Angela Lea Argo v. Christina T. Hemphill

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
September 8, 2022

2022COA104

No. 21CA0897, Argo v. Hemphill — Real Property — Nonprobate
Transfers on Death — Transfer of Real Property on Death —
Vesting of Ownership in Grantee-Beneficiary — Unrecorded
Interests

In this property rights case, the division of the court of appeals

interprets the notice and recording requirements of section

15-15-407, C.R.S. 2021, to determine whether the plaintiff’s lifetime

lease agreement is enforceable against two defendants who received

the contested property by beneficiary deed.

Under section 15-15-407(2), a grantee-beneficiary takes title to

a property conveyed by a beneficiary deed subject to several

different types of interests at the time of the property owner’s death.

These include interests the grantee-beneficiary had actual notice of

at the time of the owner’s death and interests that were recorded

before the owner’s death.
Under section 15-15-407(3), a party holding an unrecorded

interest in the property must record evidence or notice of that

interest no later than four months after the owner’s death. If the

party holding the interest fails to do so, and if the grantee-

beneficiary did not have actual notice of the interest at the time

they took title, then the party is forever barred from asserting the

interest in the property.

The division holds that the plaintiff’s unrecorded lifetime lease

agreement is unenforceable because the defendants did not have

actual notice of it at the time of the owner’s death and because it

was not recorded within four months of the owner’s death.

Further, the division concludes that the district court’s

findings were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review of

its ruling that the lifetime lease agreement was a spurious

document and award of attorney fees and costs to the defendants.

Accordingly, the division (1) affirms the judgment that the

lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable; (2) reverses the judgment

in favor of two of the defendants on their spurious document

counterclaim; (3) reverses the order awarding attorney fees and

costs; and (4) remands for further proceedings.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA104

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0897
Otero County District Court No. 19CV30031
Honorable Michael A. Schiferl, Judge

Angela Lea Argo,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Christina T. Hemphill, a/k/a Christina Tara O’Berto and Dianna K. Hemphill,
a/k/a Dianna K. Hemphill-O’Byrne,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
ORDER REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Navarro and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur

Announced September 8, 2022

Brunette Law Office, LLC, Stephen A. Brunette, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellant

Jessica Hoyt, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2021.
¶1 Plaintiff, Angela Lea Argo, appeals the district court’s

judgment in favor of defendants, Christina T. Hemphill (also known

as Christina Tara O’Berto), Dianna K. Hemphill (also known as

Dianna K. Hemphill-O’Byrne), and Steven K. Rein, and its order

awarding attorney fees and costs to the Hemphills. We affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶2 This case involves a property rights dispute over an

agricultural property in Otero County. The property belonged to

Don William Argo, who died on March 19, 2018, after a lengthy

illness. Angela is Don’s surviving spouse.1 The Hemphills are

Don’s nieces.

¶3 In September 2017, Don executed a last will and testament

bequeathing the property to the Hemphills upon his death. That

same month, Don also executed and recorded a beneficiary deed

conveying the property to the Hemphills upon Don’s death.

1To promote clarity and prevent confusion, we refer to Angela and
Don by their first names throughout the opinion. We mean no
disrespect in doing so.

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¶4 When Don died, title to the property passed to the Hemphills.

The Hemphills attempted to sell the property to Rein. The sale was

to be completed on March 20, 2019. The Hemphills contend the

sale fell apart because Angela recorded a lifetime lease agreement

regarding the property. When the sale did not go through, they

leased the property to Rein in October 2019.

¶5 Angela contends that she has a leasehold interest in the

property. On March 16, 2018 — three days before Don’s death —

Angela and Don executed an agreement granting Angela a lifetime

lease for the property. The agreement stated that it “shall

supersede the Beneficiary Deed should Don William Argo die. Even

though said property is transferred to the new owners upon death,

this agreement must be honored.” It further specified that “[u]pon

[Angela’s] death all uses of the land will be then transferred to [the

Hemphills].” Neither Don nor Angela recorded the lifetime lease

agreement at or shortly after the time it was created.

¶6 On August 25, 2018 — more than five months after Don’s

death — Angela personally delivered the lifetime lease agreement to

the Hemphills at a family gathering. It is undisputed that the

Hemphills did not have notice of the lifetime lease before that date.

