Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

NADINE WYLIE, ADMINISTRATRIX (ESTATE OF
KEITH WYLIE) v. APT FOUNDATION, INC.
(AC 46061)
Cradle, Seeley and Norcott, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff, acting in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of
the decedent, appealed to this court from the judgment rendered by the
trial court for the defendant following the granting of the defendant’s
motion to strike her operative complaint. The defendant operated a
center for drug rehabilitation and provided methadone treatment for
opioid dependent patients at its premises. As the decedent began to
walk up the public sidewalk toward the entrance to the defendant’s
driveway, an individual approached and fatally stabbed the decedent
directly in front of the defendant’s premises. The plaintiff brought an
action for wrongful death, setting forth claims of, inter alia, public
nuisance. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that local residents had devel-
oped concerns regarding loitering, drug use, crime, prostitution, and
public defecation on private property in the immediate vicinity sur-
rounding the defendant’s premises, that the defendant created a magnet
for criminal activity in the immediate vicinity surrounding the premises
by providing a methadone treatment program without also providing
for proper security, and that over the nine month period immediately
preceding the decedent’s death the police responded to forty-two com-
plaints of criminal activity in the area. In its motion to strike, the defen-
dant noted that the complaint alleged that the stabbing occurred on the
public sidewalk that the defendant neither owned nor controlled and
claimed that the allegations set forth in the operative complaint did not
support the claims that the operation of a methadone clinic at the
premises had a natural tendency to create danger and to inflict injury
on public property or that the defendant’s use of its property was unrea-
sonable or unlawful. Held that the trial court properly granted the defen-
dant’s motion to strike the public nuisance claim as alleged in the
plaintiff’s operative complaint: this court concluded that the defendant’s
premises did not have a natural tendency to create danger and to inflict
injury as, although the conditions alleged to be existing in the immediate
vicinity of the premises in the operative complaint were not pleasant
and may have been dangerous, they did not imbue the premises itself
with a natural tendency to create danger and to inflict injury; moreover,
the allegations in the plaintiff’s operative complaint failed to provide
the necessary factual basis to support her claim of a public nuisance,
as referencing the numerous police responses to the premises in a given
time period did not establish whether those responses were due to the
defendant’s operation of its drug rehabilitation center or whether the
police responses were related to individuals on the defendant’s premises,
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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.
and the plaintiff’s conclusory assertion regarding the lack of proper
security was not sufficient to set forth a claim of public nuisance.
Argued January 16—officially released June 18, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, public nui-
sance, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court,
Wilson, J., granted the defendant’s motion to strike;
thereafter, the court, Wilson, J., granted the defendant’s
motion for judgment and rendered judgment thereon,
from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Matthew D. Popilowski, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Steven J. Zakrzewski, with whom were Kelcie B. Reid
and, on the brief, John J. Robinson, for the appellee
(defendant).
Opinion

NORCOTT, J. The plaintiff, Nadine Wylie, acting in
her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of Keith
Wylie (decedent), appeals from the judgment rendered
by the trial court in favor of the defendant, APT Founda-
tion, Inc., following the granting of a motion to strike
her amended substitute complaint dated July 21, 2021.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
concluded that she failed to allege sufficient facts to
support her public nuisance claim. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as alleged in the plaintiff’s
amended substitute complaint and construed in the
manner most favorable to sustaining its legal suffi-
ciency,1 and procedural history are relevant to our dis-
cussion. The defendant operated a center for drug reha-
bilitation and provided methadone treatment for opioid
dependent patients at 495 Congress Avenue in New
1
See, e.g., Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 333, 328, 210 A.3d 469 (2019);
Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., 277 Conn. 113, 117, 889
A.2d 810 (2006).
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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

