Parental Resp Conc EAR-L

25CA1669 Parental Resp Conc EAR-L 04-30-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1669
Adams County District Court No. 24DR30365
Honorable Teri L. Vasquez, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning E.A.R-L., a Child,

and Concerning Carmen Lydia Rosado,

Appellant,

and

John Michael Larkins,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Dunn and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 30, 2026

Brown Carrington, PLLC, Dorothy Walsh Ripka, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant

No Appearance for Appellee
¶1 Carmen Lydia Rosado (mother) appeals the district court’s

judgment allocating decision-making responsibilities and parenting

time. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Mother and John Michael Larkins (father) share one child,

E.A.R-L. (the child), who was born in 2012. After the parties

separated in 2016, the child resided primarily with mother until

October 2022 when he began living primarily with father by

agreement.1 At that time, due to the distance between the parents,

father changed the child’s school enrollment to a school closer to

his residence.

¶3 In April 2024, mother and father separately petitioned the

district court for an allocation of parental responsibilities.

Following a dispute between the parents regarding the child’s

school enrollment, the court ordered the child to begin the

2024/2025 school year in mother’s school district. But after a

temporary orders hearing less than three weeks later, the court

1 The parties dispute whether they intended the move to be

temporary or long-term.

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ordered the child to be reenrolled in the school associated with

father’s residence.

¶4 The district court then appointed a child and family

investigator (CFI) and scheduled a permanent orders hearing.

Father, mother, and the CFI testified at the hearing. Among other

things, mother requested sole medical and educational decision-

making responsibility and primary residential care during the

school year as recommended by the CFI. Father requested an

allocation of joint decision-making responsibility and that the child

remain primarily with him during the school year.

¶5 After considering the testimony, admitted exhibits (including

the CFI report), relevant factors under section 14-10-124(1.5),

C.R.S. 2025, and the allegations of domestic violence, the district

court designated father the primary residential parent during the

school year, allocated the first, second, fourth, and fifth weekends

during the school year to mother, and equally divided summer

parenting time between the parents. The court also ordered joint

decision-making responsibility for all major decisions, including

educational and medical decisions.

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¶6 Mother filed a motion to amend the permanent orders under

C.R.C.P. 59, which the court denied.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 The district court has broad discretion over the allocation of

parental responsibilities, and we will not disturb its ruling absent

an abuse of that discretion. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA

116M, ¶ 8; In re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶¶ 23, 26. A

court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair or based on a misapplication of the law. In

re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 45. Under this deferential

standard, the question is not whether we would have reached the

same result but, rather, whether the district court’s decision “fell

within a range of reasonable options.” Churchill v. Univ. of Colo.,

2012 CO 54, ¶ 74 (citation omitted). Thus, we exercise every

presumption in favor of upholding the district court’s best interests

decision and will affirm the decision when it has record support.

See Collins, ¶ 8; Morgan, ¶ 26. We review the district court’s factual

findings for clear error, meaning that we will not disturb the

findings unless they lack any support in the record. Van Gundy v.

Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.

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¶8 When allocating parenting time and decision-making

responsibility, the court must focus on the child’s best interests,

giving paramount consideration to the child’s safety, needs, and

physical, mental, and emotional conditions. See §§ 14-10-

123.4(1)(a), 14-10-124(1.5), (1.7), C.R.S. 2025; Collins, ¶ 7. In

making its determination, the court considers all relevant factors,

including the best interests factors identified in section 14-10-

124(1.5)(a) and (b). See Collins, ¶ 7; Morgan, ¶ 21. But the court

need not make express findings on each of the factors if the record

reflects that the court considered the “pertinent factors.” People in

Interest of A.M.K., 68 P.3d 563, 565-66 (Colo. App. 2003). The

district court’s “[f]indings must be sufficiently explicit . . . to give the

reviewing court a clear understanding of the basis of the order.”

Pawelec, ¶ 44.

III. Allocation of Parenting Time

¶9 Mother contends that the district court erred by allowing the

child to reside primarily with father during the school year.

Specifically, mother contends that several of the court’s factual

findings lack record support and, even assuming record support,

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the court’s findings fail to adequately establish that the parenting

time order was in the child’s best interests. We disagree.

A. The Court’s Factual Findings Do Not Lack Record Support

¶ 10 After the court recited the applicable law, it considered the

section 14-10-124 best interests factors. As a threshold matter, the

court found that the physical locations of the parties prevented an

equal parenting time schedule, a finding mother does not dispute.

