Peo v. Ramirez

24CA0134 Peo v Ramirez 05-14-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0134
Jefferson County District Court No. 23CR96
Honorable Randall C. Arp, Judge
Honorable Jeffrey R. Pilkington, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Simon Alfredo Ramirez,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Dunn and Harris, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 14, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Eric A. Samler, Alternate Defense Counsel , Hollis A. Whitson, Alternate
Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Simon Alfredo Ramirez, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of three

counts of attempted first degree murder and two counts of second

degree assault. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Joshua Gonzales, Jeremiah Lesperance, and Teiara Landon

were walking near a Regional Transportation District (RTD) light rail

station in Lakewood when they got into an argument with an

unknown man (alleged shooter). Gonzales said that he and the

alleged shooter exchanged threats, which included the alleged

shooter showing that he had a gun and Gonzales acting like he had

a gun as well.

¶3 The alleged shooter was accompanied by a friend who tried to

get the alleged shooter to walk away from the situation. Similarly,

Landon and Lesperance tried to deescalate the situation and

convinced Gonzales to leave. Shortly after Landon, Lesperance, and

Gonzales began walking away, the alleged shooter fired his gun at

them, hitting Gonzales and Lesperance. The alleged shooter fled

the scene, and Lesperance ran to seek help.

1
¶4 To identify the alleged shooter, Detective Sarah Poellot

obtained video from the city’s traffic camera system and RTD’s

camera system. Detective Poellot was able to see the shooting on

the RTD videos and then, in combination with video from traffic

cameras, track the alleged shooter’s movements before and after the

shooting. The alleged shooter appeared to be at a motel before and

after the shooting, so, a few days after the shooting, Detective

Poellot went to the motel and obtained video recordings from its

security cameras.

¶5 Detective Poellot said that on the night of the shooting, the

alleged shooter appeared to leave from and return to a room in

which a known resident and employee of the motel — Regina

Benavidez — lived. A few weeks later, Detective Poellot spoke with

Benavidez about the man they had seen in the videos leaving her

room before the shooting and returning after. Benavidez identified

Ramirez as that man.

2
¶6 The prosecution charged Ramirez with, among other things,

three counts of attempted first degree murder and two counts of

second degree assault.1

¶7 The case proceeded to a jury trial, after which the jury found

Ramirez guilty as charged. Ramirez now appeals and argues the

trial court denied him a fair trial because the court (1) “assumed

the role of [an] advocate and violated [his] right to an impartial

judge” by instructing the prosecutor on how to authenticate the

motel and RTD videos; (2) abused its discretion by admitting into

evidence the motel videos; and (3) denied his request for substitute

counsel.

¶8 For the reasons discussed below, we disagree and therefore

affirm the judgment.

II. Ramirez Hasn’t Demonstrated That the Court Was Biased

A. Additional Background

¶9 During the trial, defense counsel objected to the admission of

the RTD and motel videos based on a lack of authentication. The

prosecutor sought to authenticate those videos through the

1 The prosecution also charged Ramirez with three counts of

menacing but later dismissed those charges before trial.

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testimony of Detective Poellot. After hearing arguments from the

prosecutor and defense counsel, the court admitted the motel

videos and contingently admitted the RTD videos subject to

testimony from a different witness that could verify the accuracy of

the videos.

¶ 10 Detective Poellot testified that a traffic camera faced the front

portion of the motel. She collected videos from the motel’s security

system, which she said she was very familiar with because she had

previously collected videos from that system multiple times. The

detective said that the traffic camera videos corroborated what she

saw on the motel videos regarding the movement of people the night

of the shooting but that the motel videos provided more detail

because the motel cameras were closer.

¶ 11 When the prosecutor sought to admit the motel videos based

on Detective Poellot’s testimony, defense counsel objected because

Detective Poellot wasn’t present and didn’t view any of the videos at

the time they were recorded. Defense counsel also argued that the

prosecution didn’t attempt to have Benavidez or any of the other

individuals seen on the motel videos testify to authenticate the

videos.

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¶ 12 Noting that “the burden to authenticate evidence is not high,”

the prosecutor argued that the traffic camera videos, which the

court had already admitted into evidence,2 showed the alleged

shooter “in all corners of the [motel]” and corresponded with the

motel videos.

¶ 13 The court then had the following exchange with the

prosecutor:

The Court: [Prosecutor], can you explain to me
why I don’t have somebody from the [motel]
testifying to the accuracy of their recording
system and the scenes depicted in this
video . . . and/or, I guess most importantly,
why none of the witnesses who testified
yesterday[3] were asked to review the video[s] of
the incident and identify the individuals and
the accuracy of th[e] video[s]?

