Belton v. Dragoi

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Belton v. Dragoi

DAVID BELTON v. ENDRI DRAGOI ET AL.
(AC 46182)
Bright, C. J., and Clark and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered following
its granting of the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant
police officers. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly
concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the defendants used excessive force when they arrested him. Held:

The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendants
with respect to the plaintiff’s battery claim because, after viewing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party,
this court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the
force the defendants used during the altercation with the plaintiff and, thus,
the plaintiff was entitled to have a jury review the evidence and determine
whether the force employed by the defendants was justified and reasonable.

The trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment for the defendants
with respect to the plaintiff’s false arrest claim because the undisputed
facts established that there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for
interfering with an officer.
Argued April 25—officially released October 8, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, battery, and
for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Young,
J., granted the defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the
plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part; fur-
ther proceedings.
Christopher DeMarco, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Alan R. Dembiczak, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. This case arises out of an incident
between the plaintiff, David Belton, and the defendants,
Endri Dragoi and J. T. Sosik, who are police officers
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Belton v. Dragoi

in the city of New Haven (city). At issue on appeal
is whether the trial court properly rendered summary
judgment for the defendants as to the plaintiff’s claims
that the defendants committed a battery on him and
falsely arrested him. Specifically, the plaintiff claims
that the court improperly concluded (1) with respect
to the alleged battery, that there are no genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the defendants used more
than reasonable force during the altercation and (2)
with respect to the alleged false arrest, that (a) the
defendants were entitled to governmental immunity
because the plaintiff had failed to raise a claim of negli-
gent false arrest and (b) there are no genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the defendants had probable
cause to arrest the plaintiff.1 We agree with the plaintiff’s
first claim but disagree with his other claims. Accord-
ingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, and proce-
dural history are relevant to our analysis. On July 30,
2019, the plaintiff was standing on the front stoop of the
building at 1343 Chapel Street in New Haven (property),
where he resided with his mother. The defendants, who
were on duty and on patrol, stopped at the property
because they did not recognize the plaintiff as someone
1
The plaintiff also identifies as separate claims that the court’s analysis
of his battery cause of action is inherently contradictory, that the court
relied on General Statutes § 52-557n even though the defendants did not
rely on that statute in their motion for summary judgment, and that, because
his causes of action were ‘‘ambiguous’’ as to whether they were based on
intentional or negligent conduct, the court should have let the jury make that
determination or should have treated the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as a motion to strike so that the plaintiff could replead in a way
to avoid the defendants’ claims of immunity. We do not view these claims
as separate claims and address them in the context of the claims we have
identified. Furthermore, for sake of clarity, we have addressed the plaintiff’s
claims in a different order from that in which they were briefed by the plain-
tiff.
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who resided there. The owner of the property had pro-
vided the New Haven Police Department with a list of
approved tenants to assist the department in identifying
trespassers at the property. The defendants exited their
vehicle and approached the plaintiff. Both defendants
were in uniform and wearing body cameras that
recorded their interaction with the plaintiff. Dragoi
asked the plaintiff if he lived at the property. The plain-
tiff responded by asking Dragoi, ‘‘Why?’’ Dragoi then
asked the plaintiff: ‘‘Do you live here or are you lying?’’
The plaintiff responded that he lived at the property.
Dragoi then instructed the plaintiff to step off the front
stoop, at which time both defendants grabbed the plain-
tiff’s arms to physically remove him from the front
stoop. When the plaintiff asked why they were moving
him, Dragoi told the plaintiff that he had to make sure
that the plaintiff did not have any weapons on him.
Dragoi then conducted a patdown search of the plain-
tiff, with which the plaintiff complied. The plaintiff
asked Dragoi why they were ‘‘fucking with [him],’’ and
Dragoi accused the plaintiff of trespassing on the prop-
erty. After the plaintiff told the defendants that he did
not like people touching him, both defendants, using
both hands, grabbed the plaintiff’s arms and waist and
attempted to forcibly remove him from the front stoop.
The plaintiff asked, ‘‘What’d I do?’’ Dragoi simply
repeated his command that the plaintiff get off the stoop
and instructed him to sit down, while the defendants
continued to struggle with the plaintiff. During this
struggle, the plaintiff raised his voice and told the defen-
dants, ‘‘Don’t fucking touch me.’’ All of this occurred
within two minutes of when the defendants first
encountered the plaintiff.

As the altercation escalated, the plaintiff’s sister,
Devina Belton, arrived and told the defendants that the
plaintiff resided at the property with their mother and
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Belton v. Dragoi

then called her mother, while standing next to the defen-
dants, to get her to come down to verify that the plaintiff
resided at the property. The plaintiff’s sister also yelled
at the plaintiff to comply with the defendants’ orders
to step down from the stoop. Neither the plaintiff nor
the defendants listened to the plaintiff’s sister. Instead,
the altercation between the plaintiff and the defendants
became more physical, and the plaintiff more vigorously
resisted the efforts to move him from the front stoop.
Dragoi threatened to handcuff the plaintiff and
attempted to twist the plaintiff’s arm behind his back.
In response, the plaintiff pushed Dragoi away from him.
