v. Abad

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
January 28, 2021

2021COA6

No. 18CA0775, People v. Abad — Crimes — Sexual Exploitation

of a Child; Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Double

Jeopardy — Multiplicity; Evidence — Authentication — Hearsay

The prosecution charged the defendant with nine different

counts of sexual exploitation of a child under section 18-6-

403(3)(b.5), C.R.S. 2020, based on his possession of photos found

in a Dropbox account and photos and videos found on two phones

that police recovered from his bedroom. On direct appeal, a

division of the court of appeals considers the defendant’s

contentions that the district court erred by (1) admitting

unauthenticated evidence from a Dropbox account and two cell

phones; (2) admitting hearsay testimony from two cell phone

extraction reports; and (3) entering multiplicitous convictions in

violation of double jeopardy.
The division finds no error as to issues one and two. As to

issue three, the division concludes that where the evidence adduced

at trial did not establish factually distinct acts of possession, the

defendant’s convictions are multiplicitous and violate double

jeopardy.

Consistent with People v. Bott, 2020 CO 86, the division

concludes that simultaneous possession of any number of sexually

exploitative items exceeding twenty constitutes a single offense.

Extending Bott, the division concludes that simultaneous

possession of more than one sexually exploitative video constitutes

a single offense. Finally, the division concludes that the fact that

the sexually exploitative material was found on three different

electronic devices or storage sites, standing alone, does not

establish factually distinct offenses justifying multiple convictions

and punishments. Accordingly, the division merges the defendant’s

convictions and remands for resentencing.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA6

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0775
Jefferson County District Court No. 16CR3216
Honorable Christopher C. Zenisek, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Zachariah Andrew Abad,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Dunn and Freyre, JJ., concur

Announced January 28, 2021

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany L. Limes, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Meredith Rose, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 A jury convicted defendant, Zachariah Andrew Abad, of nine

counts of sexual exploitation of a child. On appeal, he contends

that the district court erred by (1) admitting unauthenticated

evidence from a Dropbox account and two cell phones; (2) admitting

hearsay testimony from two cell phone extraction reports; and (3)

entering multiplicitous convictions in violation of double jeopardy.

¶2 In resolving Abad’s third contention, infra Part III, we must

apply the Colorado Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v.

Bott, 2020 CO 86 (Bott II), and decide two related matters of first

impression. Consistent with Bott II, we conclude that simultaneous

possession of more than twenty items of sexually exploitative

material constitutes a single offense under section 18-6-403(3)(b.5),

C.R.S. 2020. Extending the rationale of Bott II, we conclude that

simultaneous possession of multiple sexually exploitative videos

constitutes a single offense under section 18-6-403(3)(b.5). And we

conclude that the fact that sexually exploitative material was found

on three different electronic devices or storage sites, standing alone,

does not establish factually distinct offenses justifying multiple

convictions and punishments.

1
¶3 Consequently, we conclude that Abad’s convictions are

multiplicitous and violate double jeopardy. Accordingly, we merge

his convictions and remand for resentencing, if necessary. We

otherwise affirm the judgment.

I. Factual Background

¶4 Investigator Kevin Donahue of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s

Office Crimes Against Children Unit received a cyber tip from the

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) about

photographs uploaded to a Dropbox account. The NCMEC believed

the photographs were sexually exploitative images of children. The

NCMEC provided Donahue a Yahoo email address and a list of IP

addresses associated with the Dropbox account.

¶5 Based on this information, Donahue sent requests for

production of records to, among others, Dropbox, Comcast, and

Yahoo. In response, Yahoo produced subscriber information that

included a phone number. Donahue ran the phone number

through law enforcement databases and was able to link the

number to Abad and obtain his address.

¶6 Once Donahue learned that Abad lived in Arvada, he

transferred the case to the Arvada Police Department. The

2
information Donahue provided formed the basis for a search

warrant. During the search of Abad’s house, police officers seized

two cell phones from Abad’s bedroom — a Samsung Galaxy S-III

(the S-III) and a Samsung Galaxy S-IV (the S-IV). The police

downloaded the contents of the cell phones and found sexually

exploitative images and videos of children on each device.

¶7 The prosecution charged Abad with nine class 4 felony counts

of sexual exploitation of a child, based on his alleged possession of

the photos found in Dropbox and the photos and videos found on

the two phones. As detailed infra Part III.A, the jury convicted Abad

of eight class 4 felonies and one class 6 felony. The district court

sentenced him to six years each on the class 4 felonies and eighteen

months on the class 6 felony, all sentences to run concurrently.

II. Admissibility of Evidence

A. Standard of Review

¶8 We review all evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, ¶ 10. A trial court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or if it misapplies the law. Campbell v. People, 2019 CO 66,

¶ 21; People v. Jefferson, 2017 CO 35, ¶ 25.

3
B. Dropbox Evidence

¶9 Abad contends that the district court erred by admitting the

images found in Dropbox because they were not properly

authenticated. We disagree.

1. Additional Factual Background

¶ 10 At trial, Donahue testified that after he received the cyber tip

from the NCMEC about a particular Dropbox account that might

contain sexually exploitative material, he sent a request for

production of records — “basically a search warrant for business

records” — to Dropbox “for the subscriber information and content

of that Dropbox account.” Dropbox responded with the subscriber

information for the account, which included Abad’s name, an email

address, and a list of IP addresses.1 Dropbox also sent a thumb

drive “that contained the contents of [the account].” Donahue

followed instructions to decrypt and view the thumb drive’s

contents. Then he copied the contents of the thumb drive onto a

disc.

1 The prosecution did not admit the Dropbox subscriber evidence
for the truth of the matter asserted but instead to explain
Donahue’s investigation.

4
¶ 11 When the prosecutor asked Donahue what he found on the

thumb drive, Abad’s attorney objected based on lack of

authentication. In response, the district court ruled that the

prosecutor could lay more foundation to show that the evidence was

what the prosecution purported it to be — “information returned

from Dropbox pursuant to [Donahue’s] investigation.”

¶ 12 Donahue then explained that he had reviewed the disc’s

contents before trial and they were “a fair and accurate

representation of what [he] received from Dropbox.” And he

testified that the files on the thumb drive and disc contained several

folders holding hundreds of images and videos of children engaged

in sexual acts with adults. The court admitted the disc of Dropbox

contents (People’s Exhibit 3) into evidence without objection from

Abad’s attorney.