2
¶7 During the next few months, Angela unsuccessfully attempted

to persuade the Hemphills to honor the lifetime lease. Then, on

February 1, 2019, the Hemphills’ attorney sent Angela a letter

stating that (1) per the beneficiary deed, title to the property vested

in the Hemphills upon Don’s death; (2) the lifetime lease agreement

was unenforceable and Angela was forever barred from asserting an

interest in the property because she didn’t record her interest in the

property within four months of Don’s death; and (3) she had one

month to remove her personal belongings from the property.

¶8 On March 15, 2019, Angela recorded the lifetime lease

agreement in Otero County.

¶9 The next month, Angela filed suit against the defendants,

seeking a “complete adjudication of the rights of all parties to this

action with respect to the [property]” under C.R.C.P. 105. In the

complaint, which contained several individual claims against the

Hemphills and Rein, Angela sought a ruling that her lifetime lease

agreement is enforceable against all the defendants. In response,

the Hemphills filed several counterclaims against Angela, petitioned

the court to declare that the lifetime lease agreement is a spurious

document under C.R.C.P. 105.1 and sections 38-35-201 to -204,

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C.R.S. 2021, and requested that the court quiet title to the property

in them. The district court held a two-day bench trial on Angela’s

claims and the Hemphills’ counterclaims in April 2021. After

Angela rested her case, the Hemphills and Rein separately moved

for directed verdicts under C.R.C.P. 50 on the grounds that the

lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable.

¶ 10 In oral findings and a subsequent written order, the district

court found that the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable,

“void, invalid, and otherwise of no legal [e]ffect” under section

15-15-407, C.R.S. 2021, because the defendants did not have

notice of the lifetime lease agreement until more than four months

after Don’s death. The court ruled that, because the agreement is

unenforceable, Angela has no right, title, or interest in the property.

The court dismissed Angela’s remaining claims.

¶ 11 Additionally, the court implicitly found that the lifetime lease

agreement is a spurious document, ruled in favor of the Hemphills

on their spurious document counterclaim, quieted title to the

property in the Hemphills, and ordered the defendants to file any

attorney fees requests within twenty-one days of the issuance of the

written order.

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¶ 12 Angela subsequently filed two timely C.R.C.P. 59 motions for

post-trial relief. In the first motion, Angela contended that the

court made inadequate findings on the Hemphills’ spurious

document counterclaim and asserted that the court incorrectly

ruled that the lifetime lease agreement is a spurious document. In

the second motion, Angela contended that the court improperly

found that the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable and invalid

and that it improperly quieted title in the Hemphills.

¶ 13 The court denied Angela’s post-trial motions in identical

written orders that stated, in their entirety, as follows: “Denied. The

evidence at trial was that there was no notice of any type within

four months of [Don’s] death.”

¶ 14 After the court denied Angela’s C.R.C.P. 59 motions, the

Hemphills filed a motion for attorney fees and costs. The Hemphills

sought attorney fees under two theories. First, the Hemphills

argued they were entitled to a mandatory award under the spurious

document statutes, which require the court to enter a monetary

judgment in favor of the prevailing party on such a claim.

§ 38-35-204(2), (3). Alternatively, the Hemphills argued that they

were entitled to attorney fees and costs under section 13-17-102,

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C.R.S. 2021, on the ground that Angela’s claims lacked substantial

justification.

¶ 15 The court, without identifying the theory underlying its ruling,

granted the Hemphills’ motion and awarded $36,318.20 in fees and

costs, plus interest at the statutory rate.

II. Analysis

¶ 16 Broadly, Angela asserts that the court erred by (1) finding that

the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable and invalid; (2) finding

that the lifetime lease agreement is a spurious document; and

(3) awarding attorney fees and costs to the Hemphills. We first

address Angela’s arguments in turn. Then we address the

Hemphills’ request for appellate attorney fees and costs.

A. Enforceability of the Lifetime Lease Agreement

¶ 17 Angela raises several interrelated challenges to the court’s

directed verdict, interpretation of section 15-15-407, and finding

that the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable and invalid. We

address, and reject, each of her arguments.

1. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶ 18 “C.R.C.P. 50 authorizes a party to move for a directed verdict

at the close of the evidence offered by the opposing party.” State

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Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Goddard, 2021 COA 15, ¶ 25. The

district court should only grant a motion for a directed verdict

where “the evidence compels the conclusion that reasonable

[people] could not disagree and that no evidence or inference

therefrom has been received at trial upon which a verdict against

the moving party could be sustained.” Schuessler v. Wolter, 2012

COA 86, ¶ 33.

¶ 19 We review the district court’s ruling on a motion for directed

verdict de novo. Id. “Like the district court, we must consider all

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

determine whether a reasonable [person] could have found in favor

of the nonmoving party.” Goddard, ¶ 26.

¶ 20 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we

review de novo. Fischbach v. Holzberlein, 215 P.3d 407, 409 (Colo.

App. 2009). When interpreting a statute, our main goal is to

ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s purpose and

intent. Town of Vail v. Vill. Inn Plaza-Phase V Condo. Ass’n, 2021

COA 108, ¶ 11. “In doing so, we consider the entire statutory

scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of

its parts, and we construe words and phrases in accordance with

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their plain and ordinary meanings.” Ryser v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.,

2021 CO 11, ¶ 14. Where the statutory language is clear and

unambiguous, we apply it as written and do not resort to other

rules of statutory construction. Id.; Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO

13M, ¶ 21.

2. Discussion

¶ 21 Angela contends that the district court’s interpretation of

section 15-15-407 is erroneous because it (1) conflicts with the

plain language and legislative intent of that statute; (2) conflicts

with the commonly understood and accepted meanings of the terms

“actual notice” and “constructive notice”; and (3) renders the

limitation of action provisions of the statutory scheme meaningless.

We disagree with her first two arguments, do not resolve the third,

and conclude that the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable

based on the plain language of section 15-15-407.

a. The District Court’s Interpretation Did Not Conflict with the
Plain Language and Legislative Intent of the Statute

¶ 22 Under section 15-15-407(1), “[t]itle to the interest in real

property transferred by a beneficiary deed shall vest in the

designated grantee-beneficiary only on the death of the owner.”

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¶ 23 Section 15-15-407(2) states,

A grantee-beneficiary of a beneficiary deed
takes title to the owner’s interest in the real
property conveyed by the beneficiary deed at
the death of the owner subject to all
conveyances, encumbrances, assignments,
contracts, mortgages, liens, and other
interests, affecting title to the property,
whether created before or after the recording of
the beneficiary deed, or to which the owner
was subject during the owner’s lifetime
including, but not limited to, any executory
contract of sale, option to purchase, lease,
license, easement, mortgage, deed of trust, or
other lien. The grantee-beneficiary also takes
title subject to any interest in the property of
which the grantee-beneficiary has either actual
or constructive notice.

¶ 24 Section 15-15-407(3)(a), however, imposes a time limit for

asserting an unrecorded interest in the property:

A person having an interest described in
subsection (2) of this section whose interest is
not recorded in the records of the office of the
clerk and recorder of the county in which the
property is located at the time of the death of
the owner, shall record evidence or a notice of
the interest in the property not later than four
months after the death of the owner. The
notice shall name the person asserting the
interest, describe the real property, and
describe the nature of the interest asserted.

¶ 25 Section 15-15-407(3)(b) addresses the result of the failure to

timely record an interest in the property:

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Failure to record evidence or notice of interest
in the property described in subsection (2) of
this section within four months after the death
of the owner shall forever bar the person from
asserting an interest in the property as against
all persons who do not have notice of the
interest. A person who, without notice,
obtains an interest in the property acquired by
the grantee-beneficiary shall take the interest
free from all persons who have not recorded
their notice of interest in the property or
evidence of their interest prior to the expiration
of the four-month period.

¶ 26 Together, these provisions unambiguously provide that a

grantee-beneficiary takes title to the property subject to a number

of different kinds of interests at the time of the owner’s death.

These include both recorded and unrecorded interests. If a grantee-

beneficiary has actual notice of an unrecorded interest at the time

of the owner’s death, then the grantee-beneficiary takes title subject

to that interest. A grantee-beneficiary also takes title subject to any

recorded interests at the time of the owner’s death.

¶ 27 But an unrecorded interest in the property that the grantee-

beneficiary did not have actual knowledge of at the time of the

owner’s death must be recorded within four months of the owner’s

death. If the interest is not recorded within that time period, then

10
the holder of the interest is forever barred from asserting an interest

in the property.