The defendants then stepped off the front stoop and
Dragoi pointed his Taser gun at the plaintiff and
instructed him several times to get on the ground. When
the plaintiff did not comply and said that he would not
sit down, Dragoi threatened to use the Taser on the
plaintiff. At that point, the plaintiff stepped off the front
stoop toward Dragoi. Before he could sit down, Dragoi
pushed the plaintiff back, and the plaintiff swatted Dra-
goi’s hand away and returned to the front stoop. Dragoi
again instructed the plaintiff to get on the ground and
told him, ‘‘last chance.’’ The plaintiff’s sister also was
yelling at the plaintiff to get on the ground, as she did
not want him to get tasered. The plaintiff then stepped
off the front stoop, in the direction of Dragoi, in a
possible effort to comply with Dragoi’s demand that he
sit down. Before he could do so, Dragoi fired his Taser
at the plaintiff, which hit him.2 The defendants then
grabbed the plaintiff’s arms and tried to put them behind
his back. The plaintiff resisted these efforts and pulled
his arms away. The defendants ordered the plaintiff to
2
‘‘[W]hen a Taser is deployed, it fires two prongs at the targeted person,
which stay connected to the Taser gun by conductive wire. . . . Generally
speaking, the shock from the Taser completely incapacitates the target for
the duration of the cycle. At the end of the cycle, however, the target’s
normal functioning is immediately restored.’’ State v. Osbourne, 138 Conn.
App. 518, 523, 53 A.3d 284, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 937, 56 A.3d 716 (2012).
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get on the ground, but he refused to comply. Dragoi
then discharged his pepper spray, which hit Sosik but
not the plaintiff.
Eventually, the plaintiff was handcuffed. He and Dra-
goi then continued to argue about who was responsible
for the altercation. The plaintiff was then placed in the
back of an ambulance and transported to the hospital
to have the Taser prongs removed from his body. Dragoi
thereafter interviewed the plaintiff’s sister, who told
him that the plaintiff had been residing with his mother
at the property for more than one year. She also
described the plaintiff as acting ‘‘crazy’’ during his inter-
action with the defendants. The plaintiff was charged
with disorderly conduct, interfering with a police offi-
cer, and criminal trespass in the third degree. Those
charges later were dismissed.
On March 20, 2020, the plaintiff commenced the
underlying action against the defendants. In the first
count of his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, ‘‘[a]t
all relevant times, the defendants . . . were duly
appointed members of [the New Haven] Police Depart-
ment, acting under color of state law, and were acting
in their official capacities as police officers for the city.’’
After describing the events of July 30, 2019, the first
count of the complaint concludes by alleging that the
defendants’ actions ‘‘constitute battery upon the plain-
tiff, as a result of which the plaintiff required hospital-
ization and suffered pain and physical injury, and
offended the plaintiff’s personal sense of dignity.’’ In
the second count of his complaint, the plaintiff incorpo-
rated the allegations from the first count and alleged
that his ‘‘arrest was without probable cause that an
offense had been committed.’’ The plaintiff alleged that,
as a result of his arrest, he had to live with the threat
of incarceration until the charges against him were ‘‘dis-
missed without a finding of probable cause having been
made by a judicial authority.’’ The plaintiff concluded
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his second count by alleging that, ‘‘[a]s a result of the
defendants’ actions in falsely arresting the plaintiff, the
plaintiff suffered emotional distress.’’ The plaintiff
requested as relief ‘‘money damages,’’ ‘‘punitive dam-
ages’’ and ‘‘such other and further relief as the court
may deem appropriate.’’
In their answer to the first count of the complaint,
the defendants admitted ‘‘the deployment of a Taser
and pepper spray’’ but alleged that doing so was ‘‘in
response to the plaintiff’s noncompliant, physically
aggressive and belligerent behavior.’’ They also denied
that their actions constituted a battery of the plaintiff.
In response to the plaintiff’s allegations in the second
count of the complaint, the defendants denied that their
arrest of the plaintiff was without probable cause. The
defendants also pleaded three special defenses. In their
first special defense, the defendants pleaded that they
were justified in using physical force on the plaintiff
because they reasonably believed such force was neces-
sary to effect the plaintiff’s arrest or to defend them-
selves while attempting to arrest the plaintiff. In their
second special defense, the defendants alleged that any
injuries the plaintiff suffered were caused by his own
negligence in resisting the defendants’ lawful com-
mands. In their third special defense, they alleged that
they were entitled to qualified immunity because at all
relevant times they were acting in the course and scope
of their employment as municipal employees, and their
actions ‘‘were governmental in nature and required the
exercise of judgment and discretion on their part.’’ In
his reply to the defendants’ qualified immunity defense,
the plaintiff admitted that the defendants were acting
in the scope of their employment and that their actions
were governmental in nature and required the exercise
of judgment and discretion. Nevertheless, the plaintiff
denied that the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity because ‘‘their actions were either malicious,
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Belton v. Dragoi

illegal or constituted wilful misconduct and/or . . .
one or more of the defendants’ actions subjected an
identifiable person to imminent harm.’’
On June 15, 2022, the defendants moved for summary
judgment on three grounds. First, they argued that,
because the defendants were sued only in their official
capacities, the plaintiff’s causes of action were effec-
tively against the city and the city cannot be held liable
for the intentional torts of its employees. Second, they
argued that the plaintiff’s battery cause of action failed
because the defendants were justified in their use of
force. Third, they argued that the plaintiff’s false arrest
cause of action failed because there was probable cause
for the plaintiff’s arrest. In support of their motion, the
defendants relied on the transcripts of the depositions
of the plaintiff and Devina Belton, the defendants’ affi-
davits, an approved tenant list for the property, and
copies of the video footage from their body cameras
recorded during the altercation.
In response to the defendants’ motion, the plaintiff
argued that his causes of action for battery and false
arrest did not necessarily allege intentional torts. He
noted that his complaint did not allege that the defen-
dants acted intentionally and argued that Connecticut
has recognized that both causes of action can be based
on negligent conduct. He further argued, relying on the
body camera video, that there were genuine issues of
material fact as to whether there was probable cause
for the plaintiff’s arrest and whether the defendants
acted reasonably in using physical force on him.3
The defendants filed a reply to the plaintiff’s objection
in which they argued that, although causes of action
The plaintiff also relied on excerpts from his deposition transcript as
3

evidence that he resided at the property and was not trespassing. Because
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the
nonmoving party, we assume this fact for purposes of our analysis.
