Taylor v. Taylor

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Taylor v. Taylor
CHARLENE TAYLOR ET AL. v.
THADDEUS TAYLOR
(AC 48455)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Clark, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the plain-
tiffs’ application for discharge of a mechanic’s lien. The defendant claimed,
inter alia, that the court improperly granted the plaintiffs’ application on
the ground that it was not served on the plaintiffs in the manner required
by statute. Held:
This court, having reviewed the record of the proceedings before the trial
court, the defendant’s brief, and the legal principles that applied to the
defendant’s claims on appeal, concluded that those claims were without merit.
Argued March 24—officially released May 5, 2026
Procedural History
Application to discharge a mechanic’s lien on certain
real property owned by the plaintiffs, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Hartford, where the court, Shaikh, J., denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss; thereafter, the case was
tried to the court, Chavey, J.; judgment granting the
application, from which the defendant appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Thaddeus Taylor, self-represented, the appellant
(defendant).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The defendant, Thaddeus Taylor,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting
the application for discharge of a mechanic’s lien filed by
the plaintiffs, Charlene Taylor and Elizabeth Taylor. On
appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly
(1) denied his motion to dismiss the application to dis-
charge the mechanic’s lien wherein he argued that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to file the application
because they were not the owners of the subject property,
and (2) granted the plaintiffs’ application to discharge

Taylor v. Taylor
the mechanic’s lien on the ground that it was not served
on the plaintiffs in the manner required by statute. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are relevant to our consideration
of this appeal. The plaintiffs are the coadministrators
of the estate of Charles Taylor, Jr., who died in March,
2024. The defendant is the brother of Charles Taylor, Jr.
On May 21, 2024, the defendant filed a mechanic’s lien
on the property that was owned by Charles Taylor, Jr.,
at 44 Guilford Street in Hartford. On July 19, 2024, the
plaintiffs filed an application to discharge the mechanic’s
lien that the defendant had placed on the property on
the ground that “[t]here was no proper notice and [they]
were not served.”
On August 14, 2024, the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the application on the ground that the plaintiffs
lacked standing because they were not the rightful own-
ers of the property. The plaintiffs filed an objection to
the defendant’s motion to dismiss, asserting that they
had standing as coadministrators of the estate of Charles
Taylor, Jr. Following a hearing, the court, Shaikh, J.,
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.1 The court
explained: “All parties agreed that the [plaintiffs] are
both cofiduciaries/administrators of the late Charles
Taylor, Jr. The court took judicial notice of the fidu-
ciary decree/order to this effect and marked it as a court
exhibit. All parties testified that at the time of his death,
the subject property, 44 Guilford [Street], Hartford
. . . was titled in the name of [Charles Taylor, Jr.]. As
coadministrators [of his estate], the [plaintiffs] have
authority pursuant to [General Statutes] § 45a-321 for
possession, care and control of the property, thereby
granting them standing to bring this application.” The
defendant thereafter filed a motion to reargue, which
the court summarily denied.
Thereafter, on February 6, 2025, the court, Chavey,
J., held a hearing on the application to discharge the
1 The defendant did not provide to this court the transcript of this
hearing.

