v McBride

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
July 23, 2020

2020COA111

No. 17CA2249, People v McBride — Regulation of Vehicles and
Traffic — Equipment — Tail Lamps and Reflectors

A division of the court of appeals considers whether section

42-4-206(1), C.R.S. 2019, which requires motor vehicles to be

equipped with tail lamps emitting red light, prohibits tail lamps

from emitting some white light along with red light. The division

concludes that it does, as the statute requires taillights to shine

only red light. Therefore, the division affirms the judgment for this

traffic infraction and affirms the use of the infraction as justification

for a traffic stop.

The division further considers whether section 42-4-903(1),

C.R.S. 2019, which requires the use of a turn signal before turning

or moving right or left upon a roadway, requires drivers to signal

when navigating a roundabout. The division concludes that it does
not, as the statute does not apply to roundabouts. Therefore, the

division reverses the judgment for this traffic infraction.

Finally, the division considers whether the prosecution

presented sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant

knowingly possessed a firearm as a prior offender. The division

concludes that the prosecution did not and therefore reverses the

defendant’s conviction for the possession charge.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA111

Court of Appeals No. 17CA2249
Mesa County District Court No. 17CR190
Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Timothy Robert McBride,

Defendant-Appellant

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART
AND REVERSED IN PART

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
J. Jones and Welling, JJ., concur

Announced July 23, 2020

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jacob B. McMahon, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 In this criminal case, we address two issues of first impression

in this state: (1) whether section 42-4-206(1), C.R.S. 2019, which

requires motor vehicles to be equipped with tail lamps emitting red

light, prohibits tail lamps from emitting some white light along with

red light; and (2) whether section 42-4-903(1), C.R.S. 2019, which

requires the use of a turn signal before turning or moving right or

left upon a roadway, requires drivers to signal when navigating a

roundabout. We conclude that the answer to the first question is

“yes” and the answer to the second is “no.” We also conclude that

the evidence doesn’t support a finding that the defendant, Timothy

R. McBride, knew about the gun found in the car he was driving.

Accordingly, we affirm Mr. McBride’s traffic infraction for a tail lamp

violation but reverse his traffic infraction for failure to signal and

his conviction for possession of a weapon by a previous offender

(POWPO).

I. Background

¶2 One night, while sitting in an unmarked police car surveilling

a hotel for illicit drug activity, a sheriff’s deputy saw a Lincoln Town

Car with two people in it pull into the parking lot, park for less than

ten minutes without anyone getting into or out of the car, and drive

1
away. He relayed his observations to another deputy, who followed

the Lincoln from another unmarked police car.

¶3 The second deputy, as she followed the Lincoln, noticed that

both of the car’s tail lamps were broken and that, although the

lamps had been patched with red tape, the tape was melted and the

bulbs emitted some white light along with red light. The deputy

also observed the Lincoln navigate a roundabout without signaling

and continue straight on the same road. She radioed a third

deputy in a marked patrol car to stop the Lincoln and investigate

the two traffic infractions.

¶4 The third deputy pulled the Lincoln over and identified the

driver as Mr. McBride and his passenger as M.S. Additional officers

and a police dog arrived at the scene. The officers arrested

Mr. McBride on an outstanding warrant. Meanwhile, the dog

alerted to the presence of illegal narcotics in the car. Upon

searching the car, officers found a bag of methamphetamine

between the floorboards and a handgun wedged between the driver

and front passenger seats under M.S.’s purse. M.S. also had drug

paraphernalia on her person.

2
¶5 The prosecution charged Mr. McBride with five offenses:

(1) possession of a controlled substance; (2) a special offender

sentence enhancement for possession of a firearm; (3) POWPO; (4) a

traffic infraction for an improper tail lamp; and (5) a traffic

infraction for failure to signal for a turn.1

¶6 Mr. McBride filed a motion to suppress evidence of the drugs

and the gun as fruits of an illegal traffic stop. After a hearing, the

court denied the motion, ruling that there was reasonable suspicion

to stop Mr. McBride for the two traffic infractions.

¶7 Mr. McBride’s defense at trial was that the drugs and gun

belonged to his passenger, M.S., and that he didn’t see them or

know they were in the car. The jury convicted him of POWPO and

the two traffic offenses. It acquitted him of the drug possession

charge, which mooted the special-offender enhancer. The court

imposed a two-year prison sentence for the POWPO offense (an

aggravated sentence due to the court’s finding that Mr. McBride

was on probation at the time of the offense) and assessed monetary

penalties for the traffic offenses.