Haven (premises). In 2017, the decedent was in a rela-
tionship with K, who was receiving treatment at the
premises for her drug addiction. The decedent regularly
accompanied K to her appointments at the premises.
At some point, the decedent ended his relationship with
K and, in September, 2017, commenced a new relation-
ship with A, who also was receiving treatment at the
premises. K, who attended group therapy with A, was
unhappy about the decedent’s new relationship and she
entered into a romantic relationship with Daniel Streit.
On multiple occasions between September and Octo-
ber, 2017, the decedent was on the premises while vis-
iting A, as was permitted by the defendant’s patient
handbook. During each of these occasions, Streit
approached the decedent and a physical fight ensued.
Despite the animosity between the decedent and Streit,
the defendant did not take any action against K.
On October 7, 2017, the decedent traveled to the
premises to visit A. Streit, wearing purple latex gloves
and holding a knife, was waiting for the decedent at
the end of the driveway leading to the parking lot of
the premises. The defendant owned, controlled and/or
maintained the driveway. As the decedent began to walk
up the sidewalk toward the entrance to the driveway,
Streit approached him. A physical altercation ensued
and resulted in Streit fatally stabbing the decedent on
the public sidewalk directly in front of the premises.
The plaintiff thereafter brought this wrongful death
action2 against the defendant pursuant to General Stat-
2
The plaintiff commenced this action on August 27, 2019. The plaintiff
filed a revised complaint on January 14, 2020. The defendant moved to strike
the revised complaint on February 13, 2020. On May 15, 2020, the plaintiff
requested leave to file an amended complaint. On August 14, 2020, the
plaintiff requested leave to file a second amended complaint. One month
later, the defendant moved to strike the second amended complaint, and
the court granted this motion on April 15, 2021. The plaintiff then filed a
substitute complaint on April 30, 2021, and, on July 21, 2021, requested leave
to file an amended substitute complaint, which the court granted over the
defendant’s objection.
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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

utes § 52-555. In a two count amended substitute com-
3

plaint, the plaintiff set forth claims of negligence and
public nuisance.4 With respect to the negligence count,
the plaintiff generally alleged that the defendant failed
(1) to provide adequate security for the premises and
surrounding area, (2) to remove and prevent Streit from
loitering, and (3) to recognize and remedy the hostilities
between the decedent, Streit, K, and A, which ultimately
resulted in the decedent suffering lethal injuries.
As to the public nuisance count, the plaintiff alleged
that local residents have developed concerns regarding
loitering, drug use, crime, prostitution, and public defe-
cation on private property in the immediate vicinity
surrounding the premises. Next, she alleged that the
defendant ‘‘created a magnet for criminal activity in the
immediate vicinity surrounding the premises by provid-
ing a methadone treatment program without also pro-
viding for proper security, safety protocols, and moni-
toring of its facility, its patients, and the immediate
3
General Statutes § 52-555 (a) provides: ‘‘In any action surviving to or
brought by an executor or administrator for injuries resulting in death,
whether instantaneous or otherwise, such executor or administrator may
recover from the party legally at fault for such injuries just damages together
with the cost of reasonably necessary medical, hospital and nursing services,
and including funeral expenses, provided no action shall be brought to
recover such damages and disbursements but within two years from the
date of death, and except that no such action may be brought more than
five years from the date of the act or omission complained of.’’
4
‘‘Public nuisance is a tort, defined as an unreasonable interference with
a right common to the general public.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
DiMiceli v. Cheshire, 162 Conn. App. 216, 231 n.7, 131 A.3d 771 (2016). Our
Supreme Court has explained: ‘‘Public nuisance law is concerned with the
interference with a public right, and cases in this realm typically involve
conduct that allegedly interferes with the public health and safety.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Fisk v. Redding, 337 Conn. 361, 373, 253 A.3d
918 (2020); see also Demond v. Project Service, LLC, 331 Conn. 816, 861,
208 A.3d 626 (2019) (‘‘Nuisances are public where they . . . produce a
common injury . . . . The test is not the number of persons annoyed, but
the possibility of annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights. A
public nuisance is one that injures the citizens generally who may be so
circumstanced as to come within its influence.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)); see generally Pestey v. Cushman, 259 Conn. 345, 355, 788 A.2d
496 (2002) (‘‘[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire
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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

