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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
RANDY A. WRIGHT v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 46768)
Elgo, Moll and Clark, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who had been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree
and other crimes, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas
court’s judgment denying in part his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly rejected his claim that his
criminal trial counsel, F, rendered ineffective assistance by advising him to
flee the state during trial or by leading him to believe that it was in his best
interest to do so. Held:
The habeas court did not err in concluding that the petitioner failed to
establish that F rendered ineffective assistance with respect to his alleged
advice about fleeing the state, as the court’s factual findings, including its
finding that F did not advise the petitioner to flee, were well supported by
the evidence, which this court would not reweigh in a manner that under-
mined the habeas court’s conclusions.
This court could not conclude that the habeas court’s incorrect ruling, which
precluded the petitioner from testifying as to alleged statements F made
about fleeing the state, was so fundamentally unfair as to deny the petitioner
his due process right to a fair trial, as, although the proffered testimony
was admissible nonhearsay that was offered not for its truth but to prove
the nature of F’s advice and the effect it had on the petitioner, the habeas
court permitted the petitioner to testify at length as to the substance of that
advice, his understanding of that advice, and the actions he took in reliance
thereon, even if he was not permitted to recount the exact words F used.
The petitioner’s contention that the habeas court improperly failed to con-
sider certain evidence that supported his claim that F rendered ineffective
assistance in connection with his trial performance was unavailing, as the
court did not err in concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that
he was prejudiced by F’s cross-examination of a physician who testified for
the state, which did not amount to, as the petitioner claimed, an admission
that he engaged in unlawful sexual contact with the victim or that it gave
the prosecutor an opportunity to graphically explain to the jury the anatomy
of sexual penetration, and there was no basis to support the petitioner’s
claim that the victim’s statement to the police, which F had offered into
evidence at the criminal trial but which was not offered into evidence at
the habeas trial, was so prejudicial that it impacted the jury’s verdict or
that the state relied heavily on it to support its case.

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This court declined to review the petitioner’s unpreserved claims that the
habeas court improperly failed to address F’s statements and actions after
the petitioner failed to appear in court in determining whether F rendered
ineffective assistance or had a conflict of interest and that F rendered
ineffective assistance at the petitioner’s sentencing proceeding, as none of
those claims were presented to the habeas court.
(One judge concurring in part)
Argued November 21, 2024—officially released October 21, 2025
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Tolland and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment
denying the petition in part, from which the petitioner,
on the granting of certification, appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Dina S. Fisher, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(petitioner).
Danielle Koch, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Anne F. Mahoney, state’s attorney,
Angela Macchiarulo, supervisory assistant state’s attor-
ney, and Susan Campbell, assistant state’s attorney, for
the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
CLARK, J. In the criminal trial underlying this habeas
corpus matter, the petitioner, Randy A. Wright, was
convicted and sentenced in absentia after he absconded
during trial following the first day of evidence. Follow-
ing the granting of his petition for certification to
appeal, the petitioner appeals from the judgment of the
habeas court denying in part his amended petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims
that the habeas court erred by (1) rejecting his claim
that he was deprived of his right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel when his trial counsel allegedly
advised him to flee the state during trial, (2) precluding
him from testifying as to the substance of that alleged

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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
advice, (3) failing to consider certain evidence relevant
to his claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assis-
tance in connection with his handling of the trial, (4)
failing to address whether trial counsel’s alleged con-
cealment from the trial court of his role in the petition-
er’s decision to flee constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel and/or a conflict of interest, and (5) failing
to address whether he was deprived of his right to the
effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. We affirm
the judgment of the habeas court.
The following facts and procedural history, as set
forth by this court in the petitioner’s direct appeal and
as found by the habeas court, are relevant to our resolu-
tion of this appeal. ‘‘The victim 1 was born on September
14, 1998, and the [petitioner] was born on September
24, 1973. The [petitioner] was a friend of the victim’s
father, T, and the victim had known the [petitioner] for
her entire life. T and the victim’s mother, G, are
divorced. Following the divorce, T moved out of the
family home, and the victim and her sister continued
to reside with G. The [petitioner] began a romantic
relationship with G and moved into the home, at which
point in time the victim was approximately nine years
old. Beginning when she was nine years old, and at
least once per week for several years after that, the
[petitioner] touched the victim inappropriately when
the two of them were in her bedroom. The touching
began as a back massage during which the [petitioner]
1 In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline
to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be
ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.

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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
removed the victim’s bra, but eventually progressed to
touching the victim’s breasts and clitoris.
‘‘Although the victim and the [petitioner] were largely
alone when this touching occurred, on one occasion a
family friend, A, who was residing in the home, walked
in on the two of them and observed the [petitioner]
without a shirt on, laying on the victim’s bed with the
victim in a ‘cuddling position.’ A ran out of the room
and downstairs to tell G what she had seen, but the
[petitioner] ran out after her and denied wrongdoing;
an argument ensued. G did not believe A and did not
call the police. On another occasion, the victim told her
former boyfriend, C, that the [petitioner] had touched
her breasts and ‘fingered’ her but made C promise not
to tell anyone. The [petitioner’s] touching of the victim
continued until approximately September, 2012, at
which point the victim moved out of the home and went
to live with T. The following month, the victim told T
that the [petitioner] had touched her inappropriately,
and T subsequently took the victim to the police station
so that she could make a statement. In her statement,
the victim described an occasion on which the [peti-
tioner] had given her a back massage, undone her bra,
and touched her vagina. She also stated that the [peti-
tioner] had removed her bra on several occasions in
the past.’’ (Footnote in original; footnote omitted.) State
v. Wright, 235 Conn. App. 143, 146–48, 	A.3d
(2025).
The petitioner subsequently was arrested and charged
with sexual assault in the first degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2), sexual assault in the
second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71
(a) (1), and two counts of risk of injury to a child
in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). The
petitioner retained Attorney Vincent Fazzone to repre-
sent him at trial. ‘‘[The petitioner’s] criminal trial began
on November 5, 2014. The next day, [the petitioner]

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filed a motion for [a] mistrial and to fire [Fazzone]
and asked for a continuance of thirty days to hire new
counsel. [The trial court, Swords, J.] denied his motions
for [a] mistrial and continuance [and informed the peti-
tioner that if he did not want Fazzone to continue to
represent him, he could represent himself, with Fazzone
as standby counsel]. The matter was continued to
November 10, 2014, to give [the petitioner] time to [decide
whether he wanted to represent himself and, if so, to
prepare his defense]. . . .
‘‘On November 10, 2014, [the petitioner] failed to
appear in court. [Fazzone] moved for a mistrial, which
was denied by Judge Swords, who also deemed [the
petitioner’s] presence waived. The trial proceeded with-
out [the petitioner], and, on that same day, he was found
guilty by the jury. On January [6], 2015, Judge Swords
sentenced [the petitioner] in absentia [to twenty years
of incarceration followed by twenty-five years of special
parole]. [The petitioner] was apprehended in January,
2015, in Virginia and brought back to Connecticut to
serve his sentence.’’
The petitioner commenced this action by filing a self-
represented petition for a writ of habeas corpus on
November 4, 2016. On October 7, 2019, the petitioner
filed the operative amended petition, which contained
two counts. In count one, the petitioner alleged that
Fazzone had provided ineffective assistance by advising
him to flee the state to avoid prosecution and that
the trial would stop in his absence. In count two, the
petitioner alleged that Fazzone had provided ineffective
assistance in various ways in connection with his con-
duct of the trial, and by failing to file an application for
sentence review and an appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
On May 3, 2023, the habeas court, Bhatt, J., held a
trial on the petition, at which the petitioner testified on

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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
his own behalf and presented the testimony of Fazzone.
The petitioner also introduced several exhibits, includ-
ing the transcripts and the courthouse clerk’s file from
his underlying criminal trial. The respondent, the Com-
missioner of Correction, called no witnesses, intro-
duced no exhibits, and did not file a posttrial brief. The
petitioner filed a posttrial brief on June 2, 2023.
On June 6, 2023, the habeas court issued a memoran-
dum of decision granting the petition as to the petition-
er’s claims that Fazzone had provided ineffective assis-
tance by failing to file an application for sentence review
and an appeal but denying all other claims. The court
rendered judgment restoring the petitioner’s right to
file an application for sentence review and to appeal
from the judgment of conviction and denying the
remaining claims.2 The petitioner subsequently filed a
petition for certification to appeal, which the court
granted.3 The petitioner filed the present appeal on
August 7, 2023. Additional facts and procedural history
will be set forth as necessary.
Before addressing the petitioner’s individual claims
on appeal, we begin by setting forth the general legal
principles relevant to the petitioner’s ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims. ‘‘The sixth amendment pro-
vides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
2 After the habeas court restored the petitioner’s right to appeal, on August
3, 2023, the petitioner appealed from his conviction to our Supreme Court,
which transferred the matter to this court on February 15, 2024. Following
oral argument in the present appeal, we entered an order sua sponte staying
this appeal pending final resolution of the petitioner’s direct appeal from
his conviction. We issued our decision in the petitioner’s direct appeal on
September 16, 2025; see State v. Wright, supra, 235 Conn. App. 144; after
which we entered an order lifting the stay in the present appeal.
3 The habeas court initially denied the petition for certification to appeal
on June 20, 2023. On November 9, 2023, the petitioner filed a motion for
rectification and articulation regarding various aspects of the court’s memo-
randum of decision. On November 30, 2023, after a hearing on that motion,
the court vacated its previous denial and granted the petition for certification
to appeal.