1 M.S. was separately charged with related offenses.
3
II. Analysis

¶8 Mr. McBride raises four issues on appeal: (1) the evidence

doesn’t support the traffic offenses for a tail lamp infraction and

failure to signal; (2) the trial court erred by denying the motion to

suppress; (3) the evidence doesn’t support the conviction for

POWPO; and (4) the enhancement of his sentence based on his

probationary status at the time of the offense was illegal. On the

first issue, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support

the tail lamp infraction but not the failure to signal infraction. On

the second, we conclude that, because of the tail lamp infraction,

officers had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. And on the

third, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support the

POWPO conviction. Our conclusion on the third issue moots the

fourth, and therefore we don’t address it.

A. Traffic Infractions

¶9 Mr. McBride contends that there is insufficient evidence to

support the two traffic infractions. We disagree as to the tail lamp

infraction but agree as to the failure to signal infraction.

4
1. Standard of Review

¶ 10 We review sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo,

applying the substantial evidence test. People v. McCoy, 2015 COA

76M, ¶ 37, aff’d on other grounds, 2019 CO 44. Under this test, we

consider whether the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to support a rational

conclusion that the defendant is guilty of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id.

¶ 11 Where a sufficiency of the evidence challenge requires our

interpretation of a statute, our goal is to effectuate the General

Assembly’s intent. Id. at ¶ 38. To determine that intent, we start

with the language of the statute, giving words and phrases their

plain and ordinary meanings. Id. We must read and consider the

statutory scheme as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and

sensible effects to all of its parts. Id. If the language is clear and

ambiguous, we will apply it as written, without resorting to further

statutory analysis. Id.

5
2. Tail Lamp Infraction

¶ 12 Mr. McBride’s sufficiency challenge to the tail lamp infraction

turns on interpretation of the applicable statute. That statute,

section 42-4-206(1), provides that

[t]o be operated on a road, every motor vehicle
. . . must be equipped with at least one tail
lamp mounted on the rear, which, when
lighted as required in section 42-4-204, emits
a red light plainly visible from a distance of five
hundred feet to the rear . . . .

(Emphasis added.) The statute further provides that vehicles

manufactured after 1958, like the vehicle in this case, “must be

equipped with at least two tail lamps mounted on the rear . . .

which . . . comply with this section.” Id. Section 42-4-204, C.R.S.

2019, in turn, requires vehicles to display lighted lamps between

sunset and sunrise and at other times when conditions are

unfavorable.

¶ 13 The parties dispute whether section 42-4-206(1) requires that

tail lamps shine only red light, or whether it simply requires that

lamps shine red light without prohibiting lamps from also shining

other colors. We conclude, for several reasons, that the statute

requires tail lamps to shine only red light.

6
¶ 14 First, giving the words their plain and ordinary meanings, the

statute signifies that tail lamps must shine only red. The statute

doesn’t say a tail lamp must shine red, along with any other colors.

It only says “red.” Further, allowing the use of additional colors

would detract from uniformity and uniform enforcement of the law.

If tail lamps had red light mixed with a host of other colors, there

would no longer be uniformity in tail lamps shining as red. And if a

tail lamp shone a lot of white light with a smidge of red but could be

perceived as faintly red at a 500-foot distance, that would introduce

subjectivity on the part of police. Therefore, to promote uniformity

and apply the plain language of the statute, “red” must mean “red”

and only “red.” See People v. Wright, 742 P.2d 316, 321 n.7 (Colo.

1987) (“In Colorado, the legislature has expressly stated that, as a

matter of policy, traffic laws and enforcement throughout the state

should be uniform.” (citing § 42-4-102, C.R.S. 2019)).

¶ 15 Second, another subsection of section 42-4-206 requires “a

tail lamp or a separate lamp” to illuminate the rear registration

plate “with a white light.” § 42-4-206(3). This provision suggests

that tail lamps can include white lights, but only for the purpose of

illuminating the rear plate.

7
¶ 16 Third, other provisions of the traffic code allow or require

lamps in colors other than red. For instance, section 42-4-215(1),

C.R.S. 2019, requires vehicles to have stop lamps on the rear that

“display a red or amber light, or any shade of color between red and

amber” when the driver applies the brake. Section 42-4-215(2)

requires vehicles to have flashing turn signal lamps in the front

“display[ing] a white or amber light, or any shade of color between

white and amber” and in the rear “display[ing] a red or amber light,

or any shade of color between red and amber.” Section 42-4-215(7)

permits vehicles to have hazard lights on the front flashing “white

or amber lights, or any shade of color between white and amber”

