v. Hamilton

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
July 3, 2019

2019COA101

No. 16CA1468, People v. Hamilton — Evidence — Hearsay —
Hearsay Exceptions — Hearsay Within Hearsay —
Authentication — Machine-generated Records

A division of the court of appeals decides that a computer-

generated report of the contents of a cell phone is not hearsay so

long as it was created without human input or interaction. To

qualify as a computer-generated report that does not constitute

hearsay, the party seeking to introduce the report must lay a

foundation that it was machine-generated without human input. In

addition, the division holds that a trial court commits error by

giving multiple jury instructions that unnecessarily highlight the

defendant’s prior conviction.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA101

Court of Appeals No. 16CA1468
City and County of Denver District Court No. 13CR3362
Honorable Michael J. Vallejos, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Rayon D. Hamilton,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Román and J. Jones, JJ., concur

Announced July 3, 2019

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jennifer L. Carty, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jon W. Grevillius, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Rayon D. Hamilton, appeals his conviction for

sexual assault. J.F., the victim, accused Hamilton of drugging her

at a bar, separating her from her friends, taking her to an

apartment without her consent while she was unconscious, and

sexually assaulting her.

¶2 Hamilton contends that the district court erred by (1)

admitting hearsay to establish that neither Hamilton’s phone nor

the victim’s phone contained text messages about which Hamilton

had testified; (2) admitting evidence of two other instances in which

Hamilton had been accused of sexual assault; (3) adding qualifying

“factually innocent” language to the acquittal instruction; and (4)

adding a reference to a prior conviction in the instruction advising

the jury that Hamilton had been acquitted of a prior sexual assault

charge.

¶3 We agree with his first contention, reverse on that basis, and

remand for a new trial. We also agree that the district court erred

in adding a reference to Hamilton’s prior conviction to the acquittal

instruction. We reject his remaining contentions.

1
Background

¶4 While at bars with friends, J.F. ran into Hamilton, whom she

had met through an ex-boyfriend. Hamilton bought a round of

shots for J.F. and her friends. J.F. testified she thought her “drink

had drugs in it” because she could not remember much after she

had “taken the shot.” J.F. told the jury the next thing she

remembered was waking up on her stomach in an apartment, with

her hands being held above her head, and Hamilton was having sex

with her.

¶5 J.F. testified that she did not agree to have sexual intercourse

with Hamilton. According to her testimony at trial, she kept saying

“no” and tried to wiggle away from him.

¶6 Hamilton admitted to having sexual intercourse with J.F. but

claimed it had been consensual. He testified that J.F. had been

awake throughout the encounter.

¶7 The district court instructed the jury on one count of second

degree kidnapping, two counts of sexual assault, and one count of

distribution of a controlled substance. Hamilton was convicted on

one of the sexual assault counts and the distribution count and

was acquitted on the remaining counts.

2
Admissibility of Detective Slay’s Testimony Concerning the
Phone Reports

¶8 Hamilton told the investigating detective, Bryan Slay, that J.F.

had sent him multiple texts while they were drinking together at the

bars. He claimed that J.F. had also sent him texts the day after the

alleged sexual assault. Hamilton gave similar testimony at trial.

¶9 Detective Slay testified that police department personnel

downloaded the contents of Hamilton’s and J.F.’s phones and

generated reports (the Reports) reflecting the phones’ contents. At

trial, the prosecutor did not seek to introduce the Reports into

evidence or call as witnesses the police department employees who

had examined the phones or generated the Reports. Instead,

Detective Slay testified that, based on his review of the Reports,

neither phone contained text messages from J.F. to Hamilton.

¶ 10 Hamilton contends that Detective Slay’s testimony about the

contents of the Reports was hearsay, the admission of which

violated CRE 803(7) and 803(10) and his rights under the

Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Colorado

Constitutions. He argues that Detective Slay’s testimony unfairly

prejudiced him because it contradicted his own testimony that J.F.

3
had texted him both the night of the alleged sexual assault and the

next morning.

¶ 11 Analysis of the admissibility of Detective Slay’s testimony

concerning the Reports requires us to determine whether the

Reports were inadmissible hearsay, whether Detective Slay’s

testimony constituted a second layer of inadmissible hearsay, and

whether the prosecutor established the reliability and authenticity

of the Reports.

A. The Hearsay Issues

1. Standard of Review

¶ 12 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo. 1993). However,

a trial court’s decision on whether a statement constitutes hearsay

is a legal conclusion, which we review de novo. People v. Medina,

25 P.3d 1216, 1223 (Colo. 2001); see also Dutch v. United States,

997 A.2d 685, 689 (D.C. 2010) (concluding that the determination

of whether a statement falls under an exception to the hearsay rule

is a legal conclusion).

¶ 13 The harmless error standard applies to review of trial errors of

nonconstitutional dimension preserved by objection. Hagos v.

4
People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12, 288 P.3d 116, 119. Such an error is

harmless where “there is no reasonable possibility that it

contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” Pernell v. People, 2018

CO 13, ¶ 22, 411 P.3d 669, 673; People v. Cohen, 2019 COA 38,

¶ 11, ___ P.3d ___, ___. Under this standard, reversal is required

only if the error “substantially influenced the verdict or affected the

fairness of the trial proceedings.” Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338,

342 (Colo. 1986).

¶ 14 We review unpreserved trial errors for plain error. Hagos,

¶ 14, 288 P.3d at 120. “Plain error is obvious and substantial.” Id.

We reverse under plain error if the error “so undermined the

fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as to cast serious doubt

on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Id. (quoting People

v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005)).

2. Preservation of Hamilton’s Arguments Regarding Detective
Slay’s Testimony

¶ 15 The defense did not object to the prosecutor’s two questions to

Detective Slay regarding the contents of Hamilton’s phone.