¶ 13 The prosecutor then offered twenty-three printed images

(People’s Exhibits 3-1 through 3-23) as evidence of the sexually

exploitative material from the Dropbox account. Donahue testified

that the printed images were “fair and accurate representations of

the materials [he] received from Dropbox.” Abad’s attorney objected

5
to their admission based on lack of authentication, but the court

overruled the objection and admitted them into evidence.

¶ 14 Later, the prosecution qualified Michael Roemer, a detective

with the Arvada Police Department, as an expert in Cellebrite

software, which the Arvada Police used to download information

from Abad’s cell phones. He testified that once a cell phone has

been downloaded and information from the phone has been

extracted, he is trained to look at the extracted information,

including images, text messages, and chats. He testified that some

of the sexually exploitative images extracted from the S-IV were the

same as those on the disc from Dropbox. He testified that some file

path names on the extraction report from the cell phones contained

the word “Dropbox.” And he testified that he viewed chats in the

extraction report that had been downloaded from a messaging app,

which involved Abad and several others, referenced viewing “nudes

of 12- to 17-year-old females,” discussed sharing images, and

included links to Dropbox posted into the chat.

2. Applicable Law

¶ 15 Authenticity is a condition precedent to admissibility. CRE

901(a). The condition “is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support

6
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”

Id.; People v. N.T.B., 2019 COA 150, ¶ 16. The burden to

authenticate evidence is low — only a prima facie showing is

required. Gonzales v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 27. “Once the

proponent meets this burden, the actual authenticity of the

evidence and the effect of any defects go to the weight of evidence

and not its admissibility.” N.T.B., ¶ 16.

¶ 16 Although CRE 901(b) sets forth nonexhaustive examples of

ways to authenticate evidence, it does not establish the nature or

quantity of proof required or prescribe any exclusive method for

authenticating evidence. Gonzales, ¶ 30; N.T.B., ¶ 17.

Because the rule’s plain language instructs
that a proponent need only provide sufficient
evidence to support a finding that the proffered
evidence is what the proponent claims, the
rule vests trial courts with broad discretion to
consider a variety of foundational
circumstances depending on the nature of the
proffered evidence.

Gonzales, ¶ 30; see also Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm.

for Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207, 1213 (Colo. App. 2008) (“Whether a

proper foundation has been established is a matter within the

7
sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be

disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”).

3. The Dropbox Images Were Properly Authenticated

¶ 17 Electronic evidence may be authenticated in several different

ways under CRE 901, including through the testimony of a witness

with knowledge that the evidence is what it is claimed to be and

through circumstantial evidence. See People v. Hamilton, 2019 COA

101, ¶ 36; Glover, ¶ 25. Information from Dropbox and other

similar cloud-based storage providers, however, presents unique

challenges in that it lacks readily identifiable characteristics that

often make authentication under CRE 901 possible. N.T.B., ¶ 20.

“Specifically, files uploaded to remote servers are not necessarily

shared with other users, which forecloses the opportunity for a

recipient to authenticate them. And cloud storage providers may

not require detailed profiles of their users, which eliminates another

avenue to corroborate ownership of the account’s contents.” Id.

¶ 18 Still, as noted, the standard for authentication is low.

Gonzales, ¶ 27. Once the proponent makes a prima facie showing,

the ultimate determination of whether the evidence is, in fact,

authentic rests with the jury. Id. at ¶ 43; accord N.T.B., ¶ 16.

8
¶ 19 At trial, the prosecution claimed that the printed images it

sought to introduce were sexually exploitative images of children

sent to Donahue by Dropbox. When it overruled Abad’s

authentication objection, the district court understood the evidence

being offered was “information returned from Dropbox pursuant to

[Donahue’s] investigation.”2

¶ 20 Donahue’s testimony was sufficient to authenticate the printed

images as sexually exploitative images of children from a Dropbox

account, which Dropbox sent to Donahue. First, Donahue testified

that he sent a request for production to Dropbox for subscriber

information and the content of the Dropbox account associated with

the NCMEC cyber tip. Then, he testified he received a thumb drive

from Dropbox and viewed its contents. Next, he testified that he

copied the contents of the thumb drive to a disc, that he viewed the

contents of the disc before trial, and that the contents of the disc

were a fair and accurate representation of what he received from

2 On appeal, the People contend that the images Donahue
authenticated at trial were “child pornography contained in a
Dropbox account associated with Abad.” (Emphasis added.) That
is not how the prosecution characterized the evidence at trial,
however, and our review is necessarily limited to the district court’s
ruling on the evidence as it was admitted.

9
Dropbox. The district court admitted into evidence the disc

containing the entire contents of the Dropbox account. Abad’s

attorney did not object. Finally, Donahue testified that the printed

images the prosecution sought to introduce were fair and accurate

representations of the materials he received from Dropbox.

¶ 21 Considering this evidence collectively, we conclude that the

district court did not err by finding that the printed images were

what the prosecution claimed they were — fair and accurate

representations of the materials Dropbox sent to Donahue. See

N.T.B., ¶ 18 (“[W]here a law enforcement investigator possesses

personal knowledge that proffered evidence was produced in

response to a search warrant, courts have allowed the investigator

to authenticate that evidence.”). Accordingly, the district court did

not abuse its discretion by admitting the Dropbox images.3

3 It is worth noting that whether the evidence was sufficient for the
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Abad controlled the
Dropbox account or possessed images contained in it is a separate
question. Abad argues on appeal that there was insufficient
evidence to support a conclusion by a reasonable person that he
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to the count associated
with Dropbox. See People v. Brassfield, 652 P.2d 588, 592 (Colo.
1982). But the premise underlying his argument is that the
Dropbox images should not have been admitted. He argues that we

10
C. Cell Phone Evidence

¶ 22 Abad contends that the district court erred by admitting

certain evidence related to the S-III and S-IV. Specifically, he

argues that (1) the cell phone extraction reports and the images and

videos from the phones were not properly authenticated and (2) the

extraction reports and witness testimony about the content of the

extraction reports were hearsay. We reject these contentions.

