Harp v. Abdulhakeem

25CA1001 Harp v Abdulhakeem 06-11-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1001
Arapahoe County District Court No. 22CV31730
Honorable Benjamin Figa, Judge
Honorable Ben L. Leutwyler III, Judge

Harp, L L C, a/k/a Harp, LLC, a Colorado Limited Liability Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

Welcome to Realty, LLC 401K PSP,

Defendant-Appellee,

v.

Noori Abdulhakeem,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Grove and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 11, 2026

Albert V. Evans, Centennial, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Hatch Ray Olsen Conant LLC, Christopher J. Conant, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee

Anderson Notarianni McMahon LLC, Kimberly A. Bruetsch, Denver, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 This case concerns a parcel of real property in Aurora, owned

by plaintiff, Harp, L L C (Harp), that was judicially foreclosed upon

and sold to defendant Welcome to Realty LLC 401K PSP (Welcome

to Realty) and later sold to defendant Noori Abdulhakeem. The trial

court concluded that it never had personal jurisdiction over Harp

because a different entity with a similar name had been served with

process instead. The court then unwound the foreclosure and

declared Welcome to Realty and Abdulhakeem’s interests in the

property void. In the aftermath of the voided foreclosure,

Abdulhakeem asserted a breach of the warranty of title claim

against Welcome to Realty and asserted claims for unjust

enrichment against both Harp and Welcome to Realty. The court

rejected those claims.

¶2 In this appeal, Abdulhakeem challenges the order voiding the

foreclosure judgment and sale, the determination that his and

Welcome to Realty’s interests were void, and the rejection of his

breach of warranty and unjust enrichment claims. We reject his

challenges and affirm the judgment. Additionally, Harp and

Welcome to Realty both request an award of attorney fees for this

appeal. We deny both requests.

1
I. Background

¶3 Saddle Rock Metropolitan District (Saddle Rock) filed a judicial

foreclosure action relating to the subject property in 2022, seeking

to enforce a lien for unpaid assessments, attorney fees, and costs.1

However, instead of serving Harp — an entity based in Aurora and

the owner of the property — Saddle Rock served HARP, LLC — an

unrelated entity based in Colorado Springs. After the time for filing

a responsive pleading had passed, the court entered a decree of

judicial foreclosure and authorized a sheriff’s sale of the property.

¶4 Welcome to Realty bought the property at auction for about

$9,600 and received a deed from the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s

Office. A few months later, Welcome to Realty entered into a

contract to sell the property to Abdulhakeem. Pursuant to the

terms of that contract, Abdulhakeem paid Welcome to Realty

$105,000, Welcome to Realty procured and paid for a $105,000 title

insurance policy in favor of Abdulhakeem, and Welcome to Realty

executed a special warranty deed for the property.

1 Saddle Rock was a party in the underlying case but is not a party

to this appeal.

2
¶5 Harp later learned of the foreclosure. It filed a motion to set

aside the judgment and sheriff’s sale under C.R.C.P. 60(b),

asserting that it was the true owner of the property and that it had

not been properly served. It also brought a separate case against

Welcome to Realty and Abdulhakeem to quiet title in the property.

Abdulhakeem brought a counterclaim against Harp for unjust

enrichment and brought cross-claims against Welcome to Realty for

breach of the warranty of title and unjust enrichment.

¶6 The trial court granted Harp’s Rule 60(b) motion and voided

the judgment and sale. It then consolidated the two cases. The

court later granted summary judgment in favor of Harp on its quiet

title claim, declaring Welcome to Realty and Abdulhakeem’s

interests void, and then granted summary judgment in favor of

Welcome to Realty on Abdulhakeem’s breach of warranty claim.

After a bench trial, the court rejected Abdulhakeem’s two unjust

enrichment claims. This appeal followed.

II. Challenge to Order Voiding Foreclosure

¶7 Abdulhakeem first challenges the trial court’s Rule 60(b) order

voiding the judgment authorizing foreclosure and the sheriff’s sale.

