State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

STATE OF CONNECTICUT EX REL. JEREMIAH
DUNN, CHIEF STATE ANIMAL CONTROL
OFFICER v. JOANN CONNELLY ET AL.
(AC 46113)
Elgo, Seeley and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant C appealed from the judgment of the trial court vesting in
the plaintiff ownership of certain animals the court found to be neglected
after they were seized subsequent to a warrantless search of C’s property,
where she operated an animal rescue. C claimed, inter alia, that the court
improperly denied her motion in limine, which sought to exclude all evidence
seized following the search on the basis of its determination that the exclu-
sionary rule did not apply to animal welfare proceedings brought pursuant
to statute (§ 22-329a). Held:

This court concluded, under the balancing test set forth in United States
v. Janis (428 U.S. 433), that the trial court’s ruling denying C’s motion in
limine was legally and logically correct, that court having correctly deter-
mined that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable in civil proceedings, as
the minimal deterrent effect of employing the rule in the circumstances at
issue was substantially outweighed by the societal interest in presenting
reliable evidence of animal neglect in actions under § 22-329a to protect the
health and safety of animals.

C waived her claim that she was entitled to a jury trial under article first,
§ 19, of the state constitution, as she never requested a jury trial and made
no objection prior to the start of the proceedings, in which she actively
participated.

Argued May 23—officially released October 8, 2024

Procedural History

Verified petition seeking, inter alia, custody in favor
of the plaintiff of certain animals in the named defen-
dant’s possession that allegedly were neglected or cru-
elly treated, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the
court, Budzik, J., issued an order vesting temporary
custody of the animals with the plaintiff; thereafter, the
court granted the named defendant’s motion to reargue;
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

subsequently, the court, issued an order vesting tempo-
rary custody of the animals with the plaintiff; thereafter,
the court denied the named defendant’s motion to
exclude certain evidence; subsequently, the case was
tried to the court, Budzik, J.; judgment vesting perma-
nent ownership of the animals with the plaintiff, from
which the named defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Trey Mayfield, pro hac vice, with whom, on the brief,
was John J. Radshaw III, for the appellant (named
defendant).
Daniel M. Salton, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, and Katherine A. Roseman, assistant attorney gen-
eral, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant Joann Connelly1 appeals
from the judgment of the trial court vesting permanent
custody with the Department of Agriculture (depart-
ment) of certain animals owned by the defendant, which
included thirty-three dogs, twenty-eight cats, five ducks,
three goats, one parakeet, and one pony. On appeal,
the defendant claims that (1) the court improperly
denied her motion in limine, which sought to exclude
any evidence seized following a warrantless search of
her property, on the basis of its determination that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings,
and (2) the animal welfare statute, General Statutes
(Supp. 2022) § 22-329a2 (g) and (h), violates her right
1
CT Pregnant Dog and Cat Rescue, Inc. (rescue), an animal rescue oper-
ated by Connelly, also was named as a defendant in this matter. Because
an appearance by counsel was not filed on behalf of the rescue by the
deadline set by this court, the appeal was dismissed as to the rescue. In
this opinion, our references to the defendant are to Connelly.
2
All references in this opinion to § 22-329a are to the version of the statute
codified in the 2022 supplement to the General Statutes unless otherwise indi-
cated.
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

to a civil jury trial under article first, § 19, of the Con-
necticut constitution. We disagree and affirm the judg-
ment of the court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. The defendant is the owner of prop-
erty located at 171 Porter Road in Hebron, at which
she operates CT Pregnant Dog and Cat Rescue, Inc.
(rescue). The rescue is wholly owned by the defendant
and is a licensed animal importer registered with the
state pursuant to General Statutes § 22-344 (e). The
property serves as the defendant’s primary residential
and business address, and consists of 5.57 acres, includ-
ing a two-story residential home, a barn or stable out-
building, and several sheds. The defendant uses the
house, barn and surrounding land to house and care
for animals.
On March 23, 2022, Tanya Wescovich, an animal con-
trol officer with the plaintiff, the state of Connecticut,
visited the property with an employee of the Depart-
ment of Children and Families,3 which had received a
report that the defendant was abandoning the property
and the animals being kept there. On the basis of Wes-
covich’s observations during that visit, the next day,
March 24, 2022, Wescovich, along with William A. Bell,
the animal control officer for the town of Hebron,
applied for a search and seizure warrant for the defen-
dant’s property in Hebron. The warrant application was
granted by the Superior Court that same day.4 On March
3
An employee of the Department of Children and Families had contact
with the defendant on March 21, 2022, concerning an unrelated matter.
4
Specifically, the warrant granted permission to search ‘‘[t]he grounds,
property, house, garage, trailers, vehicles, paddocks, barns and outbuildings
located at 171 Porter Rd., Hebron, CT’’ for the following: ‘‘All animals on
the property, alive or dead, including but not limited to dogs, cats, horses,
goats, poultry and to have said animals evaluated and tested for dehydration,
emaciation, physical condition, wounds, parasites, injuries and illness by a
licensed veterinarian; all animal health and ownership records; collars,
leashes, halters, lead ropes; photographs of animals; receipts and bills related
to animal care and feeding; medication and syringes related to animal care.’’
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

25, 2022, Wescovich, along with members of the Con-
necticut State Police, animal control officers from the
department and nearby towns, and officials from the
Chatham Health District,5 executed the warrant, seizing,
in total, thirty-three dogs, twenty-eight cats, five ducks,
three goats, one parakeet, and one pony.
On April 18, 2022, Jeremiah Dunn, the chief animal
control officer of the plaintiff, filed a verified petition
seeking permanent ownership of the animals pursuant
to § 22-329a (b)6 and (c),7 as well as an application for
an immediate ex parte order of temporary care and
custody. The court, Cobb, J., granted the application
for an immediate ex parte order of temporary care and
custody that same day and ordered a remote hearing
to be held on April 22, 2022, at which the defendant
had to show cause as to why the order of temporary care
and custody should not continue. The remote hearing,
5
The Chatham Health District serves the towns of Colchester, East Had-
dam, East Hampton, Hebron, Marlborough, and Portland, and has authority,
pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-206, to ‘‘examine all nuisances and
sources of filth injurious to the public health . . . .’’
6
General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a (b) provides: ‘‘Any animal control
officer or regional animal control officer appointed pursuant to section 22-
328, 22-331 or 22-331a, as applicable, may take physical custody of any
animal upon issuance of a warrant finding probable cause that such animal
is neglected or is cruelly treated in violation of section 22-366, 22-415, 53-
247, 53-248, 53-249, 53-249a, 53-250, 53-251 or 53-252, and shall thereupon
proceed as provided in subsection (c) of this section except that if, in the
opinion of a licensed veterinarian or the State Veterinarian, at any time after
physical custody of such animal is taken, such animal is so injured or
diseased that it should be euthanized immediately, such officer may have
such animal humanely euthanized by a licensed veterinarian.’’
7
General Statutes § 22-329a (c) provides: ‘‘Such officer shall file with the
superior court which has venue over such matter or with the superior court
for the judicial district of Hartford at Hartford a verified petition plainly
stating such facts of neglect or cruel treatment as to bring such animal
within the jurisdiction of the court and praying for appropriate action by
the court in accordance with the provisions of this section. Upon the filing
of such petition, the court shall cause a summons to be issued requiring
the owner or owners or person having responsibility for the care of the
animal, if known, to appear in court at the time and place named.’’
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

however, took place on April 29, 2022, at which the
defendant stipulated, through counsel, that she would
not contest the ex parte order vesting the temporary
care of the animals in the department. The court, Bud-
zik, J., thus, ordered that day that temporary custody
of the animals be vested in the department.
The defendant subsequently filed a motion seeking
to withdraw her oral stipulation from the April 29, 2022
hearing, as well as a motion to reargue the court’s April
29, 2022 order of temporary custody. In her motion to
reargue, the defendant asserted that new information
had come to light that created ‘‘a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact regarding the statutory underpinnings of the
plaintiff’s claims in [the] verified petition.’’ Specifically,
the defendant claimed that results of the examinations
performed ‘‘on each individual animal by licensed veter-
inarians after they were in the custody of the animal
control officers who had effectuated the seizure’’ were
not available at the time of the April 29, 2022 hearing,
and that the results of these examinations showed that
all but one animal were ‘‘healthy and apparently well
cared for.’’ The court granted the defendant’s motion
to reargue on May 18, 2022, and scheduled a new hearing
on the plaintiff’s application for temporary custody on
May 26, 2022.
During the May 26, 2022 hearing, Wescovich and the
defendant both testified. By agreement of the parties,
the court admitted into evidence twenty-nine exhibits,
consisting of, inter alia, photographs taken during the
March 25, 2022 seizure of the animals, as well as veteri-
nary reports documenting the physical condition of the
animals. In a memorandum of decision dated June 15,
2022, the court made the following findings. ‘‘On March
23, 2022 . . . Wescovich visited the property with an
employee of the . . . Department of Children and Fam-
ilies . . . [which] had received a report that [the defen-
dant] was abandoning the property and the animals
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

being kept there. Upon accessing the property . . .
Wescovich testified that she observed that the entire
property was in an extreme state of uncleanliness and
disarray.8 Trash and unusable junk were everywhere.
One dog was loose on the property. . . . Wescovich
observed numerous large piles of trash, numerous
empty plastic containers, numerous unused animal feed
containers, a full garbage dumpster, and unused animal
cages scattered about the property. A pile of trash
blocked the entrance to the garage, and a dozen bags
of trash were piled next to the house. The pictures of
the property, house, and barn entered into evidence
and examined by the court . . . corroborate . . .
Wescovich’s oral testimony and affidavit, which was
also admitted into evidence as a full exhibit. . . .
‘‘Upon walking within fifteen feet of the front door
of the house . . . Wescovich detected an overwhelm-
ing odor of ammonia from the presence of urine and
feces. Upon enter[ing] the house itself . . . Wescovich
observed that the floors of the house were covered with
cat and dog urine and feces, loose dog food, dirt, and
newspaper clippings. . . . Wescovich testified that the
air quality inside the house was so poor that she had
difficulty breathing despite the use of an N95 respirator
mask. . . . Wescovich also testified that the air in the
house created a burning sensation in her eyes.
‘‘On the first floor of the house . . . Wescovich
observed approximately twenty-eight dogs in cages dis-
tributed throughout the first floor. Two additional dogs
were loose in the house. . . . Wescovich observed that
the first floor areas generally and each of the dogs’
cages were, to be plain, filthy. The cages were soiled
8
The court credited Wescovich’s testimony with respect to her experience
and observations regarding the subject property and animals. Specifically,
the court stated in its memorandum of decision that Wescovich ‘‘has exten-
sive training and experience in the investigation of animal neglect and abuse
cases. . . . The court finds . . . Wescovich to be a very credible witness
and credits [her] testimony.’’
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