Hamilton, however, directs us to two other places in the record

where he asserts he preserved this issue.

5
¶ 16 First, during Detective Slay’s cross-examination, defense

counsel asked, “Detective, he just asked you a question about texts

on [J.F.’s] phone” and “[w]ere you testifying by your personal

knowledge or some report that was given to you that you read?”

After Detective Slay responded that his testimony was based on “[a]

report from that phone being downloaded,” defense counsel

“move[d] to strike that testimony as the foundation is hearsay.”

Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor could have “[laid] the

foundation to admit the text messages from [J.F.’s] phone, but they

chose not to. Now they are trying to . . . admit hearsay statements

from the detective about a report that he read.” But defense

counsel’s objection concerned Detective Slay’s testimony regarding

the contents of J.F.’s phone and not the contents of Hamilton’s

phone.

¶ 17 Second, Hamilton asserts that his counsel preserved his

argument regarding the contents of his phone during a bench

conference addressing a juror’s proposed questions to Detective

Slay: “Were there texts on [J.F.’s] phone to [Hamilton]? . . . Does

the phone company have no record of the texts? Did you

investigate with [Hamilton’s] and [J.F.’s] phone companies?”

6
Defense counsel objected to the questions, stating, “[w]ere there

texts on [J.F.’s] phone to [Hamilton]? I object. That’s the same

objection I made the last time.” Like the earlier objection, this

objection addressed evidence of the contents of J.F.’s phone.

¶ 18 We therefore conclude that Hamilton did not preserve his

argument that the district court erred in admitting Detective Slay’s

testimony regarding the contents of Hamilton’s phone, but

preserved his argument that the court erred in allowing Detective

Slay to testify regarding the contents of J.F.’s phone.

3. The Reports Were Hearsay

a. The Prosecutor Introduced the Content of the Reports into
Evidence to Prove the Truth of the Matter Asserted

¶ 19 Hearsay is “a statement other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). Hearsay is

inadmissible except as provided by the Colorado Rules of Evidence

or other applicable statutes or rules. CRE 802; People v. Buckner,

228 P.3d 245, 249 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 20 A declarant is “a person who makes a statement.” CRE

801(b). A “statement” is either “(1) an oral or written assertion or

7
(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him to be

communicative.” CRE 801(a).

¶ 21 During rebuttal, the prosecutor introduced the content of the

Reports through Detective Slay’s testimony. He testified that he

had “the tech guys work on [the phone],” and that he was able to

view “the report that [he] had the technical people run.” Detective

Slay then said that, based on his review of the Reports, Hamilton’s

and J.F.’s phones did not contain any texts between Hamilton and

J.F.

¶ 22 We disagree with the People’s argument that the prosecutor

did not introduce the content of the Reports into evidence for the

truth of the matter asserted. In characterizing the content of the

Reports, Detective Slay was not merely providing a “personal

observation about the existence of any text messages” or explaining

“what actions the detective took as part of his investigation.” The

prosecutor went far beyond merely asking Detective Slay whether

he had obtained Hamilton’s and J.F.’s phones and whether the

police had analyzed them.

¶ 23 Rather, his testimony focused on the key content of the

Reports — their alleged assertion that the phones did not contain

8
the text messages from J.F. to Hamilton about which Hamilton had

testified. The prosecutor specifically asked Detective Slay whether

the Reports showed that J.F. had texted Hamilton on the relevant

days. This question elicited testimony regarding the truth of the

matters asserted in the Reports.

b. The Prosecutor Did Not Establish that the Reports Were
Machine-Generated Without Human Input or Interpretation

¶ 24 Even if the prosecutor introduced the Reports into evidence to

prove the truth of their contents, the Reports would not be hearsay

if a machine generated them automatically. Such records are not

hearsay because no “person” or “declarant” made a communicative

“statement” within the meaning of CRE 801. Buckner, 228 P.3d at

250. As a division of this court noted in Buckner, this reasoning is

in accord with decisions from other jurisdictions applying

substantially similar hearsay rules. Id. (citing United States v.

Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2005)); see United

States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007) (concluding

that only a person can make a statement and nothing “said” by a

machine is hearsay); Hamilton, 413 F.3d at 1142-43 (holding

information automatically generated by a computer was not hearsay

9
because there was no “declarant” or “statement” involved); United

States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3d Cir. 2003) (deciding that

an automatically generated time stamp was not hearsay because it

was not uttered by a person). See generally People v. Marciano,

2014 COA 92M-2, ¶ 28, 411 P.3d 831, 838 (in deciding cases

involving the Colorado Rules of Evidence, we consider instructive

cases from other jurisdictions interpreting analogous rules).

¶ 25 The Reports were machine-generated because

• the operator made no statements of any kind;

• the operator did not say or write the information the

machine generated;

• the operator simply operated the machine;

• the machine used a common scientific and technological

process;

• the conclusion of the machine-generated report was

drawn solely from the machine’s data; and

10
• the source of the data was independent of human

observation or reporting.

See Washington, 498 F.3d at 230; Adam Wolfson, Note, “Electronic

Fingerprints”: Doing Away with the Conception of Computer-

Generated Records as Hearsay, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 151, 159 (2005)

(“[H]uman interaction often triggers the computer processes that

create the records; however, the crucial factor is whether the record

is a mark of computer activity or if it is the electronically-saved

statements of a human user.”).

¶ 26 A computer-generated record constitutes hearsay, however,

when its creation involves human input or interpretation. See

United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 907 (10th Cir. 1994)

(concluding that money transfer records constituted hearsay

because an employee created them by entering information into the

computer); see also Baker v. State, 117 A.3d 676, 683 (Md. Ct.