and on the rear flashing “amber or red lights, or any shade of color

between amber and red.” Section 42-4-215(8) permits vehicles to

have up to three identification lamps in the front and up to three

such lamps in the rear, with any front lamps “emit[ting] an amber

light” and any rear lamps “emit[ting] a red light.” And section 42-

12-204, C.R.S. 2019, permits street-rod or custom vehicles to use

8
“blue dot tail lights” (red lamps with blue or purple inserts) for stop

lamps, rear turn signal lamps, and rear hazard lamps.2

¶ 17 Collectively, these provisions suggest that when the legislature

says “red” it means only “red” and when it says “amber” or “white” it

means only “amber” or “white.” They also suggest that where more

than one color is permitted, the legislature says so — for instance in

permitting any shade of color between white and amber or between

red and amber for certain types of lamps and permitting the use of

blue dot tail lights for certain lamps on certain vehicles. But in

enacting section 42-4-206(1), the legislature chose to say only “red

light,” suggesting that red is the only permissible light color for tail

lamps. See Cain v. People, 2014 CO 49, ¶ 13 (“Under the rule of

interpretation expressio unius exclusio alterius, the inclusion of

certain items implies the exclusion of others.” (quoting Beeghly v.

Mack, 20 P.3d 610, 613 (Colo. 2001))).

¶ 18 And fourth, as these various provisions demonstrate, specific

colored lights on a vehicle carry significance. Cf. Tidwell ex rel.

Tidwell v. City & Cty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75, 78, 83 (Colo. 2003)

2 This is by no means an exhaustive list of the statutory provisions
regarding lamp colors. It is meant only to be illustrative.
9
(explaining the significance of the use of red, blue, and white

rotating “stage two” lights on police cars). Front lights are generally

white or amber, and rear lights are generally red (or sometimes

amber). The only white lights on the rear of a car are generally the

small license plate lamp and backup lamps (which illuminate only

when a driver is backing up).3 This uniformity of lighting helps

drivers ascertain what direction a car is facing and whether it is

backing up. Permitting vehicles to emit white light (even if mixed

with red) from tail lamps could therefore lead to confusion and

accidents. See Gallagher Transp. Co. v. Giggey, 101 Colo. 116, 120,

71 P.2d 1039, 1042 (1937) (a driver has a right to assume other

vehicles will be lawfully lighted).

¶ 19 Our interpretation is consistent with the majority view in other

jurisdictions to have considered similar statutory provisions. See,

e.g., Williams v. State, 853 P.2d 537, 538 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993)

3 Although state law doesn’t require backup lamps to be any
specific color, § 42-4-215(6), C.R.S. 2019, federal standards and
regulations have required white backup lamps since the late 1960s.
See David W. Moore & Kåre Rumar, Historical Development and
Current Effectiveness of Rear Lighting Systems 11-12, 38-39 (Univ.
of Mich. Transp. Research Institute Oct. 1999),
https://perma.cc/WTY3-2FEH; see also 49 C.F.R. § 571.108(S7.6)
& tbl. I-a (2019).
10
(“We . . . interpret [the statute] to require that taillights emit only

red light.”); Robinson v. State, 431 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Ark. 2014)

(“Th[e] statute does not contemplate a taillight that displays a white

light in addition to a red light.”); State v. Patterson, 97 P.3d 479,

482 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) (“Based upon the plain reading of [the

statutory sections, the defendant] violated Idaho law by driving with

taillights that emit light of a color other than red.”); People v. Allen,

933 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 (App. Div. 2011) (“We hold that the statute

requires a tail light to display only red light.”). But see Vicknair v.

State, 670 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex. App. 1984) (a taillight complies

with state statute so long as it emits red light visible at the required

distance, even if it also emits white light), aff’d on other

grounds, 751 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

¶ 20 Our interpretation also comports with People v. Brant, 252

P.3d 459, 463 (Colo. 2011), in which our supreme court said that

an investigatory stop for a violation of section 42-4-206 was

justified when a vehicle had a broken tail lamp. Although we

acknowledge that the statute regulates color, not brokenness, Brant

supports our interpretation that a broken tail lamp that emits some

white light along with red light violates the statute.

11
¶ 21 Accordingly, we affirm the traffic infraction for an improper tail

lamp.

3. Turn Signal Infraction

¶ 22 Mr. McBride’s sufficiency challenge to the turn signal

infraction also turns on interpretation of the applicable statute.

That statute, section 42-4-903, provides, in relevant part:

(1) No person shall turn a vehicle at an
intersection . . . , or turn a vehicle to enter a
private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a
vehicle from a direct course or move right or left
upon a roadway unless and until such
movement can be made with reasonable safety
and then only after giving an appropriate
signal in the manner provided in sections 42-
4-608 and 42-4-609.