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enjoy the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
U.S. Const., amend. VI. This right is incorporated to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d
799 (1963).’’ Davis v. Commissioner of Correction, 319
Conn. 548, 554, 126 A.3d 538 (2015), cert. denied sub
nom. Semple v. Davis, 578 U.S. 941, 136 S. Ct. 1676,
194 L. Ed. 2d 801 (2016). Most ineffective assistance
of counsel claims are governed by the two part test
established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). ‘‘Under
the two-pronged Strickland test, a [petitioner] can only
prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if
he proves that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient,
and (2) the deficient performance resulted in actual
prejudice. . . . To demonstrate deficient performance,
a [petitioner] must show that counsel’s conduct fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness for com-
petent attorneys. . . . To demonstrate actual preju-
dice, a [petitioner] must show a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different but for counsel’s errors.’’ (Citations omitted.)
Davis v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 555.
‘‘Strickland recognized, however, that [i]n certain
[s]ixth [a]mendment contexts, prejudice is presumed.
. . . In [United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659–60,
104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984)] . . . which
was decided on the same day as Strickland, the United
States Supreme Court elaborated on the following three
scenarios in which prejudice may be presumed: (1)
when counsel is denied to a [petitioner] at a critical
stage of the proceeding; (2) when counsel entirely fails
to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful advers-
arial testing; and (3) when counsel is called upon to
render assistance in a situation in which no competent

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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
attorney could do so. . . . In Cronic, the court rea-
soned that such situations indicate that there has been
a denial of [s]ixth [a]mendment rights that makes the
adversary 	process 	itself 	presumptively 	unreliable.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Cancel v. Commissioner of Correction, 189 Conn. App.
667, 697–98, 208 A.3d 1256, cert. denied, 332 Conn. 908,
209 A.3d 644 (2019). ‘‘Our state jurisprudence has recog-
nized that Cronic must be interpreted narrowly and
applied rarely.’’ Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction,
324 Conn. 631, 649, 153 A.3d 1264 (2017). As our
Supreme Court has explained, the Strickland standard
applies in cases involving ‘‘specific errors in representa-
tion, for which counsel can provide some reasonable
explanation,’’ whereas Cronic applies when counsel
‘‘complete[ly] fail[s] to advocate for a defendant . . .
such that no explanation could possibly justify such
conduct . . . .’’ Davis v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 319 Conn. 556.
I
We first address the petitioner’s claims relating to
count one of his amended habeas petition.4 The peti-
tioner claims that the habeas court erred in concluding
that he failed to establish that Fazzone had rendered
ineffective assistance by either advising the petitioner
to flee the state or leading him to believe that it was
in his best interest to flee. The petitioner also claims,
in the alternative, that the court violated his right to
due process by precluding him from testifying as to the
substance of Fazzone’s alleged advice. The petitioner
therefore argues that, if we reject his claim that the
court erred in concluding that he failed to establish
that Fazzone rendered ineffective assistance as alleged
under count one of the amended petition, we should
4 We address the petitioner’s claims in a different order than they appear
in his principal appellate brief.

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remand the case for a new trial on that count. We
disagree with both of the petitioner’s claims.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to the petitioner’s claims pertaining to
count one of his amended habeas petition. In support
of count one, the petitioner alleged that, after a hearing
on a motion he made to remove Fazzone as counsel,
Fazzone had ‘‘advised [him] that the case was not pro-
ceeding in a manner consistent with the petitioner’s
best interests,’’ ‘‘gave the petitioner his case file and
gave back $500 of the money [that] the petitioner had
paid [Fazzone],’’ and ‘‘told the petitioner that he would
need his case file because ‘you need it for a new attor-
ney.’ ’’ The petitioner further alleged that Fazzone had
‘‘instructed the petitioner to flee the [state] so as to
avoid further prosecution and his possible conviction,’’
and ‘‘advised the petitioner that the court would stop
the trial if he fled . . . [and] that the delay caused by
[his] flight would give the petitioner the necessary time
to retain another lawyer to represent him at a suc-
ceeding trial on the same charges.’’ The petitioner also
alleged that Fazzone had gone to the petitioner’s house
the following day, where he ‘‘gave [the petitioner] an
additional amount of cash,’’ ‘‘discussed the petitioner
fleeing during his trial,’’ and ‘‘suggested to the petitioner
that he purchase a ‘burner phone’ and change his hair
color.’’ The petitioner alleged that he ‘‘followed Faz-
zone’s advice and left Connecticut 	. 	. 	. 	under the
belief that the trial would stop, and [that] he would
have the ability in the [future] to hire new counsel,’’
and that Fazzone’s advice had amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel.
At the habeas trial, Fazzone testified about his inter-
actions with the petitioner between November 6, 2014,
when the court heard the petitioner’s motion to remove
Fazzone as counsel, and November 10, 2014, when the
petitioner failed to appear for trial. Fazzone testified

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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
that, after the hearing on November 6, he met with the
petitioner in a courthouse conference room and outside
the courthouse, where the petitioner expressed dissatis-
faction with Fazzone’s performance and the progress
of the trial. Fazzone acknowledged that the topic of the
petitioner fleeing was discussed during that meeting
but testified that he ‘‘did not in any way advise [the
petitioner] to flee . . . .’’ Fazzone also testified that,
at some point during that meeting, he refunded the
petitioner $500 from the amount the petitioner had paid
toward his fee. He testified that the petitioner recently
had paid him $500 and that he ‘‘didn’t feel that it was
fair that I . . . should keep any money that [the peti-
tioner] had just given me for . . . future representation
if [he was] going to hire new counsel.’’ Fazzone testified
that he refunded the petitioner that money so he could
use it ‘‘as a retainer for another attorney.’’ Fazzone also
testified that he gave the petitioner ‘‘as much . . . of
the discovery as I could in the event that [the petitioner]
wanted to meet with another attorney and have . . .
at least a copy.’’
Fazzone also acknowledged that, sometime between
November 6 and 10, 2014, he had gone to the petitioner’s
home to retrieve some paperwork that had been mixed
in with the files he gave to the petitioner and that the
topic of the petitioner fleeing the state was discussed
again at that time. Fazzone testified that the petitioner
‘‘had mentioned . . . that he was intending maybe to
just get out of town’’ and that he advised the petitioner
‘‘not to do that.’’ He also testified that, while at the
petitioner’s apartment, he noticed that the petitioner
was packing his belongings, and that the petitioner had
told him that he was packing because he ‘‘wanted to
be prepared’’ and ‘‘was just getting everything together,
all of his belongings in the event that he had to do jail
time . . . .’’ Fazzone also testified that he gave the
petitioner an additional $100 at that time because the

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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
petitioner had told him ‘‘[t]hat he had contacted several
attorneys, but they wanted . . . more money than [the]
$500 [that Fazzone had already given him].’’
Fazzone also was questioned about prior deposition
testimony he had given in a legal malpractice action that
the petitioner had filed against him. 5 In that deposition,
Fazzone was asked whether he ‘‘ ‘may have inadver-
tently’ ’’ led the petitioner to believe ‘‘ ‘that his absence
from . . . court might be in his best interest . . . .’ ’’
Fazzone testified in the deposition: ‘‘Well, yeah, perhaps
inadvertently because the money was given back to
[the petitioner] after . . . he was discussing fleeing on
his case. . . . [H]e was very upset. He was tired. I’d
say even crying. I felt sympathy for him. So, I said I
understand . . . you thinking that way, but I strongly
advise you against it. So, is it possible? You know,
maybe. . . . I said the police are going to be looking
for you, your cell phone. They’re going to be talking to
your family members and your friends, and 	. 	. 	.
they’re very good at finding fugitives, particularly with
these charges. So, maybe . . . inadvertently . . . but
I did make it clear that I strongly advise against it.’’
The petitioner testified that, after the hearing on his
motion to remove Fazzone as counsel, he met with
Fazzone in the conference room at the courthouse.
When the petitioner’s habeas counsel asked the peti-
tioner what he and Fazzone discussed during that meet-
ing, however, the respondent’s counsel objected on
hearsay grounds. The following colloquy ensued:
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I’m going
to object. This is hearsay.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: . . . [F]irst of all, I think
some of these things have already been said by [Faz-
zone]. Second, these are conversations between the
5 The petitioner subsequently withdrew the legal malpractice action.

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attorney and client . . . so that . . . [the petitioner]
is explaining what he was discussing with his attorney.
And this is . . . directly leading into the conversations
about the advice regarding his flight.
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: It’s still hearsay, Judge.
He can ask him what his impression was after their
conversations . . . .
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: I think his impression
without knowing what was said—
‘‘The Court: You can ask him what his understanding
was . . . or what he felt about the progress of the trial,
[Fazzone’s] performance, advice he was given.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. I can
phrase it that way.’’
Thereafter, the petitioner’s counsel conformed his
questioning to the habeas court’s ruling that he could
ask the petitioner about his understanding of Fazzone’s
advice. Regarding the meeting with Fazzone in the con-
ference room, the following colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: . . . [C]oming back to
the conversation in the conference room. You had a
discussion with [Fazzone] about how the trial was
going. Is that right?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. How long was this
conversation . . . ?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Probably a good half hour or so.
. . . Or longer.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: After the conversation
ended, what was your impression of what was happen-
ing in the case?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: That it wasn’t going well.

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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. Did you discuss
any plans for your future representation?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes. . . .
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: When you were dis-
cussing the plan for your future representation [Faz-
zone] gave you some advice. Is that right? . . .
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: . . . Okay. After he gave
you that advice, what was the impression you were left
with? Don’t say exactly what he said, but what is it that
you understood from that conversation?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: My impression, what I understood
from that conversation was that, when I left, the trial
would stop, and that would give me a chance to get a
new attorney to go back to it, but it would stop. . . .
[T]here wouldn’t be anything going on after that.’’
Regarding the conversation with Fazzone outside the
courthouse, the following colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: . . . Were you given
advice during the conversation [outside the court-
house]?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: All right. What was your
impression of the advice you were given?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: My impression was to leave, get
the burner [phone], change the hair, and everything
would stop.’’
Regarding the reason for Fazzone giving him $600
and a copy of the discovery from his file, the following
colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: 	. 	. 	. 	[W]hat is your
understanding as to why he gave you the money?

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‘‘[The Petitioner]: Part of my understanding . . . of
why he gave me the money, partly so I could have gas
money just to go, to leave.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. And what is your
understanding as to why he gave you the file?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: It’s my understanding he gave me
the file because, when my trial stopped, I could give
that file to the new attorney.’’
Regarding Fazzone’s advice during the conversation
at the petitioner’s apartment, the following colloquy
occurred:
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Did you have any further
discussions about your case?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. . . . [A]fter those
discussions, what impressions were you left with about
your case?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: That it was a good idea that I left.’’
Finally, regarding the steps the petitioner took to
avoid apprehension and his reasons for taking those
steps, the following colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: . . . Were you present
[in court on Monday, November 10, 2014]?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: No.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Where were you?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Halfway across the United States.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. Were you eventu-
ally arrested for the case?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes. . . .
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. Where were you
arrested?