with urine, feces, and used and soiled ‘pee’ pads. Old
dog food kibble was strewn about the floor and in the
dogs’ cages.9 . . .
‘‘Wescovich observed cobwebs throughout the entire
house. There were piles of trash and unusable junk
everywhere. . . . Wescovich stated that it was difficult
to move about the house because of the presence of
so much trash and junk. Indeed, on March 25, 2022, the
house was condemned by the Chatham Health District10
as unfit for human habitation and in violation of [§ 19-
13-B1 (i) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agen-
cies, which is part of the Connecticut Public Health
Code].11 . . . Wescovich also recovered numerous
used and unused containers of various animal medi-
cines and syringes . . . including canine distemper
vaccine and sulfadimethoxine (trademarked as Albon).
Possession and use of canine distemper vaccine and
Albon is restricted.
9
‘‘Testifying in her defense, [the defendant] offered that the filthy state
of the house was the result of behavioral issues associated with [the defen-
dant’s] minor [child] and [the child’s] failure to clean the cages and house
appropriately. The court does not credit [the defendant’s] testimony. More-
over, in the exercise of common sense, human experience, and reasonable
inference, the court concludes, in its role as fact finder, that the filthy and
unsanitary conditions depicted in the photographs of the property, house,
and barn were the result of lengthy and long-term neglect of the property,
house, and the animals living there. For clarity and completeness, the court
does not credit [the defendant’s] testimony that the deplorable conditions
depicted in the photographs of the property, house, and barn were the result
of any failure to clean the house, barn, or property on the part of [the
defendant’s] minor [child], or [the defendant’s] allegation that the animals
were not properly walked on the morning they were seized. Similarly, in
its role as fact finder, the court does not credit [the defendant’s] allegation
that the conditions at the property were the fault of her estranged husband.’’
10
During the hearing, the plaintiff submitted as a full exhibit the notice
of violation and public health order issued to the defendant, which stated
that she was in violation of the health code provisions.
11
Section 19-13-B1 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies pro-
vides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he following conditions are specifically
declared to be public nuisances . . . (i) Buildings or any part thereof which
are in a dilapidated or filthy condition which may endanger the life or health
of persons living in the vicinity.’’
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‘‘On the second floor of the house . . . Wescovich
found one cat in a cage and one cat loose in a bedroom.
The cat’s cage was unsanitary with dirty cat litter and
feces. There was no litter box for the loose cat. Three
other cats were confined to an upstairs bathroom.
Another bedroom held a large, caged parakeet that was
very thin. The parakeet subsequently died. The air qual-
ity was significantly worse on the second floor than on
the first floor. There was also a strong smell of incense
on the second floor, which, in the exercise of common
sense, human experience, and reasonable inference, the
court concludes, in its role as fact finder, was intended
to cover up the smell of urine and feces throughout the
house. Incense is harmful to the respiratory system of
parakeets. . . . Wescovich observed the same filthy
and unsanitary conditions on the second floor as on
the first floor.
‘‘Upon entering the basement area . . . Wescovich
found fourteen cats in cages. Four more dogs were
confined to kennels in the basement, and at least one
dog was loose in the basement. The conditions in the
basement were similar to the filthy and unsanitary con-
ditions in the rest of the house. The floors of the cat
cages and dog kennels were dirty with urine, feces, and
spilled cat litter. Litter boxes were full. There were no
clean places for the animals to sit. Garbage was piled
in the corners of the basement and strewn about the
basement generally.
‘‘The barn and paddock area were similarly cluttered
with trash and unusable junk. The paddock area con-
tained such a large pile of fecal matter and hay that it
blocked the entrance to the barn and was situated such
that animals would have to walk through the pile to
gain access to the barn. A pony and several goats and
ducks lived in this area.
‘‘After seizure from the property, the subject animals
were taken to various local veterinary hospitals for
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

examination and treatment. . . . While [the defendant]
is correct that the animals generally did not show signs
of malnutrition or dehydration, many of the animals
showed the detrimental effects of the filthy and unsani-
tary conditions they were forced to live in by [the defen-
dant] and [the rescue]. Dermatitis or other skin and
coat conditions (fleas, hair loss, matted coats, matted
feces in their coats) were very common. Many cats had
respiratory issues. Veterinarians commonly noted that
the cats and dogs smelled strongly of urine or feces
and [that] many animals had patching or urine scalds
on their paw pads from standing in urine or feces for
long periods of time. Gastrointestinal issues (ringworm,
roundworm, tapeworm, hookworm, giardia, urinary
tract infections, and diarrhea) were also common. Sev-
eral cats or dogs were noted to be timid or fearful. One
of the goats was malnourished and had lice.’’ (Citations
omitted; footnotes added; footnote in original.)
On the basis of these findings, the court found, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant
‘‘abused, neglected, and cruelly treated the subject ani-
mals’’ by failing ‘‘to give the subject animals ‘proper
care’ and [to] provide them with ‘wholesome air,’ as
those terms are defined by General Statutes [Rev. to
2021] § 53-247.’’12 Accordingly, the court vested tempo-
rary ownership of the animals with the department and
12
General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53-247 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
Any person who overdrives, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures,
deprives of necessary sustenance, mutilates or cruelly beats or kills or
unjustifiably injures any animal, or who, having impounded or confined any
animal, fails to give such animal proper care or neglects to cage or restrain
any such animal from doing injury to itself or to another animal or fails to
supply any such animal with wholesome air, food and water, or unjustifiably
administers any poisonous or noxious drug or substance to any domestic
animal or unjustifiably exposes any such drug or substance, with intent that
the same shall be taken by an animal, or causes it to be done, or, having
charge or custody of any animal, inflicts cruelty upon it or fails to provide
it with proper food, drink or protection from the weather or abandons it
or carries it or causes it to be carried in a cruel manner, or fights with or
baits, harasses or worries any animal for the purpose of making it perform
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

ordered the defendant to pay a cash or surety bond of
$500 per animal, which she did for all of the animals
except the ducks.13
Subsequently, a hearing was scheduled for Septem-
ber 7, 2022, pursuant to § 22-329a (d), concerning the
plaintiff’s petition seeking permanent custody of the
animals. At the commencement of that hearing, the
defendant informed the court that she wanted to dis-
charge her attorney. As a result, the court agreed to
continue the hearing until October 18, 2022, to give
the defendant the opportunity to retain new counsel.
Immediately following the conclusion of the September
7 proceeding, the plaintiff filed a motion requesting that
the court take judicial notice of the following for the
upcoming October 18 hearing: (1) ‘‘The evidentiary
exhibits entered in full during the . . . evidentiary
hearing in the underlying matter on May 26, 2022’’; (2)
‘‘[t]he full transcript and testimony of the May 26, 2022
hearing’’; and (3) ‘‘[t]he court’s memorandum of deci-
sion, including factual findings and legal conclusions,
dated June 15, 2022 . . . .’’ The defendant’s counsel
responded by filing an objection to the motion for judi-
cial notice. Therein, counsel asserted that he had ‘‘no
objection to the [court’s] taking judicial notice’’ of the
evidentiary exhibits and the full transcript of the May
26 hearing, but requested that the court not take judicial
notice of its June 15 decision, findings and conclusions.
On September 22, 2022, the court granted the plaintiff’s
motion for judicial notice, stating in its order that ‘‘[t]he
defendant [was] free to present additional evidence in
order to attempt to convince the court that its prior
factual findings were in error.’’
for amusement, diversion or exhibition, shall, for a first offense, be fined
not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one
year or both, and for each subsequent offense, shall be guilty of a class D
felony. . . .’’
13
On September 7, 2022, the court vested in the department permanent
ownership of the ducks.
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On September 27, 2022, the defendant filed a motion
in limine seeking to exclude any evidence obtained from
her property on the ground that the search and seizure
at her home on March 23, 2022, without a warrant and
over her objection, was unlawful, in violation of the
fourth amendment to the federal constitution and arti-
cle first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. The defen-
dant further asserted that, even though the removal of
the animals on March 25, 2022, was conducted pursuant
to a warrant, it was clear that the basis for the issuance
of the warrant was the illegal entry on March 23. The
motion was signed by the defendant herself, not by
counsel.
On October 3, 2022, the plaintiff filed an objection
to the defendant’s motion in limine, arguing that the
motion was procedurally improper, as only the defen-
dant, and not counsel, had signed the motion. The plain-
tiff claimed that, although the motion was signed by
the defendant herself and ‘‘assert[ed] in the certification
that she [was acting] ‘pro se’ . . . the defendant’s coun-
sel has made it clear . . . [that] he [was] still on
retainer, and, in consultation with counsel, it appears
he had no knowledge of this motion and did not review
its contents prior to its filing. The defendant cannot
simultaneously have representation and also represent
herself. As is well settled in Connecticut jurisprudence,
hybrid representation is not permitted in a civil con-
text.’’ The plaintiff further argued that the motion was
waived and that the ‘‘exclusionary rule . . . has been
categorically disallowed in civil actions.’’
On October 6, 2022, the court issued an order denying
the defendant’s motion in limine.14 In its order, the court
stated: ‘‘The exclusionary rule does not apply to civil
14
Although the parties, in their appellate briefs and at oral argument before
this court, also have referred to the defendant’s motion as a motion to
suppress, for consistency in this opinion we refer to the motion as a motion
in limine.
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

cases.’’ On October 12, 2022, the defendant, through
counsel, filed a motion to reargue the court’s order
denying her motion in limine. In her motion to reargue,
the defendant claimed that, although there are certain
civil proceedings in which courts specifically have held
that the exclusionary rule does not apply, ‘‘the law is
different when it comes to matters involving the forfei-
ture of property where the proceeding is of a quasi-
criminal nature.’’ The court denied the defendant’s
motion to reargue.
On October 18, 2022, the court held a hearing on
the plaintiff’s petition for permanent custody of the
animals. In doing so, it took judicial notice of the testi-
mony presented at the May 26, 2022 temporary custody
hearing, as well as the plaintiff’s exhibits entered into
evidence at the May 26 hearing, and they were entered
into evidence at the October 18 hearing. At the begin-
ning of the hearing, the defendant’s counsel stated that
the defendant took exception to the court’s order deny-
ing the motion to reargue the court’s denial of the
motion in limine. The court reiterated its denial of the
motion in limine, stating, ‘‘I don’t think the exclusionary
rule applies . . . for purposes of this case. I’m ruling
that it does not. I agree with [plaintiff’s] argument that
this proceeding is civil in nature. I’d also note that the
statute . . . at issue here is . . . for the protection of
animals and . . . the safety and security of the animals
at issue. It is not punitive in the sense [of] the case15
. . . cited by the defendant. . . . It is to protect the
animals, which would be another reason why I don’t
think the exclusionary rule applies.
‘‘Finally, I think . . . that the defendant had ample
opportunity to raise these issues at . . . probable
15
The defendant cited to One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965), in both her motion to
reargue and at the beginning of the October 18, 2022 hearing, for the proposi-
tion that the exclusionary rule applies to a civil forfeiture proceeding in
which a defendant’s property is seized by the government. Id., 702.
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

cause hearings. She was, obviously, present when the
circumstances upon which she’s relying occurred. And
to the extent that she had any objection to the evidence
that was seized at that point, or any procedural issues
with respect to [how] the [department] or any of the
other police individuals acted, she could have raised
that at the time and did not. The evidence that, I think,
is at issue was entered by the court on the record
without objection.’’ (Footnote added.) The defendant’s
counsel then interjected that the defendant had not
been ‘‘given any of the evidence, the video evidence
. . . until some two months after’’ the May 26, 2022
hearing.
The court responded: ‘‘I understood that. But your
client was present. The video simply shows the conduct
of your client. And your client was present and could
have instructed her attorney, based on her presence
and knowledge of the circumstances, to file whatever
objection she thought was appropriate. Or you could
have made that evaluation based on simply consulting
with your client. You didn’t need the video to tell you
what happened. She was there.’’ At this point, the defen-
dant responded by stating: ‘‘I [complained] multiple
times. I’d like that on the record. And I’ve complained
multiple times, my civil rights were violated. Multiple
times. And I requested to speak out and to be heard.’’
Although the court attempted to quiet the defendant,
she continued to speak, and the following colloquy
occurred:
‘‘[The Defendant]: They illegally entered my house
and stole my animals.
‘‘The Court: Ma’am, you’re only harming your argu-
ment by stating that you knew your civil rights were
violated. That only makes my ruling stronger because
you knew your civil rights were violated yet didn’t
object.
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

‘‘[The Defendant]: I did.
‘‘[The Court]: So, you should listen to your attorney.
‘‘[The Defendant]: I wasn’t allowed to.
‘‘The Court: Ma’am. You should listen to your attorney
and follow his advice.’’
Upon the conclusion of this exchange, the court
began the trial. After the court admitted the evidence
from the May 26, 2022 hearing, the plaintiff rested its
case. Thereafter, the defendant called as witnesses Wes-
covich and Elizabeth Lee Murphy, a veterinarian. The
defendant also testified at the hearing.
On December 13, 2022, the court issued its memoran-
dum of decision vesting permanent ownership of all
the animals with the department. In its memorandum
of decision, the court ‘‘reaffirm[ed], readopt[ed], and
incorporate[d] . . . all of the court’s findings of fact
as set forth in its June 15 [2022] memorandum of deci-
sion, as if fully set forth herein.’’ The court then made
the following additional findings related to the evidence
presented during the defendant’s case-in-chief. ‘‘Wes-
covich testified that she did not use any scientific mea-
suring device to measure the air quality in [the defen-
dant’s] house . . . . Murphy has been a veterinarian
since 1985. . . . Murphy testified that she had
reviewed the [plaintiff’s] exhibits and that the [plain-
tiff’s] exhibits were the basis of her opinions. . . . Mur-
phy did not examine any of the subject animals and
never visited the property. . . . Murphy opined that,
while the sanitary conditions in which the subject ani-
mals lived were ‘not adequate’ . . . the animals were
[not] in life-threatening conditions and . . . had suffi-
cient food, water, and shelter. . . . Murphy also testi-
fied that the house that the subject animals lived in was
more like a ‘barn,’ and that, while a barn was ‘probably
not’ a proper environment for the subject animals, the
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

conditions were not actually ‘cruel’ and the animals
were not ‘neglected,’ in . . . Murphy’s view. After . . .
Murphy testified, [the defendant] testified that she spent
a significant amount of money ($132,000) on veterinary
bills for the subject animals in an effort to keep [them]
healthy and well cared for, and that many of the gastro-
intestinal issues suffered by the subject animals and
documented in the veterinary records . . . were com-
mon in rescued animals.’’ (Citation omitted.)