1. Additional Factual Background

¶ 23 During the search of Abad’s house, the police seized two cell

phones from Abad’s bedroom, the S-III and the S-IV. After the

phones were logged into evidence at the police station, Detective

Renee Beale, who was the lead detective on the case at the time,

downloaded the contents of the cell phones. Beale downloaded the

S-III on her own. Sergeant Amity Losey, who took over the

should “not consider inadmissible evidence in determining whether
sufficient evidence” supported his conviction. We disagree. See
People v. Hard, 2014 COA 132, ¶ 39 (“In assessing the sufficiency of
the evidence, we must consider all the evidence admitted at trial,
including the erroneously admitted evidence . . . .”). Nonetheless,
we have concluded that the Dropbox images were properly
authenticated, which is Abad’s only appellate challenge to their
admission. And Abad does not argue that the evidence was
insufficient if the Dropbox images are considered.

11
investigation after Beale retired for medical reasons, assisted Beale

in downloading the S-IV.

¶ 24 To download a cell phone, the police plug the phone into a

computer, and specialized computer software extracts all available

data from the phone and creates an extraction report. After

describing this standard download process, Losey testified —

without objection — that the police downloaded the data from

Abad’s phones in the same way they download data from phones in

“every other case.”

¶ 25 Then Roemer, the Cellebrite expert, explained that the Arvada

Police Department has been using the Cellebrite software to extract

data from phones since 2009. He explained that an extraction

report may contain, among other things, user information, phone

and chat logs, text and multimedia messages, emails, images,

videos, file path information, and dates that files were downloaded.

The software may also be able to extract information that has been

deleted from the phone.

¶ 26 Losey reviewed the complete extraction report for the S-III.

She testified that there were 22,418 total images on the S-III, which

included images of children engaging in sexual acts. She testified

12
about a video on the device titled “13 Y/O sex” and described its

contents. She also testified as to the names of other videos that

had been deleted from the phone. Abad’s attorney objected to

Losey’s testimony describing the content of the images and video

based on the “best evidence rule” and to the titles of the videos as

hearsay. The district court overruled the objections.

¶ 27 The prosecutor then moved to admit three pages of the S-III

extraction report (People’s Exhibit 2), which reflected when the

phone was downloaded, the serial number of the phone, the device

user name and photograph, and email addresses and user names

associated with the phone and various apps on the phone. Abad’s

attorney did not object.

¶ 28 The prosecutor also offered twenty-eight printed images

(People’s Exhibits 2-1 through 2-26, 2-28, and 2-29) as evidence of

the sexually exploitative material from the S-III. Losey testified that

the images were fair and accurate representations of photographs

she previously viewed in the complete extraction report for the S-III.

Abad’s attorney did not object.

¶ 29 Detective Kevin Westbrook assisted in executing the search

warrant at Abad’s residence and recovering Abad’s two cell phones.

13
He testified without objection that the phones were placed into

evidence at the Arvada Police Department and that they “were, in

fact, later downloaded.”

¶ 30 Westbrook also testified that he reviewed the complete

extraction report for the S-IV. He said the total number of images

on the two phones exceeded 74,000 and that approximately 9,000

images were identified as “child pornography.” He could not recall

how many sexually exploitative videos were on the phones but

testified that five videos from the S-IV were downloaded for use in

this case. Abad’s attorney objected on several grounds and the

objections were overruled.

¶ 31 The prosecutor offered twenty-two printed images (People’s

Exhibits 1-1 through 1-22) as evidence of the sexually exploitative

material from the S-IV. Westbrook testified that the images were

fair and accurate representations of images downloaded from the

S-IV that depicted children “engaged in graphic sexual acts with

either other children or with adults.” Abad’s attorney did not

object.

¶ 32 The prosecutor offered five discs each containing a sexually

exploitative video extracted from the S-IV (People’s Exhibits 1-23

14
through 1-27) and one disc containing a sexually exploitative video

extracted from the S-III (People’s Exhibit 2-30). Westbrook testified

that the videos were fair and accurate representations of the videos

downloaded from the S-III and S-IV. Abad’s attorney did not object.

¶ 33 The prosecutor moved to admit six pages of the S-IV extraction

report (People’s Exhibit 1), which reflected the make and model of

the phone, a Bluetooth device named “Zachariah Abad,” email

addresses and usernames associated with various accounts and

apps on the phone, and searched terms. Abad’s attorney did not

object.

¶ 34 Westbrook testified that the partial extraction report reflected

a YouTube search conducted on May 12, 2015, for “[IM] a

pedophile.” Losey and Roemer both testified that they saw this

same search on the same day during their reviews of the S-IV

extraction report.

¶ 35 Westbrook testified that the partial S-IV extraction report

reflected the username “Chocothunde” associated with the phone’s

KIK messaging app. Losey testified that she viewed a conversation

between Chocothunde and others through the KIK app on the S-IV

and confirmed specific statements made by Chocothunde and the

15
others engaged in the conversation. Abad’s attorney objected to

lack of authentication — specifically as to the identity of the users

— and to hearsay. The district court determined that the

prosecutor had laid a sufficient foundation that the phone belonged

to Abad and that the statements made by Chocthunde through the

app were Abad’s statements. The court ruled that statements by

other users were not being offered for their truth, but to provide

context for Abad’s statements.

¶ 36 Losey testified without further objection to other KIK app

communications she viewed in the S-III extraction report between

Abad and unknown users. Roemer likewise testified without

further objection to other KIK and Snapchat communications he

viewed in the S-IV extraction report between Abad and unknown

users.

¶ 37 Although he did not call any defense witnesses, Abad admitted

two exhibits into evidence during Roemer’s cross-examination.

First he offered Defense Exhibit B, a partial extraction report from

the S-III showing each of the still images admitted by the

prosecution (People’s Exhibits 2-1 through 2-26, 2-28, and 2-29)

and their associated file path information. Second, he offered

16
Defense Exhibit C, a partial extraction report from the S-IV showing

each of the still images admitted by the prosecution (People’s

Exhibits 1-1 through 1-22) and their associated file path

information.

2. Authenticity

¶ 38 Abad contends that the district court erred by admitting

witness testimony about the contents of the S-III and S-IV

extraction reports because the reports were not properly

authenticated. He also contends that the district court erred by

admitting the images and videos from the S-III and S-IV because

they were not properly authenticated. We find no reversible error.

a. Applicable Law

¶ 39 As noted, the authenticity requirement under CRE 901 is

satisfied by a prima facie showing that the matter in question is

what its proponent claims. Gonzales, ¶ 27; N.T.B., ¶ 16.

b. Preservation and Standard of Reversal

¶ 40 The People contend that Abad failed to preserve these

arguments by failing to object at trial. We agree.