Spec. App. 2015) (concluding that call records not generated solely

by the internal operations of the computer, but that likely involved

a human’s data entry, constituted hearsay); cf. Cranston v. State,

936 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that evidence

tickets produced by a chemical breath test machine are not hearsay

11
because they do not involve any material human intervention). For

these reasons, we hold that the district court erred in determining

that the Reports were not hearsay.

4. Detective Slay’s Testimony Was Also Hearsay

¶ 27 We next consider whether Detective Slay’s testimony regarding

the Reports was itself hearsay. Hearsay included within hearsay is

inadmissible unless each part of the combined statements conforms

with an exception to the hearsay rule. CRE 805. “Where a

statement contains multiple layers of potential hearsay, the court

must analyze each layer separately to determine whether it falls

within a recognized hearsay exception or exclusion.” People v.

Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 101, 315 P.3d 136, 160.

¶ 28 “For hearsay within hearsay to be admitted as evidence, a

hearsay exception must apply to each link of the chain.”

Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2008)

(interpreting analogous federal rule).

¶ 29 Rather than offer the Reports themselves into evidence, the

prosecutor put Detective Slay on the witness stand to tell the jury

what the Reports said. He explained that “[t]he people that we have

downloaded that information in our police technical unit” and that

12
he was characterizing “[a] report from that phone being

downloaded.”

¶ 30 Detective Slay’s testimony about the Reports added a second

layer of hearsay. See CRE 805. His testimony was hearsay because

he described to the jury the content of the Reports to prove the

truth of their content. See CRE 801(c). For this reason, absent the

application of a hearsay exception, Detective Slay could not have

testified about the contents of the Reports, even if the Reports

themselves were admissible. See People v. Raffaelli, 701 P.2d 881,

884 (Colo. App. 1985) (holding that detective’s or caseworker’s

testimony regarding the content of a doctor’s report was

inadmissible hearsay under CRE 802 and CRE 805). But the

People do not argue that any hearsay exception applies, and the

application of any such exception is not otherwise apparent to us.

B. The Reliability and Authenticity of the Reports

¶ 31 In addition to reviewing whether the Reports and Detective

Slay’s testimony regarding the Reports were hearsay, we also must

address whether the prosecutor established their reliability and

authenticity.

13
¶ 32 An analysis of the admissibility of a machine-generated record

must consider the reliability and accuracy of the process used to

create and obtain the underlying data, and whether the report is

authentic. See People v. Huehn, 53 P.3d 733, 736 (Colo. App. 2002)

(explaining that the rules of relevancy, authentication, and hearsay

govern admissibility of a computer printout); see also Washington,

498 F.3d at 231 (“Any concerns about the reliability of . . . machine-

generated information is addressed through the process of

authentication not by hearsay . . . .”); Baker, 117 A.3d at 683

(concluding that the admissibility of records that are entirely self-

generated should be determined on the basis of the reliability and

accuracy of the process used to create and obtain the data).

1. Reliability of Machine-Generated Records

¶ 33 The reliability of machine-generated records can be

established “through the testimony of the operator of the machine

or any other relevant evidence.” Thomas v. People, 895 P.2d 1040,

1045 (Colo. 1995); Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., 720 P.2d 564, 568

(Colo. 1986) (holding officer’s testimony, coupled with proof of

compliance with operational procedures established by board of

health, sufficient to establish that test was properly conducted).

14
¶ 34 The proponent of the admissibility of computer-generated

evidence must lay a sufficient foundation to establish that the

machine’s results are valid and reliable, the machine was in proper

working order at the time it generated the report, and the operator

was qualified to operate it. See Thomas, 895 P.2d at 1045; see also

People v. Bowers, 716 P.2d 471, 474 (Colo. 1986) (holding that the

prosecution must lay a proper foundation for the admission of

breath test results into evidence).

2. Authentication of Machine-Generated Records

¶ 35 The authentication requirement for admission of evidence is

satisfied if the proponent establishes that the evidence is what the

proponent claims it to be. CRE 901(a); People v. Heisler, 2017 COA

58, ¶ 7, ___ P.3d ___, ___; Huehn, 53 P.3d at 736.

¶ 36 “[E]lectronic evidence may be authenticated in a number of

different ways,” including through the testimony of a witness with

knowledge that evidence is what it is claimed to be and through

circumstantial evidence. People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, ¶ 25, 363

P.3d 736, 741 (quoting Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012)). The proponent may authenticate electronically

generated printouts through the testimony of a person with

15
personal knowledge of how the printouts were generated and that

they are what they are claimed to be. See Heisler, ¶ 12, ___ P.3d at

___; Glover, ¶ 24, 363 P.3d at 741; People v. Bernard, 2013 COA 79,

¶ 10, 305 P.3d 433, 435.

3. The Prosecutor Did Not Establish That the Reports Were
Reliable and Authentic

¶ 37 The prosecutor did not show that the Reports were reliable or

authentic. See Huehn, 53 P.3d at 736; see also Washington, 498

F.3d at 231; Baker, 117 A.3d at 683. Nor did the prosecutor

introduce any evidence that the police’s machine had accurately

downloaded the contents of Hamilton’s and J.F.’s phones or that

the Reports were what the prosecutor claimed them to be. See

Thomas, 895 P.2d at 1045; Glover, ¶ 12, 363 P.3d at 739.

¶ 38 Specifically, the record lacks any evidence that

• the machine used to generate the Reports produces

accurate reports of the contents of phones;

• the machine was in proper working order at the time it

generated the Reports;

• the person operating the machine at the time was

properly qualified;

16
• the person followed proper procedures in operating the

machine;

• the Reports were valid and reliable; or

• Detective Slay was qualified to interpret the Reports.

¶ 39 Without this type of evidentiary foundation, Detective Slay’s

testimony regarding the extraction of data from Hamilton’s and

J.F.’s phones, the generation of the Reports, and his interpretation

of the Reports was speculative.