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for battery and false arrest can be based on negligent
conduct, the plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint and
the undisputed evidence establish that the plaintiff’s
claims are based on the defendants’ intentional con-
duct. They also reiterated their arguments that the
undisputed facts prove that, even if the plaintiff’s causes
of action are viewed as sounding in negligence, they
fail because the defendants’ use of force during the
altercation was a reasonable response to the plaintiff’s
actions and there was probable cause for his arrest.
They further argued that, if the plaintiff’s causes of
actions sounded in negligence, they were entitled to
discretionary act immunity under General Statutes
§ 52-557n.4
After hearing oral argument from counsel for the
parties, the court issued a memorandum of decision
rendering summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dants. With respect to the plaintiff’s first count, the
court agreed with the plaintiff that the allegations
therein could be read as asserting a claim of negligent
battery because they ‘‘could support a claim that the
[defendants] used more force than reasonably neces-
sary to effectuate a lawful arrest.’’ Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the plaintiff’s battery cause of
action failed as a matter of law because the undisputed
evidence established that the defendants’ use of force
was justified by the plaintiff’s actions in resisting arrest
and not complying with the defendants’ orders.
With respect to the plaintiff’s second count alleging
false arrest, the court concluded that, if the plaintiff
intended to rely on a theory that the false arrest was
negligent, rather than intentional, he needed to specifi-
cally so plead. The court concluded that, because the
4
Although § 52-557n has been amended since the events underlying this
case; see Public Acts 2023, No. 23-83; that amendment has no bearing on
the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current
revision of the statute.
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plaintiff failed to plead that his false arrest was the
result of negligent conduct, the second count must be
read as alleging an intentional tort, as to which the
defendants are entitled to immunity.5 The court further
concluded that the defendants were entitled to sum-
mary judgment on the false arrest count because the
undisputed evidence established that there was proba-
ble cause for the plaintiff’s arrest. The court thus
granted the defendants’ motion and rendered judgment
accordingly. This appeal followed. Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

We begin with our familiar standard of review. ‘‘The
standards governing our review of a trial court’s deci-
sion to grant a motion for summary judgment are well
established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that sum-
mary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the plead-
ings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judg-
ment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party
seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing
5
The court stated in its memorandum of decision: ‘‘The plaintiff has not
specifically pleaded a claim of negligent false arrest, as our courts require.
The allegation is one of intentional conduct. Therefore, the defendants are
entitled to immunity under § 52-557n for the claim of battery.’’ (Emphasis
added.) We conclude that the court’s reference to battery in the previous
sentence was a scrivener’s error. The immediately preceding sentences to
the court’s conclusion make clear that the court meant to say that there
was immunity for the claim of false arrest, not for the claim of battery.
This conclusion is buttressed by the court’s statement that the plaintiff had
sufficiently pleaded a claim of negligent battery such that the defendants
had failed to establish as a matter of law that they were entitled to immunity
under § 52-557n (a) (2) on the basis of the allegations of the plaintiff’s
complaint. Our conclusion thus disposes of the plaintiff’s claim on appeal
that the court’s memorandum of decision is inherently contradictory because
it concluded, on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, that the
defendants were and were not entitled to immunity under § 52-557n.
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the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts
[that], under applicable principles of substantive law,
entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and
the party opposing such a motion must provide an evi-
dentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact. . . . A material fact
. . . [is] a fact [that] will make a difference in the result
of the case. . . . Finally, the scope of our review of
the trial court’s decision to grant the [defendants’]
motion[s] for summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Day v. Seblatnigg, 341 Conn.
815, 825, 268 A.3d 595 (2022).
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly
rendered summary judgment for the defendants on his
battery cause of action because there are genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the defendants’ use of
force was reasonable during the altercation. In
response, the defendants argue that, because the com-
plaint alleges, and the undisputed evidence shows, that
the defendants’ conduct can be viewed only as inten-
tional and not negligent, they are entitled to immunity
under § 52-557n (a) (2). Alternatively, they argue that,
even viewing the plaintiff’s battery count as sounding
in negligence, the court correctly rendered summary
judgment in their favor because the undisputed evi-
dence establishes that their use of force was reasonable.
We begin with the relevant law that was the basis
for the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
the plaintiff’s response thereto. Section 52-557n (a) (2)
provides: ‘‘Except as otherwise provided by law, a politi-
cal subdivision of the state shall not be liable for dam-
ages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or omis-
sions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute
criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful miscon-
duct; or (B) negligent acts or omissions which require
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Belton v. Dragoi

the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official
function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted
by law.’’ ‘‘[O]ur Supreme Court [has] held that the defen-
dant municipality [can] not be liable for intentional torts
committed by its employees under § 52-557n (a) (2) (A).
This court consistently has adhered to that precedent.’’
McCullough v. Rocky Hill, 198 Conn. App. 703, 712,
234 A.3d 1049, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 985, 242 A.3d
480 (2020).

Although the plaintiff did not sue the city in the pres-
ent case, his complaint alleges that, ‘‘[a]t all relevant
times, the defendants . . . were duly appointed mem-
bers of [the New Haven] Police Department, acting
under color of state law, and were acting in their official
capacities as police officers for the city.’’ ‘‘It is well
settled law that an action against a government official
in his or her official capacity is not an action against
the official, but, instead, is one against the official’s
office and, thus, is treated as an action against the entity
itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66,
105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) (‘Official-capacity
suits . . . ‘‘generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent.’’ Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 [690 n.55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 611 (1978)]. . . . [In general] an official-capacity
suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated
as a suit against the entity. . . . It is not a suit against
the official personally, for the real party in interest is
the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an
official in his personal capacity can be executed only
against the official’s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking
to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity
suit must look to the government entity itself.’ . . .)
