Peo v. Martinez

24CA0891 Peo v Martinez 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0891
El Paso County District Court No. 23CR2102
Honorable William H. Moller, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Mathew Sean Martinez,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Freyre and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Michael J. Allen, District Attorney, Doyle Baker, Senior Deputy District
Attorney, Tanya A. Karimi, Deputy District Attorney, Isaiah Rose, Deputy
District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kira L. Suyeishi, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 The District Attorney for the Fourth Judicial District appeals

the district court’s order dismissing the only charge against

defendant, Mathew Sean Martinez, as a sanction for a discovery

violation. We reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 The prosecution charged Martinez with driving under the

influence (DUI) – fourth or subsequent offense, alleging that he had

been previously convicted of three prior alcohol-related driving

offenses in the State of Texas. Martinez entered a plea of not guilty,

and Judge Diana May, the presiding judge at the time, set a jury

trial for January 2024. Martinez later asked to continue the trial,

and the court granted his request, resetting the trial for April 1.

¶3 On the morning of trial on April 1, a new prosecutor was

assigned to the case, which created a conflict for Judge May. She

advised the parties that the case would be reassigned to a new

judicial officer.

¶4 Later that day, the parties appeared before Judge William

Moller. The parties addressed preliminary matters, including

Martinez’s motion to exclude an investigator’s report that compared

photographs he took of Martinez to certified records from the Texas

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convictions and concluded that Martinez appeared to be the person

in the Texas records. Martinez argued that the prosecution had

failed to timely disclose the report because it had been provided to

the defense only a week before trial. The court denied the motion,

concluding that the prosecution had disclosed the report “as soon

as practicable” and had “not failed to disclose materials required by

[Crim. P.] 16.”

¶5 During argument concerning the photograph comparison

report, the prosecutor mentioned that the investigator had also

attempted to compare fingerprints he collected from Martinez with

those contained in the Texas records. The prosecutor explained

that the poor quality of the fingerprints in the Texas records

prevented any meaningful comparison. Based on that information,

defense counsel argued that another potential discovery violation

had occurred. Specifically, counsel explained that the prosecution

had failed to provide Martinez with the fingerprints collected by the

investigator or any information related to the investigator’s

unsuccessful attempt to compare them with the Texas records.

And counsel argued that the undisclosed evidence was potentially

exculpatory, noting that “if he’s not the same Martinez from Texas,

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this goes from a . . . felony DUI down to a misdemeanor DUI. That

is huge.” Counsel moved the court to dismiss the case as a remedy

for the alleged Crim. P. 16 violation.

¶6 The court concluded that a “significant” discovery violation

had occurred. It found that the undisclosed fingerprints and the

investigator’s inability to compare them with the Texas records were

potentially exculpatory evidence and that, had such evidence been

timely disclosed, the defense could have retained an expert to

conduct a fingerprint comparison. It determined that the trial could

not proceed that day due to the Crim P. 16 violation and excused

the jurors. The court then proceeded to consider the appropriate

sanction. While discussing whether the trial could be reset, the

prosecutor advised the court that defense counsel was on vacation

the following week and noted, “[T]here’s only I think one other trial

date before speedy runs. I think that’s April 8th” — which was one

week later.1 Defense counsel added, “I think there’s another case

1 After the prosecutor made this representation, the court clerk

said, “That’s correct.” But it is not clear to us if the clerk was
agreeing that there was only one other available trial date before the
speedy trial deadline or if the clerk was agreeing that April 8 was an
available trial date.

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that actually would potentially go, and . . . I don’t know who has

speedy priority.”

¶7 Based largely on these representations, the court dismissed

the case. It found that (1) the prosecution knew of the evidence and

did not disclose it; (2) the withheld evidence was significant and

potentially exculpatory; (3) defense counsel would have had an

opportunity to engage an expert to determine whether the Texas

records involved the same defendant had the evidence been

disclosed; (4) evidence establishing that Martinez was not the same

defendant as in the Texas records “would have reduced this charge

from a felony to a misdemeanor and would potentially have changed

the entire outcome of the case”; and (5) the length of time that it

would take for the defense to do a comparison would run beyond

the speedy trial deadline. Consequently, the court concluded that

dismissal was “the only appropriate sanction at this time.”