¶ 40 We reject the People’s argument that the Reports were properly

authenticated based on the prosecutor’s ipse dixit assertion that

the Reports reflected the contents of Hamilton’s and J.F.’s phones.

Counsel’s unsupported representation to the district court did not

sufficiently establish the reliability and admissibility of the Reports.

See Heisler, ¶ 12, ___ P.3d at ___.

C. The Admission of Detective Slay’s Testimony Regarding the
Contents of J.F.’s Phone Constituted Reversible Error

¶ 41 We hold that the district court erred in admitting Detective

Slay’s testimony regarding the contents of J.F.’s phone into

evidence because, as explained above,

• the Reports were inadmissible hearsay;

17
• Detective Slay’s testimony regarding the content of the

Reports was also inadmissible hearsay; and

• the prosecutor failed to prove that the Reports were

reliable and authentic.

¶ 42 Because Hamilton preserved his objection to Detective Slay’s

testimony regarding J.F.’s phone, we apply the harmless error

standard in deciding whether the district court’s admission of the

testimony requires reversal. See Hagos, ¶ 12, 288 P.3d at 119.

¶ 43 We discern a reasonable possibility that the jury considered

Detective Slay’s testimony that J.F.’s phone contained no text

messages to Hamilton in deciding that J.F. had not consented to

engage in sexual intercourse with him. Much of Hamilton’s

testimony concerned how J.F. had shown interest in him by texting

him before and after the alleged sexual assault, in contrast to J.F.’s

testimony that “there was never a physical attraction” and that

there was “nothing that would have ever made [her] want to have

sex with him.”

¶ 44 If the jury had believed Hamilton’s testimony about the text

messages, it could reasonably have concluded that J.F had shown

an interest in him. This determination, in turn, could have

18
supported a conclusion that they had engaged in consensual sexual

intercourse and, therefore, no sexual assault had occurred.

Detective Slay’s hearsay testimony directly contradicted this key

evidence and, moreover, undermined Hamilton’s credibility.

¶ 45 Detective Slay’s testimony was particularly prejudicial because

it was part of the prosecutor’s rebuttal case. Hamilton had no

opportunity to respond to the evidence or provide an explanation as

to why the police did not find any text messages from J.F. to

Hamilton on J.F.’s phone. The record also indicates that the jury

gave significant weight to the evidence showing that J.F. had not

texted Hamilton. Several of the jurors’ questions for Detective Slay

concerned whether J.F. had texted Hamilton.

¶ 46 Therefore, we conclude there is a reasonable possibility that

Detective Slay’s testimony about the contents of J.F.’s phone

contributed to Hamilton’s conviction of sexual assault, such that it

undermines our confidence in the outcome of the case. People v.

Casias, 2012 COA 117, ¶ 63, 312 P.3d 208, 220. (Because we

reverse Hamilton’s conviction based on the erroneous admission of

Detective Slay’s hearsay testimony regarding the contents of J.F.’s

phone, we need not decide whether admission of Detective Slay’s

19
testimony regarding the contents of Hamilton’s phone was plain

error.)

¶ 47 For the above reasons, we reverse Hamilton’s judgment of

conviction for sexual assault and remand for a new trial. (Given

our reversal of Hamilton’s judgment of conviction for sexual assault

based on the erroneous admission of Detective Slay’s testimony

regarding the Reports, we do not address Hamilton’s contention

that allowing the testimony also violated his rights under the

Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Colorado

Constitutions.)

Admissibility of Evidence of the Prior Sexual Assault Charges
Against Hamilton

¶ 48 We address the remaining issues Hamilton raises on appeal,

as they may arise again at the new trial.

¶ 49 Hamilton argues that the district court erred in admitting

evidence of the acts underlying his two prior sexual assault

charges. (Hamilton was acquitted of one of the charges and the

other charge was withdrawn.) The prosecutor argued that the

evidence of the two prior sexual assault charges was admissible

because such evidence had “the same or similar character to the

20
sexual assault perpetrated against [J.F.]” and revealed a common

pattern:

• identifying potential victims who were drinking with

friends and had become intoxicated;

• separating them from their friends;

• taking them, without their consent, to an apartment;

• forcibly holding them down;

• sexually assaulting them; and

• Hamilton’s DNA appearing on vaginal swabs taken from

each victim.

¶ 50 The victims in the two prior incidents testified that Hamilton

had followed this pattern when he sexually assaulted them. The

evidence thus supports the commonality between the two prior

sexual assault charges and the charges against Hamilton

concerning J.F. The district court found that the evidence of the

prior charges of sexual assault was admissible under CRE 404(b),

applying the four-part test delineated in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d

1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990), as well as under the doctrine of chances,

because it was relevant to the issue of consent and Hamilton’s

credibility. Hamilton’s counsel had argued that the evidence of the

21
two prior sexual assault charges was inadmissible because it

differed significantly from the allegations underlying the charges

involving J.F. He makes the same argument on appeal. We are not

persuaded.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 51 We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude other

acts evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v. Jones, 2013 CO

59, ¶ 11, 311 P.3d 274, 276. A district court abuses its discretion

when its ruling on the admissibility of other acts evidence is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on a

misapprehension of the law. People v. Trammell, 2014 COA 34,

¶ 10, 345 P.3d 945, 947-48.

B. The Law Governing Admissibility of Other Act Evidence

¶ 52 All relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided

by constitution, statute, or rule. CRE 402. Relevant evidence is

that evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

CRE 401. Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” CRE

22
403. Relevant evidence is not admissible to prove the character of a

person by showing that he acted in conformity with that character

on a particular occasion. CRE 404(b).

¶ 53 Notwithstanding these limitations, CRE 404(b) allows

admission of evidence of a defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts

to prove, for example, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. CRE

404(b); Jones, ¶ 12, 311 P.3d at 276.