The court did not credit the portions of Murphy’s
testimony in which she opined that the animals had
not been neglected or cruelly treated, as well as her
testimony with respect to the specific medical condi-
tions of the animals, as Murphy did not examine any
of the animals. The court also specifically did not credit
portions of the defendant’s testimony. The court found,
‘‘by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the defen-
dant] abused, neglected, and cruelly treated the subject
animals . . . .’’ In making this finding, the court noted
that the conditions at the property were unsanitary and
filthy, and that the medical conditions of the animals
reflected those unsanitary and filthy conditions. The
court stated: ‘‘In particular, the long-term presence and
accumulation of urine and feces [found at the defen-
dant’s property] produced an unwholesome air quality
heavily laden with harmful ammonia gas. Nothing pre-
sented in the hearing on permanent custody changes
the factual or legal conclusions reached by the court
in its June 15, 2022 memorandum of decision on tempo-
rary custody. Indeed . . . Murphy affirmatively testi-
fied that the sanitary conditions in which the subject
animals lived were ‘not adequate,’ and that the barn-
like conditions the subject animals lived in were ‘proba-
bly not’ a proper environment for the . . . animals.’’
The court concluded, on the basis of the evidence
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before it, that ‘‘any person of ordinary intelligence’’
would have known that the conditions at the property
did not meet the standard of proper care and whole-
some air as required by § 53-247, and that the animals
were neglected and cruelly treated by the defendant.
The court, therefore, vested permanent ownership of
the animals with the department pursuant to § 22-329a
(g) (1).16 This appeal followed.17 Additional facts will
be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court improp-
erly denied her motion in limine on the basis of its
16
The court also ordered the defendant to ‘‘pay the expenses incurred by
the [plaintiff] in providing proper food, shelter and care to the subject
animals calculated at the rate of fifteen dollars per day per animal from
March 25, 2022, the date the subject animals were seized by the [plaintiff].’’
17
Following oral argument before this court, the defendant filed a notice
of supplemental authority pursuant to Practice Book § 67-10, in which she
referenced two cases that were mentioned at oral argument but not briefed,
as well as a June 27, 2024 decision of the United States Supreme Court
regarding the right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment to the federal
constitution. In her notice, however, she also responded to questions raised
by this court at oral argument and set forth arguments in support of her
position on various issues raised. The plaintiff responded to the notice,
pointing out that it was not in conformity with § 67-10 in that, in the notice,
the defendant ‘‘engages in extensive supplemental argument . . . .’’ The
plaintiff thus asserts that it should not be considered by this court, with
the exception of the reference to the 2024 Supreme Court case, which the
plaintiff maintains is not relevant to the present case. We agree with the
plaintiff. Pursuant to § 67-10, ‘‘[w]hen pertinent and significant authorities
come to the attention of a party after the party’s brief has been filed, or
after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly file with the
appellate clerk a notice listing such supplemental authorities, including
citations, with a copy certified to all counsel of record in accordance with
Section 62-7. . . . The filing shall concisely and without argument state the
relevance of the supplemental citations and shall include, where applicable,
reference to the pertinent page(s) of the brief. . . . This section may not
be used after oral argument to elaborate on points made or to address
points not made.’’ The defendant’s notice is four pages in length, it includes
argument, and it elaborates on and addresses issues raised at oral argument.
For that reason, we limit our consideration to the 2024 Supreme Court
decision referenced in the notice.
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

determination that the exclusionary rule, applicable in
the context of a violation of the fourth amendment,
does not apply to civil matters.18 In support of this claim,
the defendant asserts that the present case involves a
civil forfeiture proceeding, to which the exclusionary
rule applies.19 Specifically, the defendant argues that
the exclusionary rule applies to animal welfare proceed-
ings20 because such proceedings involve the civil forfei-
ture of noncontraband property, such as domesticated
18
The plaintiff argues that the defendant did not preserve this claim for
review on appeal. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that, because the defen-
dant voluntarily agreed at the May 26, 2022 temporary custody hearing
to the admission into evidence of twenty-six exhibits, and because she
subsequently represented that she had no objection to the plaintiff’s motion
requesting that the court take judicial notice of those exhibits and the
testimony from the May 26 hearing for purposes of the October 18, 2022
permanent custody hearing, she waived any objection to the admission of
that evidence, most of which derived from the alleged unconstitutional
warrantless search of her residence on March 23, 2022. Thus, the plaintiff
asserts that the defendant, having agreed to the admission of the evidence
at the temporary custody hearing and having agreed with the plaintiff’s
request for the trial court to take judicial notice of that evidence for purposes
of the upcoming permanent custody hearing, failed to preserve her fourth
amendment claim that the evidence should have been suppressed as a
result of the unlawful warrantless search of her home on March 23, 2022;
accordingly, the plaintiff argues that this court should decline to review
the claim. We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s arguments. Because the
defendant filed her motion in limine seeking to exclude the evidence on
fourth amendment grounds prior to the October 18 permanent custody
hearing, at which the court took judicial notice of the challenged evidence,
she revoked any prior consent she may have given to the admission of that
evidence and, thus, did not waive her fourth amendment claim. We, therefore,
proceed to a review of the merits of this claim.
19
Although the defendant, in her motion in limine, argued that the war-
rantless entry into her home violated both the federal constitution and article
first, § 7, of the state constitution, on appeal, she has neither raised nor
briefed any claim under the state constitution relating to the warrantless
entry of her home. Any such claim, therefore, is deemed abandoned. See,
e.g., Nietupski v. Del Castillo, 196 Conn. App. 31, 37 n.7, 228 A.3d 1053
(failure to provide independent state constitutional analysis renders any
claim with respect to state constitution abandoned), cert. denied, 335 Conn.
916, 229 A.3d 1045 (2020).
20
We previously have identified a proceeding conducted pursuant to § 22-
329a as an ‘‘animal welfare action . . . .’’ Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v.
Eser, 211 Conn. App. 537, 539, 274 A.3d 203 (2022).
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

animals, regardless of whether a crime is alleged.21 We
disagree.
We first set forth the applicable standard of review.
‘‘The purpose of a motion in limine is to exclude irrele-
vant, inadmissible and prejudicial evidence from trial
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 111
Clearview Drive, LLC v. Patrick, 224 Conn. App. 419,
427, 313 A.3d 386 (2024). When a trial court’s ruling
pertaining to a motion in limine is based on a legal
determination, ‘‘the applicable standard of review
requires this court to determine whether the trial court
was legally and logically correct . . . .’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 426. In the present case,
because the court’s determination that the exclusionary
rule is inapplicable involved a legal determination, we
exercise plenary review. See id.
A
The following legal principles are relevant to the
defendant’s claim that the exclusionary rule is applica-
ble to a civil animal welfare proceeding. ‘‘The [f]ourth
[a]mendment provides that, ‘The right of the people to
21
In her appellate brief, the defendant cites to a number of general princi-
ples underlying the fourth amendment, including, inter alia, that ‘‘the fourth
amendment’s warrant requirement applies to all governmental actors with-
out regard to whether they describe their search and seizure endeavors
as ‘civil’ or ‘criminal.’ ’’ In doing so, the defendant argues that the fourth
amendment is not limited in its application to criminal proceedings. The
issue in this appeal, however, is not whether the fourth amendment was
violated as a result of the warrantless search of the defendant’s property
on March 23, 2022. Rather, the issue in this appeal concerns the court’s
determination that the exclusionary rule does not apply to animal welfare
proceedings, and that is the issue addressed on appeal by the plaintiff. The
exclusionary rule is a prudential rule, not a constitutional rule, that was
formulated in the criminal context to deter law enforcement officers who fail
to obtain a warrant as required under the fourth amendment; its application
necessarily must stem from a fourth amendment violation. Therefore, for
purposes of this appeal, we assume, without deciding, that the warrantless
search of the defendant’s property on March 23, 2022, was conducted in
violation of the fourth amendment.
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be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.’ The basic purpose of this
[a]mendment, as recognized in countless decisions of
[the United States Supreme] Court, is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials. The [f]ourth
[a]mendment thus gives concrete expression to a right
of the people which ‘is basic to a free society.’ . . . As
such, the [f]ourth [a]mendment is enforceable against
the [s]tates through the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment.’’
(Citation omitted.) Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 528, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967);
see also Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303–
304, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018); State v.
Bemer, 339 Conn. 528, 533 n.6, 262 A.3d 1 (2021).
‘‘The [f]ourth [a]mendment protects the right to be
free from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ but it
is silent about how this right is to be enforced. To
supplement the bare text, [the United States Supreme
Court] created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanc-
tion that bars the prosecution from introducing evi-
dence obtained by way of a [f]ourth [a]mendment viola-
tion.’’ Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231–32,
131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011). As such, the
exclusionary rule ‘‘is a prudential doctrine . . . cre-
ated by [the] [c]ourt to compel respect for the constitu-
tional guarant[ee]. . . . Exclusion is not a personal
constitutional right, nor is it designed to redress the
injury occasioned by an unconstitutional search. . . .
The rule’s sole purpose is to deter future [f]ourth
[a]mendment violations.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 236–37. ‘‘[T]he exclusion-
ary rule bars the government from introducing at trial
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

evidence obtained in violation of the . . . United
States constitution. . . . The rule applies to evidence
that is derived from unlawful government conduct,
which is commonly referred to as the fruit of the poison-
ous tree . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Romero, 199 Conn. App. 39,
50, 235 A.3d 644, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 955, 238 A.3d
731 (2020).
‘‘[T]he exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able
to cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he
has already suffered. . . . [T]he [exclusionary] rule’s
prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police con-
duct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the [f]ourth
[a]mendment against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures . . . . Application of the rule is thus appropriate
in circumstances in which this purpose is likely to be
furthered. . . . [I]n the complex and turbulent history
of the rule, the [United States Supreme] Court never has
applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding,
federal or state. Immigration & Naturalization Ser-
vice v. Lopez-Mendoza, [468 U.S. 1032, 1041–42, 104 S.
Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984)] (holding that rule
does not apply in deportation proceedings); see also
Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 363, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344
(1998) (recognizing that [Supreme Court has] repeat-
edly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to pro-
ceedings other than criminal trials and holding that rule
was not applicable in parole revocation proceedings);22
22
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, the United States
Supreme Court stated: ‘‘We have emphasized repeatedly that the govern-
ment’s use of evidence obtained in violation of the [f]ourth [a]mendment
does not itself violate the [c]onstitution. See, e.g., United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 906 [104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677] (1984); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 482, 486 [96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067] (1976). Rather, a
[f]ourth [a]mendment violation is fully accomplished by the illegal search
or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or administrative
proceeding can cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has
already suffered. United States v. Leon, [supra, 906] (quoting Stone v. Powell,
[supra, 540] (White, J., dissenting)). The exclusionary rule is instead a judi-
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448, 454, 96 S. Ct.
3021, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976) (holding that rule does
not apply in civil tax proceedings); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343–46, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed.
cially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures. United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 [94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561] (1974). As
such, the rule does not proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence
in all proceedings or against all [persons; Stone v. Powell, supra, 486], but
applies only in contexts where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously [served. United States v. Calandra, supra, 348]; see also United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 [96 S. Ct. 3021, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046] (1976)
([i]f . . . the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence,
then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted). Moreover,
because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we
have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh
its substantial social costs. United States v. Leon, [supra] 907.
‘‘Recognizing these costs, we have repeatedly declined to extend the
exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials. [Id., 909]; United
States v. Janis, [supra, 428 U.S.] 447. For example, in United States v.
Calandra, [supra, 414 U.S. 338] we held that the exclusionary rule does not
apply to grand jury proceedings; in so doing, we emphasized that such
proceedings play a special role in the law enforcement process and that
the traditionally flexible, nonadversarial nature of those proceedings would
be jeopardized by application of the rule. [Id., 343–46, 349–50]. Likewise, in
United States v. Janis, [supra, 433] we held that the exclusionary rule did
not bar the introduction of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a civil
tax proceeding because the costs of excluding relevant and reliable evidence
would outweigh the marginal deterrence benefits, which, we noted, would
be minimal because the use of the exclusionary rule in criminal trials already
deterred illegal searches. [Id., 448, 454]. Finally, in [Immigration & Natural-
ization Service] v. Lopez-Mendoza, [supra, 468 U.S. 1032], we refused to
extend the exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings, citing the
high social costs of allowing an immigrant to remain illegally in this country
and noting the incompatibility of the rule with the civil, administrative nature
of those proceedings. [Id., 1050.]
‘‘As in Calandra, Janis, and Lopez-Mendoza, we are asked to extend the
operation of the exclusionary rule beyond the criminal trial context. We
again decline to do so. Application of the exclusionary rule would both
hinder the functioning of state parole systems and alter the traditionally
flexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings. The rule
would provide only minimal deterrence benefits in this context, because
application of the rule in the criminal trial context already provides signifi-
cant deterrence of unconstitutional searches. We therefore hold that the
federal exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction at parole revocation
hearings of evidence seized in violation of parolees’ [f]ourth [a]mendment
rights.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
tion & Parole v. Scott, supra, 524 U.S. 362–64.
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