Why are we trying to back door these videos
when witnesses in this case were available to
authenticate or provide further authentication
for these videos . . . . Why have I not — and
why am I not going to receive any of that
information?

Prosecutor: Your Honor, in regards to this
video system, particularly the [motel], I think
Detective Poellot is probably as familiar with

2 Ramirez doesn’t challenge the court’s ruling that there was

sufficient foundation to admit those videos.
3 The prior day’s witnesses included the three victims and

Benavidez.

5
this system as the people that work at that
motel given how many times she’s downloaded
from it and that she can verify its reliability.

¶ 14 Persuaded that the traffic camera system corroborated the

accuracy of what was depicted in the motel videos, the court

admitted the videos and ruled that any questions regarding their

authenticity impacted the weight the jury afforded them, not their

admissibility.

¶ 15 Turning to the RTD videos, defense counsel objected to the

court admitting them through Detective Poellot’s testimony because

she didn’t download them and there was no “duplicative” video from

the traffic camera system demonstrating their reliability.

¶ 16 The court asked the prosecutor which witness was going to

testify that the RTD videos accurately and fairly depicted what they

purported to show. The prosecutor said that there had been

extensive testimony from Landon and others that corroborated the

RTD videos. The court pressed the prosecutor regarding why she

hadn’t called certain witnesses to authenticate the RTD videos. The

court said,

[T]he normal process is one of the victims
reviews the videos, and then on the stand
says, yep, those videos accurately and fairly

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depict what happened on the night in
question.

....

I don’t have that corroboration regarding those
RTD videos. Why don’t I have somebody from
RTD here to tell this jury, this is our system,
this is what it shows, it’s accurate, this is what
I downloaded? Why aren’t they here? This is
an attempted murder case.

¶ 17 The prosecutor said it was probably “best practice” to have a

person from RTD or one of the victims provide testimony for

authentication purposes but argued that the court had already

received into evidence “numerous corroborative details” of the

events depicted in the RTD videos. The court then said to the

prosecutor,

[I]t’s not even just the preferred way. It is the
standard and accepted way to admit videos, is
to have somebody testify as I indicated[.] [S]o
I’m not happy with the way this is going[,] and
I’ll decide whether I’m going to admit [the RTD
videos] when I hear the testimony[,] and I hear
the objection by [defense counsel]. But it’s not
the way it’s supposed to be done.

¶ 18 The court conditioned the admission of the RTD videos upon

the prosecution’s ability to produce a witness who could

authenticate them and said it would declare a mistrial if the

prosecution couldn’t get the RTD videos admitted. The court later

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allowed the prosecution to recall Landon who then verified the

accuracy of the RTD videos.

B. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 19 A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to have an

impartial court at all stages of the proceedings. See Sanders v.

People, 2024 CO 33, ¶¶ 27-28. While a trial court has a duty to

maintain an impartial forum, it also has wide discretion in

conducting a trial, including with respect to the order and

presentation of evidence. People v. Hall, 2021 CO 71M, ¶ 16; see

also CRE 611(a) (requiring a trial court to “exercise reasonable

control over the mode and order of . . . presenting evidence” to

make the “presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth”

and to maximize time efficiency).

¶ 20 But when a trial court exercises its discretion over the mode

and order of evidence presentation, it must ensure it doesn’t

become an advocate. See People v. Adler, 629 P.2d 569, 573 (Colo.

1981); Hall, ¶ 39 (holding that the trial court didn’t abuse its

discretion when it requested argument from both sides regarding

properly admitted evidence during a bench trial); see also People v.

Martinez, 523 P.2d 120, 121 (Colo. 1974) (concluding that the trial

8
court acted as an advocate rather than a neutral arbiter when it

took on an active role in the prosecution’s case by calling witnesses,

presenting evidence, and cross-examining defense witnesses).

¶ 21 Because Ramirez asserts that the court acted as an advocate

by instructing the prosecution on how to admit certain video

exhibits, we review the court’s actions for an abuse of discretion.

See Hall, ¶ 16. A court abuses its discretion when it acts in a

manner that is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or

based on an erroneous understanding or application of the law.