¶ 41 On appeal, Abad contends that the extraction reports were not

authenticated because the person who conducted the initial

17
download did not testify about it at trial. But he fails to identify any

part of the record where his attorney lodged a similar objection with

the district court. Losey, Westbrook, and Roemer testified at length

about the contents of the extraction reports. The only

“authentication” objection Abad’s attorney raised was when

Westbrook testified to the number of sexually exploitative images on

the two phones. And although defense counsel used the word

“authentication,” he did not state the basis for the authentication

objection or make any argument similar to the one he advances on

appeal.

¶ 42 Abad’s attorney also did not object when the prosecution

offered the partial extraction reports from the S-III and S-IV into

evidence; instead, counsel affirmatively stated, “No objection.”

Indeed, on appeal Abad clarifies that he “does not challenge the

pages of the reports admitted as Exhibits 1 and 2.” Abad’s attorney

also offered into evidence his own partial extraction reports

(Exhibits B and C), which were created from the same data

downloaded from the S-III and S-IV. Abad’s attorney likewise did

not object when the prosecutor offered into evidence the images and

18
videos from the S-III or S-IV; instead, counsel affirmatively stated,

“No objection.”

¶ 43 Because Abad failed to preserve these contentions, if we

determine that the district court abused its discretion, we review for

plain error. People v. Hagos, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14 (“[W]e review all

other errors, constitutional and nonconstitutional, that were not

preserved by objection for plain error.”); People v. Devorss, 277 P.3d

829, 834-35 (Colo. App. 2011). A plain error is (1) obvious;

(2) substantial; and (3) undermines the fundamental fairness of the

trial itself so as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the

judgment of conviction. Romero v. People, 2017 CO 37, ¶ 6 (citing

Hagos, ¶ 14). “To qualify as plain error, the error must be one that

‘is so clear-cut, so obvious,’ a trial judge should be able to avoid it

without benefit of objection.” Id. (citation omitted).

c. The Extraction Reports

¶ 44 Losey and Westbrook testified that the S-III and S-IV were

seized from Abad’s bedroom during the search of his home. They

testified that the data from the phones was downloaded by the

same process used by the Arvada Police in every other case

involving extraction of data from cell phones — the phone is

19
plugged into a computer that extracts all the available data from the

phone and creates a comprehensive extraction report. Roemer

testified the police use a software called Cellebrite to download the

data and create the extraction reports. Although Beale conducted

the download of the S-III, Losey and Westbrook both testified,

without objection, that they knew the S-III had been downloaded

and an extraction report prepared. Losey assisted Beale with the

download of the S-IV. And Losey, Westbrook, and Roemer testified

at length about the extraction reports without objection (with the

single exception noted above).

¶ 45 Given the minimal showing required by CRE 901, had the

complete extraction reports for the S-III and S-IV been offered into

evidence on this record, the district court would not have abused its

discretion by concluding that they were what the prosecution

claimed they were — data downloaded from the S-III and S-IV. See

CRE 901(a). Accordingly, on this same basis, we cannot conclude

that the district court abused its discretion by allowing witness

testimony about the extraction reports.

¶ 46 But even if we were to conclude that the district court abused

its discretion by not sua sponte rejecting witness testimony about

20
the extraction reports based on lack of authenticity, the error was

not plain because it was not obvious. For an error to be so obvious

that it qualifies as plain error, “the action challenged on appeal

ordinarily ‘must contravene (1) a clear statutory command; (2) a

well-settled legal principle; or (3) Colorado case law.’” Scott v.

People, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Pollard, 2013 COA

31M, ¶ 40).

¶ 47 Citing Hamilton, ¶¶ 36-39, Abad argues: “Someone had to be

able to tell the jury, ‘I did the download, I followed the proper

procedures, the machine that I used and its software were working

properly, and I know that these images and videos are accurate

replicas of what was stored on the phone.” But Hamilton does not

make the purported error obvious because Hamilton was

announced after Abad went to trial. See People v. Thompson, 2018

COA 83, ¶ 34 (“Because plain error requires that the error be

obvious and any legal principles be ‘well settled,’ we only consider

the status of the law at the time of trial.”) (citation omitted), aff’d on

other grounds, 2020 CO 72; People v. O’Connell, 134 P.3d 460, 465

(Colo. App. 2005) (“[W]e will use the status of law at the time of trial

in considering whether the trial court committed plain error.”). And

21
we do not find Hamilton persuasive here.4 See People v. Smoots,

2013 COA 152, ¶ 21 (“[W]e are not bound by the decisions of other

divisions of this court.”), aff’d sub nom. Reyna-Abarca v. People,

2017 CO 15. So we perceive no reversible error.

d. The Images and Videos

¶ 48 Having concluded that the extraction reports were properly

authenticated, we also dispose of Abad’s unpreserved challenge to

the authenticity of the images and videos from the S-III and S-IV.

¶ 49 Losey testified that the printed images offered as People’s

Exhibits 2-1 through 2-26, 2-28, and 2-29 were “fair and accurate”

representations of photographs she viewed on the “download report”

for the S-III. Westbrook testified that the printed images offered as

People’s Exhibits 1-1 through 1-22 were “fair and accurate

representations of the images that were downloaded from” the S-IV.

4 We do not find People v. Hamilton, 2019 COA 101, persuasive in
part because it establishes an inflexible set of requirements that
must be met to authenticate cell phone extraction reports, which
appears inconsistent with Gonzales v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 39, in
which the Colorado Supreme Court recently rejected “adherence to
a rigid formula for authentication.” Instead, the supreme court
reminded us that the standard for authentication under CRE 901 is
“flexible” and “minimal — all that’s required is a prima facie
showing that the evidence is what its proponent claims.” Id. at
¶¶ 39, 42.

22
Westbrook also testified that the videos offered as People’s Exhibits

1-23 through 1-27 and 2-30 were “fair and accurate

representations of the videos that were downloaded from” the S-III

and S-IV.

¶ 50 We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to make a prima

facie showing that the images and videos are what the prosecution

claimed — images and videos downloaded from the S-III and S-IV.

