Peo v. Trujillo

24CA0637 Peo v Trujillo 06-18-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0637
Mesa County District Court No. 22CR936
Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Andrew David Trujillo,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, ORDER REVERSED,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 18, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Sonia Raichur Russo, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Cynthia A. Harvey, Alternate Defense Counsel, Aurora, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Andrew David Trujillo, appeals the trial court’s

judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty

of sexual assault on an at-risk individual and the court’s order

designating him a sexually violent predator (SVP). We affirm the

conviction but reverse the SVP designation and remand the case

back to the trial court with directions.

I. Background

¶2 The victim, M.S., has cerebral palsy and an intellectual

disability. She lives with her parents, and while she can perform

basic tasks like bathing and dressing herself, she can’t drive, cook,

do laundry, or count money.

¶3 At the time of the events at issue here, M.S. was nineteen

years old. She was at the grocery store with her mother when

Trujillo approached and asked her mother if he could take M.S. to

dinner or a movie. M.S.’s mother told Trujillo that he would need to

meet M.S.’s father first. M.S.’s mother gave M.S. permission to give

Trujillo her phone number, and she did.

¶4 The same day, Trujillo texted M.S., called her, and then texted

again, ultimately asking if she wanted to go to dinner. M.S. told

Trujillo that he would need to meet her father first. Trujillo and

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M.S. then exchanged messages on Snapchat1 and talked on the

phone.

¶5 The next day, Trujillo went to M.S.’s house. M.S.’s father was

at work, and her mother was asleep on the couch and did not know

Trujillo was there. After leaving the house for a brief time, Trujillo

invited M.S. to go for a drive, telling her that he was outside her

house and that she should meet him outside. M.S. didn’t tell her

mother that she was leaving the house but called her father and

told him she was going to take a walk.

¶6 Trujillo drove M.S. to a parking lot by a nearby river. Trujillo

held M.S.’s head down and made her “suck his dick.” Trujillo

helped M.S. take off her clothing. He then grabbed M.S. by the

arms and made her get on top of him and choked her. M.S.

testified that Trujillo was wearing a condom and his penis “went

inside” her vagina. M.S. testified that she said no to Trujillo several

times. M.S. got dressed, and Trujillo drove her home.

1 Snapchat is a messaging application through which individuals

can send pictures, videos, or text. See Snap Inc., What is
Snapchat?, https://perma.cc/TN8B-ETPC. These messages
“automatically delete” after they are opened if not saved by the
individual receiving the messages. Snap Inc., When does Snapchat
delete Snaps and Chats?, https://perma.cc/Z3A3-4HJ5.

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¶7 Later that day, M.S. told her mother that she had sex but then

said that she had been raped. After M.S. described what Trujillo

did, her mother called 911. Deputy Lee Pratt responded, spoke to

M.S. and her mother, and collected information from M.S.’s phone.

¶8 Trujillo was charged with one count of sexual assault on an

at-risk person, one count of the lesser included offense of sexual

assault, and two habitual criminal sentence enhancers. Before

trial, Trujillo challenged M.S.’s competency to testify at trial. The

trial court held a hearing at which M.S., her father, and Deputy

Pratt testified. The court determined that M.S. was competent to

testify at trial, and she did.

¶9 The jury found Trujillo guilty as charged, and the court

merged the convictions for the greater and lesser included sexual

assault offenses. The court sentenced Trujillo to seventy-two years

to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections and

designated him an SVP.

¶ 10 Trujillo appeals, challenging the trial court’s pretrial

competency determination and his SVP designation. We disagree

with Trujillo’s first contention but agree with his second.

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II. Competency

A. Governing Legal Standards

¶ 11 Witnesses “who are of unsound mind” at the time they appear

to testify are deemed incompetent and may not testify. § 13-90-

106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. A witness is competent if they have “the

capacity to observe, recollect, communicate, and understand the

oath to tell the truth.” People v. Alexander, 724 P.2d 1304, 1307

(Colo. 1986). If the witness is competent, any mental deficiency

goes to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. Id.

¶ 12 The trial court has wide latitude to determine a witness’s

competency. People v. Alley, 232 P.3d 272, 275 (Colo. App. 2010)

(citing People v. Galloway, 677 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Colo. App. 1983)).