He points out that the entity that sought to unwind the

3
foreclosure — Harp, L L C (with spaces) — was delineated differently

than the entity named as the grantee on the original deed — Harp

LLC (without spaces).2 He also argues that under the secretary of

state’s naming conventions, the entity named as the grantee on the

deed — Harp LLC (with lowercase letters) — is indistinguishable

from the entity that was served in the foreclosure case — HARP,

LLC (with capital letters). Thus, he contends, Harp lacked standing

to challenge the foreclosure judgment, and the service of process on

HARP, LLC was proper.

¶8 We decline to consider these arguments, as Abdulhakeem

didn’t preserve them in the trial court. See Wisehart v. Zions

Bancorporation, 49 P.3d 1200, 1204 (Colo. App. 2002) (We “will not

consider arguments not presented to the trial court” in a civil case.).

Abdulhakeem points out that Saddle Rock made similar arguments

to the trial court, but he wasn’t a party to the foreclosure case at

the time Saddle Rock initially raised the arguments and the trial

court ruled on them. And while the quiet title case to which he was

2 There is also a difference in the use of commas, but Abdulhakeem

doesn’t argue that it has any legal significance.

4
a party was later consolidated with the foreclosure case, that didn’t

make him a party to the foreclosure case. See Nat’l Farmers Union

Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Frackelton, 650 P.2d 571, 572 (Colo. App. 1981)

(Consolidation of two lawsuits “do[es] not merge [them] into a single

cause ‘or make those who are parties in one suit parties in

another.’” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 662 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983).

Moreover, he never made any attempt to raise the arguments

himself; instead, all his arguments to the trial court accepted the

voided foreclosure as an undisputed fact and addressed only its

impact on the parties. Thus, we do not consider the arguments

preserved by Abdulhakeem. See United States v. Zapata, 546 F.3d

1179, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2008) (even where parties were aligned as

codefendants, the objection of one defendant didn’t preserve the

appellate rights of other defendants).

¶9 Nor do we view either of Abdulhakeem’s arguments as raising

a matter of standing, which, as he notes, a party may raise at any

time. See HealthONE v. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879, 891 n.5 (Colo.

2002). The crux of his so-called “standing” argument, which relates

to Harp’s ability to enforce the deed, doesn’t rest on whether Harp

suffered an injury in fact to a legally protected interest; plainly, it

5
did. See Sandstrom v. Solen, 2016 COA 29, ¶ 17 (setting forth the

requirements of standing). There wasn’t any dispute that Harp held

title to the property, and to the extent that it may not have been

properly identified in the deed, Abdulhakeem acknowledges that it

had remedies available to it to correct the issue. As the owner of

the property, Harp had standing to challenge the foreclosure of its

property interest. See id. at ¶ 18.

¶ 10 Abdulhakeem’s argument doesn’t challenge any of that.

Instead, it rests on the legal differences between Harp, L L C (as

identified in the pleadings in this case), and Harp LLC (as identified

on the deed), which we construe as matters relating to corporate

designations and application of the secretary of state’s naming

conventions, rather than matters of standing. While those

arguments may have impacted Harp’s ability to challenge the

service of process and obtain relief without modifying the deed, they

didn’t actually call into question Harp’s ownership of the property.

6
¶ 11 Thus, we decline to consider the merits of Abdulhakeem’s

arguments challenging the Rule 60(b) order.3

III. Recording Act Protection

¶ 12 Abdulhakeem also challenges the trial court’s entry of

summary judgment in favor of Harp on its quiet title claim. He

contends that the court erred in concluding that, because the

foreclosure judgment and sheriff’s deed conveying the property to

Welcome to Realty were void, Welcome to Realty and Abdulhakeem

were not bona fide purchasers whose interests were protected by

Colorado’s recording act. He argues that the judgment and deed

were voidable, rather than void, and thus could convey good title to

a bona fide purchaser. We disagree.