People v. McFee, 2016 COA 97, ¶ 17. And when a defendant alleges

that a trial court is biased, “they must demonstrate ‘more than

mere speculation concerning the possibility of prejudice.’” Hall,

¶ 17 (quoting People v. Coria, 937 P.2d 386, 391 (Colo. 1997)). The

defendant must demonstrate that “the trial [court]’s conduct so

departed from the required impartiality as to deny [him] a fair trial.”

Adler, 629 P.2d at 573.

C. Analysis

¶ 22 Ramirez argues that the trial court assumed the role of an

advocate and violated his right to an impartial tribunal and fair trial

by instructing the prosecutor on how to authenticate the motel and

9
RTD videos, rather than sustaining defense counsel’s objections.

We disagree for two reasons.

¶ 23 First, we’re unpersuaded by Ramirez’s reliance on Martinez

and People v. Hrapski, 718 P.2d 1050 (Colo. 1986), to support his

argument that the court abandoned its role as a neutral arbiter and

became an advocate. In Martinez, the prosecutor failed to appear at

a suppression hearing, so the court took it upon itself to act as the

prosecutor by, among other things, calling and questioning

witnesses, which included cross-examining defense witnesses. 523

P.2d at 121. And in Hrapski, the trial court dismissed habitual

criminal counts against the defendant after it sua sponte reviewed

prior plea transcripts and determined that the defendant didn’t

enter the pleas knowingly or voluntarily. 718 P.2d at 1054.

¶ 24 We disagree with Ramirez that the court’s actions here rose to

the level of partiality demonstrated by the trial courts in Martinez

and Hrapski. Instead, the court engaged in an extended

conversation with both the prosecutor and defense counsel about

what it considered to be the “standard” way to authenticate video

evidence. Yet the court only admitted the motel videos after it

determined they were sufficiently corroborated by the traffic camera

10
videos. This belies Ramirez’s conclusory assertion that the court

“laid out for the prosecutor step by step instructions on how to lay

foundation for the videos” that the prosecution then followed to

admit the motel videos.

¶ 25 Viewing the record as a whole, and despite the court’s

apparent preference for how the motel videos should be

authenticated, we conclude the court didn’t abandon its role as a

neutral arbiter: It considered both parties’ positions regarding the

evidence necessary to support authentication and assessed whether

there already was sufficient evidence in the record to authenticate

the motel videos before it ultimately admitted them.

¶ 26 Moreover, all of the court’s comments about the proper way to

authenticate the videos were made outside the presence of the jury.

And although the court foreshadowed the potential consequence to

the prosecution’s case if it were unable to authenticate the RTD

videos, the court neither advocated for nor against their admission.

See People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82, ¶¶ 98-99 (a trial court’s

comments, made outside the presence of the jury, about the

admissibility of challenged evidence weren’t improper where they

neither advocated for nor against the admission of the evidence).

11
¶ 27 Likewise, despite the court noting that witnesses who had

previously testified could’ve authenticated the RTD videos, it didn’t

direct the prosecution to call Landon or any other particular

witnesses to authenticate them. See id. Rather, the court exercised

its discretion to allow the prosecutor to recall Landon to

authenticate the RTD videos. See Hall, ¶ 16; CRE 611(a). Given

that defense counsel had vigorously cross-examined Landon during

her prior testimony, the court had partially sustained defense

counsel’s objection to the admission of the RTD videos pending

further evidence, and the court gave defense counsel the

opportunity to further question Landon when she was recalled to

authenticate the RTD videos,4 we discern no abuse of the court’s

discretion.

¶ 28 Second, Ramirez hasn’t asserted — let alone demonstrated —

that the trial court was biased against him. See Hall, ¶ 17. Rather,

as already noted, his argument is focused on the court’s exchange

with the prosecutor regarding authentication. Viewing the record

as a whole, we can’t otherwise conclude that the court was biased

4 Ramirez’s defense counsel didn’t ask Landon any additional

questions.

12
against him or that the “[court’s] conduct so departed from the

required impartiality as to deny [him] a fair trial.” Adler, 629 P.2d

at 573; People v. Jennings, 2021 COA 112, ¶ 28 (“The record must

establish such bias clearly; mere speculative statements and

conclusions are not enough.”).

¶ 29 Accordingly, we reject Ramirez’s contention that he was denied

a fair trial because the court was impartial and biased against him.