2d 561 (1974) (holding that rule does not apply in grand
jury proceedings). [B]ecause the rule is prudential
rather than constitutionally mandated, [it has been held]
to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits out-
weigh its substantial social costs. . . . Pennsylvania
Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, supra, 363. [T]he
need for deterrence and hence the rationale for exclud-
ing the evidence are strongest where the [g]overnment’s
unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a crimi-
nal sanction on the victim of the search. . . . Fishbein
v. Kozlowski, 252 Conn. 38, 52–53, 743 A.2d 1110
(1999).’’ (Citation omitted; footnote added; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Boyles v. Preston, 68 Conn. App.
596, 611–13, 792 A.2d 878, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 901,
802 A.2d 853 (2002); see also Davis v. United States,
supra, 564 U.S. 236–37 (because exclusionary ‘‘rule’s
sole purpose . . . is to deter future [f]ourth [a]mend-
ment violations . . . [United States Supreme Court]
cases have thus limited the rule’s operation to situations
in which this purpose is thought most efficaciously
served’’ (citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted)). ‘‘Because the exclusionary rule precludes
consideration of reliable, probative evidence, it imposes
significant costs: It undeniably detracts from the truth-
finding process and allows many who would otherwise
be incarcerated to escape the consequences of their
actions. See Stone v. Powell, [428 U.S. 465, 490, 96 S.
Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976)]. Although [the United
States Supreme Court has] held these costs to be worth
bearing in certain circumstances, [its] cases have
repeatedly emphasized that the rule’s costly toll upon
truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents
a high obstacle for those urging application of the rule.
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 [100 S. Ct.
2439, 65 L. Ed. 2d 468] (1980).’’ (Footnote omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Pennsylvania Board of
Probation & Parole v. Scott, supra, 364–65.
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24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

Consistent with this precedent, this court previously
has recognized, as a general rule, that the exclusionary
rule does not apply to civil cases. See Tompkins v.
Freedom of Information Commission, 136 Conn. App.
496, 499 n.4, 46 A.3d 291 (2012); In re Nicholas R., 92
Conn. App. 316, 321, 884 A.2d 1059 (2005); see also
State v. Schroff, 198 Conn. 405, 412, 503 A.2d 167 (1986)
(‘‘Subject to a few exceptions, the same rules of evi-
dence apply in criminal cases as in civil cases. . . .
The most notable exceptions are the exclusionary rules
prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in violation of
the accused’s constitutional rights.’’ (Citation omitted;
emphasis added.)).
Nevertheless, the exclusionary rule has been applied
beyond the confines of criminal cases ‘‘in a proceeding
for forfeiture of an article used in violation of the crimi-
nal law. [See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylva-
nia], 380 U.S. 693 [85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170]
(1965) [Plymouth Sedan]. [In Plymouth Sedan, the
court] expressly relied on the fact that ‘forfeiture is
clearly a penalty for the criminal offense’ and ‘[i]t would
be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to
hold that in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized
evidence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceed-
ing, requiring the determination that the criminal law
has been violated, the same evidence would be admissi-
ble.’ ’’ United States v. Janis, supra, 428 U.S. 447 n.17;
see also In re 650 Fifth Avenue & Related Properties,
830 F.3d 66, 98 (2d Cir. 2016) (‘‘[i]t is well-established
that the [f]ourth [a]mendment’s exclusionary rule
applies in forfeiture cases’’); One 1995 Corvette VIN
No. 1G1YY22P585103433 v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 353 Md. 114, 123–24, 724 A.2d 680 (‘‘Eleven
of the thirteen United States Courts of Appeals have
interpreted Plymouth Sedan to stand for the proposi-
tion that the exclusionary rule applies to civil in rem
forfeitures. Additionally, courts in thirty-four states
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State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

have interpreted Plymouth Sedan to stand for the same
proposition. . . . Our examination of the cases has
revealed no court that completely rejects that interpre-
tation . . . .’’ (Footnotes omitted.)), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 927, 120 S. Ct. 321, 145 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1999).

The United States Supreme Court, thus, has not fore-
closed application of the exclusionary rule to civil pro-
ceedings. ‘‘Instead, the [c]ourt [has] instructed that the
exclusionary rule may be extended where the benefits
exceed the costs to society’’; Garrett v. Lehman, 751
F.2d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1985); and it ‘‘set forth a frame-
work for deciding in what types of proceeding[s] appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule is appropriate. Imprecise
as the exercise may be, the [c]ourt recognized in [United
States v. Janis, supra, 428 U.S. 446] that there is no
choice but to weigh the likely social benefits of exclud-
ing unlawfully seized evidence against the likely costs.’’
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Men-
doza, supra, 468 U.S. 1041; see also Ahart v. Colorado
Dept. of Corrections, 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo. 1998)
(‘‘The question of whether the exclusionary rule applies
in a particular civil case requires weighing the deterrent
benefits of applying the rule against the societal cost
of excluding relevant evidence. . . . There is no ‘bright
line’ to determine when the rule should apply, and
courts must apply the Janis analytic framework on a
case by case basis.’’ (Citation omitted.)). This approach
is known as the Janis balancing test. See Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza,
supra, 1042; see also Long Lake Township v. Maxon,
343 Mich. App. 319, 330, 997 N.W.2d 250 (2022) (‘‘[t]he
Janis balancing test, as it is now known, requires a
court contemplating applying the exclusionary rule in
a civil proceeding to weigh the ‘prime purpose’ of the
rule—deterrence—against ‘the likely costs’ ’’), aff’d,
Docket No. 164948, 2024 WL 1960615 (Mich. May 3,
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26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly

2024). In applying that test, the Supreme Court deter-
mined in Janis that the exclusionary rule does not apply
to a federal civil tax assessment proceeding and in
Lopez-Mendoza that it does not apply to a deportation
proceeding. See United States v. Janis, supra, 459–60;
see also Immigration & Naturalization Service v.
Lopez-Mendoza, supra, 1042.
Our appellate and trial courts have applied the Janis
balancing test when determining whether the exclusion-
ary rule applies to certain civil proceedings. See, e.g.,
Fishbein v. Kozlowski, supra, 252 Conn. 54 (applying
Janis balancing test in determining that exclusionary
rule does not apply to driver’s license suspension hear-
ings); Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565, 570, 541 A.2d
504 (applying Janis balancing test in determining that
exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revoca-
tion proceedings), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898, 109 S. Ct.
242, 102 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1988); Boyles v. Preston, supra,
68 Conn. App. 612–13 (applying Janis balancing test in
determining that exclusionary rule does not apply to
civil trial); Housing Authority v. Dawkins, Superior
Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Housing
Session at Norwalk, Docket No. 9502-16173 (May 10,
1995) (14 Conn. L. Rptr. 450) (applying Janis balancing
test in determining that exclusionary rule does not apply
in summary process proceeding), aff’d, 239 Conn. 793,
686 A.2d 994 (1997); see also Tompkins v. Freedom of
Information Commission, supra, 136 Conn. App. 499
n.4 (standing for proposition that exclusionary rule cat-
egorically does not apply to civil proceedings), citing
In re Nicholas R., supra, 92 Conn. App. 321.23
23
Although in Tompkins, we stated that the exclusionary rule does not
apply to civil proceedings, the previously cited precedent from our Supreme
Court indicates that application of the Janis balancing test is appropriate
when deciding if the exclusionary rule applies to a particular civil proceeding.
Notably, however, courts in Missouri, New Jersey and North Dakota forgo
application of the Janis balancing test and, instead, simply regard the exclu-
sionary rule as categorically inapplicable to civil proceedings, as we did in
Tompkins. See, e.g., Coble v. Director of Revenue, 323 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Mo.
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Accordingly, ‘‘United States Supreme Court prece-
dent regarding the exclusionary rule’s use in civil cases
can be succinctly summarized as follows: it only applies
in forfeiture actions when the thing being forfeited as
a result of a criminal prosecution is worth more than
the criminal fine that might be assessed. That’s it.’’ Long
Lake Township v. Maxon, supra, 343 Mich. App. 332; see
also Dolan v. Salinas, Superior Court, judicial district
of New Britain, Docket No. CV XX-XXXXXXX-S (July 22,
1999) (25 Conn. L. Rptr. 119, 121) (‘‘[t]he only civil
context in which the [United States] Supreme Court
has applied the exclusionary rule is a case of a ‘quasi-
criminal’ forfeiture proceeding based on criminal con-
duct’’). Further, ‘‘[i]t is unclear if the Supreme Court
requires a threshold finding that the nature of the civil
proceeding is ‘quasi-criminal’ . . . or if the nature of
the proceeding is merely one factor in applying the
Janis balancing test.’’ (Citation omitted.) Pike v. Gal-
lagher, 829 F. Supp. 1254, 1265 n.6 (D.N.M. 1993).
Notably, if a proceeding is identified as quasi-crimi-
nal, we have treated that as determinative of whether
the exclusionary rule applies without requiring consid-
eration of the Janis balancing test. See In re Nicholas
R., supra, 92 Conn. App. 321 n.3. In Connecticut, few
proceedings are deemed to be quasi-criminal, and they
include (1) ‘‘forfeiture proceeding[s] intended to penal-
ize . . . for the commission of a criminal offense’’;
Miller v. Dept. of Agriculture, 168 Conn. App. 255, 269
n.15, 145 A.3d 393 (citing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan
v. Pennsylvania, supra, 380 U.S. 702), cert. denied, 323
Conn. 936, 151 A.3d 386 (2016); (2) attorney disciplinary
proceedings; Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 19, 835
App. 2010) (exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings); In re
Civil Commitment of J.M.B., 395 N.J. Super. 69, 95, 928 A.2d 102 (App. Div.
2007) (same), aff’d, 197 N.J. 563, 964 A.2d 752, cert. denied sub nom. J.M.B.
v. New Jersey, 558 U.S. 999, 130 S. Ct. 509, 175 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2009); Muscha
v. Krolik, 969 N.W.2d 142, 143 (N.D. 2022) (same).
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A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073, 124 S.
Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2004); and (3) juvenile
delinquency proceedings. In re Nicholas R., supra, 321
n.3; see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 664,
847 A.2d 883 (2004) (proceedings to terminate parental
rights are not quasi-criminal); Robertson v. Apuzzo, 170
Conn. 367, 375, 365 A.2d 824 (child paternity proceed-
ings are civil, not quasi-criminal), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
852, 97 S. Ct. 142, 50 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976); Miller v. Dept.
of Agriculture, supra, 263–64 (administrative hearing on
disposal orders for biting animals is not quasi-criminal).
Our courts have never reached the issue of whether
animal welfare proceedings conducted pursuant to § 22-
329a are subject to the exclusionary rule. Thus, in the
present case, we first must determine whether the ani-
mal welfare proceeding at issue constitutes a forfeiture
proceeding intended to penalize the defendant for a
criminal offense. If it does, the exclusionary rule applies
pursuant to Plymouth Sedan. If it does not, we next
must determine whether animal welfare proceedings
conducted pursuant to § 22-329a are quasi-criminal. If
such proceedings are determined to be quasi-criminal,
the exclusionary rule is applicable. Finally, even if we
determine that animal welfare proceedings are not
quasi-criminal in nature, we nevertheless must apply the
Janis balancing test to determine whether it is appro-
priate to extend the exclusionary rule to this particular
civil proceeding. In other words, if the proceeding at
issue constitutes either a forfeiture akin to Plymouth
Sedan or a quasi-criminal proceeding, the exclusionary
rule applies; otherwise, the rule is inapplicable unless
we determine, after applying the Janis balancing test,
that it should be extended to animal welfare proceed-
ings. We therefore turn to the defendant’s claim that
the animal welfare proceeding at issue in this case con-
stitutes a civil forfeiture proceeding to which the exclu-
sionary rule applies.
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B
The defendant’s claim that the animal welfare pro-
ceeding at issue in the present case constitutes a civil
forfeiture of noncontraband property is premised on
the principle that animals are considered property
under state law.24 In response, the plaintiff does not
24
We note that, although the defendant correctly notes that animals are
‘‘ ‘generally . . . regarded as personal property,’ ’’ quoting Nonhuman
Rights Project, Inc. v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc., 192 Conn. App. 36,
45, 216 A.3d 839, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 920, 217 A.3d 635 (2019), animals
enjoy a unique status in our society as opposed to typical personal property.
As the Supreme Court of Vermont stated, ‘‘nonhuman animals occupy a
unique legal status in that they have traditionally been regarded as property
but are nonetheless different from other property’’ and, instead, ‘‘occup[y]
a special place somewhere in between a person and [a] piece of personal
property.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Sheperd, 204 Vt. 592, 601, 170 A.3d 616 (2017); see id., 602 (‘‘animal welfare
is a factor [that must be] consider[ed] when determining whether a search
or seizure was lawful’’); Baity v. Mickley-Gomez, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
S, 2020 WL 9314537, *5 (Conn. Super. December 14, 2020) (‘‘a domesticated,
household pet holds a special and unique interest to its owner dissimilar
to other property’’); see also General Statutes § 22-350 (dogs are considered
personal property under state law). In State v. Newcomb, 359 Or. 756, 770,
375 P.3d 434 (2016), the Oregon Supreme Court ‘‘conclude[d] that [the]
defendant had no protected privacy interest in [his dog’s] blood that was
invaded by the medical procedures performed [to diagnose and treat the
malnourished dog]. In [those] circumstances, [the court agreed] with the
state that [a dog] is not analogous to, and should not be analyzed as though
he were, an opaque inanimate container in which inanimate property or
effects were being stored or concealed.’’ The court recognized that, even
though ‘‘[a] dog is personal property under Oregon law, a status that gives
a dog owner rights of dominion and control over the dog . . . Oregon law
simultaneously limits ownership and possessory rights in ways that it does
not for inanimate property. Those limitations, too, are reflections of legal
and social norms. Live animals under Oregon law are subject to statutory
welfare protections that ensure their basic minimum care, including veteri-
nary treatment. The obligation to provide that minimum care falls on any
person who has custody and control of a dog or other animal.’’ Id., 771.
Likewise, under Connecticut law, although animals are generally considered
personal property, they are subject to statutory welfare protections that
place them in a category separate from inanimate property. Therefore, the
defendant’s citation to Plymouth Sedan and its progeny, which deal with
forfeitures of assets like vehicles and currency, is unavailing in the present
case because ‘‘in the context of searches and seizures . . . the treatment
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dispute whether animals are considered property but
argues that such proceedings do not constitute a civil
forfeiture under this state’s statutory scheme. We agree
with the plaintiff.