(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left
shall be given continuously during not less
than the last one hundred feet traveled by the
vehicle before turning in urban or metropolitan
areas and shall be given continuously for at
least two hundred feet on all four-lane
highways and other highways where the prima
facie or posted speed limit is more than forty
miles per hour.

(Emphasis added.) The referenced sections 42-4-608 and 42-4-609,

C.R.S. 2019, describe signaling via lamps or hands and arms when

such signals are required by statute.

12
¶ 23 The parties dispute whether these provisions require a driver

to signal when navigating a roundabout.4

¶ 24 Notably, only one traffic code provision expressly addresses

roundabouts. That provision, section 42-4-1006(2), C.R.S. 2019,

says “[a] vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be

driven only to the right of such island.”

¶ 25 The question, then, is whether any of the actions described in

section 42-4-903(1) — turning at an intersection, turning to enter a

private road or driveway, otherwise turning from a direct course,

and moving right or left upon a roadway — encompass driving

through a roundabout. The People focus largely on the provision

requiring signaling when moving right or left upon a roadway,

urging that drivers necessarily move right or left upon the roadway

when they drive through a roundabout.

¶ 26 Two other jurisdictions have addressed this issue under

similar statutory provisions: Alaska and Indiana. Both held that

4 Although the People argued in the trial court and on appeal that
signaling is required only when exiting a roundabout — not when
entering one — neither the information nor the verdict form or
mittimus so specified. Accordingly, we consider any signaling
requirements for either entering or exiting a roundabout.

13
their statutes regarding the use of turn signals don’t apply to

roundabouts.5 We find their reasoning persuasive and conclude for

the same reasons that section 42-4-903(1) doesn’t require a driver

to signal when entering or exiting a roundabout.

¶ 27 In Noble v. State, the Alaska Court of Appeals gave several

reasons for its decision that the state’s traffic laws don’t require

drivers to use a turn signal when entering or exiting a roundabout.

357 P.3d 1201, 1201-06 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015). Those same

reasons apply equally here.

¶ 28 First, the court cited the state laws expressly applying to

roundabouts. Id. at 1202. As with Colorado’s laws, none of the

provisions addressed signaling. Id.

¶ 29 Next, the court turned to the general provisions on signaling.

Id. at 1202-03. Although not identical to Colorado’s laws, these

provisions similarly require the use of a signal when a motorist

turns or moves right or left upon, off, or on a roadway. Id. at 1202.

5 In a third case, the Eighth Circuit declined to decide whether state
law required drivers to signal in a roundabout; the court held only
that a traffic stop based on failure to signal was reasonable because
the officer could reasonably have believed it was a violation. United
States v. Gadson, 670 F. App’x 907, 909 (8th Cir. 2016).
14
They also similarly require continuous use of a signal for the last

hundred feet before turning. Id. at 1202-03. (Colorado’s law differs

in that this 100-foot requirement applies only in urban or

metropolitan areas and that a longer, 200-foot requirement applies

on any highway that is four-laned and/or has a posted speed limit

exceeding forty miles per hour. § 42-4-903(2).)

¶ 30 The Noble court noted that Alaska’s provisions mirror those of

the 1969 Uniform Vehicle Code, which was drafted before

roundabouts became widespread. 357 P.3d at 1203. It further

noted that the uniform code had last been amended in 2000, and

that none of the 2000 amendments mentioned roundabouts. Id. It

cited sources indicating that, as of 1997, a few years before the

most recent amendments, there were only three dozen roundabouts

in the entire nation. Id. Although none of those was in Alaska,

according to one of the cited sources, ten were in Colorado. Transp.

Research Bd., Modern Roundabout Practice in the United States 14

(1998), https://perma.cc/5S4M-JN7P.

¶ 31 The point, the court explained, is that the uniform code

provisions cannot be readily applied to roundabouts because they

were drafted at a time when roundabouts weren’t common. Noble,

15
357 P.3d at 1203-04. This limitation applies equally to Colorado’s

signaling provisions, which likewise are based on and similar to the

model code provisions. See § 42-4-102 (legislative declaration

stating a purpose of “conforming, as nearly as possible, certain of

the traffic laws of this state with the recommendations of the

national committee of uniform traffic laws and ordinances as set

forth in the committee’s ‘Uniform Vehicle Code’”); see also Nat’l

Comm. of Unif. Traffic Laws & Ordinances, Uniform Vehicle Code

and Model Traffic Ordinance § 11-604(a)-(b) (1969),

https://perma.cc/TW3U-QQUJ (uniform code provisions nearly

identical to those in section 42-4-903(1)-(2)).