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Kelly v. New Haven, 275
Conn. 580, 595, 881 A.2d 978 (2005).
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On the basis of the allegations of the plaintiff’s com-
plaint and the legal principles set forth in the preceding
paragraphs, the defendants argued in support of their
motion for summary judgment that, because the defen-
dants were sued for acting in their official capacities,
the plaintiff’s action constitutes an action against the
city itself. Furthermore, they argued that, because bat-
tery and false arrest constitute intentional torts, the city
is immune from liability pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (2).
In response to the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff did not dispute that he was suing
the defendants in their official capacities.6 Instead, he
argued that his causes of action were not barred by
application of § 52-557n (a) (2) because they alleged
negligent, as opposed to intentional, conduct. In partic-
ular, the plaintiff asserted: ‘‘The defendants argue that
this case cannot be maintained as the plaintiff has
alleged intentional torts against them, but such is not
necessarily the case. The plaintiff’s claims are based
6
Other than a passing reference in his reply to the defendants being
personally liable if their actions constituted wilful misconduct, the plaintiff
did not argue in his appellate briefs that he was suing the defendants other
than in their official capacities. At oral argument before this court, counsel
for the plaintiff for the first time argued that the allegations of his complaint
could be read as alleging claims against the defendants in their individual
capacities. We will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a
reply brief or at oral argument. See Benjamin v. Corasaniti, 341 Conn. 463,
476 n.8, 267 A.3d 108 (2021) (‘‘[i]t is a well established principle that argu-
ments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Traylor v. State, 332 Conn. 789, 809 n.17, 213 A.3d 467
(2019) (‘‘[r]aising a claim at oral argument is not . . . a substitute for ade-
quately briefing that claim’’).
Furthermore, such an argument is flatly inconsistent with how the plaintiff
argued the immunity issue in opposition to the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, wherein he focused on whether his causes of action
sound in negligence or intentional tort and never disputed that, if they sound
only in intentional tort, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
In fact, during oral argument before the trial court, when asked by the court
if claims against the defendants ‘‘based on either a reckless or intentional
act . . . would be precluded as to these two defendants,’’ the plaintiff’s
counsel responded: ‘‘Correct.’’
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on two causes of action, battery and false arrest, neither
of which allege[s] that the defendants acted intention-
ally.’’7 As support for his argument, the plaintiff relied
on cases in which our Supreme Court had recognized
negligence based causes of action of battery and
false arrest.8
In their reply to the plaintiff’s objection, the defen-
dants argued that the allegations of the complaint and
undisputed evidence established that there was nothing
accidental about the defendants’ conduct that would
support causes of action for negligent battery or false
arrest. They argued that the only reasonable interpreta-
tion of the complaint and undisputed facts is that the
plaintiff’s causes of action are based on intentional con-
duct. In support of their arguments, the defendants
pointed to the plaintiff’s prayer for relief that sought
punitive damages, which are available only for inten-
tional, and not negligent, conduct. Alternatively, the
defendants argued that, if the plaintiff’s battery and
false arrest claims sound in negligence, the defendants
are entitled to governmental discretionary act immunity
under § 52-557n.9 Finally, the defendants reiterated their
7
At oral argument before the trial court, counsel for the plaintiff refused
to commit as to whether his causes of action sounded in negligence or
intentional tort. After acknowledging that he ‘‘would be precluded’’ from
asserting a reckless or intentional tort claim against the defendants and
being confronted with the inconsistency of seeking punitive damages in a
claim for negligence, counsel for the plaintiff stated: ‘‘I don’t claim it’s an
action in negligence. . . . I’m not saying whether or not this [is] an action
in negligence or an intentional tort.’’ He then asserted, without citing any
authority, that § 52-557n (a) (2) only provides immunity for intentional torts
involving malicious or criminal conduct. He similarly stated that § 52-557n
does not preclude all claims against the city for an intentional tort before
concluding this part of the argument by stating: ‘‘[R]ight now, the complaint
doesn’t specify whether or not this is a negligence action or an intentional
tort action, or a reckless, or wanton and wilful action.’’
8
See, e.g., Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 78, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985);
Sansone v. Bechtel, 180 Conn. 96, 99, 429 A.2d 820 (1980).
9
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that ‘‘[t]he court inappropriately consid-
ered the defense of [governmental] immunity, which was raised for the
first time in the defendants’ reply memorandum.’’ This claim warrants little
discussion. The defendants only raised their governmental discretionary act
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Belton v. Dragoi

arguments that the undisputed facts established that
they had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff and that
their use of force was reasonable.
Before addressing each of the plaintiff’s causes of
action, the court framed the parties’ positions regarding
the defendants’ claim of immunity: ‘‘The defendants
assert that they are entitled to immunity for what they
claim are intentional torts alleged by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff argues that he has not alleged intentional torts.
Rather, he has alleged negligence claims of battery and
false arrest.’’10
immunity defense in response to the plaintiff’s claim, asserted for the first
time in his objection to the motion for summary judgment, that his causes
of action could sound in negligence. When ruling on the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, the trial court did not address the defendants’ discre-
tionary act immunity argument. Instead, the court resolved the defendants’
motion on the basis of whether the plaintiff’s causes of action sounded in
negligence or intentional tort, whether there were genuine issues of material
fact as to the reasonableness of the force used by the defendants, and
whether there was probable cause for the plaintiff’s arrest. The defendants
also have not raised discretionary act immunity as an alternative ground
for affirmance in this appeal and acknowledge that the issue was never
addressed by the trial court. Thus, the plaintiff’s claim is of no moment.
10
In his appellate briefs, the plaintiff claims that the court’s characteriza-
tion of his complaint as alleging negligent battery and false arrest is incorrect.
