26CO29, 25SA305 - In Re Northern Integrated Supply Project Water Activity Enterprise v. VIMA Partners

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

<!-- PageHeader="The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls." -->

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
May 4, 2026

2026 CO 29

No. 25SA305, N. Integrated Supply Project Water Activity Enter. v. VIMA
Partners -Eminent Domain-Water Activity - Statutory Interpretation.

In this C.A.R. 21 proceeding brought by a private landowner, the supreme
court issued an order to show cause to consider whether a water activity enterprise
formed under sections 37-45.1-101 to -107, C.R.S. (2025), has the authority to bring
an eminent domain proceeding against a private property owner.

The court now concludes that pursuant to the express terms of section
37-45.1-103(4), C.R.S. (2025), and section 37-45-118(1)(c), C.R.S. (2025), a water
activity enterprise has the power to condemn private property in relation to water
activities. Further, on the facts presented here, the court concludes that Northern
Integrated Supply Project Water Activity Enterprise has the authority to condemn
easements on private land owned by VIMA Partners to survey, locate, construct,
operate, and maintain pipelines and related infrastructure for its water delivery
project because that work relates to water activities as defined by statute.

<!-- PageBreak -->

Accordingly, the court discharges the order to show cause and remands this
case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

<!-- PageBreak -->

# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 29

Supreme Court Case No. 25SA305
Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21
Weld County District Court Case No. 24CV30952
Honorable Kimberly Schutt, Judge

In Re
Petitioner:

Northern Integrated Supply Project Water Activity Enterprise, a government-
owned business organized pursuant to C.R.S. §§ 37-45.1-101 et seq,

V.

Respondents:
VIMA Partners, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; City of Thornton, a
Colorado home rule municipality; DCP Midstream, LP, a Delaware limited
partnership; WES DJ Gathering LLC f/k/a Kerr-McGee Gathering LLC, a
Colorado limited liability company; and Brigitte C. Grimm, in her official
capacity as Weld County Treasurer.

Order Discharged

en banc

May 4, 2026

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Trout Raley

Michael A. Kopp

William Davis Wert

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent VIMA Partners, LLC:
Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP

<!-- PageBreak -->

Daniel C. Wennogle
Kendra N. Beckwith
Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent City of Thornton:
Thornton City Attorney's Office
Diana Fantano Hoffman, Senior Assistant City Attorney
Megan Christensen, Senior Assistant City Attorney
Thornton, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Water Congress:
Jewell Jimmerson Natural Resources Law, LLC
April D. Hendricks
Peter D. Jaacks
Castle Rock, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy
District:
Jewell Jimmerson Natural Resources Law, LLC
April D. Hendricks
Peter D. Jaacks
Castle Rock, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Ute Water Conservancy District and Ute Water
Activity Enterprise:
Balcomb & Green, P.C.
Christopher L. Geiger
Glenwood Springs, Colorado

No appearance on behalf of: DCP Midstream, LP; WES DJ Gathering LLC f/k/a
Kerr-McGee Gathering LLC; and Brigitte C. Grimm, in her official capacity as
Weld County Treasurer.

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE
SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO joined.

<!-- PageBreak -->

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 In this C.A.R. 21 proceeding brought by a private landowner, VIMA
Partners, LLC, we issued an order to show cause to consider whether a water
activity enterprise formed under sections 37-45.1-101 to -107, C.R.S. (2025), has the
authority to bring an eminent domain proceeding against a private property
owner.1 We now conclude that pursuant to the express terms of section
37-45.1-103(4), C.R.S. (2025), and section 37-45-118(1)(c), C.R.S. (2025), a water
activity enterprise has the power to condemn private property in relation to water
activities. We thus further conclude that, here, Northern Integrated Supply Project
Water Activity Enterprise ("NISP Enterprise") has the authority to condemn
easements on VIMA Partners' land to survey, locate, construct, operate, and
maintain pipelines and related infrastructure for its water delivery project because
that work relates to water activities as defined by statute.

12 Accordingly, we discharge our order to show cause and remand this case to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 Specifically, the issue presented in this original proceeding is:
Whether, in a private condemnation action, a district court may
allow a water activity enterprise formed under section 37-45.1-101,
C.R.S. et seq., to condemn a landowner's private property when the
enterprise lacks standing under any of the statutes on which it
purports to rely, thereby irreparably depriving the landowner of
its private property rights.

