Marriage of Martin

25CA0544 Marriage of Martin 04-30-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0544
El Paso County District Court No. 23DR31739
Honorable Catherine Mitchell Helton, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Angela D. Martin,

Appellee,

and

Richard J. Martin,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Tow and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 30, 2026

Cage Lewis Weiman, LLC, Jamie L. Cage, Allyson C. Beyer, Glendale, Colorado,
for Appellee

McClintock Criminal Defense, P.C., Theodore P. McClintock, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 Richard J. Martin (husband) appeals the division of marital

property and maintenance portions of the permanent orders entered

in connection with the dissolution of his marriage with Angela D.

Martin (wife). He also asserts that the district court didn’t provide

him due process when it placed time limits on the permanent

orders hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The parties married in 1993. During the marriage, husband

served in, and retired from, the military. Based on his military

service, husband received military retirement benefits and Veterans’

Affairs disability benefits (VA disability benefits).

¶3 In 2016, husband started his own business selling homes and

providing property management services. Husband owned one

hundred percent of the business. The parties’ adult son joined the

enterprise as an employee and worked to grow the business’s

property management side.

¶4 Following a permanent orders hearing, the district court

dissolved the marriage and made the following relevant findings:

• Husband was the sole owner of his business.

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• Wife’s expert, who valued husband’s business at

$294,500, was credible. He explained the numbers he

used, his sources were reliable, and his method of

valuation was appropriate.

• Husband’s expert, who opined that the business was

worth $62,000, valued the business “from the perspective

of [it] being sold now,” which was “not the situation”

because husband testified that he wanted to keep the

business.

• Husband testified that he couldn’t work as much as he

once did and would like to slow down, but no evidence

suggested he would no longer be a part of the business or

would sell it.

• The value of the business, which the court awarded to

husband, was $294,500.

• Husband’s annual income was $133,517 based on an

average of his earnings in 2022 and 2023.

• Husband’s VA disability benefits weren’t marital property

to be divided in permanent orders, but they could be

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included as income in the court’s determination of a

maintenance award to wife.

II. Procedural Due Process

¶5 Husband first argues that the district court didn’t allow him to

fully present his case in violation of his procedural due process

rights. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 A meaningful opportunity to be heard is an inherent element

of due process. See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329

(Colo. App. 2007). Parties are entitled to have sufficient time in

which to orderly present their case. See In re Marriage of Salby,

126 P.3d 291, 302 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶7 A district court’s interest in administrative efficiency may not

take precedence over a party’s right to due process. In re Marriage

of Goldin, 923 P.2d 376, 382 (Colo. App. 1996). The court, however,

may set a time limit on a hearing from the outset and monitor the

parties’ use of their time during the hearing. See Maloney v.

Brassfield, 251 P.3d 1097, 1102-05 (Colo. App. 2010); CRE 611(a)

(“The [district] court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode

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and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as

to . . . avoid needless consumption of time.”).

¶8 We review a district court’s imposition of time limits at a trial

for an abuse of discretion. Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1102. A court

abuses its discretion when it acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unfair,

or unreasonable manner, or when it misapplies the law. In re

Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 5.

B. Additional Facts

¶9 The district court initially set the permanent orders hearing for

two hours. Husband moved for a full day hearing, contending that

the parties intended to call three experts and that the hearing

would include several complicated issues, such as the valuation of

husband’s business, consideration of husband’s military benefits

and two marital properties, and wife’s maintenance request. The

court granted husband’s motion, in part, and extended the hearing

to four hours. In the parties’ joint management trial certificate

(JTMC), husband again asked for a full-day hearing, reiterating that

the case was complex, involved experts, and required the testimony

of the parties’ adult son, who worked for husband’s business;

husband’s doctor; an individual who recently sold a similar

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business to that of husband; two other property managers/agents;

and his own lengthy testimony. Following a review of the JTMC, the

court extended the hearing to five hours. In doing so, the court

recited husband’s proposed evidence and witnesses relating to his

business, but it also stated that “[a]dditional lay testimony will

likely not be helpful to the [c]ourt.”