¶ 28 Angela argues that the district court’s interpretation of the

statute is incorrect, but we disagree. Angela’s arguments selectively

use certain language from the statute while disregarding its overall

structure. She contends that the language in section

15-15-407(3)(b) “as against all persons who do not have notice of

the interest” exempts her from the four-month recording

requirement because she eventually provided notice to the

Hemphills. But the principles of statutory interpretation require us

to read the statute as a whole, place individual words and phrases

in context, and give consistent, harmonious effect to all its parts.

Fischbach, 215 P.3d at 409. Contrary to her argument, the

statutory scheme does contain temporal requirements for notice.

¶ 29 Angela heavily relies on secondary sources in her briefing. We

find the statute unambiguous, but those materials would bolster

our conclusion even if we did not. Angela points to a pair of 2005

Colorado Lawyer articles. The authors describe themselves as

Colorado Bar Association members of a joint committee that

apparently drafted the beneficiary-deed legislation. In the articles,

11
they describe how the legislation is intended to work. As to

unrecorded interests in the property, the drafters indicated in one

of those articles that

as to interests in the property that have not
been recorded with the clerk and recorder,
such interests are subject to the requirement
that they must be recorded within four months
after the death of the owner. After that
deadline, the grantee-beneficiary’s title will be
deemed free and clear of any such unrecorded
interests for which the grantee-beneficiary had
no actual notice prior to the grantor-owner’s
death. This illustrates yet another intent of
the drafters: to have the record title capable of
establishing all interests in the property to
which the grantee-beneficiary’s interest is to be
subject determinable at the end of the
relatively short period of four months after the
death of the owner.

Carl G. Stevens & James G. Benjamin, Beneficiary Deeds in

Colorado — Part II: Practical Applications, 34 Colo. Law. 103, 104

(June 2005) (footnotes omitted).

¶ 30 The Hemphills took title to the property subject to other

unrecorded interests of which they had actual notice at the time of

Don’s death. Evidence or notice of any unrecorded interests had to

be recorded within the four-month period following his death.

Providing notice to the Hemphills after that time is insufficient and

12
does not constitute actual or constructive notice within the meaning

of the statute. When the statute is read as a whole, Angela’s

arguments fail.

b. The District Court’s Interpretation Does Not Conflict
with the Commonly Understood Meanings of
Actual and Constructive Notice

¶ 31 Angela contends that the district court’s interpretation

“renders meaningless the well-established meaning of the ‘actual

notice’ and ‘constructive notice’ exceptions incorporated in the

statute, by narrowing these exceptions to a four-month period after

death.” We disagree.

¶ 32 The statute does not change the well-settled definitions of

these terms. See Martinez v. Affordable Hous. Network, Inc., 123

P.3d 1201, 1206 (Colo. 2005) (defining actual and constructive

notice). Instead, it imposes time limits for a holder of a property

interest to record the interest or to provide notice of the interest to a

grantee-beneficiary and provides that failure to do so will render the

interest unenforceable.

¶ 33 Nor do we perceive any way in which the district court

misapplied or misinterpreted these phrases. The district court’s

findings identify both when Angela gave the Hemphills actual notice

13
of the lifetime lease agreement and when she recorded it. The court

also correctly found that both actions were too late under the

statute to preserve Angela’s interest in the property. The district

court’s interpretation of the statute did not alter the meaning of

actual or constructive notice, and we reject Angela’s argument to

the contrary.

c. Angela’s Statute of Limitations
Argument is Unpreserved

¶ 34 Angela contends that the court’s interpretation of section

15-15-407 renders meaningless the statute of limitations provision

in section 15-15-411(1)(b)(II), C.R.S. 2021.

¶ 35 Angela first raised this argument in her second C.R.C.P. 59

motion. But “[a]rguments made, as here, for the first time in a

post-trial motion are too late and, consequently, are deemed waived

for purposes of appeal.” Briargate at Seventeenth Ave. Owners

Ass’n v. Nelson, 2021 COA 78M, ¶ 66. Therefore, this argument is

unpreserved and we decline to consider it.

d. The Lifetime Lease Agreement is Unenforceable

¶ 36 We conclude that the lifetime lease agreement is unenforceable

under section 15-15-407. As relevant to this case, the statute

14
provides two paths that could have rendered the lifetime lease

agreement enforceable against the Hemphills. First, the agreement

could have been recorded, or actually provided to the Hemphills,

before Don’s death. In that case, the Hemphills would have had

actual or constructive notice at the time title vested in them, and

they would have taken title subject to the agreement. Second,

Angela could have recorded the agreement, or notice of its

existence, within four months after Don’s death.