¶ 32 The Noble court further elaborated on why existing signaling

laws don’t readily apply to roundabouts. 357 P.3d at 1204. For

instance, the court explained, while one could view movement into a

roundabout as movement right or left upon a roadway (for which a

turn signal is required), it was more accurate to view such

movement as following a curve in the roadway (for which a turn

signal is not required). Id. And so “[i]t seems counter-intuitive to

require all motorists to activate their right-turn signals when

entering a roundabout if they simply wish to drive around the

16
center island and continue in their original direction of travel.” Id.

Moreover, “if a motorist did activate their right-turn signal, this

right-turn signal might well confuse other motorists who were

already inside the roundabout, or who were waiting to enter the

roundabout from a different direction,” and who “might easily

suppose that the signaling motorist actually intended to turn right

(onto an intersecting road) rather than continuing straight through

the roundabout.” Id.

¶ 33 Because of such difficulties with applying existing law to

roundabouts, the court went on, some states had enacted new laws

or created websites or informational pamphlets directly addressing

the issue. Id.; see also Nickerson v. Portland Police Bureau, No. CIV.

08-217-HU, 2008 WL 4449874, at *5 (D. Or. Sept. 30, 2008)

(unpublished order) (reviewing a challenge to an Oregon law directly

addressing signaling in roundabouts). In Alaska, the legislature

hadn’t passed any laws on point, the department of transportation

hadn’t provided any guidance, and a university website had

indicated that motorists on campus “will want to” signal when they

exit a roundabout. Noble, 357 P.3d at 1205. “The result is that no

one can determine, with any degree of surety, what rules apply.” Id.

17
So, too, in Colorado, where there are no laws or departmental

guidance directly on point and the driver handbook doesn’t indicate

whether signaling is required in roundabouts. See Colo. Dep’t of

Rev., Div. of Motor Vehicles, Colorado Driver Handbook 19 (2017),

https://perma.cc/763H-TPYS (stating, as to roundabouts, only that

drivers should “[y]ield to traffic already within the rotary island” and

“[d]rive to the right and watch for directional signs and signals”).

¶ 34 Finally, the Noble court remarked that the required signaling

distance of 100 feet can’t readily be applied to roundabouts, where

entrances and exits are often less than 100 feet apart. 357 P.3d at

1206. As a result, signaling for that length of time at a roundabout

could be confusing and potentially dangerous. Id. This concern

similarly applies to Colorado, where signaling distances, though not

applicable in rural areas, are generally 100 feet (or 200 feet for any

roundabouts that may exist on four-lane highways or highways

with posted limits above forty miles per hour).

¶ 35 For all these reasons, the court in Noble concluded that there

was “no clear way to apply the signaling provisions of [state law] to

roundabouts.” Id. And because any attempt at clarification would

amount to “creating new rules, based on a weighing of facts and

18
policies that is normally entrusted to legislatures or executive

agencies,” the court declined to stretch the language of the statute

to try to make it apply to roundabouts. Id. Instead, the court

encouraged the legislature or department of public safety to address

the issue if they feel it appropriate to do so. Id.

¶ 36 The Indiana Court of Appeals recently applied similar

reasoning in considering this same issue under its state’s laws.

State v. Davis, 143 N.E.3d 343, 347-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). The

Davis court noted that the state’s traffic laws expressly addressing

roundabouts don’t touch on signaling; its general provisions on

signaling were enacted before roundabouts became widespread in

the state; motorists entering a roundabout are simply following the

curve of the road, which would make use of a signal “nonsensical”;

requiring the use of a signal for exiting a roundabout would be

“problematic” because it would be unclear how and when the

motorist would need to signal; and, with the multitude of

roundabout configurations across the state, it would be difficult to

ascertain just how to apply existing law. Id. And, like the Alaska

court, it ultimately concluded that state law on signaling doesn’t

apply to roundabouts and that it is up to the legislature, not the

19
court, to promulgate rules for roundabouts if it chooses to do so.

Id. at 349.

¶ 37 We find the analysis in Noble and Davis persuasive and

conclude for the same reasons that section 42-4-903(1) does not

apply to motorists entering or exiting a roundabout.

¶ 38 The one notable difference in Colorado is that a failed bill in

2017 would have expressly provided that turn signals are not

required in roundabouts. S.B. 17-059, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.

Sess. The bill summary suggests that its proponents believed

existing law does require signaling in roundabouts. See S.B.

17-059, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (as introduced),

https://perma.cc/6LPB-573N (“Currently, a person must signal an

intention to turn before turning or changing lanes while driving a

vehicle. The bill exempts motor vehicles that are using a

roundabout unless otherwise posted.”). But the bill died in the

Senate and was never introduced in the House. See S. Journal,

71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. 178 (Feb. 10, 2017).