Taylor v. Taylor
mechanic’s lien. At the outset of that hearing, the court
directed the defendant’s attention to the application to
discharge and the plaintiffs’ claim therein that they did
not receive notice or service of the filing of the mechanic’s
lien. When the court asked the defendant what evidence
he intended to present to prove that he had served the
mechanic’s lien on the plaintiffs within thirty days of
its filing, the defendant submitted into evidence a letter,
dated April 26, 2024, and addressed to the plaintiffs at
175 Roosevelt Street in Hartford. The letter stated, in
part, “I’m writing this demand notice to you [as] fiducia-
ries for the [e]state of Charles Taylor, Jr. . . . [and seeking
payment of] $38,000 plus $8,000 for all the work [per-
formed] at 44 Guilford Street . . . .” At the conclusion of
the hearing, the court granted the plaintiffs’ application
to discharge the mechanic’s lien on the ground that the
defendant failed to establish probable cause that it was
served in the manner required by statute.2 The defendant
2 The court issued its ruling from the bench, and it was memorial-
ized in a written order on February 13, 2025. In that order, the court
explained, inter alia: “At a conference on January 28, 2025, the court
discussed with the parties the upcoming hearing on the application to
discharge the lien. The court expressly noted that the [plaintiffs] were
contesting notice and service and asked [the defendant] if he was pre-
pared to proceed on those issues. He confirmed that he was. The court
also noted, pursuant to the language of [General Statutes] § 49-35b
(a), that [the defendant] as lienor ‘shall first be required to establish
that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of his lien.’ [The
defendant] indicated his understanding that he bore this burden of
proof and stated he was prepared to present evidence for that purpose.
“The court held an evidentiary hearing on the application on Febru-
ary 6, 2025. [The defendant] offered his sworn testimony as well as
numerous exhibits.
“At the commencement of the hearing, the court again noted that the
application at issue challenged notice and service of the lien, and [the
defendant] confirmed that his evidence would focus on those issues.
[The defendant] offered the mechanic’s lien into evidence, and the court
admitted it, over the [plaintiffs’] objection. The lien indicates that it was
filed against Charles Taylor, Jr., at 175 Roosevelt Street in Hartford,
as owner of the property at 44 Guilford Street. The evidence indicated
that Charles Taylor, Jr., had died on March 6, 2024.
“[The defendant] also offered into evidence a letter dated April 26,
2024, and addressed to the [plaintiffs] at 175 Roosevelt Street in Hart-
ford; the court admitted it, over the [plaintiffs’] objection. In his

Taylor v. Taylor
thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
court summarily denied.
As noted previously in this opinion, the defendant
challenges on appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss
wherein he argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to file the application to discharge the mechanic’s lien
and the granting of the application to discharge the
mechanic’s lien. We have reviewed the record of the
proceedings before the trial court, the defendant’s brief
to this court3 and the legal principles that apply to the
defendant’s claims on appeal and conclude that those
claims are without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.
sworn testimony, [the defendant] stated [that] he made a request to the
[plaintiffs] for payment by sending the letter dated April 26, 2024. The
letter’s subject line states: ‘Re: Estate of Charles Taylor Jr.; Request
immediate Payment for work done at 44 Guilford Street, Hartford,
CT [$38,000 plus $8000].’ The letter states, in part, ‘I’m writing this
demand notice to you [as] fiduciaries for the Estate of Charles Taylor
Jr.’ and seeking payment of $38,000 plus $8000 for work performed at
44 Guilford Street. The letter continued, ‘if I do not receive my payment
entirely or you contact me and make acceptable arrangements within the
[seven] days, I will have no other choice but to file a lien of the property
and file a civil lawsuit in regards to this matter.’ [The defendant] testi-
fied that the [plaintiffs] declined to discuss the matter with him or to
pay the requested amount.
“Following [the defendant’s] completion of his presentation of evidence
on February 6, 2025, and as stated on the record on that date, the court
finds that the mechanic’s lien is invalid because [the defendant] failed
to establish probable cause that it was served in the manner required
by statute. He did not offer evidence that service of the lien was made
on the property owner within thirty days of May 21, 2024. The issue of
service was not addressed in the evidence, and the April 26, 2024 let-
ter, which predated the filing of the lien, does not meet the statutory
requirements for service.
“After the court stated its ruling on the record on February 6, 2025,
[the defendant] argued that he could have presented evidence of ser-
vice and suggested that he be allowed to do so. The court denied this
request, as [the defendant] had a full and fair opportunity to meet
his statutory burden as lienor and presented no basis for the court to
afford him further opportunity to meet his burden, especially given
the express discussion of the issues of notice and service at the Janu-
ary 28, 2025 conference and at the beginning of the February 6, 2025
evidentiary hearing.”
3 The plaintiffs did not file an appellate brief.