He claims that his complaint is ‘‘ambiguous’’ as to whether the causes of
actions asserted sound in intentional tort or negligence and that ‘‘it should
be for the jury to determine whether the defendants’ actions were negligent
or intentional.’’ He further claims that, in light of the ambiguity over the
nature of his claims, the court should have treated the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment as a motion to strike so that he could replead his
claims if necessary. Both claims are without merit.
First, the plaintiff did not dispute the underlying premises of the defen-
dants’ motion for summary judgment. Because the plaintiff was suing the
defendants in their official capacities, he was effectively suing the city, and
because the city cannot be held liable for the intentional torts of its employ-
ees, the court construed the plaintiff’s argument as asserting that his claims
sounded in negligence because otherwise they would be barred by applica-
tion of § 52-557n (a) (2). Furthermore, the construction of the pleadings is
a legal question for the court, not a factual question to be left for the jury.
See Brusby v. Metropolitan District, 160 Conn. App. 638, 667, 127 A.3d 257
(2015) (‘‘[c]onstruction of pleadings is a question of law’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Thus, the court properly considered whether the complaint
could be read as asserting negligence causes of action to avoid the defen-
dants’ immunity argument.
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After concluding that battery and false arrest can be
based on either intentional or negligent conduct, the
court considered whether the plaintiff’s allegations of
battery could be read as sounding in negligence. The
court summarized the plaintiff’s battery allegations: ‘‘(1)
the defendants approached the plaintiff outside of an
apartment building and accused him of trespassing; (2)
the plaintiff told the defendants that he was not tres-
passing and that he lived in the building; (3) the defen-
dants asked for identification; (4) the plaintiff told the
[defendants] his identification was in the apartment;
(5) the defendants grabbed and tased the plaintiff and
attempted to pepper spray him; and (6) the defendants
handcuffed the plaintiff.’’ After noting that these allega-
tions were supported by the plaintiff’s deposition testi-
mony, the court concluded: ‘‘Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, these allegations
could support a claim that the [defendants] used more
force than reasonably necessary to effectuate a lawful
arrest. . . . The defendants have not provided evi-
dence to support their claim that there are no genuine
issues of material fact as to whether they are entitled
to summary judgment under the immunity provided
in § 52-557n (a) (2) as to the battery claim.’’ (Citation
omitted.)
Nevertheless, the court ultimately held that the defen-
dants were entitled to summary judgment on the plain-
tiff’s battery cause of action because the force they
Second, the plaintiff never suggested to the trial court that it should
treat the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as a motion to strike.
Furthermore, when the court asked counsel for the plaintiff whether his
causes of action sounded in negligence or intentional tort, counsel refused
to answer. See footnote 7 of this opinion. Counsel also did not request an
opportunity to amend his complaint either in response to the defendants’
motion for summary judgment or in response to the court’s inquiries. Instead,
he argued that ‘‘we can revise the pleadings up until, you know, jury delibera-
tions begin.’’ The court then pointed out to counsel that such revisions
could be done only with leave of the court, which counsel acknowledged.
Nevertheless, counsel still did not request such leave to clarify the nature
of the plaintiff’s causes of action. Under these circumstances, the court
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used in their altercation with the plaintiff was justified
and not excessive. In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied on General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-22,11
which sets forth certain defenses from criminal liability
in connection with the use of force in making an arrest
or preventing escape, and provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b)
. . . [A] peace officer . . . is justified in using physical
force upon another person when and to the extent that
he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to:
(1) Effect an arrest or prevent the escape from custody
of a person whom he or she reasonably believes to have
committed an offense, unless he or she knows that the
arrest or custody is unauthorized; or (2) defend himself
or herself or a third person from the use or imminent
use of physical force while effecting or attempting to
effect an arrest or while preventing or attempting to
prevent an escape.’’ The court agreed with the defen-
dants’ argument that, because the plaintiff was resisting
arrest, they were justified, pursuant to § 53a-22 (b), in
using the force they did to subdue the plaintiff and,
therefore, cannot have committed a battery on the plain-
tiff.
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that whether the force
the defendants used was justified or excessive is a genu-
ine issue of material fact that is for the jury to decide.
The defendants argue that there is no factual dispute
as to what occurred during the altercation, as it was
all captured on the defendants’ body cameras. According
to the defendants, the undisputed evidence establishes
that their use of force was objectively reasonable.12
had no obligation sua sponte to treat the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as a motion to strike.
11
Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 53a-22 are
to the 2019 revision of the statute.
12
In their appellee brief, the defendants reiterate their argument that the
plaintiff’s causes of actions should be viewed as asserting only intentional
tort claims, as to which the city, as the real party in interest, is immune.
Nevertheless, the defendants have not argued that the trial court erred in
rejecting their claim of intentional act immunity under § 52-557n because
it construed the plaintiff’s battery claim as sounding in negligence. They
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Although we agree that, given the video evidence,
there is no factual dispute as to the actions the defen-
dants took during the altercation with the plaintiff, the
question of whether their actions were justified is one
also did not raise this argument as an alternative ground for affirmance. In
any event, we agree with the trial court that the plaintiff’s battery count
can be read as asserting a negligence cause of action.
Our Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly the tort of negligent battery.
See, e.g., Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 78, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985) (‘‘[i]n
this state an actionable assault and battery may be one committed wilfully
or voluntarily, and therefore intentionally; one done under circumstances
showing a reckless disregard of consequences; or one committed negli-
gently’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sansone v. Bechtel, 180 Conn.
96, 99, 429 A.2d 820 (1980) (‘‘We have long adhered to the rule that an
unintentional trespass to the person, or assault and battery, if it be the
direct and immediate consequence of a force exerted by the defendant
wantonly, or imposed without the exercise by him of due care, would make
him liable for the resulting injury. . . . This principle has been applied to
the case of an unintended injury incident to disciplinary action taken by a
teacher.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)); Krause v.