¶ 39 This unsuccessful legislative proposal doesn’t affect our

interpretation of existing law. “[T]he ‘interpretation placed upon an

existing statute by a subsequent group of [legislators] who are

20
promoting legislation and who are unsuccessful has no persuasive

significance.’” Minto v. Sprague, 124 P.3d 881, 885 (Colo. App.

2005) (quoting United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)); see

also In re Marriage of Heupel, 936 P.2d 561, 570 n.10 (Colo. 1997)

(“[W]hile ‘unsuccessful attempts to amend proposed legislation

during the process of enactment’ is relevant in interpreting the

adopted measure, the same does not hold true for ‘unsuccessful

attempts to amend a measure passed by a previous legislative

session.’” (quoting Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency v. McKay, 769 F.2d

534, 538 (9th Cir. 1985))).

¶ 40 Accordingly, we reverse the traffic infraction for failure to

signal.

B. Reasonable Suspicion for the Traffic Stop

¶ 41 Mr. McBride next contends that the officers lacked probable

cause for the traffic stop. We disagree.

¶ 42 A trial court’s order on a motion to suppress presents a mixed

question of law and fact. People v. Burnett, 2019 CO 2, ¶ 13. We

accept the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by

competent evidence on the record, but we assess the legal

21
significance of those facts de novo. Id. We also review related

issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Id.

¶ 43 The trial court denied the motion to suppress based on a

finding that officers had reasonable suspicion to conclude that

Mr. McBride violated two traffic provisions — the tail lamp provision

and the signaling provision. The evidence presented at the

suppression hearing, like the evidence at trial, established that the

Lincoln’s tail lamps emitted both red and white light. Because we

have concluded that this violates section 42-4-206(1), there was

sufficient basis for the stop. Accordingly, although Mr. McBride

didn’t violate the signaling provision, we needn’t consider whether

officers nonetheless had a reasonable basis for concluding he may

have done so.

C. POWPO

¶ 44 Finally, Mr. McBride contends that the evidence was

insufficient to support the POWPO conviction — specifically, the

required element that he knowingly possessed a firearm. We agree.

22
1. Additional Facts

¶ 45 When Mr. McBride was pulled over in the Lincoln, he was

riding with a passenger, M.S., seated in the front passenger seat.

The car wasn’t registered to either of them.

¶ 46 The arresting officer didn’t see Mr. McBride or M.S. make any

furtive movements, as if to hide evidence, while Mr. McBride was

pulling the car over. Nor did the officer see any guns when he

looked into the car upon making initial contact with Mr. McBride or

upon returning to the car to arrest Mr. McBride (after discovering

the outstanding warrant). Mr. McBride didn’t attempt to flee but

cooperated with officers during the arrest.

¶ 47 Later, in a full search of the car, officers found a handgun in

the crevice between the driver and front passenger seats, under

M.S.’s purse. The inside of the car was messy, with items strewn

about, making it difficult to discern specific items. And the gun

wasn’t visible, even from inside the car, until the purse was moved.

¶ 48 There was no evidence that the gun was registered or

otherwise belonged to Mr. McBride or that it was stolen. There was

23
also no evidence that Mr. McBride’s fingerprints or DNA were found

on the gun or on any other items in the car.6

2. Standard of Review

¶ 49 In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we review

the record de novo to determine whether the evidence presented

was sufficient in both quantity and quality to sustain the

defendant’s conviction. Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo.

2010); see also McCoy, ¶ 37.

¶ 50 Under the applicable substantial evidence test, we consider

“whether the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial,

when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion

by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291 (quoting

People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 130, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (1973)).

The relevant question under this test is “whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational

6 One of the officers testified that at one point during the traffic stop
M.S. pretended to cry and claimed everything in the car belonged to
Mr. McBride. But M.S. didn’t testify at trial, and the People don’t
rely on this evidence to support the POWPO conviction.
24
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “[W]e must give the prosecution

the benefit of every reasonable inference which may be fairly drawn

from the evidence.” Id. at 1292. However, “there must be a logical

and convincing connection between the facts established and the

conclusion inferred.” Id. “If the evidence is such that reasonable

jurors must necessarily have a reasonable doubt, then the evidence

is insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction.” Id.

3. Application

¶ 51 A person commits the crime of POWPO if that person

“knowingly possesses, uses, or carries upon his or her person a

firearm . . . subsequent to the person’s conviction for a felony . . .

under Colorado or any other state’s law or under federal law.”

§ 18-12-108(1), C.R.S. 2019.

¶ 52 The question in this case is whether the prosecution presented

sufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

Mr. McBride knowingly possessed the handgun found in the car he

was driving. We conclude that it did not.