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‘‘[The Petitioner]: In Virginia. . . .
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: All right. Had you done
anything about your appearance?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Lost some weight, changed the hair.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Why did you do those
things?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: I was told to.’’
On cross-examination, the petitioner was questioned
further about Fazzone’s alleged advice, the petitioner’s
reasons for fleeing the state, and what he thought would
happen if he fled:
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: . . . So, it was your
[impression] . . . that [Fazzone] told you to flee, take
your file . . . go to California, earn some money, come
back, hire a new attorney and fight these charges. Was
that the plan?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: The plan was that the trial was
going to stop. . . . And I would be given a new trial
where I could hire a new lawyer that could handle the
case better because he was failing at it, and he was out
of his depth. . . .
‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Okay. . . . [I]f the
trial was going to stop, right, according to you, why
were you then under the impression that you then would
be able to hire a new attorney? Why weren’t you just
going to be dragged back to Connecticut and we were
going to pick right up where we left off?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: [Fazzone] told me, gave me the
impression that if I left, under his advisement, that the
trial would stop. Then it would be done. He would be
out of it, and then I could get a new lawyer, and it would
start all over again with somebody that’s competent.

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‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Okay. So, he didn’t just
tell you [that] you should flee. He had this whole plan
that, for whatever reason, you couldn’t show up [on]
Monday with a new lawyer. But if you fled, then when
you came back, we wouldn’t just continue to proceed
with trial . . . you would get a do-over. Right?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Essentially.’’
On redirect examination, the petitioner’s counsel
again asked the petitioner about his understanding of
Fazzone’s alleged advice:
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Can you tell the court
what it is you understood the plan for leaving the state
to be?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: The plan that I understood to leave
the state was just to leave to buy time to get an attorney
and then court would stop, and then it would give me
a chance to get an attorney and then it would start back
over from square one.
‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Okay. And who . . . did
you have a discussion with [when] that plan came up?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: [Fazzone].’’
In his posttrial brief, the petitioner argued that Faz-
zone’s alleged advice that the petitioner should flee the
state to avoid further prosecution entitled him to a new
trial under either the Cronic or Strickland standard. In
its memorandum of decision, the habeas court first
rejected the petitioner’s claim under Cronic, finding
that ‘‘[t]here is no credible evidence that . . . Fazzone
told [the petitioner] to flee the jurisdiction.’’ With
respect to the petitioner’s claim under Strickland, the
court found that ‘‘the credible evidence establishes that
. . . Fazzone did not tell [the petitioner] to flee the
jurisdiction to obtain a delay in his trial’’ and that the
petitioner ‘‘has not proven how the outcome of the trial

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would have been different had he not fled the state
. . . .’’ Accordingly, the court concluded that the peti-
tioner had failed to establish his entitlement to relief
under the Cronic or Strickland standard.
On November 9, 2023, while the present appeal was
pending, the petitioner filed a motion for rectification
and articulation. As relevant to this claim, the petitioner
argued that, by instructing the petitioner’s counsel ‘‘to
only elicit the impressions that Fazzone’s statements
gave to [the petitioner] . . . the court effectively sus-
tained the respondent’s hearsay objection.’’ (Citation
omitted.) The petitioner further argued that he ‘‘was
not offering Fazzone’s statements for their truth, but
for the fact that they were made to him,’’ and requested
that the court ‘‘articulate its ruling’’ on the respondent’s
hearsay objection. On December 1, 2023, the court
issued an order in which it articulated that it had sus-
tained the respondent’s hearsay objection because, ‘‘[a]t
no time did [the petitioner’s] habeas counsel explain
that the testimony sought was not for the truth of the
matter, as he now claims.’’ The court further explained
that it had ‘‘permitted [the petitioner] to testify about
what his understanding of the conversation with . . .
Fazzone was. Typically, evidence that is hearsay, but
not offered for the truth of the matter, is offered to
show the impact on the listener or to explain any actions
taken by the listener. Here, the court permitted [the
petitioner] to testify—and he did—about his under-
standing of what . . . Fazzone said to him and what
that led him to do.’’
A
We first address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas
court erred in concluding that Fazzone did not render
ineffective assistance in connection with his alleged
advice regarding whether to flee the jurisdiction. In
support of that claim, the petitioner argues that ‘‘[t]he

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undisputed evidence of Fazzone’s conduct and ‘wink-
ing’ approval of [the petitioner’s] flight [from the juris-
diction] was sufficient to prove’’ his claim under count
one. We are not persuaded.
‘‘Our standard of review of a habeas court’s judgment
on ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well set-
tled. In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the
underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they
are clearly erroneous, but our review of whether the
facts as found by the habeas court constituted a viola-
tion of the petitioner’s constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Harris v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 205 Conn. App. 837, 856–57, 257 A.3d 343, cert.
denied, 339 Conn. 905, 260 A.3d 484 (2021). Here, the
petitioner challenges the court’s factual finding that
Fazzone did not advise him to flee. Specifically, he
argues that, in making that finding, the court ‘‘over-
look[ed] the glaring evidence of deficient performance
by Fazzone,’’ ‘‘failed to fairly assess the evidence,’’ and
‘‘ignor[ed] substantial circumstantial evidence of Faz-
zone’s failure to provide effective assistance of counsel
. . . .’’ The petitioner further argues that his testimony
concerning his understanding of Fazzone’s advice con-
stituted ‘‘undisputed evidence’’ that Fazzone led him to
believe that it was in his best interest to flee.
‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is
no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
. . . [T]his court does not retry the case or evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, we must
defer to the [habeas] [court’s] assessment of the credi-
bility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation
of their conduct, demeanor and attitude. . 	. 	. The
habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of

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the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
to their testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, 230 Conn. App.
384, 399, 330 A.3d 134, cert. denied, 351 Conn. 921, 333
A.3d 103 (2025).
The habeas court’s finding that Fazzone did not
advise the petitioner to flee is well supported by the
evidence. As the court noted in its memorandum of
decision, ‘‘Fazzone testified that he did not, in any way,
advise [the petitioner] to flee the trial and instead
advised him not to do so . . . .’’ The petitioner does not
dispute that the court accurately recounted Fazzone’s
testimony on that point but instead relies on other testi-
mony that, he claims, undercuts the court’s finding.
Specifically, the petitioner argues that Fazzone’s testi-
mony that he gave the petitioner $600 and a portion of
his file, advised the petitioner that the police would be
able to track his cell phone, and saw that the petitioner
was packing his belongings indicated that Fazzone was
aware of and facilitated the petitioner’s flight, and that
the court erred by discounting that evidence. The peti-
tioner also relies on his own testimony that he under-
stood Fazzone’s advice to be that it was in his best
interest to flee and argues that Fazzone’s deposition
testimony supported the petitioner’s understanding of
that advice.
In making that argument, the petitioner essentially
faults the habeas court for not construing the evidence
in the light most favorable to him and improperly asks
this court to reweigh the evidence in a manner that
undermines the habeas court’s conclusions. It is well
established, however, that the habeas court, as the
finder of fact, is ‘‘the sole arbiter of the credibility of
witnesses, and the weight to be given to their specific
testimony. . . . It is the right of the trier of fact to draw
reasonable and logical inferences from the facts that
it finds to be proved.’’ (Citations omitted.) Tyson v.

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Warden, 24 Conn. App. 729, 737, 591 A.2d 817, cert.
denied, 220 Conn. 909, 597 A.2d 340 (1991). ‘‘It is axiom-
atic that the fact finder is free to accept or reject any
of the evidence it chooses, and it is not the role of this
court to reassess or reweigh that evidence.’’ Roman v.
Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 111, 123
n.7, 307 A.3d 934 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 952,
308 A.3d 1039 (2024). Thus, the court was free to weigh
the competing testimony, assess the relative credibility
of the witnesses, and determine which testimony it
deemed to be credible.
Our review of the record indicates that the habeas
court properly considered all of the testimony pre-
sented and that its factual findings were supported by
the evidence. Fazzone testified that he gave the peti-
tioner $600 not to assist in his flight, but for the peti-
tioner to put that money toward a retainer for a new
attorney. Although the petitioner contends that Fazzone
‘‘[gave] his entire file to [the petitioner] . . . [which]
demonstrated that he did not expect to continue trying
the case,’’ Fazzone testified that he gave the petitioner
only a copy of the discovery ‘‘in the event that he wanted
to meet with another attorney 	. 	. 	. 	.’’ Moreover,
although Fazzone testified in his deposition that the
petitioner may have inadvertently interpreted Fazzone’s
advice to mean that it was in his best interest to flee,
Fazzone also testified in no uncertain terms that he
‘‘did make it clear that [he] strongly advise[d] against
it.’’ The court’s factual findings regarding Fazzone’s
advice to the petitioner were supported by the evidence,
and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction
that the court made a mistake in reaching those find-
ings. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not
err in its conclusion that the petitioner failed to estab-
lish his claim under count one of the amended petition.
B
We next address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas
court violated his right to due process by precluding

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him, on hearsay grounds, from testifying as to the sub-
stance of Fazzone’s alleged advice that he flee the juris-
diction to avoid further prosecution. The petitioner
argues that the court’s hearsay ruling was erroneous
because his testimony about Fazzone’s advice was not
offered to prove that the statements contained therein
were true but, rather, to prove that Fazzone advised
him to flee and that he fled on the basis of that advice.
The petitioner argues that we should reverse the judg-
ment as to count one and remand the matter for a new
trial, at which he would be permitted to testify as to
Fazzone’s alleged advice. The respondent argues, inter
alia, that the petitioner has not established that the
court’s hearsay ruling violated his right to due process.6
We agree with the respondent.
The petitioner does not claim that he preserved his
due process claim at trial but, rather, seeks review
under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d
823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn.
773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).7 ‘‘[T]his court is not
6 The respondent also argues that the petitioner waived his due process
claim by ‘‘acquiesc[ing]’’ to the habeas court’s hearsay ruling or, in the
alternative, that he failed to brief that claim adequately. Because we conclude
that the petitioner cannot prevail on the merits of his claim, we need not
address these arguments.
7 In his principal brief to this court, the petitioner also asserts, in passing,
that his claim is reviewable under the plain error doctrine. See Practice
Book § 60-5. The only reference to the plain error rule in the petitioner’s
brief, however, is contained in a single sentence, which states in its entirety:
‘‘This claim is also reviewable despite habeas counsel’s failure to preserve
it, as it involves a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right to due
process and to testify on his own behalf, and meets the criteria set out in
[Golding] or the plain error doctrine.’’ The petitioner’s brief does not set
forth the standard of review for determining whether a claim satisfies the
plain error doctrine or explain why the alleged error in the present case
warrants reversal under that doctrine.
‘‘[W]e will not review an underlying claim for plain error unless the request
for relief under that doctrine has been adequately briefed. . . . A party
claiming plain error must engage in a separate analysis under that doctrine
to demonstrate that plain error has occurred under the circumstances of
[the] case. . . . Indeed, a mere conclusory assertion of plain error is insuffi-
cient to allow this court to reach the merits of an unpreserved claim under