<!-- PageBreak -->

## I. Facts and Procedural History

T3
In October 2024, NISP Enterprise, a business wholly owned by the Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Northern Water"), filed a petition in
condemnation in the Weld County District Court seeking to acquire permanent
and temporary construction easements on a parcel of land owned by VIMA
Partners. According to NISP Enterprise, the easements are required for the
surveying, locating, construction, operation, and maintenance of water delivery
pipelines and related infrastructure as part of a regional water supply and
distribution project called the Northern Integrated Supply Project ("NISP"). The
NISP seeks to provide 40,000 acre-feet annually of new, reliable water supply to
fifteen municipalities and water districts within Northern Water's boundaries.

14
In its petition in condemnation, NISP Enterprise identified multiple legal
sources for its authority to bring and maintain an eminent domain action, namely,
article XVI, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution; section 37-86-102, C.R.S. (2025),
and section 37-86-104(1), C.R.S. (2025), governing rights-of-way of persons owning
water rights or conditional water rights; section 37-45.1-103(4) and section
37-45-118(1)(c), governing water activity enterprises and water conservancy
districts; and title 38, article 1 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, governing the
right of eminent domain generally.

<!-- PageBreak -->

15
Following the filing of NISP Enterprise's petition in condemnation, VIMA
Partners filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that none of the
legal authorities cited by NISP Enterprise provided it with the power of eminent
domain. The district court denied VIMA Partners' motion, ruling that NISP
Enterprise had condemnation authority under article XVI, section 7 of the
Colorado Constitution; sections 37-86-102 and 37-86-104(1); and sections
37-45.1-103(4) and 37-45-118(1)(c).

16 VIMA Partners then petitioned this court pursuant to C.A.R. 21 for
immediate relief, and we issued an order to show cause.

## II. Analysis

17 We begin by addressing our jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 and setting forth
the applicable standard of review and principles of statutory construction. We
then apply these legal principles to determine whether NISP Enterprise has the
authority to condemn private property for the surveying, locating, construction,
operation, and maintenance of pipelines and related infrastructure for the NISP.

## A. Original Jurisdiction

18
The decision to exercise our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 rests
within our sole discretion. Garcia v. Centura Health Corp., 2025 CO 15, 1 14,
566 P.3d 999, 1005. An original proceeding under C.A.R. 21 is an extraordinary
remedy that is limited in both its purpose and availability. Id. We have found it

<!-- PageBreak -->

appropriate to exercise such original jurisdiction to remedy a district court's abuse
of discretion or a ruling in excess of the court's jurisdiction when no other
adequate appellate remedy exists. People v. Smith, 2023 CO 40, 1 15, 531 P.3d 1051,
1054. We have also deemed it appropriate to exercise our C.A.R. 21 jurisdiction in
condemnation proceedings when, as here, an appellate remedy would be
inadequate because the condemnor would take immediate possession of the land
and potentially damage that land while appellate review is pending. See Dep't of
Transp. v. Amerco Real Est. Co., 2016 CO 62, 1 7, 380 P.3d 117, 119.

## B. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction

19
In condemnation proceedings, as in other matters, we defer to the district
court's findings of fact but review its legal conclusions de novo. Forest View Co. v.
Town of Monument, 2020 CO 52, 1 13, 464 P.3d 774, 777.

110 We likewise review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Byers Peak
Props., LLC v. Byers Peak Land & Cattle, LLC, 2026 CO 7, 1 24, 583 P.3d 97, 103. In
construing statutes, we seek to determine and effectuate the legislature's intent.
Id. To do so, we apply words and phrases in accordance with their plain and
ordinary meanings, and we consider the entire statutory scheme to give consistent,
harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Id. We also avoid constructions
that would render any statutory words or phrases superfluous or that would lead
to illogical or absurd results. Id. And we respect the legislature's choice of

<!-- PageBreak -->

language. Id. at [ 25, 583 P.3d at 103. Accordingly, we will not add words to or
subtract words from a statute. Id. If the statutory language is unambiguous, then
we will apply it as written, and we need not resort to other rules of statutory
construction. Id.

## C. Condemnation Authority

111 VIMA Partners contends, among other things, that section 37-45.1-103(4) of
the water activity enterprise statutes and section 37-45-118(1)(c) of the Water
Conservancy Act, when read together and narrowly construed, do not grant NISP
Enterprise the power of eminent domain. We disagree.

112 As noted above, Northern Water, the parent district of NISP Enterprise, is a
water conservancy district. Prior to the passage of Colorado's Taxpayer's Bill of
Rights ("TABOR"), Colo. Const. art. X, § 20, the General Assembly enacted the
Water Conservancy Act of 1937, §§ 37-45-101 to -153, C.R.S. (2025), which allowed
for the organization of water conservancy districts to provide for the conservation
of the state's water resources and to ensure the greatest beneficial use of water
within this state. To that end, the General Assembly provided water conservancy
district boards a variety of powers. See § 37-45-118.

