In re Jadiel B.

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In re Jadiel B.

IN RE JADIEL B.*
(AC 47325)
Elgo, Clark and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminat-
ing his parental rights with respect to his minor child, J, who had previously
been adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. The father claimed,
inter alia, that the trial court erred in determining, pursuant to statute (§ 17a-
112 (j)), that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from the efforts of the
Department of Children and Families to reunify him with J. Held:

The trial court’s determination, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1), that the father
was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s reunification efforts
was not clearly erroneous.

The record was inadequate to review the father’s unpreserved claim that
the department’s failure to provide him with services during his period of
incarceration violated his right to equal protection guaranteed under the
federal and state constitutions.

Argued May 16—officially released September 25, 2024**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, Juvenile Mat-
ters at Bridgeport, and tried to the court, McLaughlin,
J.; judgment terminating the respondents’ parent rights,
from which the respondent father appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** September 25, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Jadiel B.

Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent father).
Michael Rondon, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, and Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The respondent father, Joel B.-R., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor
of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating his parental rights with respect
to his minor child, Jadiel B. (Jadiel).1 On appeal, the
respondent claims that the trial court erred in determin-
ing that (1) the Department of Children and Families
(department) had made reasonable efforts to reunify
the respondent with Jadiel and (2) the respondent was
unable or unwilling to benefit from services. The
respondent also contends that General Statutes § 17a-
112, as applied, violates the equal protection clauses
of the federal and state constitutions. We affirm the
judgment of the court.
The following undisputed relevant facts, which the
court found by clear and convincing evidence, and pro-
cedural history are relevant to this appeal.2 Jadiel was
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of Heather M., the respon-
dent mother of Jadiel. She has not appealed from the termination of her
parental rights. All references in this opinion to the respondent are to Joel
B.-R. only.
2
In addition to setting forth its findings of fact in its memorandum of
decision, the court stated that it took judicial notice of the trial court file,
specifically, ‘‘[the] prior court’s ruling in this case including the neglect
adjudication, any orders relating to an [order of temporary custody], and
then, the [permanency] plan, and, certainly, the petition in this case.’’ Addi-
tionally, the court admitted nineteen exhibits into evidence. With the excep-
tion of exhibit R, the respondent’s criminal conviction certification record,
all exhibits were entered as full exhibits upon the agreement of the parties.
The court overruled the respondent’s objection to the admission of exhibit
R, and it was also admitted as a full exhibit.
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In re Jadiel B.