¶ 37 It is undisputed that the Hemphills did not have notice of

Angela’s lifetime lease agreement at the time of Don’s death, which

is when title in the property vested in them. And it is also

undisputed that Angela did not record the lifetime lease agreement

until nearly a year after his death. Angela advances several

arguments based on Don and Angela’s intent in creating the

agreement and whether Angela acted in good faith in recording it.

But under section 15-15-407, these facts are not relevant to our

analysis. Because the notice and recording provisions of section

15-15-407 were not satisfied, the agreement is unenforceable and

Angela is forever barred from asserting an interest in the property.

15
The district court did not err by reaching this conclusion or by

quieting title to the property in the Hemphills.

B. The Record is Insufficient To Determine Whether the
Lifetime Lease Agreement is a Spurious Document

¶ 38 Angela also contends that the court erred by determining that

the lifetime lease agreement is a spurious document. One of her

arguments is that the court made insufficient findings to enable

appellate review. We agree with that contention.

1. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶ 39 We review de novo whether a recorded document is a spurious

document, as defined by section 38-35-201(3). Evans v. Evans,

2019 COA 179M, ¶ 10.

¶ 40 “The spurious liens and documents statute protects property

owners from frivolous claims used to cloud title as a means of

protest or harassment.” Better Baked, LLC v. GJG Prop., LLC, 2020

COA 51, ¶ 17. The statute allows a person “‘whose real . . .

property is affected by a recorded or filed . . . document’ to petition

for the release of a ‘spurious document.’” Id. (quoting

§ 38-35-204(1)); see C.R.C.P. 105.1.

16
¶ 41 If, following a show cause hearing, the district court

“determines that the lien or document is a spurious lien or spurious

document, [it] shall make findings of fact and enter an order and

decree declaring the spurious lien or spurious document . . . invalid

[and] releasing the recorded or filed spurious lien or spurious

document.” § 38-35-204(2); C.R.C.P. 105.1(d); see Fiscus v. Liberty

Mortg. Corp., 2014 COA 79, ¶ 31. The prevailing party in a

spurious documents action is automatically entitled to a monetary

judgment for its reasonable attorney fees and costs.

§ 38-35-204(2), (3).

2. Additional Background and Discussion

¶ 42 The court did not explicitly find that the lifetime lease

agreement is a spurious document. And it did not make any

findings related to whether the lease agreement is a spurious

document during its oral ruling at trial. Instead, it ordered the

defendants to prepare and file a draft order, which it appears to

have approved without modification. The final order states only

that “[j]udgment is entered in favor of the Hemphill Defendants on

their Claims A and B. Title to the Subject Property is hereby

quieted to the Hemphill Defendants who have fee simple title to the

17
Subject Property, with the right of possession.” While this portion

of the order explains the basis for quieting title, it does not reveal

the basis on which the court entered judgment on the spurious

document counterclaim.

¶ 43 The post-trial motions proceedings do not shed more light on

this issue. In its order denying Angela’s first C.R.C.P. 59 motion,

the only ground that the court articulated in support of its spurious

documents counterclaim ruling was that the defendants did not

have notice of the lifetime lease agreement within four months of

Don’s death.

¶ 44 But the lifetime lease agreement isn’t spurious just because

Angela’s underlying claims failed. See Better Baked, ¶ 20. A

spurious document is “any document that is forged or groundless,

contains a material misstatement or false claim, or is otherwise

patently invalid.” § 38-35-201(3). A groundless document is “one

for which a proponent can advance no rational argument based on

evidence or the law to support the claim.” Westar Holdings P’ship v.

Reece, 991 P.2d 328, 330 (Colo. App. 1999). It is a document that

is “essentially fictitious.” Evans, ¶ 41.