¶ 13 We review de novo an order granting summary judgment.

Univ. of Denv.er v. Doe, 2024 CO 27, ¶ 7. Summary judgment is

appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id.

3 Because we decline to consider these arguments on the merits, we

need not address Harp’s response that Abdulhakeem lacks standing
to raise the arguments.

7
¶ 14 “[A] judgment entered against a defendant without valid

service of process violates due process of law and is void.” Namaste

Judgment Enf’t, LLC v. King, 2020 COA 43, ¶ 18; see also Goodman

Assocs., LLC v. WP Mountain Props., LLC, 222 P.3d 310, 315 (Colo.

2010) (“[A] default judgment entered by a court without personal

jurisdiction over the defendant, e.g., due to an invalid service of

process, is a nullity and without effect.”).

¶ 15 Further, a sheriff’s deed that results from a void judgment is

itself void. See C & C Invs., LP v. Hummel, 2022 COA 42, ¶ 39 (“[I]f

the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the judgment and resulting

sheriff’s deed must be set aside.”). And “a void deed cannot pass

title.” Upson v. Goodland State Bank & Tr. Co., 823 P.2d 704, 705

(Colo. 1992); see also Delsas v. Centex Home Equity Co., 186 P.3d

141, 144 (Colo. App. 2008) (“A void deed is a nullity, invalid ab

initio, or from the beginning, for any purpose. It does not, and

cannot, convey title, even if recorded.”).

¶ 16 Colorado’s recording act, § 38-35-109, C.R.S. 2025, is a race-

notice statute. The statute protects bona fide purchasers who buy

property without notice of any claimed interests in the property.

Guar. Bank & Tr. Co. v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 111 P.3d 521, 523

8
(Colo. App. 2004). However, “[t]he interest of a good faith purchaser

under a void deed is not protected.” Delsas, 186 P.3d at 144; see

also Weber v. Williams, 324 P.2d 365, 369 (Colo. 1958) (“[A]

judgment rendered without service . . . is . . . void, and . . . all sales,

or other proceedings had thereunder, are, as to all persons,

irrespective of notice or bona fides, absolute nullities.” (quoting

Great W. Mining Co. v. Woodmas of Alston Mining Co., 20 P. 771,

775 (Colo. 1888)).

¶ 17 Based on the trial court’s determination that it lacked

personal jurisdiction over Harp due to improper service of process,

the court correctly concluded that the judgment and the deed

resulting from the sheriff’s sale were void, and not merely voidable.

See Namaste, ¶ 18; Goodman Assocs., 222 P.3d at 315; C & C Invs.,

¶ 39. Accordingly, regardless of whether Welcome to Realty or

Abdulhakeem otherwise might have been considered bona fide

purchasers, their interests were not protected by the recording act.

See Delsas, 186 P.3d at 144; Weber, 324 P.2d at 369.

¶ 18 We reject Abdulhakeem’s contrary arguments. To the extent

that he reprises his argument challenging the trial court’s Rule

60(b) ruling on the validity of the service of process, we decline to

9
consider it for the same reasons explained above. He also argues

that nothing on the face of the sheriff’s deed suggested there was

any defect and, thus, that he should’ve been able to safely rely on

that deed. We acknowledge that he was in the unfortunate position

of bearing the loss when the foreclosure and sheriff’s sale were

unwound. But, as we’ve explained, the law protects property

owners who aren’t properly notified of foreclosure proceedings. See

Namaste, ¶ 18; Goodman Assocs., 222 P.3d at 315. And once the

trial court determined that Harp was the owner and hadn’t been

properly served in the foreclosure case, it had no choice but to

unwind the foreclosure and invalidate the sheriff’s deed and any

later deeds based on it. See C & C Invs., ¶ 39; Upson, 823 P.2d at

705; Delsas, 186 P.3d at 144; Weber, 324 P.2d at 369.