born in August, 2020. On August 7, 2020, the petitioner
filed a neglect petition and a petition for an ex parte
order of temporary custody on behalf of Jadiel. The
court granted the ex parte order of temporary custody
and, on August 17, 2020, sustained the order of tempo-
rary custody, vesting temporary custody of Jadiel with
the petitioner. On May 20, 2021, the court adjudicated
Jadiel neglected and committed him to the care and
custody of the petitioner. The court ordered final spe-
cific steps for the respondent at the time of the neglect
adjudication. On October 5, 2021, the court approved
the permanency plan of termination of parental rights
and adoption for Jadiel.3
On January 24, 2022, the petitioner filed a petition to
terminate the respondent’s parental rights, which was
predicated on the respondent’s failure to achieve a suffi-
cient degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to
§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). In the petition, the petitioner
alleged, inter alia, that the department had made reason-
able efforts at reunification, that the respondent was
unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts,
and that reasonable efforts were not required because
the trial court already had approved a plan other than
reunification. On February 8, 2022, the court adjudi-
cated the respondent to be the biological father of
Jadiel. A trial on the petition to terminate the respon-
dent’s parental rights commenced on October 19, 2023,
and concluded on October 26, 2023.
In its memorandum of decision dated December 4,
2023, the court set forth the following facts that are
relevant to the disposition of this appeal. ‘‘At birth,
[Jadiel] tested positive for cocaine. The mother also
tested positive for cocaine. When [Jadiel] was born, he
had difficulty breathing and was placed on a [Continu-
ous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) machine]. The
3
On August 9, 2022, and June 6, 2023, the court also approved a perma-
nency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption for Jadiel.
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hospital transferred [Jadiel] to the Neonatal Intensive
Care Unit (NICU) for observation and for possible treat-
ment for withdrawal. Due to [Jadiel] and the mother
testing positive for cocaine, the hospital social worker
contacted the department. In response, the [petitioner]
filed the [petition for an ex parte order of temporary
custody].
The court found that Jadiel has been in the care and
custody of the petitioner since the granting of the order
of temporary custody in August, 2020, and has resided
with the same foster family since that time. The court
further found that ‘‘[t]he foster family consists of a
foster mother and foster sister. The foster mother also
has three adult children. The family provides [Jadiel]
with a loving and supportive home. [Jadiel] calls the
foster mother ‘mommy’ and the foster sister ‘sissy.’ ’’
The foster mother ensures that [Jadiel] is well cared
for medically and educationally. [Jadiel] attends pre-
kindergarten. His school social worker reports that he
is doing ‘phenomenal’ and is ‘super social and outgoing.’
[Jadiel] is happy and developmentally on target.’’
The court found that ‘‘[t]he [respondent] is thirty-six
years old. He has a long history of substance abuse and
mental health issues and criminal activity. The [respon-
dent’s] substance abuse issues include the use and
abuse of cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana.
‘‘When [Jadiel] was a month old, the [respondent]
was incarcerated on charges of robbery in the second
degree and assault in the second degree. He was
released from prison on February 9, 2023. While incar-
cerated, the department could not provide the [respon-
dent] with any services. Only the [Department of Cor-
rection] can provide programs to incarcerated
individuals. During his incarceration, the [respondent]
did not complete any programs or treatment for sub-
stance abuse or mental health issues. He also did not
complete any parenting programs.’’
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The court further found that, upon the respondent’s
release from prison, he failed to obtain consistent
employment or housing, only sporadically attended sub-
stance abuse and mental health treatment programs,
and continued to test positive for cocaine, marijuana,
opiates, and alcohol. The court noted that, on Septem-
ber 6, 2023, the respondent was arrested again as a
result of an incident that occurred on June 16, 2023.
As of the date of the termination of parental rights trial,
the respondent was incarcerated on pending charges
of assault in the second degree, robbery in the third
degree, larceny in the second degree, breach of the
peace in the second degree, interfering with an officer,
violation of probation, and attempt to commit robbery
in the second degree.
The court thereafter found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that (1) the department had made reasonable
efforts to reunify the respondent and Jadiel,4 and that
the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
those efforts, (2) the respondent had failed to rehabili-
tate, and (3) termination of parental rights was in
Jadiel’s best interest. Accordingly, the court granted the
petitioner’s petition for termination of the respondent’s
parental rights. The respondent then filed the present
appeal.5
Before addressing the respondent’s claims on appeal,
we briefly set forth the legal principles that govern our
review. ‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are
governed by . . . § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provi-
sion], a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights
consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the
4
The court noted that the respondent’s location was never an issue and
that he appeared with appointed counsel at trial.
5
Pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c), the attorney for the
minor child filed a statement adopting the brief of the petitioner and support-
ing the affirmation of the judgment terminating the respondent’s parental
rights.
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dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the
trial court must determine whether one or more of the
. . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth
in § 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing
evidence. The [petitioner] . . . in petitioning to termi-
nate those rights, must allege and prove one or more
of the statutory grounds. . . . Also, as part of the adju-
dicatory phase, the department is required to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that it has made reason-
able efforts . . . to reunify the child with the parent,
unless the court finds . . . that the parent is unable or
unwilling to benefit from reunification . . . .’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Malachi E., 188 Conn. App. 426, 434, 204 A.3d 810
(2019).
‘‘If the trial court determines that a statutory ground
for termination exists, then it proceeds to the disposi-
tional phase. . . . In the dispositional phase of a termi-
nation of parental rights hearing, the trial court must
determine whether it is established by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the continuation of the respon-
dent’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the
child.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id.
I
The respondent first challenges the court’s findings,
made pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1), that the department
had made reasonable efforts to reunify him with Jadiel
and that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from
such efforts.6 Specifically, he contends that the depart-
ment did not provide the respondent with any rehabilita-
tive services prior to the filing of the petition for termi-
nation of parental rights on January 24, 2022, because
6
The respondent also challenges the constitutionality of General Statutes
§§ 17a-111b (a) (2) and 17a-112 (j). Specifically, he contends that the statu-
tory interplay between these sections ‘‘allows for an impermissible end run
around the clear and convincing evidentiary standard required, as a matter
of due process, in all termination hearings.’’ According to the respondent,
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In re Jadiel B.