See CRE 901(a); Gonzales, ¶ 27. We perceive no abuse of

discretion.

3. Hearsay

¶ 51 Abad contends that the district court erred by admitting

hearsay testimony about the contents of the extraction reports,

which he contends included more hearsay. He further contends

that the admission of this hearsay evidence violated his

confrontation rights. We disagree.

a. Applicable Law

¶ 52 Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by the Colorado

Rules of Evidence or other applicable statutes or rules. CRE 802;

People v. Buckner, 228 P.3d 245, 249 (Colo. App. 2009). Hearsay is

“a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying

23
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). A statement made by a party is not

hearsay if it is offered against that party. CRE 801(d)(2)(A). And

statements offered for other purposes — such as showing the

statement’s effect on the listener or to give context to a defendant’s

statements — are not offered for their truth and are not hearsay.

See Glover, ¶¶ 40-42; People v. Robinson, 226 P.3d 1145, 1151

(Colo. App. 2009).

b. The Extraction Reports Are Not Hearsay

¶ 53 Abad contends that the district court erred by admitting

testimony about the extraction reports, because the reports

themselves were hearsay. We disagree.

¶ 54 A declarant is “a person who makes a statement.” CRE

801(b). A “statement” is either “(1) an oral or written assertion or

(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him to be

communicative.” CRE 801(a). Information automatically generated

by machines is not hearsay because no “person” or “declarant”

made a “statement” within the meaning of CRE 801. Buckner, 228

P.3d at 250.

24
¶ 55 Losey’s testimony established that the extraction reports were

produced automatically without human intervention. She testified

that to generate the extraction reports, “you plug the cell phone . . .

into a computer and it extracts the data and then . . . [i]t creates a

report of everything that’s on the phone.” (Emphasis added.) The

reports do not require any human input short of plugging the phone

into a machine.

¶ 56 Because the reports were automatically generated, the reports

themselves are not “statements” made by a “declarant,” and

therefore they are not hearsay. See id.5 We perceive no abuse of

discretion.

5 Abad again relies on Hamilton, in which the division concluded
that cell phone extraction reports and a detective’s testimony about
those reports were hearsay. Hamilton, ¶¶ 26, 30. The Hamilton
division started with the common premise that machine-generated
reports are not hearsay because “no ‘person’ or ‘declarant’ made a
communicative ‘statement’ within the meaning of CRE 801.” Id. at
¶ 24. It then explained that “[a] computer-generated record
constitutes hearsay, however, when its creation involves human
input or interpretation.” Id. at ¶ 26. The division concluded that
the extraction reports there were hearsay because the prosecution
did not establish that the reports were generated without human
input or interpretation. Id. at ¶ 21. Unlike Hamilton, we conclude
that there was sufficient evidence for the district court to conclude
that the extraction reports in this case were computer generated
without human input or interpretation.

25
c. Testimony About the Extraction Reports Is Not Hearsay

¶ 57 Abad contends that the district court erred by admitting

testimony about the extraction reports because that testimony

constituted hearsay within hearsay. We disagree.

¶ 58 As an initial matter, because we have concluded that the

extraction reports themselves are not hearsay, it follows that live

testimony about the reports is not hearsay. See CRE 801(c)

(“‘Hearsay’ is a statement other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.”) (emphasis added).

¶ 59 Still, when a statement contains multiple layers of hearsay, a

trial court must analyze each layer separately to determine whether

a recognized exception applies. Bernache v. Brown, 2020 COA 106,

¶ 14. Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the

hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with

an exception to the hearsay rule. See CRE 805. So, even though

we have concluded that the extraction reports were not hearsay, the

reports may still contain inadmissible evidence and we must

analyze the statements within the reports separately to determine if

they are hearsay. See Bernache, ¶ 17.

26
¶ 60 Abad does not specifically identify the language in the

extraction reports to which the witnesses testified that he contends

is hearsay. He does, however, argue that certain categories of

information contained in the extraction reports are hearsay. We

address each category as best we can.

¶ 61 To the extent Abad contends that the names of the files

extracted from the S-III and S-IV were hearsay, we disagree. They

were offered for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that Abad knew

sexually exploitative content was on his phones.

¶ 62 To the extent Abad contends that testimony about the number

of images on the S-III and S-IV was hearsay, we disagree. A

computer-generated tally is not hearsay because there is no

declarant and there is no statement within the meaning of CRE

801. See Buckner, 228 P.3d at 250. And the witnesses’ personal

perceptions of the volume and type of images in the extraction

reports are not hearsay.

¶ 63 To the extent Abad contends that testimony about the

YouTube search “[IM] a pedophile” was hearsay, we also disagree.

First, the information was admitted without objection as part of

People’s Exhibit 1, the partial S-IV extraction report. Second, it was

27
not offered for its truth; regardless of the truth or falsity of the

statement, it was offered to show that the phone user knowingly

searched for that phrase. Third, the statement constituted a

nonhearsay statement by a party opponent. CRE 801(d)(2)(A). “To

admit a statement under this rule, the proponent must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that it was the opposing party who

made the statement.” Glover, ¶ 40. This standard asks the court to

decide whether a contested fact is “more probable than its

nonexistence.” People v. Marx, 2019 COA 138, ¶ 49 (quoting People

v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127, 1135 (Colo. 1980)). We conclude the

evidence was sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that Abad was the person who conducted the search.

¶ 64 To the extent Abad contends that the device user information

contained in People’s Exhibit 1, the partial S-IV extraction report,

was hearsay, we disagree. If such information could be considered

a statement, it would be a nonhearsay statement by a party

opponent because we conclude the evidence was sufficient to

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Abad input his

name, email, and account information into the phone. See CRE

801(d)(2)(A); Glover, ¶ 13.

28
¶ 65 Finally, to the extent Abad contends that testimony about KIK

app messages was hearsay, we disagree. Roemer testified, without

objection, to the username associated with the various S-IV

messaging apps, which was reflected in People’s Exhibit 1, the

partial S-IV extraction report. For any statements made by the

usernames associated with Abad (e.g., Chocothunde), the

statements would be admissions by a party opponent, and not

hearsay. See CRE 801(d)(2)(A). We conclude the evidence was

sufficient to establish this fact by a preponderance of the evidence.