vicinity in order to protect the general public.’’ For the
time period from January 1 to October 7, 2017, the
police responded to forty-two complaints of criminal
activity, including multiple calls for violent behavior
and altercations. The plaintiff also alleged that the lack
of adequate security and safety protocols had a ten-
dency to create a risk of danger and injury to those
coming in contact with the premises and that the numer-
ous calls to the police evidenced the continuous and
ongoing threat to the public. The plaintiff further claimed
that allowing feuding patients and their visitors to ‘‘min-
gle and loiter’’ on or near the premises, which provided
methadone treatment in a high crime neighborhood
without providing adequate security, safety protocols,
and monitoring, constituted an unreasonable use of the
property. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the nuisance
created by the defendant was the direct and proximate
cause of the death of the decedent.
On January 5, 2022, the defendant moved to strike
the plaintiff’s amended substitute complaint pursuant
to Practice Book § 10-39.5 In its attached memorandum
of law, the defendant noted that the amended substitute
complaint alleged that the stabbing occurred on the
public sidewalk that it neither owned nor controlled.
As to the negligence count, the defendant argued that,
in the absence of a special relationship with the dece-
dent, it had no duty to prevent fights on the public
sidewalk outside of its premises. As to the public nui-
sance count, the defendant claimed that the allegations
set forth in the amended substitute complaint did not
support the claims that the operation of a methadone
clinic at the premises had a natural tendency to create
law than that which surrounds the word nuisance’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
5
Practice Book § 10-39 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A motion to strike
shall be used whenever a party wishes to contest: (1) the legal sufficiency
of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted . . . .’’
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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

danger and to inflict injury on public property or that
the defendant’s use of its property was unreasonable
or unlawful.
On March 4, 2022, the plaintiff filed an objection to
the defendant’s motion to strike. Therein, the plaintiff
argued that, because she had pleaded sufficient facts
that the defendant owed a duty to the decedent, the
motion to strike her negligence claim should be denied.
Additionally, she claimed that a cause of action for
public nuisance had been pleaded sufficiently. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff stated: ‘‘Here, the existence and oper-
ation of the methadone clinic by the defendant has
continually attracted crime and allowed individuals to
loiter in the driveway and in the immediate vicinity
surrounding the premises while partaking in illegal
activities such as drug use, prostitution, and defecation.
This continuous danger has been evidenced by numer-
ous 911 calls for criminal activity from January 1, 2017,
to October 7, 2017. . . . The amended complaint
alleges that the [defendant’s] allowing individuals like
[Streit] to loiter on or near their property and use their
parking lot to wait to attack [the decedent] is an unrea-
sonable use of the property.’’ The defendant filed a reply
in support of the motion to strike on March 11, 2022.
On October 3, 2022, the court, Wilson, J., issued a
memorandum of decision granting the defendant’s
motion to strike as to both counts of the plaintiff’s
amended substitute complaint. Regarding the negli-
gence count, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed
to demonstrate that the defendant owed a duty to the
decedent.6 With respect to the public nuisance count,
6
In particular, the court explained that ‘‘it is well established in Connecti-
cut that a defendant owes no duty to a party who is injured on property
not owned, controlled or maintained by that defendant. . . . Without a
special relationship to either the decedent or Streit, the allegation that Streit
waited on the outskirts of the defendant’s premises before attacking the
decedent on the public sidewalk does not change the analysis the court
undertook in its previous memorandum of decision [regarding the lack of
a duty].’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) See, e.g.,
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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

the court first stated that the amended substitute com-
plaint contained conclusory allegations that were not
supported by facts. Next, the court noted that the
amended substitute complaint lacked ‘‘factual allega-
tions to indicate that the methadone clinic itself had a
natural tendency to create danger and inflict injury upon
person or property.’’ Relying on this court’s decision in
Perry v. Putnam, 162 Conn. App. 760, 131 A.3d 1284
(2016), the trial court explained that, ‘‘unpleasant as the
activities are in the surrounding area of the methadone
clinic, such activities do not imbue the methadone clinic
with a natural tendency to create danger and to inflict
injury.’’
On October 19, 2022, the defendant moved for judg-
ment on the plaintiff’s amended substitute complaint,
which had been stricken in its entirety.7 The court
granted the defendant’s motion on November 14, 2022,
and rendered judgment thereon. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff contends that she pleaded
sufficient facts to support her public nuisance claim.8
Specifically, she argues that the court improperly deter-
mined that the allegations regarding inadequate security
were conclusory and that there were no factual allega-
Basone v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district
of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (December 14, 2020)
(Connecticut law has recognized that, although business proprietor has duty
to protect invitees from criminal acts of third parties, no duty exists to
protect party injured on property not owned, controlled, or maintained by
said proprietor); McPherson v. Staples, Inc., Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S,
2014 WL 4099329, *3 (July 15, 2014) (same).
7
Practice Book § 10-44 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Within fifteen days after
the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been
stricken may file a new pleading; provided that in those instances where
an entire complaint . . . or any count in a complaint . . . has been
stricken, and the party whose pleading or a count thereof has been so
stricken fails to file a new pleading within that fifteen day period, the judicial
authority may, upon motion, enter judgment against said party on said
stricken complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or count thereof. . . .’’
8
In her appeal, the plaintiff does not challenge the court’s striking of her
negligence claim.
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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