he was incarcerated. He further contends that the court
improperly considered efforts made by the department
after the filing of the termination petition within its
reasonable efforts determination. We conclude that the
court properly determined that the respondent was
unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification ser-
vices and, therefore, need not address the respondent’s
claim that the department failed to make reasonable
efforts to reunify the respondent and Jadiel.
The following legal principles and standard of review
are relevant to our resolution of this issue. ‘‘[Section]
17a-112 (j) (1) requires that before terminating parental
rights, the court must find by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the department has made reasonable efforts
to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the
parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that
the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunifi-
cation efforts provided such finding is not required if
the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such
efforts are not appropriate . . . . Thus, the depart-
ment may meet its burden concerning reunification in
‘‘the statutory scheme requires the department to prove it made reasonable
efforts to reunify the respondent with his child by clear and convincing
evidence unless the court has approved a permanency plan other than
reunification. But at the permanency plan hearing, the department is merely
required to satisfy its burden, including that it has made reasonable efforts
to reunify the parent with the child . . . by a mere preponderance of the
evidence.’’
In the present case, because the court expressly found, on the basis of
clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent was unwilling and unable
to benefit from reunification efforts, and we affirm those findings, we need
not address the respondent’s constitutional claims. See In re Kyreese L., 220
Conn. App. 705, 714–15 n.6, 299 A.3d 296 (declining to review constitutional
challenge to statutory scheme because court found, on basis of clear and
convincing evidence, that department made reasonable efforts to reunify
parent and child), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023); In re
Timothy B., 219 Conn. App. 823, 828 n.5, 296 A.3d 342 (‘‘[a]s a jurisprudential
matter, Connecticut courts follow the recognized policy of self-restraint and
the basic judicial duty to eschew unnecessary determinations of constitu-
tional questions’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 349 Conn.
919, 318 A.3d 439 (2023).
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one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such
efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or
unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by
a previous judicial determination that such efforts were
not appropriate.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Timothy B., 219 Conn. App. 823, 827–28, 296 A.3d
342, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 919, 318 A.3d 439 (2023).
‘‘[I]n evaluating a trial court’s ultimate finding that
the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
rehabilitation efforts for evidentiary sufficiency, we ask
whether the trial court could have reasonably con-
cluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect
of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate
conclusion]. . . . When applying this standard, we
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the judgment of the trial court. . . . [An
appellate court does] not examine the record to deter-
mine whether the trier of fact could have reached a
conclusion other than the one reached. . . . [Rather]
every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the
trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Cameron W., 194 Conn. App. 633, 667–68, 221
A.3d 885 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 918, 222 A.3d
103 (2020). Furthermore, in reviewing this claim we
note that ‘‘an opinion must be read as a whole, without
particular portions read in isolation, to discern the
parameters of its holding. . . . Furthermore, [w]e read
an ambiguous trial court record so as to support, rather
than contradict, its judgment.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 306 Conn.
438, 453, 51 A.3d 334 (2012).
The crux of the respondent’s claim is that, because
incarceration alone cannot be the basis to terminate
his parental rights, and because the department failed
to facilitate his reunification with Jadiel based entirely
on his incarceration, the court erred in terminating his
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parental rights. In considering this claim, we note ‘‘the
reality . . . that incarceration imposes limitations on
what the department and its social workers can do and
what services it can provide for an incarcerated parent
facing termination of his or her parental rights. . . .
The reasonableness of the department’s efforts must
be viewed in the context of these limitations.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Karter
F., 207 Conn. App. 1, 15–16, 262 A.3d 195, cert. denied,
339 Conn. 912, 261 A.3d 745 (2021); see also In re Katia
M., 124 Conn. App. 650, 661, 6 A.3d 86 (‘‘[a]lthough we
agree that incarceration alone is not a sufficient basis
to terminate parental rights . . . incarceration none-
theless may prove an obstacle to reunification due to the
parent’s unavailability’’ (citation omitted)), cert. denied,
299 Conn. 920, 10 A.3d 1051 (2010); In re Emily S.,
210 Conn. App. 581, 610, 270 A.3d 797 (‘‘[T]he fact of
incarceration, in and of itself, cannot be the basis for
a termination of parental rights. . . . At the same time,
a court properly may take into consideration the inevita-
ble effects of incarceration on an individual’s ability
to assume his or her role as a parent. . . . Extended
incarceration severely hinders the department’s ability
to offer services and the parent’s ability to make and
demonstrate the changes that would enable reunifica-
tion of the family.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)),
cert. denied, 342 Conn. 911, 271 A.3d 1039 (2022).
In In re Karter F., supra, 207 Conn. App. 17–18, the
respondent argued that the trial court improperly had
found that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification services because he was incarcerated.
Reading the trial court’s decision as a whole, however,
this court determined that the respondent’s incarcera-
tion was not the sole basis for the court’s finding that
he was unable to benefit from the department’s reunifi-
cation efforts. Id., 18–19. The court’s memorandum of
decision and the record, rather, ‘‘[revealed] that the
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court made ample relevant factual findings concerning
the respondent’s unresolved mental and emotional
issues and his failure to take advantage of the opportuni-
ties that the department offered him to treat those
issues or to bond with the child during his incarcera-
tion.’’ Id., 19. Similarly, in the present case, our review
of the court’s memorandum of decision and the record
reveals that the court did not base its conclusion that
the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification services solely on the fact that the respon-
dent was incarcerated. Rather, the court found, with
ample support in the record, that the respondent was
unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s
reunification efforts that were offered both prior to
the respondent’s incarceration as well as during his
incarceration.7
As set forth previously in this opinion, on August
17, 2020, the court sustained the order of temporary
custody, vesting temporary custody of the child with
the petitioner. The court noted in its memorandum of
decision that it ordered preliminary specific steps in
August, 2020, when it sustained the order of temporary
custody, and that these same specific steps were
ordered as final specific steps at the time of the adjudi-
cation of neglect on May 20, 2021.8 The specific steps
required, inter alia, that the respondent (1) ‘‘[k]eep all
appointments set by or with [the department],’’ (2)
‘‘[s]ubmit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow
the recommendations about treatment, including, inpa-
tient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse pre-
vention,’’ (3) ‘‘[n]ot use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol
or medicine,’’ (4) ‘‘[n]ot get involved with the criminal
7
In light of this conclusion, we need not address the petitioner’s contention
that the trial court was entitled to base its ‘‘unable or unwilling’’ determina-
tion solely on the respondent’s incarceration.
8
The respondent signed the specific steps on April 16, 2021, while he was
incarcerated.
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justice system [and] [c]ooperate with the Office of Adult
Probation’’ (5) ‘‘[v]isit [Jadiel] as often as [the depart-
ment] permits’’ and (6) ‘‘[t]ell [the department] the
names and addresses of the grandparents of [Jadiel].’’
Significantly, on September 7, 2020, approximately
one month after the birth of the child, and following
the issuance of the specific steps, including the step
that he ‘‘[n]ot get involved with the criminal justice
system,’’ the respondent was arrested and incarcerated
on criminal charges, including assault in the second
degree and robbery in the second degree. The record
further reflects that reunification services were pro-
vided to the respondent in the brief period between
when the petitioner gained custody of Jadiel in August,
2020, and September 7, 2020, when the respondent was
incarcerated. Specifically, the record reflects the undis-
puted fact that, prior to the respondent’s incarceration
on September 7, 2020, the respondent was offered four-
teen virtual supervised visits with Jadiel but attended
only one visit. At the time of this visit, the respondent
was ‘‘observed to be in bed and had difficulty keeping
his eyes open.’’
The evidence in the record also supports the court’s
finding that ‘‘[w]hen [Jadiel] first came into the care of
the [petitioner] in 2020 via [the order of temporary
custody], the department met with the . . . [respon-
dent] to discuss services.’’ Specifically, the summary of
facts dated August 5, 2020, states that ‘‘[t]he [d]epart-
ment held a considered removal meeting on [August 5,
2020] and encouraged . . . [the respondent] to bring
family supports for [Jadiel].’’ The summary of facts fur-
ther indicates that the department provided case man-
agement to the family and offered the respondent sub-
stance abuse services through its referrals. Finally, the
summary indicates that the department had attempted
to establish in person and telephone contact with the
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respondent and had encouraged the respondent’s sobri-
ety ‘‘through face-to-face interactions.’’
The social study admitted into evidence during the
termination of parental rights trial indicates that ‘‘[the
respondent] admitted to cocaine use in [August, 2020]
and did not take the necessary steps to remain sober.
In [August, 2020], [the respondent] agreed to [complete]
a drug screen and a substance abuse evaluation while
also agreeing to participate in any other recommenda-
tions. A referral was made to Travisano [Network] on
[August 5, 2020] but the [respondent] never followed
through on this referral.’’ According to the social study,
‘‘[the respondent] has not kept [appointments] set by
[the department] and has not participated in [a]dminis-
trative case hearings.’’ Specifically, the evidence
reflects that from August, 2020, through January 21,
2022, the department held and invited the respondent
to two administrative case reviews, but the respondent
did not participate in either meeting.
Until his incarceration in September, 2020, the
respondent did not inform the department, his attorney,
or the attorney for Jadiel of his whereabouts. The social
study attributed this to the respondent’s struggles with
‘‘homelessness, substance abuse, and legal troubles
resulting in incarcerations.’’ See In re Katia M., supra,
124 Conn. App. 665 (respondent’s failure to keep depart-
ment personnel apprised of his whereabouts and failure
to communicate through relatives, counselors or tele-
phone supports court’s finding that respondent was
unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification ser-
vices). Although the respondent was required, pursuant
to the specific steps ordered in August, 2020, to provide
the department with the names and addresses of Jadiel’s
grandparents, he failed to do so until November 8, 2021,
more than one year after Jadiel came into contact with
the department. After receiving this information, the
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In re Jadiel B.