IV. Breach of the Warranty of Title

¶ 19 Next, Abdulhakeem challenges the trial court’s entry of

summary judgment in favor of Welcome to Realty on his claim for

breach of the warranty of title. He contends that the court erred

when it concluded that the special warranty deed Welcome to Realty

conveyed to him didn’t warrant against the defect caused by the

voided foreclosure. Again, we disagree.

10
¶ 20 As before, we review de novo an order granting summary

judgment, and summary judgment is appropriate if there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law. Univ. of Denv., ¶ 7.

¶ 21 In Colorado, a grantor may convey property via various types

of deeds, each of which provides different protections to the parties.

See § 38-30-113, C.R.S. 2025. For example, under a general

warranty deed, a grantor guarantees that they are “vested of [the]

estate in fee simple with full power to convey, that the property is

free of all encumbrances except as listed in the deed, and that the

grantor will guarantee title and peaceful possession and will defend

the grantee’s title to the property.” Ford v. Summertree Lane Ltd.

Liab. Co., 56 P.3d 1206, 1209 (Colo. App. 2002) (quoting O’Brien v.

Vill. Land Co., 794 P.2d 246, 251 (Colo. 1990)). As to the guarantee

to defend title to the property, “the grantor [warrants that it] will

defend the title to the property against all persons who may claim

the title.” § 38-30-113(4)(a)(III)(A).

¶ 22 In contrast, “[a] special warranty deed covenants against

defects in title [that] arise by, through, or under the actions of the

grantor. Under this limited warranty, the grantor is not liable for

11
defects based on events [that] occurred while the property was in

the hands of a prior title holder.” Colo. Land & Res., Inc. v.

Credithrift of Am., Inc., 778 P.2d 320, 323 (Colo. App. 1989). Thus,

the guarantee to defend title to the property extends “only as

against any persons claiming to hold title by, or through, the

grantor.” § 38-30-113(4)(a)(III)(B).

¶ 23 Welcome to Realty’s purported conveyance of the property to

Abdulhakeem was via a special warranty deed. Thus, Welcome to

Realty was only liable for any defects based on events that occurred

while it was the purported title holder. See Colo. Land & Res., 778

P.2d at 323. But, as the trial court correctly concluded, the defect

at issue — the failure to serve Harp in the foreclosure case —

preceded Welcome to Realty’s claimed interest in the property.

Because the foreclosure judgment and the resulting sheriff’s deed

were void, Welcome to Realty never held legal title to the property.

See Namaste, ¶ 18; Goodman Assocs., 222 P.3d at 315; C & C Invs.,

¶ 39. And because Welcome to Realty never held legal title, no

defect occurred while the property was in its hands such that it

could be held liable under the special warranty deed. See Colo.

Land & Res., 778 P.2d at 323.

12
¶ 24 Abdulhakeem nonetheless argues that Welcome to Realty

breached the covenant of seisin — that is, the promise that it owned

and had the right to possession of the property. See Bernklau v.

Stevens, 371 P.2d 765, 768 (Colo. 1962). He cites section 38-30-

113(4)(a), which provides that general and special warranty deeds

both include various covenants, including that the grantor has a fee

simple estate and has the right to convey it. He also cites section

38-30-113(3), which provides that the form of deed used doesn’t

affect “the absolute nature of the fee simple conveyance of the

property being conveyed”; in other words, it’s not a “lesser estate or

interest” simply because of the warranty language in the deed.