II. Discovery Sanctions

¶8 The People do not challenge the district court’s conclusion that

a discovery violation occurred; rather, they contend that the district

court abused its discretion by dismissing the case as a sanction for

the discovery violation. We agree.

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A. Standard of Review and Generally Applicable Law

¶9 In the event a party fails to comply with the discovery rules,

Crim. P. 16(III)(g) permits a trial court to order sanctions that it

“deems just under the circumstances.” We review a court’s ruling

on discovery sanctions for an abuse of discretion. People v. Tippet,

2023 CO 61, ¶ 35; see People v. Lee, 18 P.3d 192, 196 (Colo. 2001)

(“Because of the multiplicity of considerations involved and the

uniqueness of each case, great deference is owed to trial courts in

this regard . . . .”). We will not disturb a trial court’s imposition of a

sanction unless its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair or it misapplies the law. People v. Daley, 97 P.3d 295, 298

(Colo. App. 2004); see People v. Moore, 226 P.3d 1076, 1081 (Colo.

App. 2009) (“A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it

bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.”).

¶ 10 But the trial court’s discretion to impose discovery sanctions is

not unlimited. Lee, 18 P.3d at 196. The court must fashion a

remedy that protects the integrity of the truth-finding process and

deters discovery-related misconduct. People v. Whittington, 2024

CO 65, ¶ 19. The court must also consider the following factors:

“(1) the reason for and degree of culpability associated with the

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violation; (2) the extent of resulting prejudice to the other party;

(3) any events after the violation that mitigate such prejudice;

(4) reasonable and less drastic alternatives to [dismissal]; and

(5) any other relevant facts.” Tippet, ¶ 37 (citation omitted).

¶ 11 “In the absence of willful misconduct or a pattern of neglect

demonstrating a need for modification of a party’s discovery

practices, a court should use sanctions only as a means to cure the

prejudice resulting from the discovery violation.” Daley, 97 P.3d

at 298; see Whittington, ¶ 19; Tippet, ¶ 53; Lee, 18 P.3d at 196-97.

In fashioning a sanction, “a court must strive to restore as nearly as

possible the level playing field that existed before the discovery

violation,” People v. Dist. Ct., 808 P.2d 831, 837 (Colo. 1991), and

“should impose the least severe sanction that will adequately

remedy the violation,” Daley, 97 P.3d at 298. Dismissal is a drastic

sanction that must be reserved for situations when the violation

cannot be adequately remedied by the imposition of a less severe

sanction. Id.

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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion by Dismissing
Martinez’s Case as a Discovery Sanction

¶ 12 The People contend that the district court abused its

discretion by dismissing Martinez’s case as a sanction for the

discovery violation because it (1) did not find that the violation was

the result of willful misconduct or a pattern of neglect, which is a

finding required to dismiss the case as a deterrent or punitive

sanction; and (2) failed to consider less drastic sanctions. We

conclude that, under the circumstances, the court abused its

discretion by imposing the most severe sanction without finding

willful misconduct or a pattern of neglect that would justify

dismissal as a deterrent sanction and without considering whether

the discovery violation could have been adequately remedied by

imposing a less severe sanction. See Tippet, ¶ 37.

1. Willful Misconduct or Pattern of Neglect

¶ 13 The People contend that the district court abused its

discretion by dismissing the case as a deterrent sanction for the

discovery violation without first finding that the prosecution had

engaged in willful misconduct or a pattern of neglect. After the

court concluded that the prosecution’s conduct amounted to a

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discovery violation, it acknowledged that the prosecutor was “new to

the case” and clarified that it was “not assigning any blame” to that

prosecutor but determined that the violation was “chargeable to the

People.” Critically though, the court’s culpability findings stop

there. The court did not find — and the record does not reflect —

that the prosecution’s discovery violation was the result of willful

misconduct or a pattern of neglect or that there was a need to deter

or punish the prosecution for its misconduct. See Whittington,

¶ 19.

¶ 14 Martinez concedes as much in his answer brief, acknowledging

that the court “did not find that the prosecution engaged in willful

misconduct when it committed the discovery violation.”