department reached out to the grandparents, but they
did not respond to the department.
Following the respondent’s incarceration on Septem-
ber 7, 2020, and continuing through the filing of the
petition for termination of the respondent’s parental
rights on January 24, 2022, the department’s ability to
offer services to the defendant was limited by several
factors. First, as the court found, only the Department
of Correction has the authority to provide services such
as mental health and substance abuse counseling for
incarcerated individuals.9 The services that were poten-
tially available to the respondent were further limited
due to the restrictions in place due to the COVID-19
pandemic. Finally, the record reveals that the respon-
dent did not remain in any facility long enough to com-
plete treatment.10
The record reflects, however, that the department
continued to make efforts to reunify the respondent
and Jadiel during this time, but the respondent did not
make use of the services that were provided. ‘‘[T]he
inevitable restraints imposed by incarceration do not
9
According to the respondent, ‘‘the state’s responsibility to make reason-
able efforts to reunify the respondent with his child should not be wiped
away simply because one agency oversees the reunification efforts while
another has custody of the respondent.’’ To the extent the respondent asserts
that this constitutes a violation of due process, we note that this claim was
not raised in the trial court. Further, the respondent has not requested
review of this claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 7881,
120 A.3d 1188 (2015), the requirements of which are discussed in part II of
this opinion. ‘‘[T]he [respondent’s] brief neither includes a Golding analysis
nor requests extraordinary review of her claim under any other exception
to the preservation rule. For this reason alone, the [respondent] has failed
to adequately brief [this] constitutional claim and the claim is deemed aban-
doned.’’ Guiliano v. Jefferson Radiology, P.C., 206 Conn. App. 603, 624, 261
A.3d 140 (2021).
10
The respondent was asked at trial whether he had tried to obtain services
while incarcerated. In response, the respondent testified that he ‘‘wrote to
[his] counselor two or three times, and the only reply [he] ever received
was that they didn’t have services available at that location . . . .’’
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in themselves excuse a failure to make use of available
though limited resources for contact with a distant
child.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn. App. 664–65.
In this regard, the department offered monthly visita-
tion between the respondent and Jadiel; the respondent,
however, only visited with Jadiel three times. Further,
the court specifically found that while the respondent
was incarcerated, the department followed up with him
every month regarding Jadiel and this case. See In re
Katia M., supra, 124 Conn. App 668–69 (while respon-
dent was incarcerated, department facilitated visits
between him and child, communicated with respon-
dent’s family monthly, and attempted to contact respon-
dent by calling correctional institution and sending him
letters). The respondent was placed on a waiting list
after being assessed for services in September, 2020.
The record reflects, however, that he had the opportu-
nity to participate voluntarily in fellowships and to con-
nect with correctional counselors at any point during
his incarceration but did not do so. The social study
indicates that the respondent ‘‘failed to demonstrate
insight into how his substance use has impacted his
ability to parent his child.’’
Reading the court’s memorandum of decision as a
whole; see In re Jason R., supra, 306 Conn. 453; and
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the judgment of the trial court; see In re
Cameron W., supra, 194 Conn. App. 667; we conclude
that the court’s determination that the respondent was
unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s
reunification efforts was not clearly erroneous.11
11
Pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1), ‘‘[t]he [petitioner] must prove [by clear
and convincing evidence] either that [the department] has made reasonable
efforts to reunify or alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to
benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112 (j) clearly provides that
the [petitioner] is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either
showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Caiden B., 220 Conn. 326, 361 n.22,
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In re Jadiel B.

