rules may result, inter alia, in the preclusion of specific
evidence. Practice Book § 40-5.10 This court previously
has explained: ‘‘Practice Book § 40-5 [grants] broad dis-
cretion to the trial judge to fashion an appropriate rem-
edy for noncompliance with discovery. . . .
‘‘Appellate review of a trial court’s remedy for non-
compliance with discovery, [a]s with any discretionary
action of the trial court . . . requires every reasonable
presumption in favor of the action, and the ultimate
issue is whether the trial court could reasonably con-
clude as it did. . . . In general, abuse of discretion
exists when a court could have chosen different alterna-
tives but has decided the matter so arbitrarily as to
vitiate logic, or has decided it based on improper or
the request, unless such time is extended by the judicial authority for good
cause shown, disclose to the prosecuting authority the names and, subject
to the provisions of subsection (g) of this section, the addresses of all
witnesses whom the defendant intends to call in the defendant’s case-in-chief
and shall additionally disclose to the prosecuting authority any statements
of the witnesses other than the defendant in the possession of the defendant
or his or her agents, which statements relate to the subject matter about
which each witness will testify.’’
9
Practice Book § 40-26 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon written request
by the prosecuting authority filed in accordance with Section 41-5 and
without requiring any order of the judicial authority, the defendant, subject
to Section 40-40 et seq., shall promptly, but no later than forty-five days
from the filing of the request, unless such time is extended by the judicial
authority for good cause shown, disclose in writing to the prosecuting
authority the existence of and make available for examination and copying
in accordance with the procedures of Section 40-7 the following items . . .
(2) Any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the
case . . . .’’
10
Practice Book § 40-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘If a party fails to comply
with disclosure as required under these rules, the opposing party may move
the judicial authority for an appropriate order. The judicial authority hearing
such a motion may enter such orders and time limitations as it deems
appropriate, including, without limitation . . . (4) Prohibiting the non-
complying party from introducing specified evidence . . . .’’
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irrelevant factors.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Billings, 217 Conn. App.
1, 43–44, 287 A.3d 146 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn.
907, 288 A.3d 217 (2023). ‘‘When this court reviews a
decision of the trial court for abuse of discretion, the
question is not whether any one of us, had we been
sitting as the trial judge, would have exercised our dis-
cretion differently. . . . Rather, our inquiry is limited
to whether the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary or unrea-
sonable. . . . Accordingly, the abuse of discretion
standard reflects the context specific nature of eviden-
tiary rulings, which are made in the heat of battle by
the trial judge, who is in a unique position to [observe]
the context in which particular evidentiary issues arise
and who is therefore in the best position to weigh the
potential benefits and harms accompanying the admis-
sion of particular evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 320 Conn.
781, 832, 135 A.3d 1 (2016).
As previously stated in this opinion, the defendant
was aware of the state’s reliance on Kettering’s opinions
since he was arrested in January, 2019. According to the
2019 arrest warrant affidavit, Kettering had specifically
concluded that ‘‘ ‘the totality of the case points strongly
toward [the defendant] as having authored the ballots in
question.’ ’’ (Emphasis added.) The defendant therefore
had notice of Kettering’s conclusion that all of the evi-
dence strongly implicated him because Kettering’s con-
clusion had been disclosed in the arrest warrant affida-
vit, which had been served more than three years prior
to trial. Nevertheless, the defense did not seek to dis-
cuss Kettering’s opinions with him or retain its own
expert to rebut them. We therefore reject the defen-
dant’s argument that he was ‘‘sandbagged’’ by Ketter-
ing’s testimony.
In his brief to this court, the defendant contends that
he ‘‘was ready to disclose [his] expert immediately and
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have him testify, albeit remotely, within the confines
of the allocated trial dates in this case.’’ The defendant
claims that his expert ‘‘would have opined on the propri-
ety or legitimacy of ‘aggregating’ multiple signatures to
arrive at a conclusion of the author’s identity.’’ These
assertions are belied by the record. In stating his inten-
tion to call his own expert, defense counsel did not
provide such definite assurances to the trial court.
Defense counsel did not disclose the name of his
intended expert, and he did not proffer a curriculum
vitae or a summary of the expert’s proposed opinion.
Rather, as recounted herein, defense counsel asserted
that he ‘‘[would] like’’ to provide an expert’s curriculum
vitae that afternoon and vaguely suggested that his
expert would perhaps provide one hour of testimony.
As the prosecutor aptly pointed out when he objected
to the defense’s attempted late disclosure, Kettering
spent years examining the evidence in this case and
had, at that point, provided three days of testimony
during trial. It was unlikely that an expert could render
a rebuttal opinion in the one hour indicated by defense
counsel, and such testimony would then have necessi-
tated a response by Kettering, which would have dis-
rupted and delayed the proceedings in a manner not
contemplated by defense counsel.
On the basis of the foregoing, we cannot conclude
that the court abused its discretion in denying defense
counsel’s request to present undisclosed expert testi-
mony on the fifth day of trial, especially in the absence
of any meaningful proffer as to the substance of that
opinion.
IV
The defendant also claims that ‘‘the Connecticut rules
of criminal procedure violated [his] due process rights
where the disclosure rules do not mandate advance
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State v. Mallozzi