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required to consider a claim unless it was distinctly
raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. . . .
It is well established, however, that an unpreserved
claim is reviewable under Golding when (1) the record
is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2)
the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the
violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitu-
tional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the
[petitioner] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harm-
lessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a
reasonable doubt.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Turner, 334 Conn. 660, 673,
224 A.3d 129 (2020). ‘‘The first two [prongs of Golding]
involve a determination of whether the claim is review-
able; the second two . . . involve a determination of
whether the [appellant] may prevail; (internal quotation
marks omitted) State v. Gray, 342 Conn. 657, 668, 271
A.3d 101 (2022); and the party seeking review under
Golding ‘‘bear[s] the burden of establishing their entitle-
ment to such review . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Beaulieu, 118 Conn. App. 1, 7, 982
A.2d 245, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 921, 984 A.2d 68 (2009).
‘‘We are free to respond to the [petitioner’s] claim by
focusing on whichever Golding prong is most relevant,
as the inability to meet any one prong requires a deter-
mination that the [petitioner’s] claim must fail.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 226 Conn. App. 617, 634, 319 A.3d
242, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 912, 324 A.3d 143 (2024).
It is well established that, as a general matter, a party
‘‘cannot raise a constitutional claim by attaching a con-
stitutional label to a purely evidentiary claim or by
that doctrine.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carlson, 226
Conn. App. 514, 540, 318 A.3d 283, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 911, 324 A.3d
143 (2024). Because the petitioner has not provided any analysis to support
his claim that reversal is warranted under the plain error doctrine, we
conclude that his claim is inadequately briefed and, therefore, decline to
review it.

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asserting merely that a strained connection exists
between the evidentiary claim and a fundamental con-
stitutional right. . . . Thus, [o]nce identified, unpre-
served evidentiary claims masquerading as constitu-
tional claims will be summarily [rejected].’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re A. H., 226 Conn. App.
1, 27, 317 A.3d 197, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 918, 317
A.3d 784 (2024). ‘‘Nevertheless, [our Supreme Court]
has recognized that an unpreserved evidentiary claim
may be constitutional in nature if there is a resultant
denial of fundamental fairness or the denial of a specific
constitutional right . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Turner, supra, 334 Conn. 674. ‘‘This is
consistent with federal jurisprudence, which recognizes
that an evidentiary error may be of constitutional magni-
tude if the error was so pervasive as to have denied [the
petitioner] a fundamentally fair trial . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. An evidentiary error rises
to the level of a due process violation only if it ‘‘was
so crucial, critical, and highly significant that [the peti-
tioner] was denied a fair trial.’’ State v. Waters, 214
Conn. App. 294, 314–15, 280 A.3d 601, cert. denied, 345
Conn. 914, 284 A.3d 25 (2022).
In the present case, the petitioner’s due process claim
is premised on an alleged evidentiary error, namely,
that the habeas court’s hearsay ruling was erroneous
because his testimony as to Fazzone’s advice was
offered not to prove that what Fazzone told him was
true but to establish his claim that Fazzone improperly
advised him that it was in his best interest to flee. He
contends that, although premised on evidentiary error,
this is not ‘‘a mere ‘evidentiary’ claim’’ and that ‘‘[t]he
habeas court’s hearsay ruling deprived [him] of the right
to offer evidence that was central to his [case] and
as such is an error of constitutional magnitude.’’ The
petitioner further argues that ‘‘[t]his loss of the opportu-
nity to prove his claims by reporting what was said to

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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
him by . . . Fazzone cost him a fair habeas trial.’’ We
agree with the petitioner that his proffered testimony
about Fazzone’s advice to him was not hearsay because
it was not offered to prove the truth of Fazzone’s out-
of-court statements. We nevertheless conclude that the
court’s exclusion of that evidence did not violate the
petitioner’s right to due process.
‘‘ ‘Hearsay’ means a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the proceeding,
offered in evidence to establish the truth of the matter
asserted.’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 8-1 (3). ‘‘If . . . a state-
ment . . . is offered for a purpose other than establish-
ing the truth of the matters contained in the statement,
it is not hearsay.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Hardison v. Commissioner of Correction, 152 Conn.
App. 410, 422, 98 A.3d 873 (2014). ‘‘The test is whether
the statement is offered to prove the truth of the matters
in the statement. If it is, it is hearsay; if offered for
some other purpose, it is not hearsay.’’ E. Prescott,
Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (6th Ed.
2019) § 8.1.2, p. 496. Additionally, to be admissible, the
statement must be relevant to the nonhearsay purpose
for which it is offered. See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 271
Conn. 218, 256, 856 A.2d 917 (2004). Thus, ‘‘if a conversa-
tion is sought to be admitted not for the truth of its
content but to establish that such a conversation took
place, it is not hearsay’’; E. Prescott, supra, § 8.6, p.
511; but to be admissible, ‘‘the offeror [must] establish
that the mere fact that the conversation itself took place
is relevant to the case.’’ Id.
In the present case, Fazzone’s alleged advice was
admissible nonhearsay because it was offered to prove
the nature of the advice and the effect it had on the
petitioner, not to prove that the statements Fazzone
made during the conversation were actually true. In
count one of the amended petition, the petitioner
alleged that Fazzone improperly advised him that, if he

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fled the state, the trial would stop and he would have
an opportunity to hire a new attorney to represent him
at a new trial, and that he fled the state in reliance on
Fazzone’s advice. Thus, the petitioner was not seeking
to prove that Fazzone’s alleged statements to him about
what would happen if he fled were true. He was not
seeking to prove, for instance, that, if he fled, the trial
would stop and he would have the opportunity to hire
another attorney; to the contrary, the petitioner’s claim
rests on the premise that Fazzone’s advice was so mis-
guided that no reasonably competent attorney would
have provided that advice. Consequently, the petition-
er’s testimony about what Fazzone said to him was
relevant to a nonhearsay purpose because, to prevail
on the claim alleged in count one, the petitioner was
required to prove that Fazzone gave him the alleged
advice and that he fled the state in reliance on it, not
that Fazzone’s out-of-court statements to him about
what would happen if he fled were true. See id., § 8.8.1,
pp. 513–14 (‘‘[w]hen the issue is whether a party acted
on advice of his or her attorney, the party is entitled
to show what that advice was’’); see also, e.g., Hardison
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 152 Conn. App.
422 (where petitioner alleged that counsel was ineffec-
tive in failing to advise about mandatory minimum sen-
tence, testimony about counsel’s advice was not hear-
say because ‘‘that testimony was relevant to show that
the statements were made, not that the statements made
were true’’). Accordingly, testimony about Fazzone’s
alleged advice was admissible nonhearsay, and the
court should have permitted the petitioner to testify as
to the substance of that advice. See, e.g., United States
v. Scully, 877 F.3d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 2017) (where defen-
dant claimed he acted on advice of counsel, court erred
by precluding defendant’s testimony about that advice;
proffered testimony was not hearsay and defendant was
entitled to testify as to substance of counsel’s advice).

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Our review of the entire record, however, convinces
us that the habeas court’s ruling was not ‘‘so crucial,
critical, and highly significant that [the petitioner] was
denied a fair trial.’’ State v. Waters, supra, 214 Conn.
App. 314–15. We reiterate that the petitioner claims only
that the court’s hearsay ruling deprived him of his right
to due process. In considering that claim, our inquiry
is not focused on the question of whether the court’s
evidentiary ruling was erroneous, but on whether the
petitioner established that ‘‘the erroneous exclusion of
evidence was so prejudicial to the rights of the [peti-
tioner] as to deprive him of a fair trial.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Finley, 34 Conn. App. 823,
830, 644 A.2d 371, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 927, 648 A.2d
880 (1994).
Despite the habeas court’s initial ruling that the peti-
tioner could not testify as to the substance of what
Fazzone had said to him, the record indicates that the
petitioner testified at length regarding his understand-
ing of Fazzone’s advice and why he allegedly believed,
on the basis of that advice, that it was in his best interest
to flee. For example, the petitioner testified that, ‘‘what
I understood from [the] conversation [with Fazzone in
the courthouse conference room] was that, when I left,
the trial would stop, and that would give me a chance
to get a new attorney . . . .’’ Regarding Fazzone’s giv-
ing the petitioner $600 and a copy of the discovery from
his file, the petitioner testified that Fazzone ‘‘gave me
the money partly so I could have gas money just to
. . . leave’’ and ‘‘gave me the file because, when my
trial stopped, I could give that file to the new attorney.’’
On cross-examination, the petitioner further explained:
‘‘Fazzone told me, gave me the impression that, if I left
under his advisement, that the trial would stop. Then
it would be done. He would get out of it, and then I
could get a new lawyer and it would start all over again
with somebody that’s competent.’’ (Emphasis added.)