We will reverse a competency determination only for an abuse of

discretion, which happens if the court’s ruling is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Alexander, 724 P.2d at 1307.

B. Trujillo’s Competency Challenge

¶ 13 Trujillo argues that M.S. lacked the capacity to observe,

recollect, communicate, and understand the oath to tell the truth.

Specifically, Trujillo argues that M.S. struggled with the concepts of

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a truth and a lie and made false statements during her interview

with Investigator Lissah Norcross.

¶ 14 Based on our review of the competency hearing, we conclude

that the court’s determination that M.S. was competent was within

the wide latitude it had to make that determination.

¶ 15 It is true that M.S. wasn’t able to articulate, in abstract terms,

the meaning of the words, “fact,” “fiction,” “truth,” and “lie” or

explain the general difference between those words. But she

demonstrated a clear functional understanding of these words and

the differences between them by identifying what was true and what

was false when presented with specific examples. For example, the

prosecutor held up markers and asked M.S. if it would be true or

false to say she was holding up a book. M.S. stated it would be

false. This was just one of many similar questions and answers

wherein M.S. demonstrated a correct functional understanding of

truth and lies.

¶ 16 M.S. also testified, “[Y]ou always have to tell the truth.” And

instead of guessing when she didn’t know the answer to questions,

M.S. responded, “I don’t know.”

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¶ 17 Thus, the above testimony indicated that M.S. understood the

functional difference between truth and lies, understood that it was

important to tell the truth, and was able to tell the truth under oath

even when she did not know the answers to questions.

¶ 18 Moreover, testimony from the competency hearing supports

the court’s conclusion that M.S. was able to observe, recollect, and

communicate. M.S. correctly testified to her birthday, the street

she lived on, her favorite movie, her age, and what she had for

dinner the night before the competency hearing. See People v.

Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219, 224 (Colo. App. 1990) (concluding that

the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion when the child witness

promised to tell the truth and knew her grade in school, the

defendant’s first name, the difference between the truth and a lie,

and the consequences of telling one or the other, and she also knew

that it was “Bronco” day). During the competency hearing, M.S.

was able to recollect and communicate details of the assault and,

more generally, of her life. Likewise, both Deputy Pratt and M.S.’s

father testified that M.S. could recollect information.

¶ 19 Trujillo points out that M.S.’s interviews with Deputy Pratt

and Investigator Norcross were inconsistent with her testimony and

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that M.S. couldn’t remember details like Trujillo’s name, giving

Trujillo her phone number, or using Snapchat. Nor could she recall

whether she sent Trujillo photos of herself, whether she told Trujillo

that she liked him, and whether Trujillo’s clothes were on or off

during the alleged sexual assault. But any inconsistency or

contradiction isn’t a matter of witness competency; it’s a matter of

witness credibility, which is a determination that is left to the jury.

People v. Norwood, 547 P.2d 273, 279 (Colo. App. 1975); Butler v.

People, 2019 CO 87, ¶ 20 (“We must leave the determination of the

credibility of witnesses to the jury.”). We therefore conclude that

these inconsistencies that Trujillo relies on were irrelevant to M.S.’s

competency.

¶ 20 Finally, we are unpersuaded by Trujillo’s reliance on Medina v.

Diguglielmo, 373 F. Supp. 2d 526, 545 (E.D. Pa. 2005), rev’d, 461

F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2006). Addressing an ineffective assistance claim,

the Medina court held that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge the competency of a twelve-year-old witness who

demonstrated “ambiguous knowledge of the difference between a

truth and a lie.” Id. at 544-45, 547-49. But Medina applied a

different competency standard (Pennsylvania’s) to a situation in

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which there was no actual competency inquiry or determination.

See id. at 540-42. We therefore find it of little use when applying

Colorado’s competency standard to the comprehensive testimony

about M.S.’s competency here.

¶ 21 In sum, we conclude that there was strong evidence of M.S.’s

ability to tell the truth; functionally differentiate between truth and

lies; and observe, recollect, and communicate. We therefore

perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that she

was competent to testify.