Thus, the court had to designate one of the parents as the primary

residential parent during the school year. To that end, the court

made the following additional factual findings.

• Father had a “remote history of abuse in the form of one

incident of physical intimidation” and a more recent

history of verbal abuse and coercive control.

• Father’s abuse was not “child focused or triggered.”

• The child was “mature enough to be heard” and his

wishes to continue attending the same school and remain

primarily in father’s home during the school year were

uninfluenced by others and “reasoned for his age.”

• The child had positive interactions with both parents,

appreciated the important people in their lives, and

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enjoyed activities with father even though they centered

around father’s interests.

• The child was well adjusted to both homes and

emotionally connected to his school and friends.

• Both parents struggled to encourage the sharing of love,

affection, and contact between the child and the other

parent.

• Both parents demonstrated a past pattern of involvement

with the child reflecting a system of time commitment to

the child.

• Both parents struggled to place the child’s needs ahead

of their own.

See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI).

¶ 11 Following these findings, the court determined that it was in

the child’s best interests to allocate majority school-year parenting

time to father.

¶ 12 Mother asserts that several of the court’s factual findings were

clearly erroneous based on a lack of record support.

¶ 13 First, mother asserts that the court erred by failing to find that

father committed acts of child abuse or neglect. She says that,

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under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III.5), the court was required to

“specifically consider” the CFI’s allegations that father engaged in

emotional abuse and educational neglect of the child. True, the CFI

alleged that father (1) engaged in coercive control by asking the

child what he did and where he went with mother; (2) emotionally

abused the child by telling him about events or activities he could

not attend with father because they occurred during mother’s

parenting time, specifically a camping trip in July 2024; and

(3) educationally neglected the child by allowing his grades to

decline. But the court’s order reflects that it specifically considered

these allegations, along with other evidence, before finding that

father’s history of abuse was not child focused. To the extent

mother argues that the district erred by not agreeing with the CFI’s

allegations of abuse and neglect, the court was not required to do

so. See In re Marriage of Chester, 907 P.2d 726, 731 (Colo. App.

1995) (“[R]ecommendations made by evaluators appointed in

custody matters are merely suggestions to the trial court.”).

¶ 14 Second, mother contends that the district court erred by

considering the child’s wishes, because (1) it applied the incorrect

statutory standard and (2) there was no evidence that his

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preferences were independent. Section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(II) allows

a court to consider “[t]he wishes of the child if he or she is

sufficiently mature to express reasoned and independent

preferences as to the parenting time schedule.” The court found

that the child was “emotionally connected to his current school and

his friends” and, although “the CFI seem[ed] to discount the basis

for the child’s wanting to stay in his own school, given the child’s

age, and the importance of friends and school life at that age,” the

court found “the child’s current wishes to be reasoned for his age.”

¶ 15 According to mother, before the court could consider the

child’s preferences, it had to find that those preferences were

“mature” and “reasonable in general,” rather than “reasonable for

[the child’s] age.” But the statute does not say that. Under

subsection (1.5)(a)(II), if a child is mature enough to form a

nonarbitrary (i.e., reasoned) and uninfluenced (i.e., independent)

opinion about his living situation, the court may consider that

opinion.

¶ 16 Here, the court found that the child was sufficiently mature to

be heard on the issue and that he had formed a reasoned and

independent age-appropriate opinion — in other words, reasonable

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for his age. The statute does not require anything more. That the

CFI disagreed with the child’s opinion, because, in her view, it did

not account for all the relevant circumstances, does not mean the

court erred by finding the child’s preference was “reasoned” and

reasonable. Furthermore, the record shows that the court

considered and made findings on each relevant factor; it did not

simply rely on the child’s wishes. See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113

P.3d 135, 147 (Colo. 2005) (“[I]t is incumbent upon the trial court to

consider all the relevant factors to determine what arrangement will

serve the child’s best interests.”). And based on the CFI’s expressed

belief that the child had not been coached, the court’s finding that

his wishes were independent was supported by the record.

¶ 17 Third, mother asserts that the district court’s finding that the

child enjoyed sharing father’s interest in his car club “was not

supported by competent evidence in the record beyond [f]ather’s

self-serving testimony.” But father’s testimony is competent

evidence to support the factual finding. See, e.g., 32A C.J.S.

Evidence § 1585 (2026) (“In civil cases, the testimony of a single

witness ordinarily is sufficient to establish any fact . . . even though

the witness is a party or interested in the action.”). Moreover, the

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CFI testified that the child “enjoy[ed] going with father to his car

club events.”