tions to indicate that the methadone clinic itself had a
natural tendency to inflict injury upon person or prop-
erty. The defendant counters that the allegations in the
amended substitute complaint regarding its rehabilita-
tion and treatment facility being located at the premises
do not satisfy any of the four elements of a public
nuisance claim. We conclude that the court properly
granted the defendant’s motion to strike the public nui-
sance claim as alleged in the amended substitute com-
plaint.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review and
the relevant legal principles. ‘‘The purpose of a motion
to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the
allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. . . . A motion to strike
challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, con-
sequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.
. . . [The court takes] the facts to be those alleged in
the complaint . . . and [construes] the complaint in
the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal suffi-
ciency. . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint
would support a cause of action, the motion to strike
must be denied. . . . Moreover . . . [w]hat is neces-
sarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly
alleged. . . . It is fundamental that in determining the
sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s
motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts
necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as
admitted. . . . Our review of a trial court’s decision
to grant a motion to strike is plenary. . . . The legal
conclusions contained in a complaint, however, are
not deemed to be admitted by a court ruling on a
motion to strike.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation v. Factory Mutual
Ins. Co., 224 Conn. App. 429, 441–42, 313 A.3d 1219
(2024); see also Bennetta v. Derby, 212 Conn. App. 617,
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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

622, 276 A.3d 455, cert. denied, 344 Conn. 903, 277 A.3d
135 (2022); see generally Lavette v. Stanley Black &
Decker, Inc., 213 Conn. App. 463, 470, 278 A.3d 1072
(2022). Additionally, we note that a motion to strike is
properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclu-
sions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged
or if the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations
that, if proven, would satisfy all the elements of the
cause of action asserted. See Stevens v. Khalily, 220
Conn. App. 634, 645–46, 298 A.3d 1254, cert. denied,
348 Conn. 915, 303 A.3d 260 (2023).
Next, we set forth the elements of a claim of public
nuisance. ‘‘[A] plaintiff must prove four elements to
succeed in a nuisance cause of action: (1) the condition
complained of had a natural tendency to create danger
and inflict injury [on] person or property; (2) the danger
created was a continuing one; (3) the use of the land
was unreasonable or unlawful; [and] (4) the existence of
the nuisance was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’
injuries and damages.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Kumah v. Brown, 160 Conn. App. 798, 804–805,
126 A.3d 598, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 908, 128 A.3d 953
(2015); see also Demond v. Project Service, LLC, 331
Conn. 816, 860–61, 208 A.3d 626 (2019); Ugrin v. Chesh-
ire, 307 Conn. 364, 374, 54 A.3d 532 (2012).
The resolution of this appeal is guided by our decision
in Perry v. Putnam, supra, 162 Conn. App. 760. In that
case, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant town’s
construction of a parking lot adjacent to their property
constituted a nuisance. Id., 762. In support of their
claim, the plaintiffs alleged ‘‘a litany of annoyances ema-
nating from the parking lot, ranging from vehicle noise,
littering of automotive parts, assorted criminal activity,
loud music, and headlights shining directly into the
plaintiffs’ home.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 763.9 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion
9
The plaintiffs in Perry further alleged that third parties engaged in activi-
ties such as ‘‘[o]vernight parking of trucks . . . with motors running while
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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

to strike and rendered judgment in favor of the defen-
dant. Id., 763–64.