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Subsequently, the petitioner expressly testified that
Fazzone came up with the plan for the petitioner ‘‘to
leave the state . . . to buy time to get an attorney and
then court would stop, and then it would give me a
chance to get an attorney and then it would start back
over from square one.’’ The petitioner further testified
that, on the basis of his conversation with Fazzone on
the courthouse steps, his impression was that he should
‘‘leave, get the burner [phone], change the hair, and
[that] everything would stop.’’ When asked why he lost
weight and changed his hair color after fleeing, the
petitioner testified that he did those things because ‘‘I
was told to.’’
Thus, contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the
habeas court did not deprive the petitioner of the oppor-
tunity to prove his claims. Although the court initially
instructed the petitioner that he could testify only as
to his understanding of Fazzone’s advice, the petitioner
ultimately testified that Fazzone came up with the plan
for him to flee; that Fazzone told him that, if he fled,
the trial would stop and he would be able to retain a
new lawyer to represent him at a new trial; that Fazzone
told him to get a burner phone and change his hair
color; that Fazzone gave him $600 to aid in his flight;
and that Fazzone gave him his file so that he could give
it to a new attorney. Accordingly, despite the court’s
initial ruling, the petitioner did testify as to the general
substance of Fazzone’s advice, even if he was not per-
mitted to recount the exact words that Fazzone used.
Perhaps 	more 	importantly, 	the 	petitioner 	testified
repeatedly and in detail as to his understanding of Faz-
zone’s advice and what actions he took on the basis of
that understanding. The court’s memorandum of deci-
sion indicates that the court considered all of the testi-
mony, found Fazzone’s version of events to be credible
and, on the basis of its credibility assessment, con-
cluded that the petitioner had failed to prove his claim.

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In light of the entire record, we cannot conclude that
the court’s hearsay ruling was so fundamentally unfair
that it deprived the petitioner of a fair trial.
II
We next address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas
court erred by failing to consider certain evidence that,
the petitioner contends, supported his claim in count
two of his amended petition that Fazzone rendered
ineffective assistance in connection with his trial perfor-
mance. Specifically, the petitioner contends that the
court failed to consider ‘‘Fazzone’s theory in [cross-
examining] the state’s expert on his idea that clitoral
contact is not ‘penetration’ ’’ within the meaning of the
sexual assault statutes and ‘‘ignored the significant dam-
age that Fazzone did to the defense by offering the
[victim’s] statement into evidence.’’ The respondent
contends that the petitioner’s claim is not reviewable
because these specific allegations of deficient perfor-
mance were not alleged in the habeas petition or pre-
sented to the habeas court and, in the alternative, that
the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by
the alleged deficient performance. We conclude that,
even if we assume that the petitioner properly presented
these allegations to the habeas court, he cannot prevail
on the merits of his claim.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this claim. As indicated previously, the state
charged the petitioner with, inter alia, sexual assault
in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (2) and
sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-
71 (a) (1). Both statutes require the state to prove, inter
alia, that the petitioner ‘‘engage[d] in sexual intercourse
with another person . . . .’’ 8 General Statutes § 53a-65
8 General Statutes § 53a-70 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is
guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person . . . (2) engages
in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is under
thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such
person . . . .’’

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(2) provides in relevant part that ‘‘ ‘[s]exual intercourse’
means vaginal intercourse 	. 	. 	. 	between persons
regardless of sex. Penetration, however slight, is suffi-
cient to complete vaginal intercourse . . . .’’
At trial, the victim testified that the petitioner’s sexual
abuse of her started when he began removing her bra
and massaging her back, and then progressed each time
until eventually he rubbed her clitoris with his fingers.
To support the allegation that the petitioner had
engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim within
the meaning of § 53a-65 (2), the state called Erica Kes-
selman, a physician with Day Kimball Healthcare, as
an expert in the field of pediatric sexual assault exami-
nations and pediatric female genitalia. On direct exami-
nation, Kesselman testified, inter alia, that the labia
majora is considered the genital opening and that
‘‘[a]nything inside the labia majora is internal.’’ She fur-
ther testified that the clitoris is within the genital open-
ing and that a person would have to penetrate the labia
majora to touch the clitoris. On cross-examination, Faz-
zone challenged Kesselman about that aspect of her
testimony, questioning whether ‘‘there’s [any] way that
. . . the clitoris . . . [can] be external at all in any way
from the vagina’’ and whether ‘‘you can see the clitoris
without having to do any type of penetration . . . .’’
Kesselman reiterated that the clitoris is internal and
that a person could not touch it without penetrating
the labia majora.
Subsequently, the state called C, the victim’s former
boyfriend, who testified on direct examination that the
We note that § 53a-70 has been amended by the legislature since the
events underlying the present case. See Public Acts 2015, No. 15-211, § 16.
This amendment, however, has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In
the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty
of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in sexual
intercourse with another person and: (1) Such other person is thirteen years
of age or older but under sixteen years of age and the actor is more than
three years older than such other person . . . .’’

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victim had called him on the phone and told him that
the petitioner had ‘‘play[ed] with her breasts and fin-
gered her.’’ He further testified that the victim had made
him promise not to tell anyone, but that eventually,
after the victim reported the allegations, he told the
police. On cross-examination, however, C acknowl-
edged that he had told the police that the victim did
not call him to tell him about the allegations. Rather,
he told the police that the victim’s sister, B, had sent
him a text message saying that the victim was hiding
something and that the victim told him about the allega-
tions after he called her to ask about B’s text message.
Thereafter, Fazzone sought to admit into evidence the
victim’s sworn statement to the police for the purpose
of establishing an alleged inconsistency between that
statement and C’s testimony. Specifically, Fazzone
explained to the court, outside of the jury’s presence,
that the victim’s statement indicated that ‘‘she never
told [B] about this incident,’’ but C had testified that he
‘‘initially heard about this evidence from a text message
from [B]. But if [the victim] never told [B], then how
can [B] tell [C]?’’ The trial court responded: ‘‘My only
concern is that by putting the statement in as a full
exhibit . . . you’re putting in another layer of corrobo-
ration of the victim’s testimony for the jury to read in
the jury deliberation room. . . . I mean, that’s up to
you. It’s a strategic call, but it’s a risky call.’’ Fazzone
then inquired whether the court could admit only the
portion of the victim’s statement that was relevant to
show the alleged inconsistency, to which the prosecutor
objected. After conferring with the petitioner, Fazzone
indicated that he intended to offer the entire statement
as a full exhibit, which the court admitted without any
objection from the prosecutor.
After the jury returned to the courtroom, Fazzone
resumed his cross-examination of C:

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‘‘[Fazzone]: Okay. So, just to . . . clarify for the jury,
so, it’s fair to say that you’re testifying that [B] had
texted you about the incident, but then later [the victim]
told you about it?
‘‘[C]: I guess, yeah.
‘‘[Fazzone]: Okay. . . . And then, Your Honor, this
is marked as a full exhibit from the Plainfield Police
Department. It is a statement from [the victim]. And I
believe now that, because it’s been offered in, Your
Honor, I may read directly from the document?
‘‘The Court: Yes.
‘‘[Fazzone]: [The victim] states in quotes: ‘I never told
[B] about what [the petitioner] did to me.’ And this
document is dated [November 6, 2012]. So, with that
said . . . isn’t it fair to say that, if [the victim] never
told [B] about what happened, then it would be impossi-
ble for [B] to text you?’’
The prosecutor objected to Fazzone’s question, and
the court sustained the objection.
During the habeas trial, when the petitioner’s counsel
asked Fazzone why he cross-examined Kesselman
about whether clitoral contact required penetration,
Fazzone responded: ‘‘I don’t know how it would relate
to the defense. It was just—it was an allegation made
by the prosecution, so.’’ Regarding his decision to have
the trial court admit the victim’s statement into evi-
dence as a full exhibit, Fazzone testified that he did not
recall the strategy behind that decision but acknowl-
edged that the trial court had described it as a ‘‘risky
move because it added a layer of corroboration’’ to the
victim’s testimony. The petitioner did not introduce the
victim’s statement into evidence at the habeas trial.
In the portion of his posttrial brief addressing count
two of his amended petition, the petitioner first argued

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that Fazzone’s trial performance was so poor that preju-
dice should be presumed under Cronic because, ‘‘[w]hat-
ever Fazzone was doing at trial, it was not putting the
state’s case through any meaningful adversarial test-
ing.’’ In support of that claim, the petitioner recounted
a litany of alleged deficiencies in Fazzone’s conduct of
the trial, including that he ‘‘failed to properly introduce
evidence, such as witness testimony, by failing to ade-
quately cross-examine the [victim] and her father and
then failing to adequately establish why he should be
allowed to re-call them’’; that ‘‘he sought to bolster the
state’s case by allowing the jury to read the [victim’s]
statement and the arrest warrant affidavit’’ (emphasis
omitted); that ‘‘[h]e sought to challenge well settled law
in a manner inconsistent with his defense theory by
trying to litigate the definition of ‘penetration’ ’’; that
‘‘[h]e failed to object to various instances of domestic
violence with the [victim’s] mother and, in several
instances, elicited that evidence’’; and that ‘‘[h]e never
entertained consulting an expert to determine whether
[the state’s expert] was correct and how to challenge
her broad statements that disclosure is often delayed,
violence usually causes complainants’ silence, or that
teens typically delay truthful disclosures.’’ The peti-
tioner argued that Fazzone’s ‘‘trial conduct constituted
a total failure of representation for which prejudice
should be presumed’’ under Cronic.
In the alternative, the petitioner claimed that Faz-
zone’s conduct during the trial constituted ineffective
assistance under the Strickland standard. With respect
to the deficient performance prong of Strickland, the
petitioner incorporated by reference the portion of his
brief addressing his Cronic claim, arguing that ‘‘[t]he
above Cronic analysis is essentially why, under Strick-
land, Fazzone rendered deficient performance.’’ With
respect to the prejudice prong of Strickland, the peti-
tioner argued in full: ‘‘[The petitioner] essentially had