Bridgeport Hospital, 169 Conn. 1, 9, 362 A.2d 802 (1975) (‘‘[a]rguably, an
intentional or negligent extension of physical contact beyond that consented
to or needed properly to position a patient on an x-ray table and which
results in injury may present an actionable battery’’); Russo v. Porga, 141
Conn. 706, 708–709, 109 A.2d 585 (1954) (‘‘An actionable assault and battery
may be one committed wilfully or voluntarily, and therefore intentionally,
or one done under circumstances showing a reckless disregard of conse-
quences. It may also be one committed negligently.’’).
Although the court has never expounded on the elements of negligent
battery or explained whether or how a defendant who intentionally initiates
contact with a plaintiff may be liable for negligent battery, our Supreme
Court’s decision in Brown v. Robishaw, 282 Conn. 628, 922 A.2d 1086 (2007),
is instructive. In Brown, our Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant,
in a case in which he was charged with negligently striking the plaintiff,
was entitled to have the jury charged on his special defense of self-defense.
Id., 629. The plaintiff argued that self-defense was not a proper defense to
a negligence cause of action. Id., 636. The trial court agreed. See id., 632.
Following a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed, arguing that
the court erred in not instructing the jury on his claim of self-defense. Id.
Our Supreme Court agreed with the defendant. Id., 633. In doing so, the
court explained: ‘‘The facts of this case involve the intersection between
negligent and intentional torts. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
handled him negligently. In reality, however, the plaintiff claims that the
defendant committed the intentional tort of assault, and that the defendant’s
response to the plaintiff’s behavior . . . was unreasonable, and therefore,
unjustified. It is undisputed that the defendant intentionally threw or
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on which reasonable minds may differ and therefore
must be resolved at trial. See Amendola v. Geremia,
21 Conn. App. 35, 37, 571 A.2d 131 (‘‘A conclusion of
negligence or freedom from negligence is ordinarily one
of fact. . . . The trier must determine whether, in his
own opinion, the defendant’s actions meet the stan-
dards of conduct for one of reasonable prudence. . . .
Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of
summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial
in the ordinary manner.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 215 Conn. 803,
574 A.2d 217 (1990).
We find instructive the decision of the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut in Mehaylo
v. Loris, Docket No. 3:19-CV-2002 (VAB), 2022 WL
17082169 (D. Conn. November 18, 2022), aff’d, Docket
Nos. 22-3162 (L) and 22-3163 (Con), 2024 WL 618761
pushed the plaintiff down the stairs of the house. Therefore, for negligence
still to be an issue, the question of whether the defendant’s intentional
conduct was unjustified remains paramount. Indeed, the plaintiff himself
notes that negligence ‘remains a viable cause of action even in instances
when self-defense is claimed: if a party who feels threatened reacts unreason-
ably he remains liable in negligence.’ Thus, the self-defense analysis incorpo-
rates negligence principles, as the plaintiff correctly points out that a party
who overreacts to a perceived threat may be held liable in negligence if
his actions are unreasonable in light of the circumstances. . . . In order
to determine if the party unreasonably overreacted so that he may be held
liable for negligence, however, the fact finder first would have to be pre-
sented with the party’s claim of self-defense. The jury in the present case
was not provided with the opportunity to accept or to reject that defense.’’
(Citation omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted.) Id., 637–39.
In the present case, the defendants, although not explicitly arguing self-
defense, argue that their intentional use of force was a justified response
to the plaintiff’s actions. Although there can be little question that the
defendants acted intentionally when using force against the plaintiff, if the
defendants acted unreasonably and overreacted to the plaintiff’s perceived
threat, they, like the defendant in Brown, may be held liable for acting
negligently. On the other hand, if the defendants’ use of force in response
to the perceived threat was not just unreasonably excessive, but also was
intended by the defendants to be excessive relative to the threat that they
perceived, the city would be immune from liability under § 52-557n (a)
(2) (A).
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(2d Cir. February 14, 2024), on which the trial court
relied in the present case to conclude that there were
no genuine issues of material fact that the defendants’
use of force was justified. In Mehaylo, the plaintiff sued
the defendants, Officers Loris and Dominguez of the
Shelton Police Department and Officer DeAngelo of the
Derby Police Department, alleging excessive force in
violation of the fourth amendment to the United States
constitution and state law assault and battery in connec-
tion with her arrest. Id., *1. Her arrest occurred at her
home after she left the scene of a motor vehicle accident
in which she was involved. Id., *1–3. The court
described the events of the arrest: ‘‘[The plaintiff] stated
that once she knew it was the police that she knew she
had to open the door. . . . She asked the officers out-
side her front door why they were at her house and
answered questions about her involvement in the earlier
car accident through the closed wood front door, which
required her to raise her voice. . . . [The plaintiff]
agreed to open the wood front door as long as she
could speak to the officers with the screen storm door
between them. . . .
‘‘Once [the plaintiff] opened the front wood door,
Officer DeAngelo opened the screen storm door,
reached into [the plaintiff’s] home, and grabbed [her]
right arm to pull her out of her home and onto the front
porch. . . . Once on the porch, Officer DeAngelo
pushed [the plaintiff] against the wall to secure her with
her arms behind her back. . . .
‘‘Officer Loris then grabbed [the plaintiff’s] left arm,
and Officer Dominguez came to assist by holding [her]
left arm while Officer Loris handcuffed her. . . . The
three officers picked [the plaintiff] up and brought her
from the front porch to a police car parked on the
street. . . .
‘‘While Officer Loris attempted to grab [the plaintiff’s]
legs so they could pick her up, she kicked backwards,
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and her foot made contact with Officer Loris’ groin.
. . .