¶ 10 At the outset of the hearing, husband’s counsel again

requested a full-day hearing. The court denied the request,

informing husband’s counsel that a full-day hearing amounted to

about three hours and fifteen minutes per side, and the court had

already granted the parties two hours and thirty minutes per side.

Throughout the hearing, the court reminded husband’s counsel of

his remaining time on at least five occasions and even allowed

husband’s testimony to go slightly over his allotted time so that he

could finish it.

¶ 11 The court also allowed the parties to submit written closing

arguments, noting that although it granted husband some

additional time, it didn’t grant all the time he requested. And at the

close of the hearing, the court allowed husband’s counsel to make

an offer of proof regarding the additional witnesses she would have

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called on husband’s behalf if the court had not placed a time limit

on the parties’ presentations of their cases. In that offer of proof,

husband’s counsel told the court that the two property

manager/agents would have “talked about the industry and the

level of work and extra time as both property managers and real

estate agents” and that another witness “would have testified with

respect to the sale of her business for $93,000, which is a company

similar [to husband’s] except they have [more property management

clients].” Husband’s counsel also stated that, if her time had not

been limited, she would have expanded on husband’s testimony

because “there were things that we had rushed through that were

important to him.”

C. Analysis

¶ 12 Given the court’s advance notice, its communication at the

hearing, its flexibility to revise time limitations, and its allowance of

written closing arguments, we aren’t persuaded that the court

violated husband’s due process rights by limiting the time available

for the hearing. See Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1103 (listing factors to

determine whether the court’s time limitation was improper).

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¶ 13 Still, husband contends that he didn’t receive enough time to

present his case. He argues that he wasn’t able to demonstrate the

proper valuation of his business because the court didn’t afford him

sufficient time to present the testimony of the witness who had

recently sold a similar business or the testimony of other property

manager/agents about the hours and amount of work involved in

his profession. But as the district court found, because no evidence

suggested that husband intended to sell his business, testimony

regarding the sale of a similar business wouldn’t have been helpful

to the court. Moreover, the testimony of other property

manager/agents would have been duplicative because husband and

wife testified at length about how many hours husband and their

son worked at the business.

¶ 14 Husband also argues he didn’t have adequate time to

thoroughly discuss his VA disability benefits and the reduction in

the amount of those benefits once the dissolution proceedings were

finalized. Although husband included this information in his

portion of the JTMC, he never informed the court that he lacked

sufficient time to provide this information at the hearing nor did he

address the reduced amount of VA disability benefits in his written

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closing arguments. Thus, this contention doesn’t change our

conclusion that the time limitations that the court imposed didn’t

violate husband’s due process rights.

¶ 15 In sum, the district court’s time management didn’t appear

inflexible or unduly restrictive during the hearing. The court

periodically reminded the parties of their remaining time, allowed

husband to provide a summary of the evidence he was unable to

present given the time limits, and permitted the parties to submit

written closing arguments. See id. at 1103-05. Thus, the court’s

imposition of a time limit of two and a half hours per side didn’t

constitute an abuse of discretion. See id. at 1103.

III. VA Disability Benefits

¶ 16 Husband next argues that the district court erred when it

included his VA disability benefits as income when determining

maintenance. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 17 We review maintenance orders for an abuse of discretion but

review de novo the legal standard applied by the court. In re

Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 12.

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¶ 18 In determining maintenance, the court must calculate each

party’s gross income. Id. at ¶ 12. Gross income includes income

“from any source,” other than certain listed exceptions not

applicable here, and specifically includes disability insurance

benefits. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(c)(I)(S), C.R.S. 2025.

B. Analysis

¶ 19 Husband argues that the court erred because the Uniformed

Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C.

§ 1408, prohibits state courts from dividing or assigning VA

disability benefits. But because the court didn’t divide or assign his

VA disability benefits when it included them in its income

calculation, it did not err.

¶ 20 Military retirement benefits are generally distributable as

marital property in a dissolution of marriage case. 10 U.S.C.

§ 1405; In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 530 (Colo. 1995).