II
The respondent next claims that the department’s
failure to provide him with services during his incarcer-
ation violated his right to equal protection guaranteed
under the federal and state constitutions. The respon-
dent concedes that this claim was not preserved at trial
and seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213
Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by
In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).
We conclude that the record is inadequate to review
the respondent’s unpreserved claim.
‘‘The [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause of the [f]ourteenth
[a]mendment to the United States [c]onstitution is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike. . . . Conversely, the equal pro-
tection clause places no restrictions on the state’s
authority to treat dissimilar persons in a dissimilar man-
ner. . . . Thus, [t]o implicate the equal protection
[clause] . . . it is necessary that the state statute [or
statutory scheme] in question, either on its face or in
practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to
it differently. . . . [Consequently], the analytical predi-
cate [of consideration of an equal protection claim] is
a determination of who are the persons [purporting to
be] similarly situated. . . . The similarly situated
inquiry focuses on whether the [respondent is] similarly
situated to another group for purposes of the challenged
government action. . . . Thus, [t]his initial inquiry is
not whether persons are similarly situated for all pur-
poses, but whether they are similarly situated for pur-
poses of the law challenged.’’ (Citations omitted; foot-
note omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart
297 A.3d 1025, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 904, 301 A.3d 527 (2023). Because
we conclude that the court properly found that the respondent was unable
or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, a finding that is sufficient
to satisfy § 17a-112 (j), we need not address the merits of the respondent’s
additional claim that the court erred in finding that the department’s efforts
to reunify the respondent with Jadiel were reasonable.
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v. Commissioner of Correction, 266 Conn. 596, 601–602,
834 A.2d 52 (2003).
‘‘After this initial inquiry, the court must . . . deter-
mine the standard by which the challenged statute’s
constitutional validity will be determined. If, in distin-
guishing between classes, the statute either intrudes on
the exercise of a fundamental right or burdens a suspect
class of persons, the court will apply a strict scrutiny
standard [under which] the state must demonstrate that
the challenged statute is necessary to the achievement
of a compelling state interest. . . . If the statute does
not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect
class, its classification need only be rationally related
to some legitimate government purpose in order to with-
stand an equal protection challenge.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Taylor v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, 216 Conn. App. 570, 586–87, 286 A.3d 449 (2022).
‘‘A party challenging a law under rational basis review
bears the burden of proving that the law’s class-based
distinctions are wholly irrational.’’ State v. Dyous, 307
Conn. 299, 317, 53 A.3d 153 (2012).
The respondent argues that the right to family integ-
rity is fundamental and that § 17a-112, in practice,
‘‘infringes upon that fundamental right by treating simi-
larly situated persons differently based upon their abil-
ity to make bond and secure their individual liberty
while awaiting disposition of their criminal charges.’’
The respondent, therefore, argues that the strict scru-
tiny standard of review applies to this claim. The peti-
tioner counters that the reasonable efforts requirement
is a statutory requirement rather than a constitutionally
mandated prerequisite to termination of parental rights
and, thus, the respondent has failed to demonstrate
the violation of a fundamental right. The petitioner,
therefore, argues that the rational basis standard of
review applies to the respondent’s claim. We need not
decide whether the strict scrutiny standard of review
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In re Jadiel B.