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no defense even though Fazzone came up with a theory.
His failure to preclude objectionable evidence and his
inexplicable proclivity for introducing objectional and
prejudicial evidence against [the petitioner] wholly
undermined his defense. His lack of knowledge with
the law governing these types of cases, his unpre-
paredness to face an expert witness, and his glaring
inexperience with trial litigation all prevented him from
getting his point across: that the witnesses had reasons
to make this all up. As a result, [the petitioner] did not
get the benefit of a competent and coherent defense at
trial. Therefore, it must be said that the outcome of the
trial, had Fazzone been able to present the defense
effectively, would likely have been different.’’ (Empha-
sis added.) Although the petitioner had referenced Faz-
zone’s cross-examination of Kesselman and his intro-
duction of the victim’s statement in the Cronic portion
of his posttrial brief (which he incorporated by refer-
ence in his argument that Fazzone’s performance was
deficient under Strickland), he did not present any spe-
cific argument explaining how those decisions by Faz-
zone would have impacted the jury’s verdict.
In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court
rejected the petitioner’s Cronic and Strickland claims
under count two of the petition. With respect to the
Cronic claim, the court found that ‘‘Fazzone did not
entirely fail to subject the prosecution’s case to mean-
ingful adversarial testing, nor did he completely fail to
advocate for [the petitioner]. He was acting as a lawyer,
and his performance did not constitute ‘no representa-
tion at all.’ . . . There is . . . ample evidence that
. . . Fazzone performed as an attorney at trial: he had
a coherent theory of defense, he cross-examined wit-
nesses, he made objections and he argued that theory
of the defense to the jury. To the extent that there is
a Cronic claim, it is denied because . . . Fazzone did

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act as counsel for [the petitioner] and subjected the
state’s case to adversarial testing.’’
With respect to the Strickland claim, the habeas court
focused on the prejudice prong, finding that, ‘‘even if
. . . Fazzone is assumed to have performed deficiently
. . . [the petitioner] has not proven prejudice. He has
not proven how the outcome of the trial would have
been different . . . had . . . Fazzone objected to cer-
tain evidence or consulted with an expert. The state’s
case rested almost wholly on the testimony of the [vic-
tim]. She testified—and the jury believed her—that [the
petitioner] sexually assaulted her on numerous occa-
sions. Her testimony was corroborated in part by a
third-party witness who walked in on [the petitioner]
in bed with her.’’ The court concluded that ‘‘[the peti-
tioner’s] general allegations—failure to properly inves-
tigate or failure to properly introduce evidence—are
denied as lacking proof. [The petitioner] did not present
any evidence of what an investigation would have
uncovered and has not pointed to specific pieces of
evidence that would have been excluded or what the
impact of that was on the jury. He has also not presented
any expert testimony at the habeas trial. Thus, all of
his claims are denied as lacking proof. There is also
no reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial
would have been different.’’
In his motion for rectification and articulation, the
petitioner requested that the habeas court ‘‘revise its
[memorandum of decision] to state that [the] issue [per-
taining to Fazzone’s introduction of the victim’s state-
ment to the police] was raised in his [amended peti-
tion].’’ 9 The court denied that request, stating that ‘‘a
9 In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court, in recounting Fazzone’s
testimony, stated that Fazzone had ‘‘attempted to introduce the victim’s
statement to the police as evidence.’’ In his motion for rectification and
articulation, the petitioner requested that the court clarify that Fazzone in
fact had introduced the statement into evidence, as opposed to merely
attempting to introduce it. In its articulation order, the court clarified that
the portion of the memorandum of decision in question ‘‘was meant to be

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reading of the amended petition does not support [the]
position’’ that the petitioner had ‘‘raised a challenge to
the introduction of the victim’s statement at trial.’’ The
court then quoted from the portion of count two of the
amended petition in which the petitioner had identified
Fazzone’s alleged instances of deficient performance
and found that ‘‘the claim that . . . Fazzone was inef-
fective for introducing the victim’s statement at trial
. . . is not encompassed among those listed above.
Thus, the court did not consider it or mention it.’’
On appeal, in challenging the habeas court’s alleged
failure to consider evidence concerning Fazzone’s
cross-examination of Kesselman and introduction into
evidence of the victim’s statement to the police, the
petitioner does not argue that this evidence would have
impacted the court’s conclusion that he had failed to
prove his Cronic claim. Instead, the petitioner focuses
on the court’s conclusion that he was not prejudiced
by Fazzone’s deficient performance, arguing that the
court’s conclusion that he ‘‘did not prove how the out-
come would have been different . . . does [not] prop-
erly account for the effect of Fazzone’s failures . . . .’’
The petitioner contends that Fazzone’s ‘‘theory . . .
that clitoral contact is not ‘penetration’ ’’ was ‘‘mis-
guided legally’’ and ‘‘rejected long ago’’ by our Supreme
Court in State v. Merriam, 264 Conn. 617, 630, 835 A.2d
895 (2003).10 He further contends that Fazzone’s cross-
examination of Kesselman ‘‘amounted to an admission
of clitoral contact—that is, guilt on [the sexual assault
counts] of the complaint,’’ and ‘‘gave the state an oppor-
tunity to graphically explain the anatomy of sexual pen-
etration and the manner in which it could be effected—
a recitation of . . . Fazzone’s testimony at the habeas trial. . . . To the
extent that the court’s recitation created an ambiguity, the court hereby
articulates that the statement was, in fact, admitted as an exhibit at the
criminal trial.’’
10 In Merriam, the court held that ‘‘the penetration element of [the sexual
assault] statutes is satisfied by the penetration of the labia majora . . . .’’
State v. Merriam, supra, 264 Conn. 630.

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with extremely prejudicial effect on the defense.’’ The
petitioner also argues that Fazzone’s decision to intro-
duce the victim’s statement as a full exhibit ‘‘offered
no benefit to the defense and bolstered the state’s case’’
because it ‘‘corroborated the [victim’s] testimony with
compelling details for the jury’s sustained focus in the
deliberation room.’’ He further argues that the ‘‘harmful
effect [of the victim’s statement] was underscored by
the state’s repeated reference to it in the prosecutor’s
closing argument.’’
As discussed previously, to prevail on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim under the Strickland stan-
dard, a petitioner must prove both that counsel’s perfor-
mance was deficient and that it resulted in prejudice
to the petitioner, and ‘‘[a] court can find against a peti-
tioner, with respect to a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, on either the performance prong or the
prejudice prong, whichever is easier.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Figueroa v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, 202 Conn. App. 54, 64, 244 A.3d 149, cert.
denied, 336 Conn. 926, 246 A.3d 986 (2021). ‘‘An evalua-
tion of the prejudice prong involves a consideration of
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent
the errors, the [fact finder] would have had a reasonable
doubt respecting guilt. . . . A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome. . . . We do not conduct this inquiry in a
vacuum, rather, we must consider the totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction,
225 Conn. App. 309, 327, 315 A.3d 1135 (2024), cert.
granted, 351 Conn. 916, 332 A.3d 293 (2025). Moreover,
‘‘[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substan-
tial, not just conceivable. . . . Notably, the petitioner
must meet this burden not by use of speculation but
by demonstrable realities.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 328. ‘‘[O]ur review of whether the facts

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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of
the petitioner’s constitutional right to effective assis-
tance of counsel is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Figueroa v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 63.
In the present case, the record does not support the
petitioner’s claims concerning Fazzone’s cross-exami-
nation of Kesselman and introduction into evidence of
the victim’s statement to the police. With respect to the
cross-examination of Kesselman, we begin by observing
that nothing in the transcript supports the petitioner’s
contention that Fazzone’s questioning on that point
‘‘amounted to an admission of clitoral contact . . . .’’
The trial transcript reveals that Fazzone repeatedly
attempted to challenge Kesselman’s testimony that the
clitoris is internal and could not be touched without
penetrating the labia majora, but nothing about that
questioning even hinted at a concession that the peti-
tioner had engaged in the alleged conduct.
The petitioner’s argument that Fazzone’s cross-exam-
ination of Kesselman ‘‘gave the state an opportunity to
graphically explain the anatomy of sexual penetration
and the manner in which it could be effected’’ also is
not supported by the record. As the party bearing the
burden of proof, the state was required to present evi-
dence to support each element of the charged offenses,
including that the petitioner had engaged in sexual inter-
course with the victim. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 351
Conn. 798, 815–16, 334 A.3d 446 (2025) (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic
that the state [bears the burden of proving] all the essen-
tial elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to obtain a conviction’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). Thus, Fazzone’s cross-examina-
tion did not open the door to the state’s introduction of
evidence to establish that clitoral touching constitutes
penetration; rather, the state was required to present
that evidence to establish the penetration element of

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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
the sexual assault charges. In fact, the trial transcript
reveals that the state elicited all of the relevant testi-
mony from Kesselman during its direct examination
and did not ask any further questions after Fazzone’s
cross-examination. The petitioner did not present any
testimony to support his claim that, but for Fazzone’s
cross-examination, the state would not have so ‘‘graphi-
cally explain[ed]’’ why the petitioner’s touching of the
victim’s clitoris satisfied the penetration element of the
sexual assault charges. Accordingly, we reject the peti-
tioner’s claim that the habeas court erred in concluding
that the petitioner had failed to establish prejudice with
respect to his claim of ineffective assistance concerning
Fazzone’s cross-examination of Kesselman.
The same is true with respect to Fazzone’s introduc-
tion into evidence of the victim’s statement to the police.
First, we note that the petitioner did not offer the vic-
tim’s statement as an exhibit or otherwise introduce
the contents of the statement into evidence at the
habeas trial. Without the statement in evidence, there
is no basis in the record to support the petitioner’s claim
that the content of that statement was so prejudicial
that it impacted the jury’s verdict.
Moreover, the record does not support the petition-
er’s argument that the prosecutor made ‘‘repeated refer-
ence’’ to the victim’s statement during closing argument
in a way that was unduly prejudicial to the petitioner.
Rather, the trial transcript reveals that the prosecutor
referred to the victim’s statement only twice during
closing argument. First, in arguing that the jury should
find that the petitioner had abused the victim when she
was older than thirteen but younger than sixteen years
of age, as required to find him guilty of sexual assault
in the second degree; see footnote 8 of this opinion;
the prosecutor referred to the date on which the victim