113 One of these powers is the power of eminent domain. Thus, section
37-45-118(1)(c) provides:

The board has power on behalf of said district ... [t]o have and to
exercise the power of eminent domain and dominant eminent domain

<!-- PageBreak -->

and in the manner provided by law for the condemnation of private
property for public use to take any property necessary to the exercise
of the powers granted in this article, [subject to an exception not
pertinent here].

114 Accordingly, the General Assembly expressly granted water conservancy
districts the power of eminent domain to take private property when necessary for
the exercise of the districts' powers. Id. Indeed, VIMA Partners does not contest
Northern Water's authority to condemn its lands.

115 Following the passage of TABOR, taxing, revenue, and spending limitations
were applied to state and local governmental entities, including water
conservancy districts. See, e.g., Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(1), (4), (7)-(8). To address
these limitations and provide for the continued beneficial use of all waters
originating in Colorado, the General Assembly enacted water activity enterprise
statutes to allow for the establishment of water activity enterprises, within or by
water conservancy districts, water conservation districts, and other state and local
governments, to pursue or continue "water activities." § 37-45.1-101(1), C.R.S.
(2025); § 37-45.1-103(1). See generally Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Water Activity
Enterprises, 22 Colo. Law. 2555 (Dec. 1993) (discussing the legislative creation of
and purposes for water activity enterprises under TABOR's enterprise exception).
Such enterprises are government-owned businesses within the meaning of
TABOR but are excluded from certain limitations that TABOR otherwise places on
state and local governmental entities. See Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(2)(b), (d)

<!-- PageBreak -->

(defining "[d]istrict" as excluding enterprises and "[e]nterprise" as "a
government-owned business authorized to issue its own revenue bonds and
receiving [sic] under 10% of annual revenue in grants from all Colorado state and
local governments combined").

116 Each water activity enterprise is wholly owned by a single district, and the
governing body of the water activity enterprise is either the governing body of the
district that owns it or such governing body as may be prescribed by applicable
laws; local charters, resolutions, or ordinances; or intergovernmental agreements.
§ 37-45.1-103(2)(a), (3). Moreover, the General Assembly expressly authorized the
governing body of each water activity enterprise to exercise its parent district's
legal authority relating to water activities. § 37-45.1-103(4). Thus, section
37-45.1-103(4) provides, "The governing body of each water activity enterprise
may exercise the district's legal authority relating to water activities, but no
enterprise may levy a tax which is subject to section 20(4) of article X of the state
constitution."

117 Because NISP Enterprise is a water activity enterprise and its parent district
is Northern Water, we conclude that, read together, the plain and unambiguous
language of sections 37-45.1-103(4) and 37-45-118(1)(c) allows NISP Enterprise to
exercise Northern Water's legal authority, including the power of eminent
domain, provided that this authority is exercised in relation to "water activities."

<!-- PageBreak -->

§ 37-45.1-103(4). The question thus becomes whether NISP Enterprise exercised
its eminent domain authority here in relation to such "water activities."

118 Section 37-45.1-102(3), C.R.S. (2025), defines "[w]ater activity" to include,
without limitation, "the diversion, storage, carriage, delivery, distribution,
collection, treatment, use, reuse, augmentation, exchange, or discharge of water."
The definition further provides that a "[w]ater activity" includes "the provision of
wholesale or retail water or wastewater or storm water services and the acquisition
of water or water rights." Id.

119 In this case, NISP Enterprise initiated the condemnation proceedings at
issue in connection with the construction and maintenance of pipelines and related
infrastructure for the NISP, which, as noted above, is a water delivery and
distribution project. Under section 37-45.1-102(3)'s plain language, such pipelines
and infrastructure are directly related to "water activities" because the pipelines
and infrastructure are indisputably related to the acquisition, carriage, delivery,
and distribution of water.

120 For these reasons, we conclude that under the express language of sections
37-45.1-103(4) and 37-45-118(1)(c), NISP Enterprise may exercise the power of
eminent domain related to the construction and maintenance of these pipelines
and their related infrastructure.

<!-- PageBreak -->

121 Our reading of these statutory provisions is confirmed by section 38-1-202,
C.R.S. (2025), in which the General Assembly provided a list of entities authorized
to exercise the power of eminent domain under Colorado law. As pertinent here,
section 38-1-202(1)(f)(XXX) provides:

The following governmental entities, types of governmental entities,
and public corporations ... may exercise the power of eminent
domain :... A water activity enterprise, as defined in section
37-45.1-102(4), C.R.S., exercising the legal authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain of the district that owns it in relation to a
water activity, as defined in section 37-45.1-102(3), C.R.S., as
authorized in section 37-45.1-103(4), C.R.S.