Distributable benefits, however, are limited to “disposable retired

pay,” which is defined at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) to exclude disability

pay. Thus, federal and Colorado cases interpreting the USFSPA

hold that disability pay isn’t subject to division as part of a marital

property distribution. See Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214, 220

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(2017) (citing Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989)); see

also In re Marriage of Tozer, 2017 COA 151, ¶ 13 (disability

retirement is not disposable retired pay under the USFSPA and is

not subject to division as marital property); In re Marriage of

Williamson, 205 P.3d 538, 540 (Colo. App. 2009) (same); In re

Marriage of Franz, 831 P.2d 917, 918 (Colo. App. 1992) (same).

¶ 21 Husband argues that Howell is instructive because it stands

for the proposition that the USFSPA prohibits a state from treating

VA disability benefits as divisible community property.

¶ 22 But husband misses an important distinction. Howell

discusses only whether a court may divide or assign VA disability

benefits when allocating marital property during a dissolution

proceeding. Nothing in Howell or in the USFSPA addresses whether

a state — by statute or judicial decision — may treat VA disability

benefits as income for purposes of calculating a support obligation.

Rather, Howell stated that a state court “remains free to take

account of the contingency that some military retirement pay might

be waived, or, as the petitioner himself recognizes, take account of

reductions in value when it calculates or recalculates the need for

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spousal support.” Howell, 581 U.S. at 222 (citing Rose v. Rose, 481

U.S. 619, 630-34 (1987)).

¶ 23 Husband acknowledges that a division of this court held that

VA disability benefits can be included when calculating a veteran-

parent’s income when determining the parent’s child support

obligation. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.E.R-L.,

2020 COA 173, ¶ 2 (“We conclude that the USFSPA does not

prohibit including such benefits in a parent’s gross income for child

support purposes.”). Still, he asserts that the same treatment of VA

disability benefits when calculating a maintenance award isn’t

warranted because after the dissolution of a marriage, the veteran

is no longer required to support the former spouse.

¶ 24 But the veteran is required to support the former spouse if the

court determines the spouse has a need for maintenance, as the

court did here. Moreover, husband cites no binding legal authority

holding that the USFSPA prohibits states from including veteran’s

disability benefits in a veteran-spouse’s income when calculating a

maintenance obligation. Nor are we aware of any such authority.

¶ 25 To the contrary, Colorado case law explicitly allows a court to

consider VA disability benefits when “determining the propriety and

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amount of an award of spousal maintenance.” In re Marriage of

Nevil, 809 P.2d 1122, 1123 (Colo. App. 1991). And the

overwhelming majority of state courts that have considered the

issue have concluded that courts may consider military disability

benefits when setting maintenance. See In re Marriage of Morales,

214 P.3d 81, 85 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (collecting cases reaching this

outcome); Marriage of Strong v. Strong, 2000 MT 178, 8 P.3d 763,

770 (2000) (same).

¶ 26 These courts reasoned that because “‘Congress clearly

intended veterans’ disability benefits to be used, in part, for the

support of veterans’ dependents,’ ‘a state court is clearly free to

consider post-dissolution disability income and order a disabled

veteran to pay spousal support.’” Strong, 8 P.3d at 770 (citation

omitted) (first quoting Rose, 481 U.S. at 631, and then quoting

Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257, 1263 n.9 (Alaska 1992)); but

see Ex parte Billeck, 777 So. 2d 105, 109 (Ala. 2000) (holding that

federal law precludes courts from considering VA disability

payments when awarding alimony).

¶ 27 Lastly, husband cites an unpublished court of appeals

opinion, along with Howell, Mansell, and Tozer, to assert that state

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trial courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to order veterans to pay

spousal maintenance awards from VA disability benefits. First,

unpublished opinions announced by a division of this court have no

precedential value. Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 40.

Moreover, with exceptions not applicable here, this court’s policy

prohibits citations to our opinions that are not selected for official

publication. Colo. Jud. Branch, Court of Appeals Policy Concerning

Citation of Opinions Not Selected for Official Publication (2026),

https://perma.cc/5AZZ-KSWL.)

¶ 28 Second, husband’s argument continues to miss the mark. The

cases he cites stand for the proposition that VA disability benefits

can’t be divided or assigned, nor can state courts order that they be

used to indemnify or reimburse a spouse for arrearages. See

Howell, 581 U.S. at 220; Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594-95; Tozer, ¶ 13.