See Glover, ¶ 13. Any statements by other unknown individuals

engaging in a chat conversation with Abad were not offered for their

truth, but for the nonhearsay purpose of providing context for

Abad’s own statements. See Glover, ¶ 42 (“As to statements made

by others in the records, they were not hearsay because they were

admitted to give context to defendant’s statements.”); Robinson, 226

P.3d at 1151.

¶ 66 Accordingly, because the extraction reports were not hearsay,

and because none of the challenged evidence contained in the

extraction reports was hearsay, the district court did not abuse its

29
discretion by admitting witness testimony about the reports or their

content.

d. No Confrontation Clause Violation

¶ 67 Abad contends that the admission of hearsay evidence violated

his rights under the Federal and Colorado Confrontation Clauses.

We disagree.

¶ 68 Although the admission of testimonial hearsay implicates a

defendant’s confrontation rights under the Federal and Colorado

Constitutions, the admission of nonhearsay does not. Robinson,

226 P.3d at 1151; see also U.S. Const. amend. VI; Davis v.

Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 (2006) (admission of testimonial

hearsay violates federal confrontation rights); People v. Oliver, 745

P.2d 222, 226 (Colo. 1987) (“The sixth amendment right

of confrontation guaranteed by the United States Constitution is

applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.”);

People v. Isom, 140 P.3d 100, 103 (Colo. App. 2005) (no right of

confrontation exists when statements are not offered for their

truth). Because the district court did not admit hearsay evidence,

the Confrontation Clause does not apply.

30
III. Multiplicity

¶ 69 Finally, Abad contends that his nine convictions are

multiplicitous in violation of double jeopardy. We agree.

A. Additional Factual Background

¶ 70 The prosecution charged Abad with nine counts of sexual

exploitation of a child. Each count alleged that he possessed or

controlled either a video or more than twenty different items of

sexually exploitative material, “[o]n and before October 27, 2015,”

the day that the police executed the search warrant at Abad’s home.

¶ 71 Before trial, Abad moved to dismiss counts 2-9 as

multiplicitous. The prosecution responded by providing a bill of

particulars explaining that it charged six separate counts for six

separate videos — one video found on the S-III and five videos found

on the S-IV — and three separate counts for three groups of more

than twenty images — one group found in Dropbox, one group

found on the S-III, and one group found on the S-IV. It contended

that possession of each sexually exploitative video constituted a

separate crime and that possession of more than twenty sexually

exploitative images on each electronic device or storage site

(Dropbox, S-III, and S-IV) constituted a separate crime. The district

31
court denied the motion to dismiss, indicating it was not persuaded

that the prosecution was not permitted to charge the case as it had.

¶ 72 Jury Instruction 3, which identified the charges, simply

stated, “The defendant is charged with committing the crimes of

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF A CHILD (NINE COUNTS), in Jefferson

County, Colorado, on or before October 27, 2015.”

¶ 73 The jury received verdict forms for each count. The verdict

forms did not reference any dates associated with the individual

counts. The only information that distinguished one count from

another was (1) whether the count related to the S-III or the S-IV

and (2) whether the count related to a video or to a group of images.

The jury convicted Abad of nine counts as follows:

 Count 1: Sexual exploitation of a child (Samsung S-IV

Video – EX. 1-27). The jury found this item was a

moving image.

 Count 2: Sexual exploitation of a child (Samsung S-IV

Video – EX. 1-26). The jury found this item was a

moving image.

32
 Count 3: Sexual exploitation of a child (Samsung S-IV

Video – EX. 1-25). The jury found this item was a

moving image.

 Count 4: Sexual exploitation of a child (Samsung S-IV

Video – EX. 1-24). The jury found this item was a

moving image.

 Count 5: Sexual exploitation of a child (Samsung S-IV

Video – EX. 1-23). The jury found this item was a

moving image.

 Count 6: Sexual exploitation of a child (Samsung S-IV

Images – EX. 1, 1-1 to 1-22). The jury unanimously

found Abad “knowingly possessed the same 21 or more

items of sexually exploitative material, or that he

knowingly possessed all of the items alleged and at least

21 items were sexually exploitative.”

 Count 7: Sexual exploitation of a child (Samsung S-III

Video – EX. 2-30). The jury found this item was a

moving image.

 Count 8: Sexual exploitation of a child (Samsung S-III

Images – EX. 2, 2-1 to 2-26, 2-28, and 2-29). The jury

33
unanimously found Abad “knowingly possessed the

same 21 or more items of sexually exploitative material,

or that he knowingly possessed all of the items alleged

and at least 21 items were sexually exploitative.”

 Count 9: Sexual exploitation of a child (Dropbox Images

– EX. 3-1 to 3-23, 3-25). The jury did not unanimously

find that Abad “knowingly possessed the same 21 or

more items of sexually exploitative material.”

Accordingly, he was convicted of a class 6 felony rather

than a class 4 felony on this count.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 74 We review de novo a preserved claim that multiplicitous

convictions violate a defendant’s constitutional protection against

double jeopardy. People v. Bott, 2019 COA 100, ¶ 57 (Bott I), aff’d,

2020 CO 86.

¶ 75 The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and

Colorado Constitutions protect an accused against being twice

placed in jeopardy for the same crime. U.S. Const. amend. V; Colo.

Const. art. II, § 18; Bott II, ¶ 7; Woellhaf v. People, 105 P.3d 209,

214 (Colo. 2005). The Double Jeopardy Clauses protect not only

34
against a second trial for the same offense, but also against

multiple punishments for the same offense. Bott II, ¶ 7.

¶ 76 Multiplicity is the charging of multiple counts and the

imposition of multiple punishments for the same criminal conduct.

Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 214; Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585, 589

(Colo. 2005) (“Multiplicity is the charging of the same offense in

several counts, culminating in multiple punishments.”).

Multiplicitous convictions violate the constitutional prohibition

against double jeopardy. Bott I, ¶ 58.

¶ 77 If a defendant is prosecuted for distinct offenses under the

same statute, we ascertain whether his double jeopardy rights were

violated by determining (1) whether the unit of prosecution

prescribed by the legislature permits the charging of multiple

offenses and (2) whether the evidence in support of each offense

justified the charging of multiple offenses and the imposition of

multiple sentences. Id. (citing Quintano, 105 P.3d at 590).

¶ 78 “Unit of prosecution” refers to the extent to which the relevant

statute permits the prosecution to separate the defendant’s conduct

into discrete acts for purposes of prosecuting multiple offenses.