122 Just as we read the plain language of sections 37-45.1-103(4) and
37-45-118(1)(c) together to grant water activity enterprises the power of eminent
domain in relation to water activities, so, too, does our General Assembly.

123 Notwithstanding the plain language of the above-described statutes, VIMA
Partners argues that, for a number of reasons, a water activity enterprise does not
have condemnation authority. We address and reject each of these arguments in
turn.

T24 First, VIMA Partners contends that because Colorado case law dictates that
statutes granting condemnation authority must be narrowly construed, sections
37-45.1-103(4) and 37-45-118(1)(c) cannot be read to grant NISP Enterprise the
power of eminent domain.

<!-- PageBreak -->

125 As VIMA Partners asserts, we construe eminent domain statutes narrowly,
and we resolve any ambiguities in favor of the condemnee landowner. Bly v. Story,
241 P.3d 529, 533 (Colo. 2010). Accordingly, the power of eminent domain cannot
be implied from doubtful or vague language in a statute, but rather the authority
to condemn must be provided expressly or by necessary implication. Mack v. Town
of Craig, 191 P. 101, 101 (Colo. 1920); accord Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Arapahoe Cnty. v.
Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 655 P.2d 831, 833-34 (Colo. 1982). Despite VIMA
Partners' assertions to the contrary, for the reasons set forth above, the General
Assembly did expressly authorize water activity enterprises like NISP Enterprise
to exercise the power of eminent domain in relation to water activities.

126 The cases on which VIMA Partners relies to argue that a narrow
construction precludes such a conclusion are distinguishable. In each of those
cases, a party sought to find condemnation authority in vague or broad statutory
language that did not specifically identify either the power of eminent domain or
the class of persons or activities for which that power may be exercised. See, e.g.,
Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis Ranch, 643 P.2d 519, 521-22 (Colo. 1982)
(concluding that a federal oil and gas lessee did not have the power to condemn
under general constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing the taking of
private property in certain circumstances because those provisions did not
unambiguously grant to federal oil and gas lessees the right to condemn); Town of

<!-- PageBreak -->

Eaton v. Bouslog, 292 P.2d 343, 344 (Colo. 1956) (concluding that the power of
eminent domain cannot be implied from the word "otherwise" in a statute
granting incorporated towns the power to acquire lands for cemeteries "by
purchase or otherwise"); Akin v. Four Corners Encampment, 179 P.3d 139, 144-46
(Colo. App. 2007) (concluding that the authority to condemn private property for
a natural gas pipeline could not be implied from a grant of condemnation
authority for "private ways of necessity" because that phrase had been construed
narrowly to encompass only passageways or roadways that were indispensable to
the practical use of a property). Here, in contrast, the statutory language identifies
the power of eminent domain, § 37-45-118(1)(c), and the General Assembly
granted water activity enterprises authority to use that power in relation to water
activities, § 37-45.1-103(4).

127 Second, and related to its first point, VIMA Partners contends that our
obligation to construe narrowly statutes granting the power of eminent domain
precludes us from interpreting sections 37-45-118(1)(c) and 37-45.1-103(4) so
broadly as to encompass a right to condemn in this case. As discussed above,
however, these statutes, when read together, authorized NISP Enterprise to
exercise condemnation authority relating to "water activities," which are defined
to include activities such as those involved here. § 37-45.1-102(3). Contrary to
VIMA Partners' suggestion, our duty to construe condemnation statutes narrowly

<!-- PageBreak -->

does not authorize us to ignore express statutory language that grants the power
of eminent domain to an entity for what might be deemed a broad set of purposes.
See Dep't of Transp. v. Stapleton, 97 P.3d 938, 943-45 (Colo. 2004) (interpreting a
statute that granted the Colorado Department of Transportation the power of
eminent domain for "state highway purposes" to include condemnation authority
not only for the acquisition of the land strictly necessary for a highway's
construction, but also for purposes "integral to the construction, maintenance, and
improvement of state highways," including a parking and transit facility).

128 Third, VIMA Partners argues that because the definition of "water activity"
does not include the phrase "eminent domain" or similar language referencing the
taking of private property, section 37-45.1-103(4)'s grant of authority "relating to
water activities" does not include the power of eminent domain. This argument,
however, fails to consider the statutory scheme as a whole, as we must do. See
Byers Peak Props., 1 24, 583 P.3d at 103.