III. The Court Didn’t Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting the Motel
Videos

A. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 30 CRE 901(a) governs the foundational requirements for

authenticating a video recording. See People v. Abad, 2021 COA 6,

¶ 50; see also Gonzales v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 27 (holding that,

before a “recording may be admitted into evidence, it must be

authenticated”). “The requirement of authentication or

identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied

by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in

question is what its proponent claims.” CRE 901(a). However,

“[t]he burden to authenticate ‘is not high — only a prima facie

showing is required.’” Gonzales,¶ 27 (quoting People v. Glover, 2015

13
COA 16, ¶ 13). CRE 901(b) provides a nonexhaustive list of ten

ways a proponent may authenticate evidence in conformity with the

requirements of the rule.

¶ 31 Furthermore, CRE 104(a) grants the trial court wide discretion

as the evidentiary gatekeeper. See CRE 104(a) (explaining that the

court determines foundational questions related to the admissibility

of evidence). It is then the jury’s role as the fact finder to determine

whether a video is authentic. See Gonzales, ¶¶ 6, 27, 42; see also

Glover, ¶ 13 (“[A] ‘district court’s role is to serve as gatekeeper in

assessing whether the proponent has offered a satisfactory

foundation from which the jury could reasonably find that the

evidence is authentic.’” (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d

104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014))).

¶ 32 Thus, in Gonzales, ¶ 39, the supreme court rejected a “rigid

formula for authentication” because it doesn’t “comport with the

more liberal requirements of the modern rules of evidence.” at.

Instead, the Gonzales court adopted a flexible approach, holding

that

when offering a . . . recording into evidence,
the proponent need only provide evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the . . .

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recording is what he or she claims it to be.
CRE 901(a). Testimony establishing the
recording’s accuracy or the reliability of the
recording process, while relevant in some
circumstances, is unnecessary in the ordinary
course to authenticate a . . . recording under
CRE 901.

Id. at ¶ 43.

¶ 33 We review a court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Id. at ¶ 25.

B. Analysis

¶ 34 Ramirez argues that the court erred by admitting the motel

videos5 because no one (1) testified about the accuracy of the

videos; (2) who was in the videos testified; and (3) from the motel

testified regarding the reliability or functionality of the motel’s

recording system. We reject his arguments for three reasons.

¶ 35 First, we disagree that “no one testified about the accuracy of

the videos” because Detective Poellot did. She confirmed that the

motel videos were “fair and accurate representations of what was

going on at that time,” which was based in part on her knowledge

5 Although defense counsel objected to the admission of both the

motel and RTD videos based on a lack of authentication, Ramirez
challenges only the court’s admission of the motel videos on appeal.

15
from downloading and reviewing the traffic camera videos that

showed the front of the motel.

¶ 36 Second, CRE 901 doesn’t require that someone from a video

testify to authenticate the video; rather, the prosecution needed

only to provide evidence sufficient for the court to find that the

videos were what they claimed to be. See Gonzales, ¶¶ 27, 43; see

also Abad, ¶ 50 (applying the holding in Gonzales to videos).

Ramirez’s proposed construction of CRE 901 directly contradicts

the supreme court’s adoption of a flexible approach. See Gonzales,

¶ 43.

¶ 37 Third, while it’s true that no one from the motel testified about

the accuracy, reliability, or functionality of its security system, such

testimony wasn’t required. See id. at ¶ 38 (overruling People v.

Baca, 2015 COA 153, ¶ 30, which required testimony from a

witness to verify the reliability of the recording process if there

wasn’t testimony from a witness with personal knowledge of the

content of a recording). And in any event, Detective Poellot testified

about the accuracy of the motel’s security system based on her

prior familiarity with it. Her testimony was sufficient to support the

court’s finding that the motel videos were what the prosecution

16
claimed them to be — videos from the motel’s premises before and

after the shooting — for admissibility purposes. See id. at ¶ 6.

Thus, we can’t conclude that the court abused its discretion when it

determined that the prosecution properly authenticated the motel

videos through Detective Poellot’s testimony. The ultimate

determination of whether the motel videos were authentic rested

with the jury. See id. at ¶ 42; Glover, ¶ 13.

IV. The Court Didn’t Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied
Ramirez’s Request for Substitute Counsel

A. Additional Background

¶ 38 A few months before trial, Ramirez indicated he wanted a new

attorney and filed a “Motion to Dismiss Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel.” After a Bergerud6 hearing, the court denied Ramirez’s

request for a new court-appointed attorney.