¶ 25 But as the Supreme Court of Texas explained in rejecting a

similar argument, even if a deed contains a covenant of seisin, the

limiting language in a special warranty deed “disclaims [the

grantor’s] liability for the alleged breach of that covenant.” Chi. Title

Ins. Co. v. Cochran Invs., Inc., 602 S.W.3d 895, 901 (Tex. 2020). In

Texas, as in Colorado, the use of a special warranty deed “[does] not

affect the scope of [a] conveyance” but “[does] affect [the grantor’s]

liability for defects in its title” by “limit[ing] the scope of th[e]

indemnity obligation to losses or injuries sustained by a failure or

13
defect in the grantor’s title arising by, through, or under the

grantor.” Id. at 903. Applying that limitation in circumstances

essentially identical to those here, where the grantor purchased

property at a foreclosure sale and conveyed it to the grantee by

special warranty deed before the foreclosure was voided, the court

in Chicago Title held that the special warranty deed “limit[ed] the

scope of [the grantor’s] liability for a failure of title — including in

the form of a breach of the covenant of seisin.” Id. at 904. Thus,

the court held, the grantor was not liable to the grantee for breach

of the covenant of seisin. Id. at 906.

¶ 26 The same result applies under Colorado law. Although under

section 38-30-113(4)(a), the special warranty deed in this case

contained the covenant of seisin, it limited Welcome to Realty’s

liability for any breach of that covenant to claims arising during

Welcome to Realty’s purported ownership of the property. As one

commentator put it, “A Colorado special warranty deed includes the

same . . . statutory warranties as a general warranty deed; however,

the warranty against encumbrances is limited to claims made by or

through the grantor.” Eben P. Clark, Which Deed Should I Use?, 48

Colo. Law. 34, 36 (Jan. 2019). Thus, “[t]here is no warranty against

14
claims made by or through prior owners or others.” Id. And

because the claim at issue in this case was raised by a prior owner,

it didn’t fall within the scope of the warranty.

¶ 27 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court didn’t err by

rejecting Abdulhakeem’s breach of the warranty of title claim.

V. Unjust Enrichment

¶ 28 Abdulhakeem also challenges the trial court’s rejection of his

unjust enrichment claim against Welcome to Realty. We discern no

error.4

¶ 29 Unjust enrichment claims require trial courts to “make

extensive factual findings to determine whether a party has been

unjustly enriched.” Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Colo.

2008). As a result, when a court bases its unjust enrichment ruling

on facts developed at trial, we “afford[] deference to the trial court’s

discretion” and review its ruling for an abuse of discretion. Redd

Iron, Inc. v. Int’l Sales & Servs. Corp., 200 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Colo.

4 Abdulhakeem doesn’t develop any argument challenging the trial

court’s rejection of his unjust enrichment claim against Harp. We
therefore don’t consider that claim. See Galiant Homes, LLC v.
Herlik, 2025 COA 3, ¶ 14.

15
App. 2008). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when it

misconstrues or misapplies the law. Castillo v. Stem Sch. Highlands

Ranch, 2025 COA 88, ¶ 24.

¶ 30 Unjust enrichment is “a judicially-created remedy designed to

undo the benefit to one party that comes at the unfair detriment of

another.” Lewis, 189 P.3d at 1141. To prevail on a claim for unjust

enrichment, a plaintiff must prove three things: (1) the defendant

received a benefit; (2) the benefit was at the plaintiff’s expense; and

(3) the circumstances make it unjust for the defendant to retain the

benefit without compensating the plaintiff. Id.

¶ 31 As to the third element, “[t]he notion of what is or is not

‘unjust’ is an inherently malleable . . . standard.” DCB Constr. Co.

v. Cent. City Dev. Co., 965 P.2d 115, 120 (Colo. 1998). To determine

whether the circumstances are unjust, our supreme court has

identified fact-specific tests that apply in some particular

situations. See, e.g., Lewis, 189 P.3d at 1142-43 (outlining a test

for analyzing the third factor in cases involving failed gifts or failed

contracts between close family members or confidants); DCB

Constr., 965 P.2d at 122-23 (outlining a test for analyzing the third

16
factor when a tenant’s contractor seeks to recover from a landlord).

Outside of these situations, “[i]n the absence of a particularized

test,” courts “should analyze the intentions, expectations, and

behavior of the parties to determine when retention of the benefit

becomes unjust.” Hannon L. Firm, LLC v. Melat, Pressman & Higbie,

LLP, 293 P.3d 55, 59 (Colo. App. 2011), aff’d, 2012 CO 61.