¶ 54 Recognizing the “grave statewide concern” that sexual offenses

pose, the General Assembly adopted a statute to delineate clearly

the CRE 404(b) admissibility requirements for other acts evidence

in prosecutions for sexual crimes. Jones, ¶ 13, 311 P.3d at 277

(quoting § 16-10-301(1), C.R.S. 2018). In a sexual offense case,

“[t]he prosecution may introduce evidence of other acts of the

defendant to prove the commission of the offense as charged for any

purpose other than propensity.” § 16-10-301(3). Such purposes

include the following:

Refuting defenses, such as consent or recent
fabrication; showing a common plan, scheme,
design, or modus operandi, regardless of
whether identity is at issue and regardless of
whether the charged offense has a close nexus

23
as part of a unified transaction to the other
act; showing motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, including grooming of a victim,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident; or for any other matter for which it is
relevant.

Id.

¶ 55 Before admitting other acts evidence under CRE 404(b) and

section 16-10-301(3), a trial court must be satisfied, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the prior act occurred, and

must consider the admissibility of the evidence under the four-

prong Spoto analysis. Jones, ¶ 14, 311 P.3d at 277; Kinney v.

People, 187 P.3d 548, 554 (Colo. 2008). Other acts evidence is

admissible only if (1) it relates to a material fact in the case; (2) the

evidence is logically relevant; (3) the logical relevance of the

evidence is independent of the intermediate inference prohibited by

CRE 404(b) that the defendant has a bad character; and (4) the

probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice. Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318.

24
1. Application of Spoto

a. The Other Act Evidence Must Relate to a Material Fact

¶ 56 Under the first prong of the Spoto analysis, the other acts

evidence must relate to a material fact, which is a fact “of

consequence to the determination of the action.” Spoto, 795 P.2d at

1318 (quoting CRE 401).

¶ 57 In applying the first Spoto prong, the district court found that

the “prior acts relate to a material fact, primarily the consent and

credibility of the alleged victim in this case.”

¶ 58 Whether J.F. consented is a material fact. While Hamilton

admitted to engaging in sexual intercourse with J.F., his theory of

defense was that J.F. had consented. Indeed, during closing

argument, Hamilton’s counsel argued that “just because somebody

has been drinking alcohol . . . [or] is intoxicated does not mean they

cannot consent to the sexual activity” and also that “[y]ou can be

high on drugs and consent to sex.”

¶ 59 The prosecutor proffered the other acts evidence to prove

intent and to rebut Hamilton’s consent theory by showing a

common plan, scheme, design, modus operandi, and

preparation. These factors are permissible to show a defendant’s

25
intent and to refute a consent defense. See People v. Martinez, 36

P.3d 154, 159 (Colo. App. 2001).

¶ 60 We reject Hamilton’s contention that modus operandi evidence

is not relevant unless the identity of the assailant is at issue.

Section 16-10-301(3) specifically provides that the prosecution may

introduce evidence of other acts to show “modus operandi,

regardless of whether identity is at issue.” § 16-10-301(3).

b. The Other Acts Evidence Must Be Logically Relevant

¶ 61 Under the second prong of Spoto, the evidence must be

logically relevant; it must have “any tendency to make the existence

of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” Jones, ¶ 16, 311 P.3d at 277 (quoting CRE 401); accord

Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318.

¶ 62 In reviewing the second Spoto prong, the district court found

that “the evidence is logically relevant” because the two prior acts

“go directly to the issue of consent and credibility of [J.F.].” The

district court further found that “there are striking similarities in

the other two offenses” that are relevant to whether “Hamilton was

26
acting with or without consent or whether he was sexually

assaulting this individual.”

¶ 63 The prosecutor argued that the details of the two prior sexual

assault charges were part of a pattern similar to the facts involving

the alleged sexual assault of J.F. The record supports this

inference.

¶ 64 The evidence of the other acts has a tendency to make

Hamilton’s intent to sexually assault J.F. and J.F.’s lack of consent

more probable than it would be without the evidence. See Jones,

¶ 16, 311 P.3d at 277; Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318. Thus, this

evidence had a tendency to allow reasonable jurors to infer that

Hamilton sexually assaulted J.F.

c. The Other Acts Evidence Must Create an Inference
Independent of Its Reflection on the Defendant’s Character

¶ 65 The third prong of Spoto “requires that logically relevant

evidence achieve its relevance in some way other than through the

impermissible inference that a person who engages in a bad act

does so because he acts in conformity with his bad character.”

Jones, ¶ 16, 311 P.3d at 277; Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318. While the

other acts evidence is admissible even if it would allow an

27
impermissible character inference, the proffered evidence must be

logically relevant independent of that inference. Jones, ¶ 16, 311

P.3d at 277. “Plan, scheme, design, modus operandi, and motive

. . . are well-accepted methods of proving the ultimate facts

necessary to establish the commission of a crime, without reliance

upon an impermissible inference from bad character.” People v.

Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1040 (Colo. 2002).

¶ 66 The district court found that the prior act evidence was “not

admitted to show character, but rather, again, went to the issue of

consent and credibility.” The district court further found that the

evidence went to “proof of motive, intent, modus operandi, plan,

[and] absence of mistake.”

¶ 67 The logical relevance of the evidence is independent of the

inference that Hamilton is a person of bad character who sexually

assaulted J.F. in conformity with his bad character. The evidence

demonstrated a pattern of behavior in committing sexual assaults

from which the jury could infer that Hamilton sexually assaulted

J.F., independent of any character flaws or propensity.

¶ 68 Further, the inference that Hamilton acted in conformity with

his pattern of identifying women for sexual assault does not rely on

28
his character. Rather, it rests on the facts common to the other

acts and his alleged sexual assault of J.F.: targeting intoxicated

women, separating them from their friends, taking them to an

apartment against their will, and sexually assaulting them. This is

modus operandi evidence, which allows for proof of the ultimate

facts in a criminal case without relying on an inference of bad

character. See id. at 1041.