Whether an animal welfare proceeding conducted
pursuant to § 22-329a constitutes a civil forfeiture
requires us to construe § 22-329a, ‘‘which presents a
question of statutory interpretation subject to plenary
review. See Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 532,
46 A.3d 102 (2012) ([i]ssues of statutory interpretation
constitute questions of law over which the court’s
review is plenary . . .). When construing a statute,
[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In
seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes
§ 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute
itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after
examining such text and considering such relationship,
the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratex-
tual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
be considered. . . . It is a basic tenet of statutory con-
struction that [w]e construe a statute as a whole and
read its subsections concurrently in order to reach a
reasonable overall interpretation.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Townsend v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 226 Conn. App. 313, 330–31,
317 A.3d 1147 (2024). ‘‘[P]ursuant to § 1-2z, [the court is]
to go through the following initial steps: [F]irst, consider
the language of the statute at issue, including its rela-
tionship to other statutes, as applied to the facts of the
case; second, if after the completion of step one, [the
court] conclude[s] that, as so applied, there is but one
likely or plausible meaning of the statutory language,
of animals is different from that of other types of property . . . .’’ State v.
Sheperd, supra, 602.
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[the court] stop[s] there; but third, if after the comple-
tion of step one, [the court] conclude[s] that, as applied
to the facts of the case, there is more than one likely
or plausible meaning of the statute, [the court] may
consult other sources, beyond the statutory language,
to ascertain the meaning of the statute.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 209 Conn. App.
296, 305, 268 A.3d 127 (2021), cert. denied, 342 Conn.
905, 270 A.3d 691 (2022).

Section 22-329a is titled: ‘‘Seizure and custody of
neglected or cruelly treated animals. Vesting of owner-
ship of animal. Animal abuse cost recovery account.’’
The statute provides a mechanism by which state ani-
mal control officials may take physical custody of an
animal. First, under subsection (a), if an animal control
officer has reasonable cause to believe that an animal
‘‘is in imminent harm and is neglected or is cruelly
treated,’’ the animal control officer may take physical
custody of the animal and, not later than ninety-six
hours after taking custody, shall file with the Superior
Court, in accordance with subsection (c), a verified
petition ‘‘plainly stating such facts of neglect or cruel
treatment . . . and praying for appropriate action by
the court . . . .’’ Pursuant to subsection (b) of § 22-
329a, ‘‘[a]ny animal control officer . . . may take physi-
cal custody of any animal upon issuance of a warrant
finding probable cause that such animal is neglected
or is cruelly treated . . . .’’ The statute further sets
forth the necessary procedures after physical custody
of an animal has been taken; see General Statutes § 22-
329a (c) and (d); or if temporary custody of an animal
is sought; see General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a
(e); and certain requirements of the animal’s owner,
including posting a bond and the payment of expenses
incurred by the state for the care of the animal. See
General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a (f) and (h). The
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language of § 22-329a is clear and unambiguous, and
nowhere in the statute is the term ‘‘forfeiture’’ present.
By contrast, General Statutes § 54-33g, which governs
the ‘‘[f]orfeiture of moneys and property related to [the]
commission of [a] criminal offense,’’ expressly provides
that it applies to forfeitures. The same is true with
respect to General Statutes § 54-36h, which governs the
‘‘[f]orfeiture of moneys and property related to [the]
illegal sale or exchange of controlled substances or
money laundering.’’ See also General Statutes § 54-36a
(f) and (g)25 (referring to forfeiture of seized property).
The omission of any reference to the term forfeiture in
the plain language of § 22-329a, taken together with the
existence of such references in statutes that do provide
for forfeiture proceedings, indicates an intent that ani-
mal welfare proceedings conducted pursuant to the
statute are not civil forfeiture proceedings. It necessar-
ily follows that, if the legislature intended proceedings
conducted pursuant to § 22-329a to be considered for-
feiture actions, it would have drafted the statute in a
manner similar to those forfeiture statutes. See Stone
v. East Coast Swappers, LLC, 337 Conn. 589, 606–607,
255 A.3d 851 (2020) (‘‘Our case law is clear . . . that
when the legislature chooses to act, it is presumed to
know how to draft legislation consistent with its intent
and to know of all other existing statutes . . . . [I]t is
a well settled principle of statutory construction that
the legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly
. . . or to use broader or limiting terms when it chooses
to do so . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.)).
For example, in State v. Richard P., 179 Conn. App.
676, 678, 181 A.3d 107, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 924, 181
25
Although § 54-36a was amended in 2023; see Public Acts 2023, No. 23-
79, § 51; that amendment has no bearing on this appeal. For simplicity, we
refer to the current revision of the statute.
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A.3d 567 (2018), the state argued on appeal that the
trial ‘‘court improperly dismissed the case because [the
state] had sufficiently represented to the court that a
material witness had ‘died, disappeared or became dis-
abled’ within the meaning of General Statutes § 54-56b
. . . .’’ In making that argument, the state asserted that
‘‘the phrase ‘has . . . become disabled’ should be con-
strued to be synonymous with ‘has . . . become
unavailable,’ as that term is typically used in related
contexts regarding witnesses.’’ Id., 685–86. This court
disagreed, reasoning: ‘‘The legislature has included the
term ‘unavailable’ with respect to witnesses in other
statutes. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 54-86l, 52-180,
52-148b (b) (1), 46b-129 (k) (4) and (5), and 17a-11 (f)
(5). Presumably, it chose not to do so when it enacted
§ 54-56b. ‘[A] court must construe a statute as written.
. . . Courts may not by construction supply omissions
. . . or add exceptions merely because it appears that
good reasons exist for adding them. . . . The intent of
the legislature, as this court has repeatedly observed,
is to be found not in what the legislature meant to say,
but in the meaning of what it did say. . . . It is axiom-
atic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to
accomplish a particular result. That is a function of
the legislature.’ . . . Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic
Diocesan Corp., 279 Conn. 207, 216, 901 A.2d 673 (2006).
‘‘This rule of statutory construction has been applied
vigorously in instances in which the legislature has
repeatedly employed a term in other statutes, but did
not use it in the provision to be construed. As our
Supreme Court stated in Viera v. Cohen, 283 Conn.
412, 431, 927 A.2d 843 (2007), ‘we underscore that the
legislature frequently has used the term withdrawal.
. . . Typically, the omission of a word otherwise used
in the statutes suggests that the legislature intended a
different meaning for the alternate term.’ . . . ‘Where
a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given
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provision, the omission of such provision from a similar
statute concerning a related subject . . . is significant
to show that a different intention existed.’ . . . Hatt
v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279, 310, 819
A.2d 260 (2003). Accordingly, we find it significant that
the legislature did not choose to include the term
‘unavailable’ in § 54-56b.
‘‘Moreover, in other statutes concerning witnesses,
the legislature explicitly has expressed its intent to
include circumstances in which a witness is beyond the
reach of process, or cannot be found, and thus cannot
be compelled to testify. For example, in General Stat-
utes § 52-160, the legislature provided that ‘[i]f any wit-
ness in a civil action is beyond the reach of the process
of the courts of this state, or cannot be found . . . [a
transcript of his or her recorded testimony in] a former
trial of the action . . . shall be admissible in evidence,
in the discretion of the court . . . .’ Presumably, the
legislature chose not to employ the same or similar
language in § 54-56b, thereby indicating an intent that
§ 54-56b sweep less broadly.’’ State v. Richard P., supra,
179 Conn. App. 688–89. The analysis in Richard P.
regarding legislative intent when a statute fails to
include a term that is present in other statutes applies
equally to the present case.
Furthermore, § 54-33g ‘‘provides for a civil action in
rem for the condemnation and [forfeiture] of the [prop-
erty] which was used in violation of the law. . . . In
such an action the guilt or innocence of the owner of
the [property] is not in issue. The only issue is whether
the [property] was used in violation of law. This follows
from the nature of the action which is one against the
res, an action in rem.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Connelly, 194 Conn. 589, 592, 483 A.2d
1085 (1984). A ‘‘forfeiture’’ is defined as a procedure
by which the government may divest a person of his
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or her property without compensation. Black’s Law Dic-
tionary (12th Ed. 2024) p. 789. ‘‘It is an area of the law
which is founded upon the many inherent fictions of
our jurisprudence. . . . As perhaps the most obvious
use of legal fiction, the civil forfeiture action is brought
directly against the property as [the] defendant. The
conceptual basis of the forfeiture is, quite basically,
that the property has perpetrated some wrong. . . .
Thus, as the action is against the property and not
the owner, the action is in rem in nature.’’ (Citations
omitted.) United States (Drug Enforcement Agency) v.
In re One 1987 Jeep Wrangler Automobile VIN No.
2BCCL8132HBS12835, 972 F.2d 472, 476 (2d Cir. 1992).
‘‘Modern civil-forfeiture statutes are plainly designed,
at least in part, to punish the owner of property used
for criminal purposes. See, e.g., Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, [618–19, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 125 L. Ed. 2d
488] (1993). When a [s]tate wishes to punish one of its
citizens, it ordinarily proceeds against the defendant
personally (known as in personam), and in many cases
it must provide the defendant with full criminal proce-
dural protections. Nevertheless . . . [the United States
Supreme] Court permits prosecutors seeking forfeiture
to proceed against the property (known as in rem) and
to do so civilly.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Leonard v. Texas,
580 U.S. 1178, 1179, 137 S. Ct. 847, 197 L. Ed. 2d 474
(2017) (statement of Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari).