Bott II, ¶ 9; Quintano, 105 P.3d at 590. “It is the province of the

35
legislature to establish and define offenses by prescribing the

allowable unit of prosecution.” Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 215; see also

Bott II, ¶ 8 (“Because any particular criminal proscription can be

violated more than once and often in more than one way, it is . . .

for the legislature to determine the breadth of the conduct it intends

to be punished as a single crime or single violation of its criminal

proscription.”).

¶ 79 To determine the unit of prosecution, we look exclusively to

the statute. Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 215; People v. Arzabala, 2012

COA 99, ¶ 23. In construing a statute, we must discern and

effectuate the intent of the legislature based primarily on the plain

and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Bott I, ¶ 61;

Arzabala, ¶ 23.

C. The Unit of Prosecution

¶ 80 To determine the unit of prosecution for sexual exploitation of

a child, we look to the text of the statute. Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at

215; Arzabala, ¶ 23. As relevant here, a person commits sexual

exploitation of a child if he “[p]ossesses or controls any sexually

exploitative material for any purpose.” § 18-6-403(3)(b.5). Sexually

exploitative material is statutorily defined to include “any” of a

36
number of specifically named and disjoined items depicting a child

involved in or observing explicit sexual conduct. § 18-6-403(2)(j);

Bott II, ¶ 13. “Sexual exploitation of a child by possession of

sexually exploitative material . . . is a class 4 felony if . . . [t]he

possession is of a video, recording or broadcast of moving visual

images, or motion picture or more than twenty different items

qualifying as sexually exploitative material.” § 18-6-403(5)(b)(II).

¶ 81 The Colorado Supreme Court recently considered the unit of

prosecution for sexual exploitation of a child by possession. See

Bott II, ¶¶ 13-16. It focused on subsection (5)(b), concerning

classification and punishment, which “expressly defines the scope

of a single commission of that offense in terms of the type or

number of different items qualifying as sexually exploitative

material possessed pursuant to subsection (3)(b.5).” Id. at ¶ 15.

In subparagraph (5)(b)(II), the legislature
specifies that possession pursuant to
subsection (3)(b.5) of a video, recording or
broadcast of moving visual images, or motion
picture, or more than twenty different items
qualifying as sexually exploitative material “is
a class 4 felony.” [§ 18-6-403(5)(b)(II)]
(emphasis added). . . .

. . . [I]n specifying that possession of more
than twenty qualifying items is a class 4

37
felony, the legislature has defined the unit of
prosecution in terms of the number of items
possessed for the crime of sexual exploitation
of a child by possession pursuant to
subsection (3)(b.5). Because the legislature
has itself determined that the possession of
qualifying items numbering greater than
twenty, without limitation, amounts to the
commission of a single felony, separate
convictions and punishment for the
simultaneous possession of qualifying items
exceeding twenty violates constitutional
protections against being punished twice for
the same offense.

Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.

¶ 82 Under the plain and unambiguous language of the statute,

Abad may be convicted and punished only once for the

simultaneous possession of more than twenty items qualifying as

sexually exploitative material. § 18-6-403(5)(b)(II); Bott II, ¶ 16. In

other words, that Abad possessed more than one set or grouping of

twenty-one sexually exploitative images does not, by itself, mean

that he committed more than one offense.

¶ 83 By the same rationale, Abad may be convicted and punished

only once for the simultaneous possession of more than one video.

Subparagraph (5)(b)(II) provides that possession of “a video . . . or

more than twenty different items qualifying as sexually exploitative

38
material” is a class 4 felony. § 18-6-403(5)(b)(II) (emphasis added).

Although “items” is not a defined term, “subparagraph (5)(b)(II)’s use

of the phrase ‘items qualifying as sexually exploitative material’ is a

clear and unmistakable reference to the list of disjoined items in

subsection (2)(j).” Bott II, ¶ 15. One of those disjoined items is

“any . . . video . . . that depicts a child engaged in, participating in,

observing, or being used for explicit sexual conduct.” § 18-6-

403(2)(j). Because such a video is an “item[] qualifying as sexually

exploitative material” under subsection (2)(j), the legislature chose

to punish possession of “a video” the same as possession of more

than twenty videos (or more than twenty other items qualifying as

sexually exploitative material).

¶ 84 Our task in construing this statute is to ascertain and give

effect to the intent of the legislature, not to second-guess its

judgment. Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo. 1993). This is

particularly true here as it is the exclusive province of the

legislature “to establish and define offenses by prescribing the

allowable unit of prosecution.” Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 215. Based

on the plain language of the statute, the legislature did not intend

to create a separate offense or authorize a separate conviction and

39
punishment for possession of each sexually exploitative video;

rather, possession of a single video or simultaneous possession of

multiple videos, absent evidence that the videos were possessed in

factually distinct ways as we discuss next, constitutes a single class

4 felony offense.

D. Abad’s Convictions Must Merge

¶ 85 Having determined that the legislature defined the unit of

prosecution for the crime of sexual exploitation of a child by

possession pursuant to subsection (3)(b.5) in terms of the number

and type of sexually exploitative items possessed, see Bott II, ¶ 16,

we must next determine whether the evidence adduced at trial

established that Abad engaged in factually distinct acts of

possession that may be prosecuted separately. See Woellhaf, 105

P.3d at 218-19; Quintano, 105 P.3d at 591-92. If the counts cannot

be prosecuted separately, they must merge. See People v. Rhea,

2014 COA 60, ¶ 17 (“Merger has the same effect as vacating one of

the multiplicitous sentences.”).

¶ 86 Typically, the factors we consider when determining whether

conduct supporting the commission of a particular offense is

factually distinct from conduct supporting a second or subsequent

40
commission of the same offense include whether the acts were

separated by time or location, were the product of new volitional

departures or fresh impulse, or were separated by intervening

events. See Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 218-19; Quintano, 105 P.3d at

591-92; see also Bott II, ¶ 14. But “possession” as a criminal act “is

clearly different in nature from other discrete, voluntary acts.” Bott

II, ¶ 14. Possession “continues until the possessor is divested of

control of the possessed item, [so] it is more in the nature of a

condition than a discrete act, or at least has more in common with

a course of conduct or a series of acts related along a continuum of

conduct.” Id. As a result, factors like temporal and spatial

proximity or the presence or absence of intervening events or

volitional departures are less applicable to offenses of possession.