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¶ 45 It does not appear from this record that the parties developed

any of these arguments below. The Hemphills’ initial counterclaim

asserted that the lease agreement “contains an invalid signature for

Don . . . and is otherwise unenforceable on its face.” But because

the proceedings terminated with the directed verdict, the Hemphills

did not present their case for their counterclaim. And in their briefs

on appeal, the parties dispute whether Angela acted with or without

good faith in recording the lease agreement in the first place. But

the appealed orders contain no factual findings on these issues.

¶ 46 The judgment and decree quieting title does not explain the

statutory basis for finding the lease agreement to be a spurious

document and does not contain specific findings that would provide

insight into the court’s reasoning and the basis for its decision. The

oral ruling also does not contain any discussion on this issue. We

therefore conclude that this portion of the judgment does not permit

meaningful appellate review. In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d

1370, 1379 (Colo. 1997). We reverse this portion of the judgment

and remand it to the district court for further proceedings.

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C. Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 47 Angela next contends that the court erred by awarding

attorney fees and costs to the Hemphills. She contends the court’s

order contains inadequate findings and challenges its ultimate

conclusion that the Hemphills were entitled to attorney fees and

costs. We agree that the court’s findings are inadequate on this

issue.

¶ 48 In its entirety, the court’s order states as follows:

THE COURT, having reviewed Defendants’
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, the
Court’s file, any response thereto, and having
been fully advised on the premises, does
hereby GRANT the Motion and Award
Defendants their attorney fees and costs from
and against the Plaintiff in the amount of
$36,318.20, plus interest at the statutory rate
until paid in full.

¶ 49 The order — which does not list the statutory basis for the

award and does not permit us to understand the court’s reasoning

— also “does not permit meaningful appellate review.” Aldrich, 945

P.2d at 1379. We therefore reverse the order and remand to the

district court for further proceedings.

¶ 50 On remand, based on our holding in Part II.B, supra, the

district court should first make factual findings and determine

20
whether the lifetime lease agreement is a spurious document. This

decision will determine who should receive statutory attorney fees

and costs under section 38-35-204.

¶ 51 The court may also consider whether the Hemphills are

entitled to attorney fees and costs under section 13-17-102, which

allows for an award of fees where an attorney or party has asserted

a claim or defense that lacks “substantial justification.”

§ 13-17-102(4); see Aldrich, 945 P.2d at 1378; Sifton v. Stewart Title

Guar. Co., 259 P.3d 542, 546 (Colo. App. 2011). The district court

is in the best position to conduct this analysis because “[w]hether a

claim lacked substantial justification is a question of fact for the

trial court.” Mitchell v. Ryder, 104 P.3d 316, 320 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 52 In conducting this analysis, the court must make specific

findings as dictated by sections 13-17-102 and -103, C.R.S. 2021.

Aldrich, 945 P.2d at 1378-79. It should also make any other

findings necessary to permit meaningful appellate review. Munoz v.

Measner, 247 P.3d 1031, 1035 (Colo. 2011) (citing Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs v. Auslaender, 745 P.2d 999, 1001 (Colo. 1987)).

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D. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 53 Finally, the Hemphills request appellate attorney fees and

costs under C.A.R. 38, 39, and 39.1 and sections 13-17-101

to -103, C.R.S. 2021. We deny the request.

¶ 54 Our conclusions in Parts II.B and II.C, supra, that the orders

below contain insufficient findings for appellate review demonstrate

that Angela’s arguments on those issues do not lack substantial

justification. And although we disagree with Angela’s interpretation

of section 15-15-407, her arguments on appeal are not

“substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially

vexatious” and do not warrant an attorney fees award.

§ 13-17-102(4); see Makeen v. Hailey, 2015 COA 181, ¶ 53 (“An

appeal is frivolous if the proponent can present no rational

argument based on the evidence and law or the appeal is

prosecuted for the sole purpose of harassment or delay.” (quoting

Mitchell, 104 P.3d at 323)); Zivian v. Brooke-Hitching, 28 P.3d 970,

974 (Colo. App. 2001) (An appeal “is groundless if there is no

credible evidence to support the allegations.”).

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III. Conclusion

¶ 55 We reverse the district court’s judgment on the Hemphills’ first

counterclaim and the order awarding attorney fees and costs to the

Hemphills. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion on these two issues.

¶ 56 Based on our holding that the lifetime lease agreement is

unenforceable, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Angela’s

claims against the Hemphills and Rein and its judgment quieting

title to the property in the Hemphills in all other regards.

JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.

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