¶ 69 We reject Hamilton’s contention that the other acts evidence

was not sufficiently similar to the charges involving J.F. to be

admissible under section 16-10-301(3). Evidence of other acts may

be introduced in sexual assault cases to show common plan or

modus operandi regardless of whether the charged offense has a

close nexus as part of a unified transaction involving the other acts.

See § 16-10-301(3). Consistent with Spoto, the district court

reviewed the underlying allegations in all three instances and found

that there were “striking similarities in the other two offenses.” The

record supports the district court’s finding.

29
d. The Risk of Unfair Prejudice Must Not Substantially Outweigh
the Probative Value of the Other Acts Evidence

¶ 70 Under the fourth prong of Spoto, “we must assess whether the

probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice.” Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318. The district

court retains a great deal of discretion in determining whether the

other acts evidence is sufficiently probative for legitimate purposes.

Rath, 44 P.3d at 1041. The balance required by CRE 403 favors

admission of the evidence. Therefore, a reviewing court must afford

the evidence the maximum probative value attributable by a

reasonable fact finder and the minimum unfair prejudice to be

reasonably expected. Id. at 1043.

¶ 71 A court does not consider Rule 403’s “probative value” in

isolation but evaluates the “marginal” or “incremental” probative

value of the evidence relative to the other evidence in the case. Id.

Thus, the court must weigh “the logical force of the evidence and

the proponent’s need for the evidence” in light of other available

evidence. Id. (quoting Martin v. People, 738 P.2d 789, 794 (Colo.

1987)). Evidence of other acts is “typically relevant and highly

probative” and should therefore be more readily available in sexual

30
assault cases than in other types of criminal proceedings. People v.

Villa, 240 P.3d 343, 350 (Colo. App. 2009) (quoting § 16-10-301(1)).

Generally, “the probative value of such evidence will outweigh any

danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. at 352 (quoting § 16-10-301(1)).

¶ 72 In reviewing the fourth Spoto prong, the district court found

that, although the other acts evidence is prejudicial, its “probative

value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice.”

¶ 73 Because J.F.’s disputed testimony is the only direct evidence

of the sexual assault, additional evidence “may have particular

‘marginal’ or ‘incremental’ probative value.” Rath, 44 P.3d at 1043.

Although there were differences in the circumstances surrounding

each of the alleged sexual assaults, they shared a number of

significant characteristics that evidence a pattern of behavior rather

than unrelated acts. The combination of the three incidents added

substantial weight to the inference that Hamilton employs a

technique to isolate intoxicated women for the purpose of sexually

assaulting them.

¶ 74 The other acts evidence directly addressed Hamilton’s

contention that J.F. had consented to sexual intercourse with him.

31
It added substantial weight to the prosecutor’s proof that J.F. was a

credible witness and that she did not consent to engage in sex with

Hamilton. Other acts evidence is admissible to corroborate a

victim’s testimony of the existence of a fact. See id.

¶ 75 Thus, although the other acts evidence was undoubtedly

prejudicial to Hamilton, the record supports the district court’s

finding that the probative value of that evidence in proving the

elements of the offense was not substantially outweighed by any

danger of unfair prejudice to Hamilton.

¶ 76 Additionally, because the district court instructed the jury that

it could consider the prior charges of sexual assault only for the

limited purpose of “proving [Hamilton’s] motive, intent, modus

operandi, plan, absence of mistake, and the issue of consent,” it

reduced the danger of unfair prejudice. See People v. Everett, 250

P.3d 649, 662 (Colo. App. 2010). Nothing in the record suggests

that the jury failed to understand or apply those instructions.

2. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting
the Other Acts Evidence

¶ 77 The district court sufficiently assessed each prong of the four-

part Spoto analysis in finding that the facts underlying the two prior

32
charges of sexual assault were admissible as other acts evidence.

We hold that the district court’s application of the four-prong

analysis was not “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair,”

and, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting the other acts evidence under CRE 404(b) and section 16-

10-301(3). Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 463 (Colo. 2009).

3. The Doctrine of Chances

¶ 78 The district court alternatively found that the evidence of the

two prior charges of sexual assault was admissible under the

doctrine of chances. Under the doctrine of chances, the

prosecution must establish that

(1) the evidence of other acts must be roughly
similar to the charged crime; (2) the number of
unusual occurrences in which the defendant
has been involved must exceed the frequency
rate for the general population; and (3) there
must be a real dispute between the
prosecution and the defense over whether the
actus reus occurred.

People v. Weeks, 2015 COA 77, ¶ 29, 369 P.3d 699, 706.

¶ 79 The doctrine of chances “provides one theory of relevance

under which a trial court may determine that other acts evidence

satisfies the second and third prongs of the Spoto analysis.” Jones,

33
¶ 17, 311 P.3d at 277. However, district courts are under no

obligation to analyze other acts evidence under the doctrine of

chances. Id. at ¶ 22, 311 P.3d at 278. While evidence that satisfies

the doctrine of chances may also satisfy elements of the Spoto

analysis, a district court may admit CRE 404(b) evidence under

Spoto without also determining whether the evidence is admissible

under the doctrine of chances. Id. at ¶ 9, 311 P.3d at 276.

¶ 80 Because we conclude that the district court did not err in

admitting the other acts evidence under Spoto, we need not

determine whether the evidence was also admissible under the

doctrine of chances. (We also need not consider Hamilton’s

argument that the admission of evidence of the other acts of sexual

assault violated his rights to due process and an impartial jury.

Due process does not bar the admission of evidence under CRE

404(b). See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1990);

People v. Conley, 804 P.2d 240, 244 (Colo. App. 1990).)