129 As discussed at length above, water activity enterprises' condemnation
power is rooted in the statutory language establishing that such entities "may
exercise the district's legal authority," § 37-45.1-103(4), and water conservancy
districts indisputably have the power of eminent domain, § 37-45-118(1)(c).
Accordingly, these statutes establish water activity enterprises' power of eminent
domain. The phrase "relating to water activities," in turn, describes the purposes

<!-- PageBreak -->

for which water activity enterprises may exercise their condemnation authority.
See § 37-45.1-103(4). Thus, the definition of "water activity" is pertinent to
determining the scope of a water activity enterprise's condemnation authority, not
the existence of that authority.

130 Finally, VIMA Partners contends that NISP Enterprise cannot exercise the
power of eminent domain in relation to its pipeline and infrastructure work
because the statutory definition of "water activity" does not specifically identify
pipelines or infrastructure projects. Again, VIMA Partners' interpretation ignores
statutory language, which we may not do. See Byers Peak Props., 1 24, 583 P.3d at
103.

131 Specifically, section 37-45.1-103(4) does not grant legal authority to water
activity enterprises solely for defined water activities under section 37-45.1-102.
To the contrary, section 37-45.1-103(4) grants legal authority for purposes "relating
to water activities." (Emphasis added.) Thus, water activity enterprises may
exercise legal authority for actions taken in connection with its water activities,
even if the action itself is not expressly identified as a water activity under the
statute. See Related, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining "related" as
"[c]onnected in some way; having relationship to or with something else"); see also
Woodrow v. Wildlife Comm'n, 206 P.3d 835, 837 (Colo. App. 2009) (defining "related

<!-- PageBreak -->

activity" to mean having a "connection, relation, or reference" or being
"connected; associated" with the activities listed in the statute).

132 Moreover, section 37-45.1-102(3) provides that the term ""[w]ater activity'
includes but is not limited to" the illustrative list of activities provided in the
definition. (Emphasis added.) We read the phrase "includes, but is not limited
to" as an "expansion or enlargement" and a "broader interpretation" of the
statutory definition. People v. Roggow, 2013 CO 70, 1 20, 318 P.3d 446, 451 (quoting
Ruff v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 218 P.3d 1109, 1113 (Colo. App. 2009), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom., City of Manassa v. Ruff, 235 P.3d 1051 (Colo. 2010)).

133 Notwithstanding the foregoing, VIMA Partners attempts to bolster its
reading of "water activity" as excluding pipeline and infrastructure projects by
pointing to the existence of a separate definition in the statutory scheme, namely,
section 37-45.1-102(5)'s definition of "[w]ater project or facility," which defines
that term to include "a dam, storage reservoir, compensatory or replacement
reservoir, canal, conduit, pipeline, tunnel, power plant, water or wastewater
treatment facility, and any and all works, facilities, improvements and property
necessary or convenient for the purpose of conducting a water activity."
(Emphasis added.) As VIMA Partners sees it, because the statutory definition of
"[w]ater project or facility" includes "pipeline" and other infrastructure projects,
a pipeline must be something other than a "water activity." Again, however,

<!-- PageBreak -->

VIMA Partners does not read the statutory language as a whole, as we are required
to do. See Byers Peak Props., 1 24, 583 P.3d at 103.

134 Although the General Assembly included different statutory definitions to
distinguish between general water activities and water projects and facilities, we
do not read the former as mutually exclusive of the latter. Indeed, in section
37-45.1-103(1), the General Assembly made clear that water activity enterprises
may be established "for the purpose of pursuing or continuing water activities,
including water acquisition or water project or facility activities." (Emphasis
added.) The statutory scheme thus describes "water project or facility activities"
as a subset of "water activities," not as a wholly separate category under the
statutory language.

135 In sum, we conclude that under sections 37-45.1-103(4) and 37-45-118(1)(c),
NISP Enterprise has the authority to condemn easements on VIMA Partners' land
to construct and maintain pipelines and related infrastructure for the NISP. In
light of this conclusion, we need not decide whether article XVI, section 7 of the
Colorado Constitution or sections 37-86-102 and -104(1) independently provide
NISP Enterprise with condemnation authority.

## III. Conclusion

136 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that pursuant to the express terms
of sections 37-45.1-103(4) and 37-45-118(1)(c), a water activity enterprise has the

<!-- PageBreak -->

power to condemn private property in relation to water activities. We thus further
conclude that, here, NISP Enterprise has the authority to condemn easements on
VIMA Partners' land to survey, locate, construct, operate, and maintain pipelines
and related infrastructure for the NISP because that work relates to water activities
as defined by statute.

137 Accordingly, we discharge our order to show cause and remand this case to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.