or the rational basis standard of review applies to this
claim because, regardless of which standard applies,
the record is inadequate to review this claim.
Pursuant to State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40,
as modified by In re Yasiel, supra, 317 Conn. 781, ‘‘a
[respondent] can prevail on a claim of constitutional
error not preserved at trial only if all of the following
conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review
the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitu-
tional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental
right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . .
exists and . . . deprived the [respondent] of a fair trial;
and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state
has failed to demonstrate harmlessness beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. . . . [T]he inability to meet any one
prong requires a determination that the [respondent’s]
claim must fail. . . . The appellate tribunal is free,
therefore, to respond to the [respondent’s] claim by
focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in the
particular circumstances.’’ (Citations omitted; empha-
sis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re Skylar B., 204 Conn. App. 729, 738–39, 254 A.3d
928 (2021).
‘‘In assessing whether the first prong of Golding has
been satisfied, it is well recognized that [t]he [respon-
dent] bears the responsibility for providing a record
that is adequate for review of [his] claim of constitu-
tional error. If the facts revealed by the record are
insufficient, unclear or ambiguous as to whether a con-
stitutional violation has occurred, we will not attempt
to supplement or reconstruct the record, or to make
factual determinations, in order to decide the [respon-
dent’s] claim. . . . The reason for this requirement
demands no great elaboration: in the absence of a suffi-
cient record, there is no way to know whether a viola-
tion of constitutional magnitude in fact has occurred.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Riley B., 203
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In re Jadiel B.