‘‘Once the officers reached the police car, still car-
rying [the plaintiff], they threw her into the back of the
car on her stomach with her hands handcuffed behind
her back and her head hit the center console. . . .
‘‘[The plaintiff] was charged with two counts of
[a]ssault [of] a [p]ublic [s]afety [o]fficer and one count
of [i]nterfering with a [p]olice [o]fficer.’’ (Citations omit-
ted.) Id., *2–3.
The defendants in Mehaylo moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing, with respect to the plaintiff’s excessive
force claim, that their use of force was objectively rea-
sonable and, with respect to the plaintiff’s state law
assault and battery claim, that ‘‘their use of force was
justified.’’ Id., *5. The District Court first addressed the
defendants’ argument that their use of force was objec-
tively reasonable as a matter of law. Id., *5–9. In doing
so, the court applied the legal test for such claims first
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L.
Ed. 2d 443 (1989). Mehaylo v. Loris, supra, 2022 WL
17082169, *6–7. ‘‘Determining whether the force used
to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under the
[f]ourth [a]mendment requires a careful balancing of
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s
[f]ourth [a]mendment interests against the countervail-
ing governmental interests at stake. . . . [The United
States Supreme Court’s] [f]ourth [a]mendment jurispru-
dence has long recognized that the right to make an
arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it
the right to use some degree of physical coercion or
threat thereof to effect it. . . . Because [t]he test of
reasonableness under the [f]ourth [a]mendment is not
capable of precise definition or mechanical application
. . . however, its proper application requires careful
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attention to the facts and circumstances of each particu-
lar case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight. . . .
‘‘The reasonableness of a particular use of force must
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hind-
sight. . . . With respect to a claim of excessive force
. . . [n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers . . .
violates the [f]ourth [a]mendment. The calculus of rea-
sonableness must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that
is necessary in a particular situation.
‘‘As in other [f]ourth [a]mendment contexts, however,
the reasonableness inquiry in an excessive force case
is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’
actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting them, without regard to
their underlying intent or motivation.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v. Con-
nor, supra, 490 U.S. 396–97.
The District Court in Mehaylo concluded that there
were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
force the defendants used was reasonable, given that
the crime the defendants were investigating was a mis-
demeanor, it was questionable whether the plaintiff
posed a threat to the defendants, and a reasonable fact
finder could conclude that the plaintiff would not have
resisted arrest had the defendants not first grabbed the
plaintiff. Mehaylo v. Loris, supra, 2022 WL 17082169,
*6–7.
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With respect to the plaintiff’s assault and battery
claim, the District Court first noted, as did the trial
court in the present case, that, ‘‘[i]f . . . the officer’s
actions are justified [under § 53a-22 (b)], he is not liable
in tort for assault or battery.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., *11. The court nonetheless held that,
because it had concluded that there were genuine issues
of material fact regarding whether the defendants’ use
of force was reasonable, those issues also precluded
summary judgment as to the state law assault and bat-
tery claim. Id. Essentially, the court equated the test
for reasonableness under the fourth amendment for
excessive use of force claims with the test for whether
the use of force was justified under the state law assault
and battery claim. See id. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment
of the District Court in an unpublished opinion. Mehaylo
v. Loris, Docket Nos. 22-3162 (L) and 22-3163 (Con),
2024 WL 618761, *2 (2d Cir. February 14, 2024).
In the present case, the defendants do not argue that
there is any distinction between the fourth amend-
ment’s reasonableness inquiry for excessive use of force
and whether their conduct was justified for purposes
of a state law battery claim. In fact, they acknowledge
in their appellee brief that the essential elements of a
fourth amendment excessive use of force claim and a
state assault and battery claim are nearly identical. See
Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 94–95 (2d Cir. 1991). They
also argue that applying the excessive use of force anal-
ysis to their conduct in this case leads to the conclusion
that their conduct was objectively reasonable and justi-
fied as a matter of law. We are not persuaded.
Having conducted a plenary review of the evidence
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmov-
ing party, we conclude that genuine issues of material
fact similar to those in Mehaylo exist as to the force
the defendants used during the altercation with the
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plaintiff. First, criminal trespass in the third degree, the
crime the defendants were investigating and with which
the plaintiff was charged, is a class C misdemeanor
punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed
three months. See General Statutes §§ 53a-36 and 53a-
109. Thus, as in Mehaylo, the defendants were investi-
gating the commission of a possible misdemeanor. Sec-
ond, the defendants’ decision to approach the plaintiff
was not prompted by any specific complaint about the
plaintiff. Instead, the defendants confronted him
because they did not recognize him as a tenant of the
building. In light of these circumstances, a reasonable
jury could conclude that, at the time that the defendants
approached the plaintiff and initiated physical contact
by grabbing his arms, the plaintiff did not pose any
threat to their safety or the safety of anyone else. Such
a conclusion would be supported by the fact that the
plaintiff consented to a patdown search when requested
by Dragoi. Finally, we cannot conclude, as a matter of
law, that the force employed by the defendants during
the course of the arrest was reasonable. Indeed, a jury
could reasonably conclude that the defendants unjusti-
fiably escalated the conflict with the plaintiff by
attempting to forcibly twist his arms behind his back
without provocation, causing the plaintiff to push them
away or that the defendants acted unreasonably in
attempting to physically remove the plaintiff from the
front stoop after the arrival of his sister, who told the
defendants that the plaintiff lived at the property with
their mother. Similarly, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could
conclude that the plaintiff was attempting to comply
with Dragoi’s commands that he step down from the
stoop and sit on the ground when Dragoi pushed him
back and then fired a Taser at him. The plaintiff is
entitled to have a jury review the evidence and deter-
mine whether the defendants’ use of force was justified
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and reasonable. Consequently, the court improperly
rendered summary judgment for the defendants on the
first count of the complaint.