¶ 32 The trial court correctly applied this test in assessing

Abdulhakeem’s unjust enrichment claim.5 As to the first two

elements, the trial court found that Welcome to Realty received a

benefit (the net proceeds it retained from its sale of the property to

Abdulhakeem for more than it had paid at the foreclosure sale) and

that the benefit was at Abdulhakeem’s expense (as Abdulhakeem

paid the purchase price but didn’t obtain valid title in the sale).

Abdulhakeem doesn’t challenge these findings.

5 The trial court determined that Abdulhakeem could bring his

unjust enrichment claim, notwithstanding the existence of an
express contract between the parties, because the essential purpose
of the contract had failed. See Gravina Siding & Windows Co. v.
Gravina, 2022 COA 50, ¶¶ 35, 38. Because we are affirming the
trial court’s rejection of the claim due to Abdulhakeem’s failure to
establish the three required elements, we don’t consider this issue.

17
¶ 33 However, as to the third element, the trial court found that

Abdulhakeem hadn’t established that it would be unjust for

Welcome to Realty to retain the benefit it received.

¶ 34 In evaluating this element, the court considered evidence of

the title insurance policy. Abdulhakeem asserts that, by doing so,

the court violated the collateral source rule. We’re not persuaded.

¶ 35 “Under Colorado’s common law collateral source rule,

‘[c]ompensation or indemnity received by an injured party from a

collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer and to which

[the wrongdoer] has not contributed, will not diminish the damages

otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer.’” Ronquillo v. EcoClean

Home Servs., Inc., 2021 CO 82, ¶ 13 (emphasis added) (alteration in

original) (quoting Colo. Permanente Med. Grp., P.C. v. Evans, 926

P.2d 1218, 1230 (Colo. 1996)). “The policy underlying this rule [i]s

that a tortfeasor should not benefit, in the form of reduced damages

liability, from an injured party’s receipt of collateral source

benefits.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, 2012 CO 31, ¶ 10.

“In other words, because it is solely the tortfeasor’s responsibility to

make the injured plaintiff whole, any benefits or gifts obtained from

third-party ‘collateral’ sources accrue solely to the benefit of the

18
injured plaintiff and are irrelevant in fixing the amount of the

tortfeasor’s liability.” Ronquillo, ¶ 13.6

¶ 36 The trial court correctly determined that the title insurance

policy was not “wholly independent of” Welcome to Realty, as

Welcome to Realty “contributed” to the policy by procuring and

paying for it in order to mitigate the risk of a defect in title. Id. at

¶ 11. Thus, the policy was not a collateral source that the court

was barred from considering. See id.; see also Haueter v. Peguillan,

586 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1978) (when sellers of real property

procured a title insurance policy for the buyer, that same policy was

reissued to the buyer’s assignee, and the assignee suffered a loss

covered by the policy, the sellers were not “so isolated from the

insurance relationship as to bring the collateral source doctrine into

play”). Instead, the court ruled, within its discretion, that

“[b]ecause Welcome to Realty paid the title insurance policy

6 Abdulhakeem doesn’t claim any violation of the post-verdict

collateral source rule codified in section 13-21-111.6, C.R.S. 2025.
Nor could he, as that statute only addresses the set-off of a damage
award based on amounts received from collateral sources. His
argument relates instead to the common law rule concerning pre-
verdict consideration of evidence of collateral sources.

19
premium . . . and the policy specifically indemnifies Abdulhakeem

for the damages he alleges,” the policy is “a circumstance that bears

on the unjust enrichment claim.”