Conn. App. 627, 637–38, 248 A.3d 756, cert. denied, 336
Conn. 943, 250 A.3d 40 (2021).
The crux of the respondent’s claim is that the statu-
tory scheme as applied to this case creates two distinct
classes of people—those who remain incarcerated
while awaiting adjudication of their criminal charges
(i.e., indigent individuals) and those who have the
means and ability to ensure their release while awaiting
criminal trial. According to the respondent, individuals
in the first category are denied access to the reunifica-
tion services necessary to achieve rehabilitation under
§ 17a-112, while those in the second category have
access to reunification services. The respondent con-
tends that this claim is reviewable under Golding
because the record establishes that he was incarcer-
ated, but not convicted, during the relevant portion
of the child protection case and that ‘‘[t]he necessary
factual predicate that exists outside the record—that
some people accused of crimes can post bond and
remain free while awaiting trial and [others] cannot—
is knowledge so common that it need not be established
on the record.’’ We disagree.
If, as argued by the respondent, this claim is subject
to the strict scrutiny standard of review, the state was
required to demonstrate that the challenged statute is
necessary to the achievement of a compelling state
interest. See Taylor v. Commissioner, supra, 216 Conn.
App. 586. Because this claim was not raised in the trial
court, however, the record is devoid of any evidence
regarding the reasons that the department may be
unable to provide the same level of services to incarcer-
ated individuals.12 Similarly, if, as argued by the peti-
tioner, this claim is subject to the rational basis standard
12
As the petitioner aptly points out in her appellate brief, ‘‘because neither
the department nor [the Department of Correction] knew that [the respon-
dent] intended to raise an equal protection argument, they did not submit
their own evidence about the nondiscriminatory reasons they could not
provide services. They had no opportunity to provide details about, for
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In re Jadiel B.

of review, the respondent was required to prove ‘‘that
the law’s class-based distinctions are wholly irrational.’’
State v. Dyous, supra, 307 Conn. 317. In this regard,
the respondent simply argues that ‘‘there can be no
rational basis for treating people arrested for the same
criminal conduct differently with regard to reunification
efforts based solely on the parent’s ability to secure
pretrial release.’’ The respondent, however, presented
no evidence regarding why the department may be
unable to provide the same level of services to incarcer-
ated individuals and how the department’s actions in
this regard were ‘‘wholly irrational.’’ In the absence of
the basic factual predicate underlying the respondent’s
equal protection claim, we conclude that the record is
insufficient to permit us to review this claim. See State
v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 167–68, 425 A.2d 939
(1979) (rejecting claim of ‘‘class bias against indigent
persons’’ in termination of parental rights proceeding
when defendant presented court ‘‘with nothing but sup-
positions and allegations to support this claim’’).
‘‘Our role is not to guess at possibilities, but to review
claims based on a complete factual record developed
by the trial court. . . . Without the necessary factual
and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court . . .
any decision made by us respecting [the respondent’s
claim] would be entirely speculative.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Riley B., supra, 203 Conn.
App. 639. On the basis of the foregoing, we decline
instance, the protocols governing [the Department of Correction’s] authority
over presentence inmates, which types of services [the Department of Cor-
rection] does typically make available and which it does not, the depart-
ment’s ability to work with [the Department of Correction] to provide ser-
vices, how different services might present different challenges (e.g.,
visitation, mental health, substance abuse, parenting), how different inmates
present different concerns (e.g., the inmate’s risk assessment, the gravity
of the underlying issues), how different institutions might have different
logistical limitations (e.g., program’s capacity, staffing, security), and how
[the COVID-19 pandemic] affected all these issues.’’
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to review the respondent’s unpreserved constitutional
claim because it fails the first prong of State v. Golding,
supra, 213 Conn. 239–40.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.