¶ 53 “‘[P]ossession,’ as it is used in [POWPO], is the actual or

physical control of the firearm.” People v. Allgier, 2018 COA 122,

25
¶ 65 (quoting Beckett v. People, 800 P.2d 74, 82 (Colo. 1990)). “[A]

defendant need not have had exclusive control of the firearm to be

found guilty of possessing it.” Id. at ¶ 66.

¶ 54 Nonetheless, the possession must be “knowing.” See People v.

Tenorio, 197 Colo. 137, 144, 590 P.2d 952, 957 (1979) (“To convict

one of possessing a weapon, the jury must find, not mere

possession, but that the defendant ‘knowingly’ possessed the

weapon and that he understood that the object possessed was a

weapon.”); see also People v. Van Meter, 2018 COA 13, ¶¶ 38, 43-44

(trial court didn’t plainly err by instructing the jury that

“[p]ossession constitutes a voluntary act if the actor was aware of

his physical possession or control thereof for a sufficient period to

have been able to have terminated it”). “A person acts ‘knowingly’

. . . with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a

statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of

such nature or that such circumstance exists.” § 18-1-501(6),

C.R.S. 2019.

¶ 55 In the related context of knowing possession of controlled

substances, it is well settled that “the ‘controlled substance need

not be found on the person of the defendant, as long as it is found

26
in a place under his or her dominion and control.’” People v.

Yeadon, 2018 COA 104, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Atencio, 140 P.3d

73, 75 (Colo. App. 2005)), aff’d on other grounds, 2020 CO 38. “If a

‘defendant has exclusive possession of the premises in which drugs

are found, the jury may infer knowledge from the fact of

possession.’” Id. at ¶ 25 (quoting People v. Baca, 109 P.3d 1005,

1007 (Colo. App. 2004)). For instance, “[k]nowledge can be inferred

from the fact that the defendant is the driver and sole occupant of a

vehicle, irrespective of whether he is also the vehicle’s owner.” Id.

(quoting Baca, 109 P.3d at 1007). “Conversely, ‘where a person is

not in exclusive possession of the premises in which drugs are

found, such an inference may not be drawn ‘unless there are

statements or other circumstances tending to buttress the

inference.’” Id. at ¶ 26 (quoting People v. Stark, 691 P.2d 334, 339

(Colo. 1984)).

¶ 56 Thus, it is clear, in the context of knowing possession of a

controlled substance, that where a defendant is not in exclusive

possession of a car or premises in which an illegal object is found,

“[m]ere presence without another additional link in the evidence will

not sustain a conviction for possession.” Id. (quoting Feltes v.

27
People, 178 Colo. 409, 417, 498 P.2d 1128, 1132 (1972)). We find

this equally true in the context of knowing possession of a firearm

and, therefore, we apply the same standards here.

¶ 57 Indeed, in both contexts, divisions of this court have applied

similar reasoning in affirming convictions for knowing possession

where the prosecution presented evidence of something more than a

defendant’s mere proximity to a gun or drugs. See, e.g., People v.

Kessler, 2018 COA 60, ¶¶ 13-14 (the defendant sat in a car for

much of the day just inches away from the cocaine found uncovered

and plainly visible in the console); Yeadon, ¶ 28 (the defendant was

in direct proximity to a visible bag of methamphetamine in the

driver’s side door compartment of the car he’d been driving before

he fled); People v. Warner, 251 P.3d 556, 565-66 (Colo. App. 2010)

(the defendant exercised dominion and control over the residence

where two guns were found, he was seen holding one of the guns

the day before it was seized and later sitting at a table inside the

residence with the same gun, and he owned the safe where the

second gun was found); People v. Jackson, 98 P.3d 940, 945 (Colo.

App. 2004) (the victim identified the gun as belonging to the

defendant); People v. Tramaglino, 791 P.2d 1171, 1171-72 (Colo.

28
App. 1989) (eyewitness testified that the defendant had the gun in

his possession, and it was later found in his car).

¶ 58 Here, however, the prosecution didn’t offer evidence of that

“something more.” For instance, there was no evidence that

Mr. McBride owned or had exclusive possession of the car, that he

owned or had stolen the gun, that he had ever touched the gun,

that when officers approached he tried to flee or made furtive

movements in an effort to hide the gun, that the gun was in plain

view in the car, or that he made any statements indicating his

knowledge of the gun’s presence in the car.