Although animal welfare proceedings under § 22-329a
similarly are in rem actions, they differ from in rem
forfeiture actions principally in that the animals subject
to the custody order have not perpetrated some wrong,
nor were they used for criminal purposes. The statute
also is devoid of any language indicating that it is
designed to punish property owners who abuse or
neglect animals. Instead, the overarching purpose of
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§ 22-329a is to protect the welfare of animals. See Weth-
ersfield ex rel. Monde v. Eser, 211 Conn. App. 537, 551,
274 A.3d 203 (2022). In cases in which an animal control
officer takes physical custody of animals that are
neglected or cruelly treated, the owners must appear
in court to show cause why the court should not vest
in some suitable state, municipal or other public or
private agency or person the animal’s temporary care
and custody pending a hearing. If, after a hearing, it is
determined that the animal is not neglected or cruelly
treated, the court may cause the animal to be returned
to its owner. If custody of the animal is vested in the
state, the owner must pay any expenses incurred by
the state to provide proper food, shelter and care for
the animal, not as a punishment. See, e.g., Miller v.
Dept. of Agriculture, supra, 168 Conn. App. 269 n.16
(‘‘A municipality may assess on the owner [of a seized
animal] certain fees, including a nominal ‘redemption
fee’ for owners claiming a captured or impounded ani-
mal, and a payment representing the cost to the munici-
pality of quarantining a biting animal. General Statutes
§ 22-333. These fees, however, merely compensate a
municipality for costs incurred while impounding an
animal, and thus cannot be described as punitive in
nature.’’).

We note that the defendant’s briefing on this issue
is minimal. After citing federal case law holding that
the exclusionary rule applies to forfeiture cases, the
defendant simply asserts, in a conclusory fashion, that
‘‘because the civil forfeiture action brought under . . .
§ 22-329a (g) to seize the dogs in [the defendant’s] cus-
tody was to seize noncontraband property—domesti-
cated animals—the fourth amendment’s protections
apply to the seizures underlying the search.’’ She has
provided no Connecticut authority to support her posi-
tion that § 22-329a sets forth a procedure for civil forfei-
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ture. Therefore, in the absence of any authority demon-
26