notice as to the sum and substance of an expert’s testi-
mony and/or the expert’s conclusions/opinions.’’11
Although the defendant failed to preserve this claim at
trial, we address it under State v. Golding, 213 Conn.
233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). Under Golding, as modified
in In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188
(2015), ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitu-
tional error not preserved at trial only if all of the follow-
ing conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to
review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of
constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fun-
damental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation
. . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair
trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the
state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the
alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable
doubt.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) State v.
Golding, supra, 239–40, as modified in In re Yasiel
R., supra, 781. ‘‘The first two [Golding] requirements
involve a determination of whether the claim is review-
able; the second two requirements involve a determina-
tion of whether the defendant may prevail.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mitchell, 170 Conn.
App. 317, 322–23, 154 A.3d 528, cert. denied, 325 Conn.
902, 157 A.3d 1146 (2017).
In claiming that his right to due process was violated
by the lack of a rule of practice requiring the state to
disclose the substance of the opinions of its expert
witnesses, the defendant essentially is alleging a consti-
tutional right to discovery. Because a criminal defen-
dant has no general constitutional right to discovery;
11
The defendant argues that, due to the absence of such a rule, ‘‘if [a
state’s] expert has not prepared a report, he or she need not be disclosed
as an expert, and [his or] her opinion can be shrouded in mystery until the
stand is taken.’’ These arguments do not apply to the defendant because
Kettering’s identity and opinions in this case were disclosed as early as the
service of the arrest warrant and were supplemented by the state’s produc-
tion to the defendant of Kettering’s case notes.
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State v. Mallozzi

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S. Ct. 837,
51 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1977); the defendant’s claim is not
of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of
a fundamental right, and, accordingly, fails under the
second prong of Golding.
V
The defendant next claims that his right to confronta-
tion under the sixth amendment to the United States
constitution12 was violated because the court declined
to strike Pesiri’s testimony, which was provided in the
state’s case-in-chief, after she asserted her fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and declined
to testify when the defense called her as a witness in
the defendant’s case. We are not persuaded.

Pesiri testified during the state’s case-in-chief on July
27, 2022. On direct examination, she testified, in sum,
that she worked in the town clerk’s office under Log-
lisci’s supervision, and that she prepared ballot sets
for the defendant to pick up. She stated that, when
employees in the office saw or were told that the defen-
dant had delivered applications, Pesiri wrote the defen-
dant’s initials on the upper right-hand corner of the
applications. On cross-examination, defense counsel
asked Pesiri, inter alia, whether she ever reported Log-
lisci for her improper handling of the absentee ballots,
and whether there was anything that stopped Pesiri
from doing so. Defense counsel also asked Pesiri about
her knowledge of the SEEC investigation, including
whether she knew she was a potential respondent in
that investigation and whether she cooperated with the
investigation. Defense counsel asked Pesiri about the
various communications that she had with Branfuhr
12
‘‘The right to confrontation guaranteed by the sixth amendment is made
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.’’ State v. Robles, 348 Conn. 1, 5 n.4, 301 A.3d 498 (2023).
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throughout the SEEC investigation and the written
statement that she gave in that investigation.
On August 30, 2022, the prosecutor rested the state’s
case-in-chief and the defense began its case the next
day. In the intervening month between Pesiri’s testi-
mony and the commencement of the defendant’s case,
it came to the court’s attention that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) was investigating the Stamford
town clerk’s office regarding the 2017 municipal elec-
tion. In light of the pending FBI investigation, as well
as testimony from Branfuhr that the SEEC investigation
was ongoing, the court informed the parties that it
would be advising any witnesses from the Stamford
town clerk’s office of their fifth amendment rights. Nei-
ther party objected to this procedure.
The following day, the prosecutor orally moved to
preclude any inquiry regarding the investigation of the
2017 election on the ground that it was irrelevant to
the prosecution in this case, which relates to the 2015
election. The prosecutor also argued that, to the extent
that questions regarding the 2017 election were relevant
for impeachment purposes, any probative value was
outweighed by their prejudicial impact. Defense coun-
sel objected to the state’s motion, arguing that an
inquiry into the 2017 investigation was relevant to
expose witnesses’ ‘‘interest in telling a story in a certain
way to avoid liability or exposure. So, that’s the real
relevance here. It’s not for impeachment purposes.’’
Defense counsel asserted that the witnesses ‘‘have an
interest of pointing away from themselves about what
happened in 2015 so as to avoid uncovering what hap-
pened in 2017 . . . .’’ The court granted the state’s
motion, explaining that ‘‘[b]ias, interest, and motive
have been fully explored on cross-examination.’’
Defense counsel then called Pesiri to testify. The
court canvassed Pesiri on her fifth amendment rights
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State v. Mallozzi