In affirming the court’s judgment, we stated that, ‘‘[f]irst
and foremost, a parking lot does not have a natural
tendency to create danger and inflict injury [on] person
or property . . . [and] [o]ur Supreme Court has repeat-
edly characterized this element as essential to the tort of
nuisance.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 765. We further explained: ‘‘Connecticut
cases have never deemed a parking lot to have a natural
tendency to create danger and to inflict injury. Condi-
tions deemed to have such a tendency include a diving
board positioned over very shallow, murky water, with-
out signage to indicate the danger; Hoffman v. Bristol,
113 Conn. 386, 387, 155 A. 499 (1931); a public town
dump, in which unattended fires frequently burned, and
which the town fire marshal had considered a hazard
for some time, adjacent to marshland that abutted a
row of buildings; Marchitto v. West Haven, 150 Conn.
432, 437–38, 190 A.2d 597 (1963); and landfills that
leaked contaminants into the plaintiffs’ water supplies;
Filisko v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 176 Conn. 33, 36–
37, 404 A.2d 889 (1978); Dingwell v. Litchfield, 4 Conn.
App. 621, 625, 496 A.2d 213 (1985). The parking lot in
this case lacks the dangerous qualities of the conditions
complained of in the cited cases. Unpleasant as the
activities that the plaintiffs describe must be to endure,
such activities do not imbue the parking lot with a
natural tendency to create danger and to inflict
injury.’’ (Emphasis added.) Perry v. Putnam, supra,
162 Conn. App. 766.
vehicle operators sleep in the cabs, [i]nappropriate sexual activity in parked
motor vehicles, [u]nderage drinking, [i]llegal drug sales, [o]vernight gather-
ings of vehicles and people playing loud music and engaging in boisterous
behavior, and [d]angerous driving . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Perry v. Putnam, supra, 162 Conn. App. 768.
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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

The plaintiff contends, notwithstanding our decision
in Perry, that the amended substitute complaint con-
tains sufficient factual allegations. First, she notes that
it alleges that, days before the fatal stabbing, the dece-
dent and Streit had engaged in a physical altercation
directly in front of the premises and that a security
guard employed by the defendant responded and wrote
a report about the event. Additionally, the plaintiff
points to the allegations of forty-two police responses
to the premises for complaints of criminal activity in
the time period from January 1 to October 7, 2017.
Finally, she directs our attention to the allegations that
the premises was ‘‘under scrutiny from local residents
for loitering, drug use, crime, prostitution, and defeca-
tion on private property . . . .’’ We are not persuaded.
We conclude that the defendant’s premises does not
have a natural tendency to create danger and to inflict
injury. See Perry v. Putnam, supra, 162 Conn. App. 765;
see also Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn.
313, 369, 780 A.2d 98 (2001) (typical examples of public
nuisances included pollution and obstruction of water-
ways, air and noise pollution, maintenance of fire or
explosion hazard, or other unsafe premises, mainte-
nance of house of prostitution, obstruction of safe travel
on public highway, and maintenance of junkyard or
dump). The premises in the present case, a center for
drug rehabilitation and methadone treatment for opioid
dependent patients, lacks the dangerous qualities akin
to a diving board placed over shallow and murky water
without warning signs, an unattended fire at a public
town dump near a row of buildings, or contaminants
leaking from a landfill into water supplies. See Perry
v. Putnam, supra, 766. Although the conditions alleged
to be existing in the immediate vicinity of the premises
in the amended substitute complaint are not pleasant
and may be dangerous, they do not imbue the premises
itself with a natural tendency to create danger and to
inflict injury. Id.
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Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc.

The plaintiff’s argument that the allegations in the
amended substitute complaint provide the necessary
factual basis to support her claim of a public nuisance
is unavailing. Referencing the numerous police responses
to the premises in a given time period does not establish
whether these responses were due to the defendant’s
operation of its drug rehabilitation center. The plain-
tiff’s allegations do not state whether these police
responses were related to individuals on the defendant’s
premises. Further, there are no specific facts alleged
to connect the actions of the defendant with a natural
tendency to create danger or inflict injury. Additionally,
the plaintiff’s conclusory assertion regarding the lack
of ‘‘proper security’’ is not sufficient to set forth a claim
of public nuisance. See Kelsey v. Connecticut Per-
forming Arts, Inc., Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2002
WL 237424, *3 (Conn. Super. January 28, 2002) (plain-
tiff’s allegation that he was assaulted while on defen-
dant’s premises as result of unsafe conditions and inade-
quate security was insufficient to state necessary facts
to prevail on claim of public nuisance). For these rea-
sons, we conclude that the plaintiff’s substitute amended
complaint failed to set forth a claim of public nuisance,
and therefore the court properly granted the defen-
dant’s motion to strike.10
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

10
As a result of our conclusion, we need not address the defendant’s other
appellate arguments that the amended substitute complaint failed to plead
facts showing that danger created by the premises was continuing, that the
defendant’s use of the premises as a drug treatment and rehabilitation center
was an unreasonable or unlawful use of the land, and that the purported
nuisance was the proximate cause of the decedent’s injuries.