¶ 39 At the Bergerud hearing, Ramirez stated he wanted substitute

counsel because (1) his case had “been looked at wrong”; (2) he

wanted defense counsel to explore a self-defense theory, but

6 A court holds a Bergerud hearing when a defendant objects to

court-appointed counsel without providing a sufficiently detailed
motion on which the court can base its decision whether to appoint
substitute counsel. See People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 694-95
(Colo. 2010).

17
counsel didn’t; and (3) his Webex meetings with counsel were

overheard by others.

¶ 40 Defense counsel told the court that he was “concerned about a

communication breakdown” and that Ramirez didn’t trust him but

that there wasn’t a conflict. Counsel said Ramirez cut most of their

communications short. Counsel also said that Ramirez “alluded,

multiple times, that there’s more going on in the situation,” but that

Ramirez hadn’t provided him the information he was alluding to.

Lastly, defense counsel addressed his investigation and

consideration of a possible self-defense theory but said that, based

on the evidence in discovery, he didn’t think that there was “even a

scintilla to justify a self-defense claim.”

¶ 41 The court asked Ramirez whether it was true that he would

end conversations with defense counsel. Ramirez said that he

wasn’t going to answer if defense counsel was only going to bring

him a plea deal for 100 years. The court then asked Ramirez,

“What if another attorney would tell you that?” And Ramirez said

that he would “[p]robably be the same way.”

¶ 42 The court denied Ramirez’s request and found that there

wasn’t a conflict that would lead to an unjust verdict or a complete

18
breakdown of communications. The court further found that

Ramirez had created any breakdown in communications because he

would either end or leave conversations with counsel, which was

insufficient to support his request for substitute counsel.

B. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 43 A defendant’s right to legal counsel is protected under both the

United States and Colorado Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI;

Colo. Const. art. II, § 16; see also People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87,

92 (Colo. 1989) (noting that the right to counsel is “considered

essential to a fair trial”). However, this right to counsel “guarantees

only competent representation[] and does not necessarily include ‘a

meaningful attorney-client relationship.’” Arguello, 772 P.2d at 92

(quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)). When a defendant

objects to continued representation by his court-appointed counsel,

the court is obligated to inquire into the reasons for the

dissatisfaction. Id. at 94. But the defendant carries the burden to

demonstrate that good cause exists for the court to appoint

substitute counsel, which includes “a conflict of interest, a complete

breakdown of communication[,] or an irreconcilable conflict which

19
leads to an apparently unjust verdict.” Id. (quoting McKee v. Harris,

649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir.1981)).

¶ 44 In People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 695 (Colo. 2010), the

supreme court established a four-factor test to guide a court’s

inquiry into whether substitute counsel is warranted. As relevant

here, two of those factors are whether the defendant substantially

and unreasonably contributed to the underlying conflict and

whether the attorney-client conflict was so great that it resulted in a

total lack of communication or otherwise prevented an adequate

defense. Id.

¶ 45 We review a court’s denial of a defendant’s request for

substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion.7 Id. at 696 n.4. We

won’t disturb the court’s ruling if it has record support. People v.

Tresco, 2019 COA 61, ¶ 16.

7 Despite acknowledging this standard, Ramirez asserts we should

apply a “simple error” standard in this case. See Henderson v.
United States, 568 U.S. 266, 282 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that “a simple-error rule” means “all trial-court mistakes
affecting substantial rights can be corrected on appeal”). We
decline to do so.

20
C. Analysis

¶ 46 Ramirez argues that good cause existed for his request for

substitute counsel, and the court violated his right to counsel by

“forcing [him] to be ‘represented’ by conflicted counsel.” He argues

that there was a serious breakdown in communication and

irreconcilable conflicts with his defense counsel. We disagree.

¶ 47 The court found — with record support — that Ramirez

created whatever communication breakdown existed between him

and his counsel. Regardless, while defense counsel said that there

was a “communication breakdown,” counsel never said that he and

Ramirez were no longer communicating at all. Counsel also said

that he didn’t believe a conflict existed. Furthermore, Ramirez

acknowledged that he probably would have the same

communication difficulties with any attorney who didn’t see the

case the same way he did. Thus, Ramirez failed to carry his burden

to demonstrate that good cause existed to grant his request for

substitute counsel. See Arguello, 772 P.2d at 94.

¶ 48 Accordingly, because Ramirez failed to demonstrate a complete

breakdown of communication with his counsel to which he didn’t

substantially or unreasonably contribute, the court didn’t abuse its

21
discretion by denying his request for substitute counsel. See

Bergerud, 223 P.3d at 695.

V. Disposition

¶ 49 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE HARRIS concur.

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