Nevertheless, he argues that the court’s findings were sufficient to

support the sanction of dismissal because the court determined

that the discovery violation involved “potentially exculpatory

evidence” and that the prosecution’s violation was “significant.” But

Martinez has not cited, nor are we aware of, any authority holding

that dismissal is an appropriate deterrent sanction if a court finds

that the undiscovered evidence was “potentially exculpatory” or

“significant.” Instead, “[i]n the absence of willful misconduct,

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dismissal as a sanction for a discovery violation is usually beyond

the discretion of the trial court.” Daley, 97 P.3d at 298 (citing Dist.

Ct., 808 P.2d at 837).

¶ 15 Because the record does not support dismissal as a sanction,

meant to deter the prosecution’s willful misconduct or a pattern of

neglect, we proceed to consider whether any less drastic sanctions

were available.

2. Consideration of Less Drastic Sanctions

¶ 16 The People contend that the district court abused its

discretion because it could have granted a continuance, excluded

the evidence, or reduced the charge as a less drastic sanction to

dismissal. Martinez argues that (1) the prosecutor invited any error

by the court in not electing a continuance; (2) the prosecutor waived

any claim that the court should have excluded the evidence or

reduced the charge; and (3) dismissal was the only reasonable

sanction available to adequately remedy the discovery violation.

¶ 17 First, to the extent the People contend that the court abused

its discretion by not considering the alternative sanction of a

continuance, we agree with Martinez that the prosecutor invited any

error by the court in that regard. The doctrine of invited error

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prevents a party from “complaining on appeal of an error that [the

party] invited or injected into the case; the party must abide [by] the

consequences of [their] acts.” People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 34;

see People v. Becker, 2014 COA 36, ¶ 20 (The doctrine typically

“precludes appellate review of alleged errors that were invited by a

party’s affirmative conduct.”).

¶ 18 Here, the prosecutor misadvised the district court that there

was only one available trial date before the speedy trial deadline

and that date was the following week. The parties agree that the

prosecutor was mistaken and that the speedy trial deadline was not

set to expire until June 2024. But based on the prosecutor’s

representation, the court determined that a continuance would not

cure the harm resulting from the discovery violation because it

either would not provide the defense enough time to retain an

expert to investigate the undiscovered evidence and prepare for a

new trial or would force Martinez to sacrifice his right to a speedy

trial. Thus, even if the court erred by not considering a

continuance as an alternative less drastic sanction to dismissal, we

conclude that the prosecution invited that error, and we will not

address the argument further. See Becker, ¶ 20.

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¶ 19 Second, we are not persuaded that the prosecution waived the

right to contend that the district court should have excluded the

evidence or reduced the charge as a less drastic sanction. Waiver is

“the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.”

Rediger, ¶ 39 (citation omitted). Waiver may be explicit or implied,

but in either circumstance, claims of waiver must be supported by

some evidence of intent to relinquish a known right. Forgette v.

People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 28. “[W]aiver extinguishes error, and

therefore appellate review . . . .” Rediger, ¶ 40.

¶ 20 Martinez argues that the People waived the right to claim that

excluding the evidence or reducing the charge was a less drastic

sanction because the prosecutor did not suggest these alternatives

to the court. This argument presumes that the prosecution had a

duty to affirmatively propose alternative sanctions to the court

before the court imposed a sanction. But Martinez has not cited,

nor are we aware of, any authority holding that the prosecution

waives the right to challenge the severity of a discovery sanction if

the prosecutor fails to propose alternatives. Instead, it is the

court’s obligation to “impose the least severe sanction that will

adequately remedy the violation.” Daley, 97 P.3d at 298; see

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Whittington, ¶ 17 (“Choosing an appropriate sanction to address

discovery violations lies within the sound discretion of the trial

court . . . .”); see also Tippet, ¶ 37 (identifying “several factors that a

court must consider when fashioning discovery sanctions”).

¶ 21 Further, Martinez does not identify any evidence in the record

that shows the prosecution intended to relinquish the right to

challenge the severity of the discovery sanction. See Phillips v.