II
The plaintiff also claims that the court erred in render-
ing summary judgment for the defendants on the second
count of his complaint alleging false arrest because it
treated the complaint as alleging only an intentional
tort, as to which the city, as the real party in interest,
was entitled to qualified immunity, and concluded that
there was probable cause for the plaintiff’s arrest.
Assuming arguendo that the plaintiff properly pleaded
negligent false arrest, we agree with the trial court that
the undisputed facts establish that probable cause
existed for his arrest, and we therefore affirm the court’s
judgment as to the second count on that basis.13
The following law is relevant to our analysis. ‘‘False
arrest is the unlawful restraint by one person of the
physical liberty of another. . . . To prevail on a claim
of false arrest, the plaintiff must establish that the arrest
was made without probable cause. . . . Because prob-
able cause to arrest constitutes justification, there can
be no claim for false arrest where the arresting officer
had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Campbell
v. Porter, 212 Conn. App. 377, 390, 275 A.3d 684 (2022).
‘‘Probable cause, broadly defined, comprises such facts
as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reason-
able mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to
13
We note that the trial court’s conclusion that the second count is barred
by qualified immunity does not implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion. See Vejseli v. Pasha, 282 Conn. 561, 572, 923 A.2d 688 (2007) (‘‘whereas
[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction
and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss . . . the doctrine
of governmental immunity implicates no such interest’’ (citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we address the alternative
basis for the court’s judgment as to the false arrest cause of action.
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believe that criminal activity has occurred. . . . It is a
flexible common sense standard that does not require
the police officer’s belief to be correct or more likely
true than false. . . . Probable cause for an arrest is
based on the objective facts available to the officer at
the time of arrest, not on the officer’s subjective state
of mind. . . . [W]hile probable cause requires more
than mere suspicion . . . the line between mere suspi-
cion and probable cause necessarily must be drawn by
an act of judgment formed in light of the particular
situation and with account taken of all the circum-
stances. . . . The existence of probable cause does not
turn on whether the defendant could have been con-
victed on the same available evidence. . . . Indeed,
proof of probable cause requires less than proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. . . . The determina-
tion of whether probable cause exists . . . is made
pursuant to a totality of circumstances test.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 390–91.
‘‘Whether the facts are sufficient to establish the lack
of probable cause is a question ultimately to be deter-
mined by the court, but when the facts themselves are
disputed, the court may submit the issue of probable
cause in the first instance to a jury as a mixed question
of fact and law.’’ DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn.
225, 252–53, 597 A.2d 807 (1991).
The existence of probable cause as to any offense
defeats a false arrest claim, even if the basis for the
arrest is unrelated to the crime being investigated or
actually invoked at the time of the arrest. See Devenpeck
v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–54, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L.
Ed. 2d 537 (2004); see also Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d
149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006) (‘‘[A] claim for false arrest turns
only on whether probable cause existed to arrest a
defendant, and . . . it is not relevant whether probable
cause existed with respect to each individual charge,
or, indeed, any charge actually invoked by the arresting
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officer at the time of arrest. Stated differently, when
faced with a claim for false arrest, we focus on the
validity of the arrest, and not on the validity of each
charge.’’ (Emphasis in original.)). Consequently, we
must determine whether, as a matter of law, the defen-
dants had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for the
commission of any crime. We conclude that there are
no genuine issues of material fact that the defendants
had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for interfering
with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
167a.14
Section 53a-167a (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of
interfering with an officer when such person obstructs,
resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer or fire-
fighter in the performance of such peace officer’s or
firefighter’s duties.’’ The plaintiff argues that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was
probable cause to arrest him for interfering with an
officer because the defendants were acting outside the
scope of their role as police officers when they sub-
jected him to a battery. The flaw in the plaintiff’s argu-
ment is that he engaged in conduct that gave rise to
probable cause of interfering with a police officer
before the defendants exercised force on him. The
defendants were investigating whether the plaintiff was
trespassing at the property based on a persistent prob-
lem of individuals not permitted to be on the property
14
In their appellee brief, the defendants argue that, in addition to the
crimes with which the plaintiff was charged, namely, disorderly conduct,
interfering with an officer, and trespass in the third degree, they also had
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for breach of the peace in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-181. Because we conclude that the defendants had
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for interfering with an officer, we need
not consider whether there also was probable cause to arrest him for other
crimes. See, e.g., Kee v. New York, 12 F.4th 150, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2021) (‘‘a
police officer is not liable for a false arrest . . . if probable cause to arrest
the plaintiff existed for any crime’’ (emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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committing crimes there. When the defendants
approached the plaintiff, he did not cooperate in their
investigation by providing his name, identification, or
any other information regarding his right to be on the
property. He also refused to comply with Dragoi’s direc-
tives to step away from the building.
Although the defendants never said that they were
placing the plaintiff under arrest at that time, they had
probable cause to do so. ‘‘[T]he broad language of § 53a-
167a reflects a recognition by the legislature that,
because police officers are confronted daily with a wide
array of diverse and challenging scenarios, it would be
impractical, if not impossible, to craft a statute that
describes with precision exactly what obstructive con-
duct is proscribed. In other words, § 53a-167a necessar-
ily was drafted expansively to encompass a wide range
of conduct that may be deemed to impede or hinder a
police officer in the discharge of his or her official
duties.’’ State v. Aloi, 280 Conn. 824, 837, 911 A.2d 1086
(2007); see id., 837, 840–41 (failure to provide police
officer with name or identification constituted violation
of § 53a-167a). The undisputed facts establish that there
was probable cause for the defendants to believe that
the plaintiff was impeding or hindering their official
duties. Consequently, because the defendants had prob-
able cause to arrest the plaintiff for a crime, his cause
of action for false arrest necessarily fails.
The judgment is reversed with respect to the granting
of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
the count of the complaint alleging battery and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.