The Jury Instructions on Hamilton’s Prior Conviction and
Acquittal

¶ 81 Hamilton contends that the district court violated his right to

due process by (1) adding language to the acquittal instruction

34
telling the jury it should not presume he was “factually innocent” of

sexually assaulting M.D. (a victim in one of the two prior sexual

assault cases), even though he had been acquitted on the sexual

assault charge; and (2) informing the jurors in the acquittal

instruction that he had been convicted of kidnapping M.D.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 82 We review jury instructions de novo, considering them as a

whole to determine whether they accurately state the governing

law. People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 33, 370 P.3d 1151,

1161. We review a district court’s decision to give a particular

instruction for an abuse of discretion. Id. A district court “abuses

its discretion where its decision to provide an instruction is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on an

erroneous understanding or application of the law.” Id.

¶ 83 Under the harmless error standard, reversal is required if the

preserved error “substantially influenced the verdict or affected the

fairness of the trial proceedings.” Tevlin, 715 P.2d at 342.

B. Preservation

¶ 84 We disagree with the People that Hamilton did not preserve his

arguments regarding the “factually innocent” and conviction

35
language added to the acquittal instruction. The defense objected

to the prosecutor’s proposed acquittal instruction “[j]ust in its

entirety, telling the jury to presume or not to presume different

things.” Defense counsel further said, “I don’t know that us

opening the door and telling the jury that he was found not guilty of

the sex assault . . . necessarily opens the door to the jury being

informed that he was found guilty of felony kidnapping . . . .”

¶ 85 These objections preserved the defense’s challenge to the

inclusion of the “factually innocent” and conviction language in the

acquittal instruction. Therefore, we review this issue for harmless

error. See Hagos, ¶ 12, 288 P.3d at 119.

C. The Inclusion of the “Factually Innocent” Language in the
Acquittal Instruction

¶ 86 Hamilton contends that the district court erred by informing

the jury in the acquittal instruction that it should not presume he

was “factually innocent” of sexually assaulting M.D. He contends

that this language trivialized the presumption of innocence.

1. The Law Governing Acquittal Instructions

¶ 87 No per se rule either requires or bars the introduction of

evidence of an acquittal; rather, district courts must determine

36
whether to admit such evidence on a case-by-case basis. Kinney,

187 P.3d at 557. An acquittal instruction is appropriate where the

jury learns that the defendant was tried in another criminal case

and may be speculating as to the outcome of that trial. Id. Under

these circumstances, the probative value of a prior acquittal is

significant. Id. A district court may allow evidence of the acquittal

for the limited purpose of ensuring the jury does not give improper

weight to the acts underlying the criminal charge in the prior case.

Id.

¶ 88 Further, a district court concerned about possible juror

confusion has the discretion to instruct the jury that it should not

presume that the defendant was “factually innocent” solely because

the jury in the prior case acquitted him. The district court can

provide an instruction that the previous jury determined, for

whatever reason, that the state had failed to prove the defendant’s

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 558.

2. The District Court Did Not Err in Adding the “Factually
Innocent” Language to the Acquittal Instruction

¶ 89 The acquittal instruction stated, in relevant part:

37
The Defendant, Rayon Hamilton, was acquitted
(or found not guilty) of sexually assaulting
[M.D.]. He was convicted of kidnapping [M.D.].

You, the jurors in this case, should not
necessarily presume that because Mr.
Hamilton was found guilty by a previous jury
that the Defendant was factually guilty but
rather that a previous jury determined that the
state proved his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Similarly, you should not necessarily
presume that because Mr. Hamilton was found
not guilty of prior acts by a previous jury that
the Defendant was factually innocent, but
rather that the previous jury determined for
whatever reason that the state failed to prove
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 90 The district court added the “factually innocent” language to

the instruction because it was “fair that [the jury] hear that the

acquittal is a burden issue and not really a factual issue.” This

language mirrored the language for acquittal instructions that the

supreme court approved in Kinney. See Kinney, 187 P.3d at 558.

¶ 91 We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by adding the qualifying “factually innocent” language to

the acquittal instruction.

D. The Two Jury Instructions on Hamilton’s Prior Conviction

¶ 92 Hamilton contends that the district court erred in adding

qualifying “factually innocent” language to the acquittal instruction

38
and in adding a reference to Hamilton’s prior kidnapping conviction

to the instruction addressing Hamilton’s prior acquittal of sexual

assault.

¶ 93 In addition to the conviction language added to the acquittal

instruction quoted above, the district court provided a cautionary

instruction that said, in its entirety:

The Defendant is to be tried for the crime
charged in this case, and no other. You may
consider the testimony of a previous conviction
only in determining the credibility of the
Defendant as a witness, and for no other
purpose. When the Defendant testifies, his
credibility is to be determined in the same
manner as [that of] any other witness.

¶ 94 The People argue that the district court correctly instructed

the jury on the kidnapping conviction because “[e]vidence of a prior

felony conviction is admissible for purposes of affecting the

credibility of the witness” and, “[i]f an acquittal is important to

judge the credibility of the witness, then a conviction in the same

proceeding is equally important.”

1. The Law Governing Jury Instructions Concerning Prior
Convictions

¶ 95 Evidence of a prior criminal conviction is generally

inadmissible because of its highly prejudicial effect. Harper v.

39
People, 817 P.2d 77, 85 (Colo. 1991). Such evidence casts

“damning innuendo likely to beget prejudice in the minds of juries.”

People v. Lucero, 200 Colo. 335, 343, 615 P.2d 660, 665 (1980)

(quoting Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 284, 344 P.2d 455, 458

(1959)). Thus, the disclosure of a defendant’s prior felony

conviction to a jury will so burden the trial “with the baggage of his

prior criminality that a fair trial as we know it bec[o]me[s] an

impossibility.” Id. at 344, 615 P.2d at 666.