¶ 37 The court then found that through their contract (which

required Welcome to Realty to convey the property by special

warranty deed and to purchase a title insurance policy) and the

special warranty deed (which warranted title only against claims

arising during Welcome to Realty’s purported ownership), the

parties “clearly and unambiguously shifted the risk of a defective

title from Welcome to Realty to Mr. Abdulhakeem.” Thus, the court

found, “the parties bargained for the very risk [they] are litigating

now (i.e., that the seller’s title might prove defective due to events

occurring before Welcome to Realty retained ownership of the

[s]ubject [p]roperty).” The court also added that Abdulhakeem

could “potentially be made whole through a title insurance claim,”

which he hadn’t pursued but which might enable him to recover the

$105,000 he’d paid for the property. In other words, according to

the court, “[t]he parties expressly negotiated the risk of a title defect

and Welcome to Realty provided a means of indemnification for that

risk.” The court therefore expressed that it “[could ]not find that

20
Welcome to Realty’s retention of the proceeds from the sale [wa]s

unjust under the circumstances.”

¶ 38 We conclude that the trial court’s findings are supported by

the record. Abdulhakeem takes issue with the court’s finding that

he hadn’t filed a claim against the title insurance policy. But he

acknowledged as much through his testimony at trial:

Q. [D]id you made [sic] a claim under your
title insurance policy to Land Title?

A. No, I didn’t make anything. I just told
them that there is an issue, what’s going
on, check that for me. And they said we
will take the [sic] care of what’s going on.

....

Q. Have you asked the title insurance
company to pay you the $105,000 of your
coverage protection under your title
insurance policy?

A. No, I was asking them that I want them
to get the land back to me.

Q. Has the title insurance company ever
denied you a request to pay you the
$105,000?

A. I didn’t request that, so no.

Q. Okay. Do you think you could request
that here today?

21
A. Not today maybe. Let me see what will
happen at this trial.

¶ 39 We also conclude that the trial court’s decision that Welcome

to Realty would not be unjustly enriched in keeping the sale

proceeds was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. See

Redd Iron, 200 P.3d at 1136; Castillo, ¶ 24. The court carefully

weighed the parties’ respective circumstances and made detailed

findings regarding the equities in this case. We therefore decline to

disturb its judgment rejecting Abdulhakeem’s unjust enrichment

claim against Welcome to Realty.

VI. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 40 Finally, we consider — and reject — both appellees’ requests

to recover attorney fees for this appeal.

¶ 41 Harp seeks appellate attorney fees under section 13-17-102,

C.R.S. 2025, arguing that Abdulhakeem’s appeal lacks substantial

justification. We cannot conclude, however, that the appeal is so

lacking in substantial justification as to warrant an award of

attorney fees. See W. United Realty, Inc. v. Isaacs, 679 P.2d 1063,

1069-70 (Colo. 1984) (a claim is not considered frivolous merely

because it ultimately proves unsuccessful). Nor did Harp explain in

22
its briefing why or how the appeal lacked substantial justification.

See C.A.R. 39.1 (requiring the principal brief of a party seeking

appellate attorney fees to “explain the legal and factual basis for an

award of attorney fees”); Sos v. Roaring Fork Transp. Auth., 2017

COA 142, ¶ 59 (rejecting an “undeveloped request” for appellate

attorney fees). We therefore reject Harp’s request for fees.

¶ 42 Welcome to Realty seeks appellate attorney fees under the

terms of its contract with Abdulhakeem. But other than stating

that the contract provides for an award of attorney fees to the

prevailing party in “any . . . litigation relating to th[e] [c]ontract,” it

didn’t develop its argument for fees. See C.A.R. 39; Sos, ¶ 59. For

instance, Welcome to Realty didn’t explain how this appeal “relate[d]

to” the parties’ contract. It also didn’t explain why fees under the

contract were warranted in light of the trial court’s finding that the

contract had failed. We therefore reject Welcome to Realty’s request

for fees.

¶ 43 To the extent that appellees seek recovery of their appellate

costs, however, those are available under C.A.R. 39(a)(2).

VII. Disposition

¶ 44 The judgment is affirmed.

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JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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