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gave her statement to the police.11 Second, during his
closing argument, Fazzone argued that the jury should
disbelieve the victim because, contrary to her trial testi-
mony, she had reported only one instance of alleged
abuse in her statement to the police. The prosecutor
responded during rebuttal argument that the jury should
consider ‘‘the context in which [the victim] gave this
statement’’ and referenced the victim’s trial testimony in
which she explained that, when she gave the statement,
‘‘[her] dad was in the room, and [she] was really embar-
rassed and . . . didn’t really want him to be there.’’
These references do not support the petitioner’s argu-
ment that the state relied heavily on the victim’s state-
ment in support of its case. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court did not err in its determination that the
petitioner failed to establish prejudice under the Strick-
land standard.12
11 In his reply brief, the petitioner argues that there was insufficient evi-
dence that he sexually assaulted the victim after she became thirteen years
old and that Fazzone’s failure to move for a judgment of acquittal of sexual
assault in the second degree is ‘‘another example of Fazzone’s deficient
performance . . . .’’ We decline to address the merits of that claim because
‘‘[i]t is . . . a well established principle that [claims] cannot be raised for
the first time in a reply brief.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dearing
v. Commissioner of Correction, 230 Conn. App. 145, 168 n.9, 329 A.3d 988,
cert. denied, 351 Conn. 910, 331 A.3d 158 (2025). We note, however, that
the petitioner raised an identical claim in his direct appeal, which was
rejected on its merits because ‘‘there was sufficient evidence . . . that the
defendant’s abuse continued until after the victim turned thirteen, as required
to sustain the defendant’s conviction for sexual assault in the second degree
. . . .’’ State v. Wright, supra, 235 Conn. App. 154.
12 The petitioner also argues, in connection with his challenge to the habeas
court’s rejection of count two of his amended petition, that the court erred
by not considering certain instances of alleged false testimony by Fazzone
during the habeas trial in assessing his credibility. Specifically, he argues
that ‘‘Fazzone falsely asserted that Judge Swords had warned [the petitioner]
of the implications if he failed to appear,’’ when, ‘‘[i]n fact, Judge Swords
made no such admonition.’’ The petitioner argues that ‘‘Fazzone clearly
demonstrated a willingness to lie in court’’ and that the habeas court ‘‘plainly
erred in failing to take into account this pattern of deception.’’
It is well established that, ‘‘[i]n a habeas trial, the court is the trier of fact
and, thus, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight
to be given to their testimony . . . . It is simply not the role of this court

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III
Finally, the petitioner raises three claims pertaining
to the habeas court’s alleged failure to address certain
of his allegations that, he maintains, were raised in his
amended habeas petition and presented to the court in
his posttrial brief. First, the petitioner asserts that the
court failed to address two separate but related claims
pertaining to Fazzone’s statements and actions after
the petitioner failed to appear in court when trial
resumed on November 10, 2014.13 Second, the petitioner
asserts that the court failed to address whether Fazzone
rendered ineffective assistance during the petitioner’s
sentencing proceeding. We decline to review these
claims because the petitioner failed to present them to
the habeas court.
We begin by setting forth the legal principles and
standard of review applicable to these claims. ‘‘The
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is essentially a
pleading and, as such, it should conform generally to
a complaint in a civil action. . . . The principle that a
[petitioner] may rely only upon what he has alleged is
basic. . . . It is fundamental in our law that the right
of a [petitioner] to recover is limited to the allegations
on appeal to second-guess credibility determinations made by the habeas
court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hilton v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, supra, 225 Conn. App. 340. Moreover, as discussed previously, the
habeas court rejected count two of the amended petition on the ground
that the petitioner had failed to prove that he was prejudiced by Fazzone’s
allegedly deficient performance. That conclusion rested not on the court’s
assessment of Fazzone’s credibility but on its determination that the peti-
tioner failed to present evidence to support his claim that Fazzone’s perfor-
mance affected the outcome of the trial. The petitioner’s brief does not
explain how the court’s credibility determination affected its resolution of
count two of the amended petition. Accordingly, we reject that aspect of
the petitioner’s claim.
13 Although the petitioner raises these as two separate claims of error in
his principal appellate brief, we address them together because they involve
overlapping factual issues, and our resolution of them requires application
of an identical standard of review.

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Wright v. Commissioner of Correction
of his complaint.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Cole v. Commissioner of Correction,
102 Conn. App. 595, 599, 925 A.2d 1231, cert. denied,
284 Conn. 924, 933 A.2d 723 (2007). Moreover, ‘‘[i]t is
axiomatic that a party cannot submit a case to the trial
court on one theory and then seek a reversal in the
reviewing court on another. A party is not entitled to
raise issues on appeal that have not been raised in the
trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexan-
der v. Commissioner of Correction, 103 Conn. App.
629, 640, 930 A.2d 58, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 939, 937
A.2d 695 (2007). ‘‘[T]he interpretation of pleadings is
always a question of law for the court . . . . Our
review of the [habeas] court’s interpretation of the
pleadings therefore is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Woods v. Commissioner of Correction,
197 Conn. App. 597, 607, 232 A.3d 63 (2020), appeal
dismissed, 341 Conn. 506, 267 A.3d 193 (2021).
A
The petitioner first contends that ‘‘on the morning of
November [10, 2014] when [the petitioner] failed to
appear for the resumption of trial . . . [Fazzone made]
false statements to Judge Swords concealing his con-
tacts with [the petitioner] and his role in [the petition-
er’s] failure to appear.’’ He claims that Fazzone’s alleged
‘‘concealment of his role in [the petitioner’s] failure to
appear’’ constituted ineffective assistance of counsel
and/or a conflict of interest, and that the habeas court
erred in failing to address those claims.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. As discussed previously, on
Thursday, November 6, 2014, after the petitioner moved
to dismiss Fazzone as his counsel, the trial court contin-
ued the case until Monday, November 10. Fazzone testi-
fied at the habeas trial that he met with the petitioner
on November 6 after court adjourned and again at the

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petitioner’s apartment at some point during the week-
end. When the petitioner did not appear in court on
November 10, the court asked Fazzone if he knew the
petitioner’s whereabouts, to which Fazzone responded:
‘‘I saw [the petitioner] on Friday. I spoke with him, and
he made it clear to me that he wanted to consult other
counsel. So, I said, ‘well, I’ll be in touch with you.’ And
I called him a couple of times last night; I was not able
to get in touch with him.’’ The court adjourned for
approximately twenty minutes to allow the petitioner
additional time to appear and to permit Fazzone to
attempt to contact him.
When court reconvened, the court asked Fazzone if
he ‘‘ha[d] anything to report’’ regarding the petitioner’s
whereabouts, to which Fazzone responded: ‘‘Yes, Your
Honor. . . . I attempted to call [the petitioner] on his
cell phone, and it went to voicemail . . . and I left him
a message, explained to him that he has to be here
immediately. I have not been able to contact him.’’ Faz-
zone then orally moved for a mistrial, stating that he
‘‘would not want the jury to see [the petitioner’s]
absence as any indication of guilt in any way.’’ The
court denied the motion and adjourned for another
twenty minutes to afford the petitioner a final opportu-
nity to appear.
When court reconvened again and the petitioner still
had not appeared, the court asked Fazzone if he had
‘‘heard from the [petitioner] since the last time we were
on the record,’’ to which Fazzone responded: ‘‘I did
again attempt to locate [the petitioner], or to . . . get
in touch with him by way of cell phone, and I have not
heard from him.’’ The court then recounted that, on
November 6, 2014, after the petitioner had moved to
dismiss Fazzone as counsel, it had continued the matter
and instructed the parties that court would reconvene
on November 10 for further consideration of the peti-
tioner’s motion. The court then asked Fazzone whether

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it ‘‘[w]ould . . . be a fair statement’’ to say that Fazzone
had ‘‘tried to get ahold of the petitioner over the week-
end.’’ Fazzone responded: ‘‘Yes, Your Honor, I did. Just
again for the record, I spoke with [the petitioner] on
Friday, and he had made it clear to me that he wanted
to consult with other counsel. Then I called him last
evening because I had not heard back from him and
. . . it went straight to voicemail, Your Honor. And I
attempted to call him twice today.’’ The court found
that the petitioner had ‘‘intentionally absented himself
in an effort to thwart the proceedings in this matter
and has waived, therefore, his right to be present.’’
In count two of his amended habeas petition, the
petitioner alleged that Fazzone’s trial performance was
deficient in various ways, none of which relate to Faz-
zone’s alleged performance at the hearing on November
10, 2014, or his statements to the trial court during that
hearing.14 As discussed previously, in his posttrial brief,
the petitioner claimed that Fazzone’s trial performance
constituted ineffective assistance under either Cronic
or Strickland and identified various actions and/or inac-
tions by Fazzone that, he claimed, supported the ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim. The petitioner did not
reference the November 10 hearing in his posttrial brief
or argue that Fazzone was ineffective for allegedly lying
to the court about his role in or knowledge of the peti-
tioner’s decision to flee. The petitioner also did not
argue that Fazzone had a conflict of interest. Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, the habeas court’s memorandum
14 The petitioner alleged in count two of his amended habeas petition that
Fazzone had rendered ineffective assistance because he ‘‘failed to file pretrial
motions to preclude testimony about [the petitioner’s] prior conviction and
about his allegedly violent relationship with the [victim’s] mother’’; ‘‘failed
to adequately investigate the allegations against [the petitioner]’’; ‘‘failed to
pursue the [victim’s] medical, [Department of Children and Families], and/
or school records’’; ‘‘failed to properly introduce evidence’’; ‘‘failed to object
to [certain testimony and to certain statements by the court]’’; ‘‘failed to
consult and/or obtain an expert witness to rebut the state’s expert’’; ‘‘failed
to file an application for sentence review’’; and ‘‘failed to file an appeal.’’