¶ 96 However, “[w]hen a defendant exercises his statutory privilege

of testifying, all prior felony convictions and their nature may be

shown to impeach his testimony.” People v. Medina, 40 Colo. App.

490, 493, 583 P.2d 293, 295 (1978) (quoting Candelaria v. People,

177 Colo. 136, 140, 493 P.2d 355, 357 (1972)).

¶ 97 The district court must advise a defendant, before he takes the

witness stand, that the prosecution may respond to his testimony

by disclosing his prior felony conviction to the jury. “[I]f the felony

conviction is disclosed to the jury then the jury can be instructed to

consider it only as it bears upon his credibility.” People v. Curtis,

681 P.2d 504, 514 (Colo. 1984).

40
¶ 98 In the limited circumstances where prior convictions are

admissible, “stringent standards apply and cautionary instructions

must accompany the introduction of such prior convictions.”

Harper, 817 P.2d at 85. The cautionary instructions can alleviate

the danger that a jury will misuse evidence of the defendant’s prior

conviction to find him guilty. People v. Chavez, 853 P.2d 1149,

1152 (Colo. 1993) (stating that a defendant is “entitled to an

instruction explaining to the jury that evidence of his prior felonies

was admitted only for the limited purpose of impeaching his

credibility”).

2. The District Court Did Not Err in Providing a Cautionary
Instruction on Hamilton’s Prior Conviction for Kidnapping

¶ 99 Before Hamilton took the witness stand, the district court gave

him the required advisement that, if he “were to testify and that

[kidnapping] conviction is disclosed to the jury, then they would be

instructed to consider the felony conviction only as it bears upon

the issue of your credibility and for no other purpose.” See Curtis,

681 P.2d at 514. Hamilton confirmed he understood the

advisement and chose to testify anyway. Thus, the prosecutor was

permitted to introduce evidence of the kidnapping conviction to

41
impeach Hamilton’s credibility. See People v. Chavez, 621 P.2d

1362, 1366 (Colo. 1981).

¶ 100 During Hamilton’s testimony, defense counsel elicited evidence

that Hamilton was “found not guilty of sexual[ly] assaulting [M.D.],”

but that he was “found guilty of kidnapping [her].” The prosecutor

made no reference to the kidnapping conviction during cross-

examination. We agree with the People that the jury could consider

Hamilton’s kidnapping conviction in weighing his credibility. See

id.

3. The District Court Erred in Adding a Reference to Hamilton’s
Prior Conviction to the Acquittal Instruction

¶ 101 We next turn to whether the district court erred in adding

language regarding the kidnapping conviction to the acquittal

instruction. The district court’s conviction language mirrored the

acquittal language in the same instruction, but with “guilty”

substituted for “not guilty of prior acts,” and “innocent” and “proved

his guilt” substituted for “failed to prove his guilt.” (The conviction

language did not include the “for whatever reason” language that

appears in the acquittal language of the instruction.) Therefore, the

42
jury received two instructions reminding it of Hamilton’s prior

conviction.

¶ 102 We hold that the district court erred in adding the conviction

language to the acquittal instruction, for four reasons.

¶ 103 First, the instruction went beyond the purpose of the

cautionary conviction instruction discussed in Chavez. It did more

than explain to the jury that the evidence of Hamilton’s prior

conviction was admitted for the limited purpose of impeaching his

credibility. See Chavez, 853 P.2d at 1152. The conviction language

added to the acquittal instruction made no reference to credibility.

¶ 104 Second, although the instruction gave the jury no more

information about the prior conviction than it had obtained through

Hamilton’s testimony, the language in the instruction, coupled with

the language of the stand alone instruction on the conviction,

unnecessarily highlighted Hamilton’s prior conviction. The People

have provided no authority, nor can we find any, for the proposition

that a district court may provide the jury with two or more

instructions addressing a defendant’s prior conviction.

¶ 105 Third, the addition of the conviction language to the acquittal

instruction defeated the limited purpose of the acquittal instruction

43
— to ensure the jury did not give improper weight to the other acts

evidence presented at trial and did not speculate whether Hamilton

had been convicted on a charge for which he had been acquitted.

See Kinney, 187 P.3d at 557. The reasons for providing an

acquittal instruction do not give a district court license to inform

the jurors in the same instruction that the defendant was convicted

of a different offense in the same case. We therefore disagree with

the People that, because the district court gave an instruction on

Hamilton’s acquittal for sexually assaulting M.D., that instruction

needed to refer to Hamilton’s conviction in the same case for

kidnapping her.

¶ 106 Lastly, the conviction language added to the acquittal

instruction was confusing and illogical. It told the jury that

Hamilton may have been convicted of kidnapping M.D. even though

he was not “factually guilty” of the crime, because the previous jury

determined that the state had proved his guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. Although the district court surely did not intend to suggest

that the earlier conviction was a miscarriage of justice, the jurors

may have questioned how a jury could convict a defendant of an

offense of which the defendant was not “factually guilty.” Further, a

44
literal reading of the instruction suggested that the jury could

convict Hamilton even if he was not “factually guilty” of sexually

assaulting J.F.

¶ 107 Thus, we conclude that the district court erred in adding the

conviction language to the acquittal instruction. Because we

reverse the judgment of conviction on other grounds, we need not

determine whether the error was harmless.

Hamilton’s Right to Due Process

¶ 108 Finally, Hamilton contends that the district court violated his

right to due process by allowing the prosecutor to present evidence

of other acts for which he was tried and acquitted, and in

instructing the jury on his prior conviction.

¶ 109 Because we resolve these issues in Hamilton’s favor on non-

constitutional grounds, we need not address his due process

argument. People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1251

(Colo. 2003).

Conclusion

¶ 110 We reverse the judgment of conviction for sexual assault and

remand for a new trial.

JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE J. JONES concur.

45