and she declined to testify. Defense counsel moved
to strike Pesiri’s earlier testimony claiming that her
assertion of her fifth amendment privilege, when recalled
as a defense witness, violated the defendant’s sixth
amendment right to confrontation. Defense counsel
maintained that he had a right to recall Pesiri so that
he could, among other things, impeach her credibility
using transcripts of her earlier trial testimony. Defense
counsel argued that the defendant had ‘‘a consistent
and persistent right to expect the ability to impeach
[Pesiri] by her own testimony and through others and
test the truthfulness of what she said on the stand. I
shouldn’t be hampered by that, by expecting that,
because I had a long cross-examination. . . . [A]s a
practical matter, we investigate statements. You see it’s
very common . . . we have paid for transcripts. We
have done other investigation. We have heard other
things in the trial past what . . . Pesiri has testified
about that could be linked up to her impeachment to
test the credibility that she has for truthfulness.’’

The court denied the motion to strike, explaining:
‘‘The opportunity to cross-examine is not unlimited. The
opportunity to examine an adverse witness by leading
questions is not unlimited. It is this court’s view that,
in this case, there is every indication that the testimony
of . . . Pesiri as an adverse witness would be cumula-
tive to her cross-examination as the state’s witness.’’

On appeal, the defendant reiterates his claim that his
constitutional right to confrontation was violated when
Pesiri asserted her fifth amendment right and declined
to testify. ‘‘[T]he sixth amendment to the [United States]
constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a
criminal prosecution to confront the witnesses against
him. . . . The primary interest secured by confronta-
tion is the right to cross-examination . . . and an
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State v. Mallozzi

important function of cross-examination is the expo-
sure of a witness’ motivation in testifying. . . . Cross-
examination to elicit facts tending to show motive,
interest, bias and prejudice is a matter of right and may
not be unduly restricted. . . . However, [t]he [c]on-
frontation [c]lause guarantees only an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent,
the defense might wish. . . . Additionally, [a]lthough
it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine the
extent of cross-examination . . . the preclusion of suf-
ficient inquiry into a particular matter tending to show
motive, bias and interest may result in a violation of
the constitutional requirements of the sixth amend-
ment. . . . The right of confrontation is preserved
[however] if defense counsel is permitted to expose to
the [court] the facts from which [it], as the sole trier
of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw infer-
ences relating to the reliability of the witness. . . .
‘‘If a defendant’s cross-examination is restricted by
the competing fifth amendment right of a witness, it
may be necessary to strike the direct testimony of that
witness. . . . [T]he sixth amendment is violated only
when assertion of the privilege undermines the defen-
dant’s opportunity to test the truth of the witness’ direct
testimony.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Moore, 293 Conn. 781, 791–92,
981 A.2d 1030 (2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 954, 130 S.
Ct. 3386, 177 L. Ed. 2d 306 (2010).
Here, as the court aptly explained, the defense had
ample opportunity to cross-examine all aspects of Pes-
iri’s testimony that was elicited on direct examination
during the state’s case-in-chief. In fact, as noted herein,
defense counsel questioned Pesiri on cross-examina-
tion relating to the SEEC investigation in this case and
her various communications with Branfuhr and the
written statement that she provided to him. The defense
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State v. Mallozzi