strating that § 22-329a provides for a civil forfeiture
action, and keeping in mind that, ‘‘[w]hen construing a
statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and
give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature’’;
(internal quotation marks omitted) Lawrence v. Gude,
216 Conn. App. 624, 629, 285 A.3d 1198 (2022); we con-
clude that the plain language of § 22-329a indicates that
proceedings brought under the statute are not forfeiture
actions.27
26
In her appellate reply brief, the defendant asserts that ‘‘[t]he fourth
amendment’s exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings
brought to protect animal welfare, regardless of whether a crime is alleged.’’
In support thereof, she cites to out-of-state authority and to Plymouth Sedan.
As we have stated, Plymouth Sedan stands for the proposition that the
exclusionary rule applies to civil in rem forfeitures. Plymouth Sedan, how-
ever, involved a civil forfeiture proceeding of an automobile brought under
a Pennsylvania statute governing the forfeiture of vehicles used in the illegal
transportation of liquor. The other out-of-state authority on which the defen-
dant relies also is inapposite, as it does not suggest or in any way support the
assertion that proceedings under § 22-329a are civil forfeiture proceedings.
27
A consideration of other states’ statutes that are similar in purpose to
§ 22-329a provides support for our conclusion, as, even though proceedings
to seize animals in some states are considered forfeitures, the relevant
statutes, unlike § 22-329a, specifically refer to the forfeiture of animals. In
Illinois, for example, the Humane Care for Animals Act, 510 Ill. Comp. Stat.
70/3.04 (a) (West 2012), which ‘‘promotes the humane care and treatment
of animals and punishes . . . for violations thereof,’’ expressly provides for
the ‘‘forfeiture’’ of animals. People v. Koy, 13 N.E.3d 1260, 1266–67 (Ill. App.
2014). ‘‘Section 3.04 (a) provides that the [s]tate’s [a]ttorney may file a
‘petition for forfeiture prior to trial’ and that the only possible ramification
of the petition is the permanent forfeiture of the animals seized in conjunc-
tion with [an] arrest. . . . Section 3.04 (a) allows the [s]tate to take action
before trial, not [as a punishment] but, rather, in the spirit of the [a]ct, to
ensure the well-being and continued recovery of the injured animals.’’ Id.,
1267. Similarly, in Mississippi, state law ‘‘provides that ‘[a]ll courts in the
State of Mississippi may order the seizure of an animal by a law enforcement
agency, for its care and protection upon a finding of probable cause to
believe said animal is being cruelly treated, neglected or abandoned.’ Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-41-2 (1) (Rev. 2014). Subsection (2) allows an owner of a
seized animal to request a hearing within five days of the seizure ‘to determine
whether the owner is able to provide adequately for the animal and is fit
to have custody of the animal.’ Miss. Code Ann. § 97-41-2 (2) (Rev. 2014).
Subsection (3) provides a nonexhaustive list of what a court may consider
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Therefore, because an animal welfare proceeding
brought pursuant to § 22-329a does not constitute a
civil forfeiture, it is not subject to the exclusionary rule
pursuant to Plymouth Sedan.
C
Having determined that an animal welfare proceeding
brought pursuant to § 22-329a is not a civil forfeiture
proceeding, we now must determine whether such a
proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature. The United
States Supreme Court has described a ‘‘quasi-criminal’’
proceeding as one whose ‘‘object, like a criminal pro-
ceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense
against the law.’’ One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsyl-
vania, supra, 380 U.S. 700; see also Ahart v. Colorado
Dept. of Corrections, supra, 964 P.2d 520 (‘‘A proceeding
is quasi-criminal if it provides for punishment but is
civil in form. . . . The more similar the objective of a
civil proceeding to the purpose of criminal proceed-
ings—punishment for violations of the law—the more
likely exclusion of the evidence will foster deterrence.
Perhaps the clearest example of civil proceedings that
are quasi-criminal are government suits seeking forfei-
ture of non-contraband property based on the theory
in determining whether the owner is fit to have custody of an animal . . . .
Subsection (5) delineates the circumstances under which an animal may
be permanently forfeited: ‘If the court finds the owner of the animal is
unable or unfit to adequately provide for the animal or that the animal is
severely injured, diseased, or suffering, and therefore, not likely to recover,
the court may order that the animal be permanently forfeited and released
to an animal control agency, animal protection organization or to the appro-
priate entity to be euthanized or the court may order that such animal be
sold at public sale in the manner now provided for judicial sales; any pro-
ceeds from such sale shall go first toward the payment of expenses and
costs relating to the care and treatment of such animal, and any excess
amount shall be paid to the owner of the animal.’ Miss. Code Ann. § 97-41-
2 (5) (Rev. 2014).’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Dancy v. State, 287
So. 3d 931, 936–37 (Miss. 2020); see also Wn. Rev. Code § 16.52.200 (3)
(2020) (expressly providing for forfeiture of animal following conviction of
animal cruelty).
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that the owner used the property in the commission of
a criminal offense.’’ (Citation omitted.)).
We begin with the object of our state’s animal welfare
proceedings. The defendant argues that proceedings
pursuant to § 22-329a, unlike our child abuse and
neglect proceedings, are not remedial in nature. The
plaintiff counters that animal welfare actions ‘‘are
standalone, remedial civil actions designed to protect
animals against neglect and abuse.’’ We agree with the
plaintiff.
Unlike civil forfeiture actions, which are meant to
penalize the property owner,28 remedial actions are
those actions that are designed to protect the rights
and interests of a specific, often vulnerable, group. See
Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC, supra, 337 Conn.
600–601 (Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Gen-
eral Statutes § 42-110a et seq., is remedial measure
designed to protect public); First Federal Bank, FSB
v. Whitney Development Corp., 237 Conn. 679, 688, 677
A.2d 1363 (1996) (tenant protection statute is remedial
given its purpose to protect certain classes of tenants);
see also J.R.B. v. Dept. of Human Services, 633 N.W.2d
33, 39 (Minn. App. 2001) (remedial statutes are those
‘‘designed to protect a specific class of individuals’’ and
therefore shall be interpreted in favor of that class),
review denied, Minnesota Supreme Court (October 24,
2001); State ex rel. Ford v. Wenskay, 824 S.W.2d 99, 100
(Mo. App. 1992) (‘‘remedial statute is one ‘enacted for
the protection of life and property, or which intro-
duce[s] some new regulation conducive to the public
28
See Garrett v. Lehman, supra, 751 F.2d 1003 (‘‘The exclusionary rule
has been applied to forfeiture proceedings because they have been deemed
to be ‘quasi-criminal.’ . . . The [c]ourt continues to instruct us, however,
that the reason forfeiture proceedings are so characterized is that ‘forfeiture
is clearly a penalty for the criminal offense.’ [United States v. Janis, supra
428 U.S. 447 n.17], quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. [Pennsylvania,
supra, 380 U.S. 701] . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.)).
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good’ ’’). ‘‘[R]emedial statutes should be construed lib-
erally in favor of those whom the law is intended to
[protect, and] exceptions to those statutes should be
construed narrowly. . . . Commission on Human
Rights & Opportunities v. Edge Fitness, LLC, 342
Conn. 25, 37, 268 A.3d 630 (2022) . . . . [R]emedial
statutes must be afforded a liberal construction in favor
of those whom the legislature intended to benefit
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Russbach v. Yanez-Ventura, 213 Conn. App.
77, 102, 277 A.3d 874, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 902, 282
A.3d 465 (2022).
With respect to the purpose of an animal welfare
action, this court has stated previously that ‘‘it is clear
from the legislative history that the primary purpose of
§ 22-329a (a) is not the protection of the owner, but
rather the protection of animals from imminent harm.’’29
29
’’When discussing the 2007 amendment on the floor of the House of
Representatives, Representative Gerry Fox explained the origins of the
amendment: ‘This bill came to us from the Commissioner of Agriculture
and requested a change to the way that animal control officers currently
handle situations where animals are treated cruelly or neglected. Presently,
when an animal control officer sees a situation that may appear to be
dangerous to an animal, they’re required to go to court and get a warrant.
What this would allow is if there’s reasonable cause to believe that an animal
[is] in imminent harm of being cruelly or negligently treated, the animal
control officer may, at that time, seize the animal.’ 50 H.R. Proc., Pt. 25,
2007 Sess., p. 8077, remarks of Representative Gerry Fox. In support of the
legislation, Representative [Diana S.] Urban stated: ‘This bill makes it much
easier when there is an animal that is being subjected to cruel treatment
or a cruel situation to get in and to mitigate that situation and be able to
move the horse, the dog, the cat, the puppy, whatever it happens to be, out
of that situation and into a place where they will be able to receive the
treatment they need.’ Id., pp. 8078–79, remarks of Representative Diana
Urban. In the judiciary committee, the then Commissioner of Agriculture,
F. Philip Prelli, explained that ‘the Department of Agriculture is the lead
agency in investigation of animal cruelty and negligence. . . . Even if it’s
done on a local level, the department is involved with those. The primary
purpose of [this] legislative proposal is to better define and clarify the section
to enable animal control officers to take physical custody of animals that
animal control officers have a reasonable cause to believe are in imminent
harm and are neglected and/or being cruelly treated. One of the things that
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Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v. Eser, supra, 211 Conn.
App. 551. In light of the clear purpose of animal welfare
actions to protect the health and safety of animals, a
vulnerable class, such actions are remedial and not
punitive, and, thus, not quasi-criminal in nature.30 The
exclusionary rule, therefore, does not apply to animal
welfare actions on the basis of quasi-criminality.
D
Finally, we must determine whether, pursuant to the
Janis balancing test, the exclusionary rule applies to
animal welfare actions. This court previously applied
the Janis balancing test in Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn.
App. 395, 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff’d, 207 Conn. 565, 541
A.2d 504, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898, 109 S. Ct. 242, 102
L. Ed. 2d 230 (1988). In Payne, this court was faced
with the question of whether the exclusionary rule
should apply to probation revocation proceedings. We
we’ve noticed about the law that’s there, it’s been a while since it’s been
modified, and the language tends to be language that was written a number
of years ago. . . . Usually, the animal control officers will go in there and
try to work with the people to either get the animals fed, get the treatment
up right, so they’re treated correctly, and then go to the steps. And if they
still feel they need to take those steps, they will get a warrant first. So the
steps we’re defining here are never going to be the norm. But there are
times when our animal control officers will see an animal that is truly in
jeopardy of dying, and we’ve seen that. We’ve seen horses down, and we’ve
seen cows down, where we’ve had to try to seize those animals and then
go and get the court order. So what this does is then sets up the procedure
that will give us the opportunity to seize the animals. Then within [ninety-
six] hours, we will have to get a court order . . . .’ Conn. Joint Standing
Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 14, 2007 Sess., pp. 4422–23, remarks of
Commissioner of Agriculture F. Philip Prelli.’’ Wethersfield ex rel. Monde
v. Eser, supra, 211 Conn. App. 549–50.
30
This conclusion is also consistent with how this court has classified an
animal disposal action. See, e.g., Miller v. Dept. of Agriculture, supra, 168
Conn. App. 268–69 (‘‘An appeal of a disposal order for a biting animal
pursuant to [General Statutes] § 22-358 (c) is not a criminal prosecution.
The issuance of a disposal order under § 22-358 (c) does not, by itself, trigger
the imposition of a fine or prison term on the owner. Rather, by obviating
the threat that dangerous animals pose to the public, the provision is remedial
and civil in nature.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)).
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explained the Janis balancing test as follows: ‘‘The
exclusionary rule is . . . designed to deter future
unlawful conduct on the part of law enforcement offi-
cers, and therefore the rule is to be applied in those
instances when its deterrent purpose is likely to be
served. . . . So, in deciding whether to extend the
exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings we
must weigh the potential injury to the fact-finding pro-
cess as a result of the exclusion of relevant evidence
against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in
this context.’’31 (Citations omitted; footnote omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 398.
In addressing this claim, we first look to child protec-
tion proceedings for guidance, as they share important
similarities with animal welfare proceedings in that
both seek to protect a vulnerable class or group and
both are civil, and not quasi-criminal, in nature. See In
re Samantha C., supra, 268 Conn. 649 (child neglect
proceedings are civil and not quasi-criminal); In re Baby
Girl B., 224 Conn 263, 282, 618 A.2d 1 (1992) (concluding
that proceeding to terminate parental rights is civil
action).32 In In re Nicholas R., supra, 92 Conn. App.
321, this court concluded that the exclusionary rule
31
After applying that test, this court determined in Payne ‘‘that the poten-
tial injury to the function of the probation revocation proceedings substan-
tially outweighed the deterrent effect to be gained by applying the exclusion-
ary rule to [those] proceedings.’’ Payne v. Robinson, supra, 10 Conn. App.
400. Accordingly, we concluded in Payne that the exclusionary rule did not
apply to the probation revocation proceeding at issue. See id.
32
See also In re Felicia S., 1993 WL 576430, *9 (Conn. Super. May 21,
1993) (‘‘A significant purpose of the criminal justice system is to punish the
guilty. The purpose of child protection proceedings, however, is by definition
to protect children. Although a parent whose child has been committed to
[the Department of Children and Families] or whose parental rights have
been terminated may feel punished, that result is purely ancillary to the
fundamental purpose of protecting children. And, although the criminal
justice system may have some role to play in protecting the public and the
rights of individuals, its primary purpose is to adjudicate and punish the
guilty.’’), aff’d sub nom. In re Felicia D., 35 Conn. App. 490, 646 A.2d 862,
cert. denied, 231 Conn. 931, 649 A.2d 253 (1994).
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does not apply to a civil, child neglect proceeding. Simi-
larly, in Matter of Diane P., 110 App. Div. 2d 354, 494
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1985), appeal dismissed, 67 N.Y.2d 918,
492 N.E.2d 1235, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1986), the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York rejected the
application of the exclusionary rule to a child protection
proceeding. Specifically, the court concluded: ‘‘Upon
weighing the likely deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule against its detrimental impact upon the fact-finding
process and the [s]tate’s enormous interest in pro-
tecting the welfare of children, we conclude that the
rule should not be applied in [child protection] proceed-
ings. Rather, its deterrence purpose will be adequately
served by the fact that any evidence seized pursuant
to an illegal search will be inadmissible in any related
criminal proceeding.’’ Id., 354. In reaching that conclu-
sion, the court explained: ‘‘Principles of law designed
to protect the citizenry from improper police activities
should not be applied without regard to the grim reali-
ties that permeate certain types of situations. A child
abused by a parent is bereft of any refuge and is perhaps
the most helpless and powerless of all victims, betrayed
by the very person to whom he or she would most
naturally turn for succor. We deal here not with theoreti-
cal quibbles over abstract social concepts, but with the
urgent plight of those who most need the protective
hand of the [s]tate. We also emphasize that the effects
of applying the exclusionary rule in a child protective
proceeding would potentially be immeasurably more
devastating than is true of the typical criminal prosecu-
tion. Normally, in a criminal prosecution, if application
of the rule prevents the conviction of a guilty person,
the result will be that a past crime goes unpunished. It
is a price society has been willing to pay to prevent
unwarranted intrusions upon person or property. Here,
however, if application of the rule leads to an erroneous
finding that there has been no abuse, the result may be
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to condemn an innocent child to a life of pain and fear
or even to death . . . . Where the result would be so
abhorrent, utilization of a rule normally intended to
provide protection from illegal police activity is not
justifiable.
‘‘Nor does the potential impact upon a parent of a
child protective proceeding require application of the
rule. The possible consequences range from an order
placing the child under the supervision of a child protec-
tive agency while remaining in parental custody to tem-
porary removal of the child for an initial period of up
to [eighteen] months . . . . Certainly, such potential
interference in family relationships evokes the need for
limited constitutional protections, albeit not to the same
extent as would a proceeding to permanently remove
the child . . . . These potential consequences, how-
ever, are not intended to punish the parent, but rather
to protect the child. The effect on the parent is but a
necessary collateral result of the need to safeguard the
child. . . . The [l]egislature has specifically declared
that the purpose of a child protective proceeding is ‘to
help protect children from injury or mistreatment and
to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional
well-being’ and to act ‘on behalf of a child so that his
needs are properly met’ . . . . On balance, the [s]tate’s
interest in protecting abused children and the unthink-
able consequences to the children if they are left in the
hands of abusive parents far outweigh the potential
consequences to the parents.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id.,
357–58. Accordingly, the court concluded ‘‘that because
a child protective proceeding itself is not punitive in
nature and the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
will be adequately served by precluding use of the evi-
dence in any related criminal proceeding, the [s]tate’s
interest in protecting its children mandates the admissi-
bility of relevant evidence seized during an illegal
search.’’ Id., 358.
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In State ex rel. A.R. v. C.R., 982 P.2d 73 (Utah 1999),
the Supreme Court of Utah also addressed the applica-
bility of the exclusionary rule to a child protection pro-
ceeding. In doing so, the court stated: ‘‘In light of the