III. SVP Designation

¶ 22 Trujillo contends that the trial court erred by finding that he

met the “stranger” relationship criteria under section 18-3-

414.5(1)(a)(III), C.R.S. 2025, and designating him an SVP on that

basis. We agree with Trujillo that the court’s factual findings

cannot support its legal determination that Trujillo was a stranger

for purposes of the SVP designation.

¶ 23 We review the court’s SVP designation as a mixed question of

fact and law. People v. Ehlebracht, 2020 COA 132, ¶ 25. We defer

to the court’s factual findings if they are supported by the record,

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and we review de novo the court’s legal conclusion designating the

defendant an SVP. Id.

¶ 24 An individual is designated an SVP if the offender (1) was

eighteen years old or older at the time of the offense, (2) was

convicted of an enumerated offense, (3) committed the offense

against a stranger or “a person with whom the offender established

or promoted a relationship primarily for the purpose of sexual

victimization,” and (4) is likely to recidivate. § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(I)-

(IV). As the Colorado Supreme Court has explained, for an offender

to be a stranger for purposes of an SVP designation, either the

victim or the offender must be unknown to the other “at the time of

the offense.” People v. Hunter, 2013 CO 48, ¶ 1.

¶ 25 There was no evidence that could have supported a conclusion

that either Trujillo did not know M.S. or that M.S. did not know him

at the time of the offense. While the interactions between M.S. and

Trujillo were brief before the sexual assault, they knew each other

at the time of the offense. Trujillo and M.S. met the day before the

assault and exchanged phone numbers. M.S. and Trujillo

exchanged text messages, sent each other Snapchats, and talked on

the phone. Trujillo sent pictures of himself to M.S. And M.S. had

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Trujillo’s contact information saved in her phone and provided it to

Deputy Pratt. Additionally, M.S. spent time with Trujillo in her

bedroom before agreeing to go for a drive with him. She also got in

his car when he told her to. M.S. knew the identity of her assailant

at the time of the assault — indeed, she identified him to police

immediately thereafter.

¶ 26 The trial court found that Trujillo qualified as a stranger for

SVP purposes because Trujillo, “in his version of the facts,

described the victim as a complete stranger.” To the extent that

this was a factual finding that Trujillo described M.S. as a complete

stranger at the time of the offense, it is unsupported by the record.

It is true that in Trujillo’s description of the assault in his sex-

offense-specific mental health evaluation prior to sentencing, he

described M.S. as “a complete stranger.” But Trujillo was referring

to when he first met M.S. at the grocery store the day before the

assault, not when the assault occurred.

¶ 27 Aside from this unsupported “complete stranger”

determination, the court made no specific factual findings

supporting its conclusion that either Trujillo or M.S. were strangers

to the other. See People v. Buerge, 240 P.3d 363, 363, 369 (Colo.

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App. 2009) (“The [SVP] statute requires the trial court to ‘make

specific findings of fact,’ based on the results of the [SVP] risk

assessment, and determine whether the defendant is a[n SVP].”

(quoting § 18-3-414.5(2))). We therefore must conclude that the

trial court erred by ruling that Trujillo met the stranger criterion

and designating him an SVP on that basis.

¶ 28 Anticipating the possible infirmity of the trial court’s stranger

criterion findings, the Attorney General urges us to affirm Trujillo’s

SVP designation on the alternative grounds that Trujillo met the

relationship requirement by establishing a relationship with M.S.

primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization. We decline to

affirm on those grounds because the court didn’t consider the issue

or make findings that would support them. The court noted that

the assessment didn’t include findings about the “established” or

“promoted” relationship criteria, and it didn’t make its own findings

on the matter.

¶ 29 Accordingly, we remand the case for the court to make factual

findings on whether Trujillo meets the “established” or “promoted”

relationship criterion to be designated an SVP. See People v.

Gallegos, 2013 CO 45, ¶ 18 (“As an appellate court, we are not in

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the best position for original fact-finding.” (quoting People v.

Rodriguez, 786 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Colo. 1989))).

IV. Disposition

¶ 30 We affirm the judgment of conviction. We reverse the SVP

designation based on the “stranger” criterion and remand the case

for the trial court to make specific findings on whether Trujillo

established or promoted a relationship primarily for the purpose of

sexual victimization under section 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(III).

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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