had an unrestricted opportunity to explore on cross-
examination any motive or bias that Pesiri may have
had and to impeach any portion of her testimony on
direct examination. We therefore conclude that the
defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated.
Accordingly, the court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion to strike Pesiri’s testimony was not improper.
VI
The defendant finally claims that the court improp-
erly denied his motion to dismiss based upon his allega-
tion of selective prosecution. We disagree.
Defense counsel moved to dismiss the charges against
the defendant on the ground that the state engaged
in selective prosecution because the state could have
prosecuted Loglisci because she was named as a
respondent by the SEEC and was liable for her role in
what the SEEC called a scheme to have invalid votes
counted in the 2015 municipal election. Defense counsel
argued that the defendant was singled out for prosecu-
tion because he did not cooperate with the SEEC inves-
tigation and exercised his constitutional rights to coun-
sel and to remain silent.
In denying the defendant’s motion, the court first
found that the defendant and Loglisci were similarly
situated in all relevant aspects because both were
involved in Stamford party politics, both were involved
with handling the absentee ballot applications and bal-
lot sets, Loglisci’s office placed the defendant’s initials
on ballot applications that he or his associates delivered
to the town clerk’s office to facilitate the distribution
of ballot sets that should not have been issued, Loglisci
allowed the defendant to pick up ballots even though
the applications for those ballots should have been
rejected, and both were named as respondents in the
SEEC investigation.
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Despite that determination, the court concluded that
the defendant was not singled out for prosecution
because he invoked his rights to counsel or to remain
silent. The court reasoned that ‘‘[t]he [SEEC] plans fur-
ther enforcement action against Loglisci once the
instant matter is resolved. The [SEEC] also concluded
that, initially, it would refer felonies for prosecution
rather than misdemeanors. The [SEEC] deemed the
defendant, not Loglisci, liable for felonies. Finally, the
defendant’s alleged forgeries distinguish his conduct
from Loglisci’s. By the defendant’s hand alone, [twenty-
six] people could have had their civil right to vote extin-
guished.’’ The court therefore concluded that the defen-
dant was not selectively prosecuted and denied his
motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improp-
erly rejected his claim of selective prosecution, arguing
that the court ignored the allegations of a ‘‘ ‘scheme’ ’’
that allegedly involved several individuals, all of whom,
he contends, were similarly situated, and that the only
difference between him and those other individuals was
that he was the only one who exercised his right to
counsel.
‘‘In cases in which the defense of selective prosecu-
tion has been asserted, before a motion to dismiss can
be granted, the defendant must prove (1) that others
similarly situated have generally not been prosecuted
and that he has been singled out and (2) that he is the
victim of invidious discrimination based on impermissi-
ble considerations such as race, religion, or the exercise
of a constitutionally protected right.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Payne, 100 Conn. App.
13, 19, 917 A.2d 43, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 914, 924
A.2d 139 (2007). ‘‘[A]bsent a showing of a selection
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such
as race, religion or other arbitrary classification . . .
conscious selectivity in enforcement of the law is not
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State v. Mallozzi

in itself a constitutional violation.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 25–26.

‘‘To establish an actual vindictive motive, a defendant
must prove objectively that the prosecutor’s charging
decision was a direct and unjustifiable penalty . . .
that resulted solely from the defendant’s exercise of a
protected legal right . . . . Put another way, the defen-
dant must show that (1) the prosecutor harbored genu-
ine animus toward the defendant, or was prevailed upon
to bring the charges by another with animus such that
the prosecutor could be considered a stalking horse,
and (2) [the defendant] would not have been prosecuted
except for the animus.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Lee, 86 Conn. App. 323, 328, 860 A.2d 1268
(2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 921, 867 A.2d 839 (2005).
‘‘A . . . court’s factual findings on prosecutorial vin-
dictiveness are reviewed for clear error and the legal
principles which guide the . . . court are reviewed de
novo.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 326.

Here, the defendant argues that he was selectively
prosecuted because he exercised his right to counsel.
In so arguing, the defendant ignores the difference
between his conduct and that of the other individuals
whom he claims were similarly situated. As the court
aptly found, the defendant was the one who fraudu-
lently filled out the absentee ballot applications and
forged the signatures of the victims. Moreover, the
defendant’s claim is devoid of any argument of animus
or invidious discrimination on the part of the state. We
therefore conclude that the court properly rejected the
defendant’s claim of selective prosecution.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.