Id.

Rather, the intended scope of a single offense
of possession is typically determined by
considerations involving the nature of the
thing or quantity of things simultaneously
possessed, how or where or when they were
acquired or controlled, the length of time they
have been possessed, or the purpose or
intended use for which they were possessed.

Id.

41
¶ 87 The People contend that Abad was properly convicted of six

separate offenses based on possession of six videos and three

separate offenses based on possession of groups of more than

twenty images found on three separate electronic devices or storage

sites — the S-III, the S-IV, and Dropbox. We have already

concluded that, absent some evidence that Abad’s possession of

each video or group of more than twenty images was factually

distinct, his simultaneous possession of the six videos and more

than sixty images constitutes a single offense of sexual exploitation

of a child by possession. See § 18-6-403(3)(b.5); see also Bott II,

¶ 16

¶ 88 Although the People argue that each of the videos is “factually

distinct,” they focus on the unit of prosecution rather than on any

distinct conduct by Abad that would support additional or

subsequent commissions of the same offense. It was their position

at trial, and it remains their position on appeal, that each video

possessed constitutes a separate and distinct offense. But because

of how the legislature has defined the unit of prosecution, the mere

fact that Abad simultaneously possessed more than one video

cannot, by itself, justify more than one conviction and punishment.

42
And the People do not identify any facts adduced at trial to

establish “how or where or when,” Bott II, ¶ 14, Abad had acquired

or controlled any one of the videos. Nor do they point us to

evidence that Abad possessed any one of the videos for a different

length of time or for a different purpose than any of the others. See

id.

¶ 89 For the three counts based on possessing more than twenty

images, the People argue that the three separate electronic devices

or storage sites (two phones and a Dropbox account) equate to three

separate “locations.” See Quintano, 105 P.3d at 592. Because the

sexually exploitative material was found in three different locations,

the People argue, Abad engaged in three distinct acts of possession

that may be prosecuted separately.6

¶ 90 While location is a relevant factor in determining whether

distinct offenses have been committed, the “location” contemplated

6 To be sure, the supreme court’s recent decision in People v. Bott,
2020 CO 86, left open the question we must answer now. The
sexually exploitative items on which Bott’s conviction and
punishment were based were all found on a single memory card.
Id. at ¶ 19. The court did not decide whether images saved on
multiple electronic devices or storage sites could establish factually
distinct possession offenses. Id.

43
by Woellhaf and Quintano is a physical location. See Woellhaf, 105

P.3d at 218-19; Quintano, 105 P.3d at 591-92. Indeed, changing

physical locations may allow a defendant an opportunity to pause

and reflect on his actions, after which further criminal conduct

more clearly constitutes a new volitional departure subject to

additional punishment. See Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 218-19;

Quintano, 105 P.3d at 591-92.

¶ 91 But as noted in Bott II, ¶ 14, the typical factors we consider

when determining whether conduct is sufficiently factually distinct

to support multiple commissions of the same offense do not readily

apply to crimes of possession. And we are not convinced that two

phones and a Dropbox account, standing alone, evidence Abad’s

possession of sexually exploitative material in factually distinct

ways — particularly when the two phones were recovered from one

physical location (Abad’s bedroom), the Dropbox account is cloud-

based, there was evidence that some images found in Dropbox were

the same images found on the S-IV, and there was no evidence that

the images found on the S-III were entirely different than the images

found on the S-IV.

44
¶ 92 The People did not argue at trial and have not identified on

appeal any other facts establishing distinct acts of possession by

Abad. Without prejudging the significance of such evidence, the

People do not contend that Abad acquired or controlled any of the

images or groups of images on a different date or at a different time

or from a different source than any of the other images or groups of

images. And they do not point us to evidence that Abad possessed

any of the images or groups of images for a different length of time

or for a different purpose than any of the others. Bott II, ¶ 14.

Without more, we cannot conclude on this record that the evidence

justified the charging of multiple offenses and the imposition of

multiple sentences. See id.; Friend v. People, 2018 CO 90, ¶ 23

(concluding the prosecution proved only a single crime in part

because “the information did not allege specific facts supporting”

five different counts and “although before us the People have

attempted to assign specific facts to particular counts, the

prosecution did not try the case that way”); People v. Abiodun, 111

P.3d 462, 471 (Colo. 2005) (noting that when determining whether a

defendant’s acts constitute factually distinct offenses, we look to

how the offenses were charged and to the evidence at trial); People

45
v. Meils, 2019 COA 180, ¶ 44 (merging four counts of sexual

exploitation of a child where there was “no indication that the

prosecution intended to demonstrate that count 1 occurred at a

different time than counts 2, 3, and 4”).

¶ 93 We also agree with Abad that it would be illogical to conclude

that possession of twenty-one images on each of three different

storage devices found in the same physical location may be

prosecuted as three separate class 4 felony offenses while

possession of sixty-three images (or 294 images, as in Bott II, ¶ 4)

on a single device must be prosecuted as a single class 4 felony

offense. See United States v. Elliott, 937 F.3d 1310, 1315 (10th Cir.

2019) (“It seems implausible that Congress could have intended to

punish an individual who possesses five images of child

pornography on five different devices five times more severely as an

individual who possesses the same five images on one device.”).

¶ 94 Because the evidence adduced at trial does not establish

factually distinct acts of possession, we conclude that Abad’s

convictions must merge and the case must be remanded for

resentencing, if necessary. See Bott I, ¶ 69 (vacating multiplicitous

convictions and remanding for resentencing); People v. Johnson,

46
2016 COA 15, ¶ 25 (“In multicount cases, judges typically craft

sentences on the various counts as part of an overall sentencing

scheme, but when a count is vacated and that scheme unravels,

they should have the discretion to reevaluate the underlying facts

and sentences on the remaining counts.”).

IV. Conclusion

¶ 95 We remand to the district court to merge Abad’s convictions on

counts 2-9 into his conviction on count 1, to amend the mittimus to

reflect the merger, and for resentencing, if necessary.7 We

otherwise affirm the judgment.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE FREYRE concur.

7 Where the original sentences for counts that are merged were
concurrent with the remaining count, there may be no need for
resentencing since the length of the initial sentence remains the
same after merger. See, e.g., Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576,
578, 582 (Colo. 1993).

47