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of decision did not address any issues concerning Faz-
zone’s statements to the court on November 10.
In his motion for rectification and articulation, the
petitioner argued that ‘‘Fazzone’s testimony before the
habeas court revealed that he lied to Judge Swords’’
because he did not disclose the details of his meeting
at the petitioner’s apartment between November 6 and
10, 2014. The petitioner requested that the court either
‘‘revise its judgment denying the . . . petition for [a]
writ of habeas corpus’’ or, in the alternative, ‘‘acknowl-
edge the undisputed fact that . . . Fazzone lied to the
trial court about his contacts with the [petitioner] prior
to [his] failure to appear . . . .’’ The habeas court
denied that request on the ground that Fazzone’s state-
ments to the trial court ‘‘were not relevant to the deter-
mination of the specific claims’’ at issue because the
petitioner did not raise any such issues in his amended
habeas petition or posttrial brief.
On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
erred by failing to address whether Fazzone’s alleged
‘‘concealment’’ of his role in or knowledge of the peti-
tioner’s decision to flee constituted ineffective assis-
tance and/or a conflict of interest. He argues that Faz-
zone made ‘‘false statements to Judge Swords concealing
his contacts with [the petitioner] and his role in [the
petitioner’s] failure to appear,’’ that these alleged ‘‘lies
to the trial court constituted quintessential ineffective
assistance of counsel,’’ and that, ‘‘if Fazzone had
answered Judge Swords truthfully about his conduct
over the weekend and his role . . . in [the petitioner’s]
disappearance, the court’s ruling on the motion for [a]
mistrial, and the outcome of the trial, would have been
different.’’ Separately, he argues that, ‘‘when [Fazzone]
lied to the court on the morning of November 10, [2014]
his self-interest in concealing his involvement with [the

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petitioner’s] disappearance trumped his duty to his cli-
ent and to the court. There was at this point an irrecon-
cilable conflict of interest.’’ The petitioner contends
that ‘‘[t]hese facts are on the record, do not require
further fact finding, were known to both parties at the
habeas trial and were available to the habeas court to
consider—and should be considered here by this
court.’’ We disagree.
Our review of the record indicates that nothing in
the amended habeas petition or the petitioner’s posttrial
brief reasonably can be construed as raising a claim
that Fazzone rendered ineffective assistance and/or had
a conflict of interest based on his alleged ‘‘concealment’’
of his role in or knowledge of the petitioner’s decision
to flee. Neither the amended petition nor the posttrial
brief even mention Fazzone’s statements to the court
on November 10, 2014, much less claim that Fazzone
lied in those statements. The only testimony elicited
during the habeas trial concerning the November 10
hearing occurred when the respondent’s counsel asked
Fazzone: ‘‘Do you recall on that Monday morning telling
the court that you had attempted several times over
the weekend to contact [the petitioner] in furtherance
of preparing for or strategizing for the trial and that
you were unable to reach him?’’ Fazzone responded:
‘‘[T]hat’s right, yes.’’15 The petitioner’s counsel did not
confront Fazzone with the transcript of the November
10 hearing or ask him any questions about his state-
ments to the court on that date. Thus, the record does
15 In his principal appellate brief, the petitioner cites this testimony in
support of his argument that, at the habeas trial, ‘‘Fazzone admitted that
he had misled Judge Swords about his contacts with [the petitioner] over that
crucial weekend.’’ The petitioner does not explain how Fazzone’s testimony
acknowledging that he told the trial court that he was unable to reach the
petitioner during the weekend constitutes an admission that he lied about
his contacts with the petitioner. In fact, as explained herein, Fazzone
expressly told the court that he had last seen the petitioner on Friday,
November 7, 2014, which the amended petition identifies as the day of the
meeting between Fazzone and the petitioner at the petitioner’s apartment.

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not support the petitioner’s argument on appeal that
he raised these claims before the habeas court.
Moreover, we disagree with the petitioner’s con-
tention that the existing record clearly establishes that
Fazzone lied to the trial court on November 10, 2014.
To the contrary, the record actually contradicts the
petitioner’s claim. The petitioner’s contention that Faz-
zone concealed information about his contact with the
petitioner appears to be based on the premise that Faz-
zone did not disclose the meeting at the petitioner’s
apartment. 16 As discussed previously, the hearing on
the petitioner’s motion to dismiss Fazzone as counsel
took place on Thursday, November 6, after which the
trial court continued the matter to Monday, November
10. During the habeas trial, Fazzone and the petitioner
both testified that they had two discussions after the
court continued the matter: one conversation took place
at the courthouse after court adjourned on November
6, and another took place at the petitioner’s apartment
at some point between November 6 and 10. Although
the transcript does not contain any testimony as to the
day of the meeting at the petitioner’s apartment, the
amended petition alleges that the meeting in question
took place ‘‘[t]he following day’’ after the court granted
the continuance on Thursday, November 6. Thus,
according to the allegations in the amended petition, the
meeting in question took place on Friday, November 7.
The transcript of November 10, 2014, indicates that,
contrary 	to 	the 	petitioner’s 	contention, 	Fazzone
informed the trial court that he had seen and spoken
with the petitioner on Friday, November 7. Specifically,
16 To the extent the petitioner intended to claim that Fazzone should have
disclosed to the court that he had advised the petitioner to flee or otherwise
led him to believe that fleeing was in his best interest, we reiterate that
Fazzone testified that he did not advise the petitioner to flee, and the habeas
court credited that testimony. Thus, any such claim is unsupported by the
record and is contrary to the court’s express factual findings.

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when the court first asked Fazzone whether he knew
the petitioner’s whereabouts, Fazzone responded that
he ‘‘saw [the petitioner] on Friday’’ and had ‘‘called him
a couple of times last night’’ but ‘‘was not able to get
in touch with him.’’ Later, when the court asked whether
it was accurate to say that Fazzone had ‘‘tried to get
ahold of the [petitioner] over the weekend,’’ Fazzone
responded that he ‘‘spoke with [the petitioner] on Fri-
day, and he had made it clear to me that he wanted to
consult with other counsel,’’ and that Fazzone ‘‘called
[the petitioner] last evening because I had not heard
back from him and . . . it went straight to voicemail
. . . .’’ Thus, we disagree with the petitioner’s con-
tention that we can discern from the existing record
that Fazzone lied to the court about his contacts with
the petitioner.
In any event, as indicated previously, at the habeas
trial, the petitioner did not confront Fazzone with the
November 10, 2014 transcript or otherwise raise the
claims that he was ineffective and/or had a conflict of
interest based on any alleged false statements to the
trial court. Because the petitioner did not present his
claims to the habeas court, that court did not make the
factual findings necessary to permit us to review those
claims. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Gatling, 73 Conn. App. 574,
575, 808 A.2d 710 (2002) (‘‘It is not the function of this
court to find facts. . . . Our role is . . . to review
claims based on a complete factual record developed
by a trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
Accordingly, we decline to review the petitioner’s
unpreserved claims.
B
The petitioner’s final claim is that the court erred by
failing to conclude that Fazzone rendered ineffective
assistance during the sentencing hearing. We decline

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to review this claim because the petitioner failed to
raise it before the habeas court.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. As indicated previously, the
petitioner failed to appear for his sentencing hearing,
which was held on January 6, 2015. Fazzone represented
the petitioner in absentia. At the outset of the hearing,
the court found that the petitioner had ‘‘voluntarily,
wilfully, and intentionally absented himself’’ and ‘‘[c]on-
sequently . . . waived his right to be addressed per-
sonally at the sentencing and to speak in mitigation of
his punishment.’’ The state noted that the victim had
provided a letter to the court, which the court confirmed
it had read. The state then presented its sentencing
argument and recommended that the court sentence
the petitioner to twenty-five years to serve followed by
ten years of special parole.
Fazzone then addressed the trial court and argued
in full: ‘‘I did have a chance to read the presentence
investigation [report] in full and the letter from [the
victim] written to Your Honor. I wanted to note that
for the record, that I have read both in full. I have not—
just for the record, I have not heard from [the petitioner]
since the trial has taken place. I have no idea where,
obviously, he is at this time, Your Honor. I feel sorrow
that he did not attend his trial. [The petitioner] obvi-
ously, was found guilty from a jury of his peers, and
so, therefore, I do feel very comfortable in saying that
I feel extreme sorrow for what [the victim] and her
family ha[ve] been through. And I . . . really do and I
hope that [the victim] has a brilliant future and enjoys
a successful future ahead of her, and I hope that their
family can mend and live a very happy life. That’s all,
Your Honor.’’ Thereafter, the court sentenced the peti-
tioner to a term of twenty years of incarceration, fol-
lowed by twenty-five years of special parole.

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The habeas court’s memorandum of decision did not
address any claim pertaining to Fazzone’s representa-
tion at sentencing. In his motion for rectification and
articulation, the petitioner requested that the court
either ‘‘revise its judgment denying [the] . . . petition
for [a] writ of habeas corpus . . . in light of . . . Faz-
zone’s failure to advocate for the [petitioner] at his
in absentia sentencing,’’ or ‘‘rectify the record in its
memorandum of decision as to . . . Fazzone’s repre-
sentation of the [petitioner] at sentencing and the
absence of any advocacy on behalf of the [petitioner].’’
The court denied that request on the ground that no
such claim was alleged in the amended petition or
addressed in the posttrial brief.
On appeal, the petitioner contends that ‘‘Fazzone’s
performance at the petitioner’s sentencing was so defi-
cient as to satisfy the Cronic presumption of prejudice’’
because, ‘‘[r]ather than provide any advocacy at all for
the [petitioner], Fazzone merely expressed ‘extreme
sorrow’ for the [victim],’’ and ‘‘completely failed to offer
any argument on behalf of the [petitioner], to offer any
mitigating evidence, to make any statement at all to
support leniency in sentencing.’’ The petitioner further
argues that the court erred by failing to address that
claim because ‘‘[t]he conduct of counsel at sentencing
should have been understood to be part of the claim
of ineffective assistance as trial counsel.’’
We conclude that the petitioner’s claim is not review-
able because he failed to present it to the habeas court.
The amended petition contains no allegations concern-
ing Fazzone’s performance at sentencing and, in fact,
does not even mention that Fazzone represented the
petitioner during the sentencing proceeding. Moreover,
in the petition’s prayer for relief, the petitioner did not
request that the court order a new sentencing hearing.
Similarly, the petitioner’s posttrial brief does not pre-
sent any argument that could reasonably be construed

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as raising a claim that Fazzone’s representation at sen-
tencing constituted ineffective assistance. The petition-
er’s posttrial brief contains only one sentence concern-
ing the sentencing proceeding, which merely states:
‘‘Fazzone remained counsel through the petitioner’s
sentencing.’’ Finally, although the petitioner introduced
the transcript of the sentencing proceeding as a full
exhibit during the habeas trial, the petitioner did not
confront Fazzone with that transcript or question him
concerning his performance during that proceeding. In
sum, there is nothing in the record to support the peti-
tioner’s claim that the court was on notice that the
petitioner intended to challenge Fazzone’s representa-
tion of him at sentencing. Accordingly, we decline to
review the petitioner’s claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion MOLL, J., concurred.