¶ 59 In this circumstance, where the defendant is not in exclusive

possession of the car or premises in which an object is found and

there is no evidence aside from mere proximity linking the

defendant to that object, a conviction premised on knowing

possession cannot stand. This is because any finding that the

defendant knowingly possessed the object would necessarily be

based on speculation. But “verdicts in criminal cases may not be

based on guessing, speculation, or conjecture,” and “a modicum of

relevant evidence will not rationally support a conviction beyond a

29
reasonable doubt.” People v. Sprouse, 983 P.2d 771, 778 (Colo.

1999).

¶ 60 That critical difference is what distinguishes this case from

People v. Rivera, 765 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1988), rev’d on other

grounds, 792 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1990), on which the People rely. In

Rivera, the defendant accompanied his wife when she bought the

gun in question and then was found in his home with the gun in

plain view within arm’s reach. Id. at 628. No such facts are

present here. In particular, no evidence suggests that Mr. McBride

had any prior knowledge of the gun or that the gun was in his plain

view when it was discovered.

¶ 61 That difference also sets this case apart from People v. Donald,

in which our supreme court recognized that “[k]nowledge . . . may

be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” 2020 CO 24, ¶ 37. The

question in Donald was whether the prosecution could establish the

required element of knowledge — in that case, knowledge of the bail

condition prohibiting the defendant from leaving the state without

permission — through stacked inferences. Id. at ¶¶ 3-11, 26. The

court held that inference stacking is not prohibited but is simply

30
one factor a court may consider in determining whether evidence

satisfies the substantial evidence test. Id. at ¶¶ 26-31.

¶ 62 Applying this framework, the court in Donald held that

(1) sufficient evidence supported an inference that the defendant

signed his bond paperwork, including the bondsperson’s testimony

that only by accident would anyone be released from jail without

signing the paperwork, defense counsel’s concession that the

defendant signed the paperwork, and a copy of the signed

paperwork; and (2) sufficient evidence supported an inference that

the defendant saw and was aware of the bond condition, including

the fact that the bond paperwork consisted of a single page and that

the subject condition was the first condition listed under a bolded

heading of additional conditions. Id. at ¶¶ 38-41.

¶ 63 Here, the issue is not one of stacked inferences — just a single

inference that lacks any direct or circumstantial evidence, aside

from mere proximity, to support it. Still, some of the reasoning

from Donald might apply if, for instance, the gun had been found in

plain view or if the car had been in Mr. McBride’s exclusive

possession. Then there could be a question whether Mr. McBride

had actual knowledge of the gun’s presence, and Donald could

31
support an inference of actual knowledge based on those

circumstances. But no such circumstances exist here.

¶ 64 Indeed, in similar cases, other courts have reversed

firearm-related convictions where the prosecution didn’t establish

anything more than the defendant’s mere proximity to the firearm

in a car. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Snow, which is

remarkably similar to this case, the defendant was driving a car

that wasn’t his, there were other passengers in the car, no one

made any furtive movements as the car was being pulled over, and

police ultimately found a gun that was not plainly visible but was

tucked between the driver’s seat and the front console. 920 N.E.2d

68, 69-72 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). Under those circumstances, the

court held that “[t]he evidence was insufficient ‘to warrant a

reasonable inference of personal knowledge of the presence of the

gun,’ and the conviction [for firearm offenses] cannot stand.” Id. at

72 (citation omitted).

¶ 65 Other cases are in accord. See, e.g., United States v. Hishaw,

235 F.3d 565, 571-73 (10th Cir. 2000) (evidence showed only that a

gun was found under the passenger’s seat of a car the defendant

didn’t own but was driving); Jones v. State, 924 N.E.2d 672, 675-76

32
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (evidence showed only that the defendant was

test-driving a customer’s car in which a gun was found under the

driver’s seat and that he made furtive gestures that appeared to be

related to hiding alcohol in the car); State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d

592, 602-03 (Minn. 2017) (evidence showed only that the defendant

was driving a car he didn’t own with two passengers, he continued

driving for a few blocks after an officer activated his vehicle lights

and siren, the officer saw movement in the car, a gun was

eventually found in a void between the headlining and roof of the

car near the sunroof, where it wasn’t immediately visible, and DNA

testing on the gun was inconclusive); Hancock v. Commonwealth,

465 S.E.2d 138, 140-41 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (evidence showed only

that the defendant was riding in the back seat of a car in which a

firearm was found in front of him under the driver’s seat and “[n]o

evidence established that [he] ever held the firearm, saw it, knew it

was present, or exercised any dominion and control over it”).

¶ 66 The facts here demand the same result. Accordingly, we

conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the POWPO

conviction, and we reverse that conviction.

33
III. Conclusion

¶ 67 We affirm the traffic infraction for the tail lamp violation but

reverse the traffic infraction for failure to signal and the judgment of

conviction for POWPO.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE WELLING concur.

34