But the district court didn’t order husband to pay maintenance

from his VA disability benefits, nor did it require him to indemnify

or reimburse wife out of his VA disability benefits. Rather, it

considered the VA disability benefits — along with all of husband’s

other sources of income — to calculate husband’s gross income for

purposes of setting maintenance. This was a proper consideration

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under Colorado law. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(c)(I)(S) (including

disability benefits under the definition of income); Nevil, 809 P.2d at

1123.

IV. Valuation of Husband’s Business

¶ 29 Husband asserts that the district court erred when it valued

his business because it based its determination on husband’s

future earning potential from the business rather than its actual

value. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 30 The court has latitude to equitably divide a marital estate

based on the facts and circumstances of the case, and we won’t

disturb its decision absent a showing that the court abused its

discretion. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28. “A

court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misconstrues or misapplies the

law.” In re Marriage of Fabos, 2022 COA 66, ¶ 16.

¶ 31 When dividing marital property, the court determines the

property’s approximate current value. In re Marriage of Wright,

2020 COA 11, ¶ 4. In doing so, the court may select the valuation

of one party over that of the other party or make its own valuation,

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and we will affirm its decision if the value is reasonable in light of

the evidence as a whole. Medeiros, ¶ 41; In re Marriage of Krejci,

2013 COA 6, ¶ 23 (recognizing that a valuation will be upheld

“unless clearly erroneous”).

B. Discussion

¶ 32 Wife’s proposed valuation of husband’s business, which the

district court adopted, was grounded in the evidence. The parties

stipulated that wife’s expert was qualified to offer opinions on

business valuations. He valued husband’s business at $294,000

using the capitalization of earnings method for an income approach

and the seller’s discretionary earnings method for the market

approach, and he averaged the numbers he obtained through the

two valuation methods. The expert explained that the seller’s

discretionary earnings method considers the earnings of the

company, adding back wages paid to the owner to determine the

total cash flow to the owner, and was an appropriate valuation for a

business the size of husband’s enterprise. The expert then

subtracted reasonable officer compensation from the seller’s

discretionary earnings, explaining how he arrived at each number

in his calculation. He then explained the market approach, using

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the seller’s discretionary earnings and averaging and weighing those

earnings. He again explained his methodology and how he arrived

at each number he used in his valuation.

¶ 33 The court found wife’s expert credible, noting that he

explained the numbers he used, his sources were reliable, and his

methodology was appropriate.

¶ 34 Husband asserts that the district court erred and should have

valued the business at $64,000, the amount his expert testified the

business would sell for if it was sold on the date of the permanent

orders hearing. But the district court didn’t find this valuation

reliable or appropriate because no evidence suggested that husband

intended to sell the business. Rather, it found, with record support,

that husband wanted to keep the business and eventually allow the

parties’ son to take it over someday. Based on this evidence and

these findings, it wasn’t an abuse of discretion for the district court

to decline to base its valuation on the business’s potential sales

price.

¶ 35 Husband further argues that the “seller’s discretionary

earnings” method essentially converted his future earnings into

marital property to be divided as part of the marital estate. Thus,

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he argues, the court didn’t value the business as of the date of the

permanent orders hearing. And he asserts that the “personal

goodwill” he brought to the company isn’t a commodity that can be

quantified or divided. But we discern no legal error in the valuation

methodology the court adopted. Instead, husband’s arguments

amount to a request that this court reweigh the credibility of the

parties’ witnesses and evidence presented, which we can’t do. See

In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (“[C]redibility

determinations and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of

the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn

therefrom, are matters within the sole discretion of the [district]

court.”); In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d 267, 270 (Colo. App. 2010)

(the district court’s resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on

review).

¶ 36 Based on the evidence and arguments before the court, the

court’s decision to calculate the value of the business using wife’s

expert testimony was a reasonable exercise of its discretion. We

therefore won’t disturb that valuation. See Krejci, ¶¶ 23, 25.

V. Disposition

¶ 37 We affirm the judgment.

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JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.

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