People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 22 (“[T]he record before us is barren of any

indication that defense counsel considered raising the unpreserved

contentions before the trial court but then, for a strategic or any

other reason, discarded the idea.”). Martinez speculates that the

prosecution may have had an “all-or-nothing” strategy and that “the

prosecution intentionally relinquished its opportunity to seek these

potential sanctions.” But he has not substantiated that claim with

record evidence. And we see no sound strategic reason the

prosecution would abandon the opportunity to pursue a

misdemeanor conviction. Cf. Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48,

¶ 16 (concluding that counsel waived the defendant’s right to a

public trial by not objecting to a known closure in part because

“legitimate strategic considerations might motivate counsel to not

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object to a closure”). Thus, we conclude that the People have not

waived the right to argue on appeal that the district court should

have imposed a less severe sanction.

¶ 22 Third, to the extent that the People argue that the exclusion of

the undisclosed evidence would have been a reasonable and less

drastic sanction to dismissal, we disagree. Such a sanction would

not have been a reasonable alternative under the circumstances.

The record shows that the prosecution had no intention of

introducing the undiscovered evidence at trial — indeed, from the

prosecution’s perspective, the evidence was inconclusive at best and

exculpatory at worst. Although excluding the evidence would have

cured the need for extra time to allow the defense to retain an

expert and investigate the fingerprints, excluding evidence that the

prosecution did not intend to use would have been no sanction at

all. See People v. Mendez, 2017 COA 129, ¶ 33 (the trial court’s

goal in imposing a sanction must be to cure any prejudice from the

discovery violation and to restore a level playing field); Daley, 97

P.3d at 298 (“[A] court should use sanctions only as a means to

cure the prejudice resulting from the discovery violation.”). Thus,

we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by

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not considering the exclusion of evidence as a reasonable discovery

sanction.

¶ 23 But we agree with the People that the district court abused its

discretion by failing to adequately consider whether the discovery

violation could have been cured by reducing the charge. See Daley,

97 P.3d at 298. As both defense counsel and the court

acknowledged while discussing the discovery violation, the

undiscovered evidence related only to whether Martinez was the

same person convicted of the offenses reflected in the Texas

records. To convict Martinez of class 4 felony DUI, the prosecution

had to prove that he had three prior alcohol-related convictions.

See § 42-4-1301(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. Without proof of the requisite

prior convictions, DUI is a misdemeanor. See id.

¶ 24 Had the court reduced Martinez’s charge from felony DUI to

misdemeanor DUI, any evidence attempting to link Martinez to the

Texas records, including the undisclosed fingerprints and the

investigator’s inability to compare them to the Texas records, would

have been irrelevant. Reducing the charge also would have

prevented the need to give the defense additional time to retain an

expert in preparation for a new trial. As a result, this potential

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sanction would have been unaffected by the misunderstanding

about the speedy trial deadline. If the defense did not need

additional time to investigate the undisclosed evidence, the trial

could have proceeded the following week on the available trial date

within the speedy trial period.2

¶ 25 Although the record reflects that the court fully understood

the import of the evidence, it does not reflect that the court

considered reducing the charge as a possible sanction in this case.

Because reducing the charge against Martinez to a misdemeanor

could have cured the prejudice that resulted from the prosecution’s

discovery violation, it was a reasonable and less drastic sanction to

dismissal. See Daley, 97 P.3d at 298.

¶ 26 In the end, we conclude that the district court abused its

discretion by imposing the drastic sanction of dismissal (1) without

finding that the discovery violation was the result of willful

2 We acknowledge there was some discussion that another trial that

may have had priority was scheduled on the same date. But it is
speculative to assume that the other trial would have prevented
Martinez’s trial from proceeding within the speedy trial period,
particularly because a misdemeanor DUI charge could have been
tried relatively quickly before either a district court or county court
judge.

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misconduct or a pattern of neglect, such that a deterrent sanction

was justified; and (2) without considering whether the violation

could have been cured by a less drastic sanction. See Tippet, ¶ 37;

Daley, 97 P.3d at 298. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal order

and remand the case to the district court to reinstate the charge

against Martinez and to reconsider the appropriate sanction for the

prosecution’s discovery violation. On remand, the court may

conduct whatever proceedings it deems necessary to enable it to

make the requisite findings and “impose the least severe sanction

that will adequately remedy the violation.” Daley, 97 P.3d at 298.

We express no opinion on what the appropriate curative or

deterrent remedy might be under the circumstances.

III. Disposition

¶ 27 The order dismissing the case is reversed, and the case is

remanded to the district court with directions to reinstate the

charge and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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