purpose of the exclusionary rule, as well as the [s]tate’s
interest in protecting children, it is improper to exclude
evidence discovered during a warrantless search in sub-
sequent child protection proceedings. State officials
confronting the possibility of child abuse or neglect—
emergencies that occasionally lead to child protection
proceedings—do not ordinarily seek to uncover incrim-
inating evidence during the warrantless searches inci-
dental to these investigations. There is little incentive
to violate the [f]ourth [a]mendment because these offi-
cers do not usually act with the object of obtaining
evidence for criminal prosecution.
‘‘There appears to be little likelihood that any sub-
stantial deterrent effect on unlawful police intrusion
would be achieved by applying the exclusionary rule to
child protection proceedings. Whatever deterrent effect
there might be is far outweighed by the need to provide
for the safety and health of children in peril. Although
it is difficult to empirically document the impact of the
exclusionary rule . . . the very paucity of exclusionary
rule cases in the context of child welfare proceedings
indicates that allegations of improperly obtained evi-
dence in such proceedings are rare. Thus, extension of
the exclusionary rule to such cases does not promise
to add significant protection to . . . [f]ourth [a]mend-
ment rights.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 78–79; see also In re Mary S., 186
Cal. App. 3d 414, 418, 230 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1986) (‘‘[a]
parent at a dependency hearing cannot assert the
[f]ourth [a]mendment exclusionary rule, since ‘the
potential harm to children in allowing them to remain
in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent
effect which would result from suppressing evidence’
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unlawfully seized’’), review denied, California Supreme
Court (December 3, 1986).
The reasoning underlying the refusal to apply the
exclusionary rule to child protection cases as set forth
in these cases can be analogized to the present animal
welfare action. Animals, like children, are part of a
vulnerable class, and the primary purpose of the animal
protection statute, § 22-329a, like the child protection
statutes, is to protect the safety and welfare of animals
that are subjected to neglect and cruel treatment. Ani-
mals are dependent on their owners to provide the
necessary food, shelter and care for their health and
well-being, and when they are subjected to abuse and
cruelty at the hands of their owners, they are helpless
and in need of the protective hand of the state. As this
court previously has stated, the state has a ‘‘significant
interest in protecting the welfare of neglected or cruelly
treated animals . . . .’’ Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v.
Eser, supra, 211 Conn. App. 558. If we were to apply
the exclusionary rule to cases in which the welfare of
an animal is threatened, we would prevent the state
from being able to offer crucial evidence related to the
neglect or abuse of animals that could be used to help
remove the animal from such an environment. Conse-
quently, the social cost resulting from application of the
exclusionary rule in this context is that the protection
of animals would be hindered.
With respect to any benefit, or the deterrent effect,
of applying the exclusionary rule in the present situa-
tion, we note that our Supreme Court previously has
stated that there is ‘‘only a marginal deterrent effect
. . . [in cases when] there [is] already a deterrent effect
created by the application of the rule to any criminal
proceedings, and because the use of evidence in a [civil]
proceeding falls outside a [law enforcement] officer’s
zone of primary interest . . . that exclusion of such
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evidence will not significantly affect a [law enforce-
ment] officer’s motivation in conducting a search.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jacobs, 229
Conn. 385, 391, 641 A.2d 1351 (1994). The deterrent
effect of applying the exclusionary rule in this context,
therefore, would be minimal. See Pennsylvania Board
of Probation & Parole v. Scott, supra, 524 U.S. 364
(discussing minimal deterrence benefit of applying
exclusionary rule to civil parole revocation hearing
because ‘‘application of the rule in the criminal trial
context already provides significant deterrence of
unconstitutional searches’’). Notably, there are analo-
gous criminal statutes, such as § 53-247, that allow for
the criminal prosecution of individuals who neglect or
abuse animals, and any criminal proceedings stemming
from violations of those statutes would, of course, be
subject to the exclusionary rule. As in Matter of Diane
P., we embrace the proposition that the use of illegally
seized evidence in an animal welfare case would not
impact a subsequent ‘‘related criminal prosecution
because normal application of the exclusionary rule
would in any event preclude use of that evidence in the
criminal prosecution.’’ Matter of Diane P., supra, 110
App. Div. 2d 358. Accordingly, the potential harm to
animals from allowing them to remain in an environ-
ment in which they are being neglected or cruelly
treated outweighs any deterrent effect that would result
from suppressing evidence unlawfully seized. More-
over, the minimal deterrent effect of applying the exclu-
sionary rule in the present case is substantially out-
weighed by the societal interest in having otherwise
reliable and relevant evidence concerning animal neglect
and cruelty presented at an animal welfare proceeding
seeking to remove the animal from such circumstances.
We also emphasize that, in the absence of imminent
harm to an animal, the typical procedure as set forth
under § 22-329a (b) for an animal control officer to
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enter a premises is by first obtaining a warrant.33 That
is the procedure established by the statute, and animal
control officers need to be properly trained to follow
that procedure. Our decision today does not condone
the warrantless entry of private residences.34 Instead,
we are charged with deciding whether, under the cir-
cumstances here, in which that procedure was not fol-
lowed, the exclusionary rule, which is a judicially cre-
ated doctrine that historically applies in the context of
criminal trials, should be extended and applied to the
present civil animal welfare proceeding. Our applica-
tion of the Janis balancing test leads us to conclude
that it should not, given that the application of the rule
33
See Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v. Eser, supra, 211 Conn. App. 550–51
(‘‘According to the legislative history, the process in § 22-329a (a) for taking
physical custody of animals in imminent harm is not the norm. Rather, the
usual process is codified in § 22-329a (b), which provides in relevant part
that ‘[a]ny animal control officer or regional animal control officer . . .
may take physical custody of any animal upon issuance of a warrant finding
probable cause that such animal is neglected or is cruelly treated . . . .’ ’’).
34
Indeed, such warrantless entries may subject an animal control officer
to civil liability for the illegal search and seizure, regardless of whether the
defendant can rely on illegally obtained evidence in this animal welfare
proceeding. See, e.g., Newsome v. Bogan, 617 F. Supp. 3d 133 (W.D.N.Y.
2022) (action by dog owner against, inter alia, police officers and animal
control officer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants searched
his apartment and seized his dogs without warrant in violation of fourth
amendment to federal constitution); Christensen v. Quinn, 45 F. Supp. 3d
1043 (D.S.D. 2014) (owner of dog breeding operation brought action against
various county and state officials, county’s animal control services provider,
and animal rights groups, under § 1983 alleging violations of his fourth
amendment rights); see also O’Neill v. Louisville/Jefferson Metro Govern-
ment, 662 F.3d 723, 727, 732 (6th Cir. 2011) (dog owners brought § 1983
action against various government officials, including director of city animal
control agency, alleging violations of fourth and fourteenth amendments
stemming from warrantless search of dog owners’ home and seizure of dogs).
This threat of civil liability will adequately deter animal control officers
from violating the fourth amendment, regardless of whether the exclusionary
rule applies in civil cases. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–98,
126 S. Ct. 2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006). The ‘‘additional marginal deterrence’’
of applying the exclusionary rule in this context would not ‘‘outweigh the
societal cost of excluding relevant evidence and decreasing the possibility
of obtaining accurate factual findings.’’ Jonas v. Atlanta, 647 F.2d 580, 588
(5th Cir. Unit B June 1981).
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would yield a minimal deterrence benefit while at the
same time it would frustrate and hinder the purpose
of our animal welfare statute and the protection of
animals.
Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling denying the defen-
dant’s motion in limine was legally and logically correct.
II
We now turn to the defendant’s claim that her right
to a jury trial under article first, § 19, of the Connecticut
constitution was violated. The defendant argues in sup-
port of this claim that the government may forfeit the
property of an individual only ‘‘if it allows [the individ-
ual] to contest that position in a court of law before a
jury,’’ and that because § 22-329a provides for a hearing
before a court only, as opposed to a jury trial, before
allowing the court to vest ownership of the animals with
the plaintiff, the statute violates her state constitutional
right to a jury trial. The defendant concedes that she
never requested a jury trial and, thus, that this claim
was not preserved but argues that it is reviewable pursu-
ant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d
823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn.
773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).
Our resolution of this claim is governed by this court’s
decision in Delahunty v. Targonski, 158 Conn. App.
741, 746–50, 121 A.3d 727 (2015). In Delahunty, ‘‘[t]he
sole claim raised by the plaintiff in her appeal [was]
that she was denied her state constitutional right to a
trial by a jury. Specifically, she argue[d] that the case
was claimed for a jury trial, albeit by [the third-party
defendants], and the denial of her right to a jury trial
constituted structural error. She concede[d] that th[e]
claim was not preserved and [sought] review under
State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40. See, e.g.,
State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 743, 91 A.3d 862 (2014)
(bedrock principle of appellate jurisprudence that
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appellate courts generally will not review unpreserved
claims made for first time on appeal). We conclude[d]
that, under the facts and circumstances of th[e] case,
she waived her right to a jury trial and therefore her
claim fail[ed] to satisfy the third prong of Golding.
‘‘In State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40, our
Supreme Court stated that ‘a defendant can prevail on
a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial
only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the
record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;
(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging
the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged
constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived
the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harm-
lessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond
a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these
conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail. The appellate
tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant’s
claim by focusing on whichever condition is most rele-
vant in the particular circumstances.’ . . . Golding
applies in civil as well as criminal cases. . . .
‘‘We are mindful that ‘[i]n the usual Golding situation,
the defendant raises a claim on appeal which, while
not preserved at trial, at least was not waived at trial.
. . . [A] constitutional claim that has been waived does
not satisfy the third prong of the Golding test because,
in such circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that
injustice [has been] done to either party . . . or that
the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and
. . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial. . . . To
reach a contrary conclusion would result in an ambush
of the trial court by permitting the defendant to raise
a claim on appeal that his or her counsel expressly had
abandoned in the trial court.’ . . . State v. Reddick,
153 Conn. App. 69, 80–81, 100 A.3d 439, [cert.] dis-
missed, 314 Conn. 934, 102 A.3d 85 [2014], and cert.
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denied, 315 Conn. 904, 104 A.3d 757 (2014); see also
Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62,
70–71, 967 A.2d 41 (2009); State v. Fabricatore, 281
Conn. 469, 481–83, 915 A.2d 872 (2007). Simply put, a
constitutional claim that has been waived does not sat-
isfy the third prong of Golding. . . .
‘‘We recently discussed waiver in the context of a
claim made pursuant to the Golding doctrine. ‘[W]aiver
is [t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment—
express or implied—of a legal right or notice. . . . In
determining waiver, the conduct of the parties is of
great importance. . . . [W]aiver may be effected by
action of counsel. . . . When a party consents to or
expresses satisfaction with an issue at trial, claims aris-
ing from that issue are deemed waived and may not be
reviewed on appeal. . . . Thus, [w]aiver . . . involves
the idea of assent, and assent is an act of understand-
ing. . . .
‘‘ ‘It is well established that implied waiver . . .
arises from an inference that the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily relinquished the right in question. . . .
Waiver does not have to be express . . . but may con-
sist of acts or conduct from which waiver may be
implied. . . . In other words, waiver may be inferred
from the circumstances if it is reasonable to do so. . . .
It also is well established that any such inference must
be based on a course of conduct. . . . Relevant cases
inform us that a criminal defendant may implicitly waive
one or more of his or her fundamental rights. . . . In
some circumstances, a waiver of rights must be know-
ing, voluntary and intelligent, and it must be expressly
made. . . . In other circumstances, waiver can be
implied . . . [and] [t]he waiver can be made by counsel
. . . .’ ’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Dela-
hunty v. Targonski, supra, 158 Conn. App. 746–49.
The court in Delahunty further stated: ‘‘In criminal
cases, our Supreme Court has held that the defendant
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must personally waive the fundamental right to a jury
trial and there must be some affirmative indication from
the defendant, on the record, that he or she knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily has waived the right to a
jury trial. State v. Gore, 288 Conn. 770, 777–78, [955]
A.2d 1 (2008). It also has recognized, however, that a
lower standard for waiving the right to a jury applies
in civil cases. L & R Realty v. Connecticut National
Bank, 246 Conn. 1, 14, 715 A.2d 748 (1998) (appropriate
to apply lower standard in determining enforceability
of prelitigation contractual jury trial waivers than for
waivers in criminal case); see also Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 94–95, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972)
(standards for waivers of rights in criminal case would
not necessarily apply to civil litigation).
‘‘A party may forfeit the right to a jury trial in a civil
case if the right is not asserted in a timely manner, may
abandon the right to a jury trial if he or she chooses a
forum that does not afford the right to a jury trial, or
may waive the right to a jury trial. L & R Realty v.
Connecticut National Bank, supra, 246 Conn. 10; see
Anastasia v. Mitsock, Superior Court, judicial district
of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2006 WL
3759402 (December 1, 2006) (42 Conn. L. Rptr. 453, 454)
(summary of law since 1899 that failure to claim civil
action to jury within thirty days of return date or within
ten days after an issue of fact has been joined amounts
to voluntary and intentional relinquishment of right to
jury trial); see also General Statutes §§ 51-239b and
52-215.
‘‘In the present matter, the plaintiff did not claim the
case for a jury trial. The . . . [third-party] defendants,
filed the claim for a jury trial. On April 18, 2013, the
[third-party defendants] filed a motion for a court trial
and certified that a copy of their motion was sent to
the plaintiff’s counsel. In a handwritten notation dated
April 29, 2013, the court granted the . . . motion by
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agreement and noted that the plaintiff’s counsel was
present. The motion to withdraw the [third-party] com-
plaint was filed by the defendants on May 31, 2013.
Most importantly, the plaintiff appeared for a trial by the
court and never raised any objection to the proceedings,
namely, the absence of a jury. We conclude that, under
the facts and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff
waived her constitutional right to a jury trial.’’ (Foot-
notes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dela-
hunty v. Targonski, supra, 158 Conn. App. 749–50.
This court explained further in Delahunty that ‘‘[t]he
failure of the plaintiff to raise an objection at the start
of the court trial, after receiving notice that the [third-
party] defendant had moved for a court trial and that
there had been no jury selection, combined with her
active and full participation in the ensuing trial, indi-
cate[d] that she had acquiesced to a court trial and
correspondingly relinquished her right to a jury trial.
She failed to object at the start of the court trial, when
there was time to present the matter to the court, so
that a possible error could be addressed and corrected if
necessary. Instead, she remained silent and participated
fully in the court trial. Only after receiving nominal
damages did the plaintiff seek to exercise her right to
a jury trial. Put another way, the plaintiff now seeks a
proverbial second bite at the apple after receiving an
award that was less than she had hoped for. We cannot
endorse such a tactic, as it amounts to an ambush of
both the trial court and the opposing party. We will not
reward the plaintiff with a new trial based on a situation
that was caused in part by her failure to raise an objec-
tion. . . . We conclude that, under these facts and cir-
cumstances, the plaintiff waived her right to a jury trial.
As a result, her claim fails under the third prong of
Golding.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 751–52.
As in Delahunty, the defendant in the present case
never requested a jury trial. Moreover, she failed to
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raise any objection prior to the commencement of the
hearing before the court and she actively participated
in it. On this basis, we conclude that the defendant
waived her claim that she was entitled to a jury trial
under the state constitution. As a result, she cannot
demonstrate a constitutional violation under the third
prong of Golding.35 Her claim, therefore, fails.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

35
In light of our determination that the defendant waived her unpreserved
jury trial claim, we need not reach the merits of her claim that she has a
right to a jury trial under the state constitution in an animal welfare action
pursuant to § 22-329a, nor do we need to address the case relied on by the
defendant in her notice of supplemental authority—Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Jarkesy, U.S. , 144 S. Ct. 2117, 219 L. Ed. 2d 650
(2024)—which concerns the right to a jury trial under the seventh amend-
ment to the federal constitution.