¶ 18 Finally, contrary to mother’s assertions, the court’s findings

that she struggled to encourage the sharing of love and affection

between the child and father and to put the child’s needs ahead of

her own are supported by the record. Specifically, the CFI testified

that mother withheld the child from father during the summer of

2024 and the child described not liking when mother called father

“bad names.” The CFI also reported that, according to the child’s

former therapist, the child did not feel heard by either parent.

Based on her investigation, the CFI opined that mother struggled to

encourage the child’s relationship with father.

¶ 19 In sum, because the district court’s findings have record

support, we will not disturb them. Id.

B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Allocated
Majority School-Year Parenting Time To Father

¶ 20 Mother next asserts that the district court’s allocation of

school-year parenting time is “entirely inconsistent” with “the

factual findings and credibility determinations cited in the

permanent orders” and is not in the child’s best interests. In

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support, mother highlights that (1) the CFI recommended that

mother be the primary residential parent during the school year

and (2) the court found that the child’s grades and school

attendance declined during his time in father’s care.

¶ 21 However, it was for the district court, not us, to weigh the

conflicting evidence and the relevant factors. See Thorburn, ¶ 49;

see also In re Marriage of Rahn, 914 P.2d 463, 465 (Colo. App.

1995) (explaining that when the district court resolves the

conflicting evidence in one party’s favor, we may not reweigh that

evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the district court); In

re Marriage of Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo. 1989) (an appellate

court may presume that the district court considered all of the

evidence admitted). After doing so, the court determined that it was

in the child’s best interests to remain primarily with father during

the school year. Implicit in that conclusion is the court’s

determination that, despite its negative findings regarding the

child’s grades and attendance, the factors weighed in favor of its

allocation of parenting time. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 21 (recognizing that a court’s

findings may be implicit in its ruling). That implicit finding along

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with the remainder of the court’s findings sufficiently explained and

supported the court’s decision. See Pawelec, ¶ 44.

¶ 22 Mother notes that the court did not make any findings

explaining why it deviated from the CFI’s recommendation. But

“[u]ltimately it is the role of the court to weigh the CFI’s

recommendations pursuant to the appropriate standards to

determine whether they are in the children’s best interests.” In re

Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.J., 242 P.3d 1128, 1133

(Colo. 2010). And the court’s findings concerning the child’s best

interests sufficiently explained the basis of its decision to allocate

the majority of school-year parenting time to father.

¶ 23 For these reasons, we cannot say that the district court’s

allocation of parenting time exceeded its broad discretion. See

Pawelec, ¶ 45.

IV. Allocation of Decision-Making Responsibilities

¶ 24 Mother contends that the district court did not comply with

the statutory requirements by allocating joint medical and

educational decision-making responsibility over her objection as a

victim of domestic violence. We disagree.

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A. Applicable Law

¶ 25 When the district court finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that a party has committed domestic violence, it may not

allocate joint decision-making responsibility over the other party’s

objection “unless the court finds that there is credible evidence of

the ability of the parties to make decisions cooperatively in the best

interest of the child in a manner that is safe for the abused party

and the child.” § 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A).

B. Analysis

¶ 26 In allocating joint decision-making responsibility, the district

court acknowledged father’s history of abuse and coercive control.

Nonetheless, it found that the parties had previously been able to

make joint decisions in the child’s best interests. And it noted that

mother had requested joint decision-making responsibility with

father on a wide range of issues, including extracurricular activities,

religious upbringing, and discipline. Accordingly, the court

determined that mother and father could continue to cooperatively

make decisions in the best interest of the child as long as certain

safeguards were implemented to protect the parties’ and the child’s

safety. The court ordered the parties to strictly limit

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communication to parenting issues, communicate only in writing

via Talking Parents, and follow a procedure for decision-making

including response deadlines.

¶ 27 Mother contends that the court erred by determining that the

parties could make all decisions jointly merely because they could

make some decisions jointly. But we agree with the district court

that mother’s acknowledgement that the parties could make

decisions jointly in the best interests of the child about certain

important issues supports a finding that the parties could make

other decisions jointly as well. And, as detailed above, the court’s

analysis did not end there. The court also found that its specific

orders governing the method, content, and timing of

communications would minimize unnecessary communication, and

protect the safety of all parties. And mother does not dispute those

findings.

¶ 28 Because the record reflects that the court carefully considered

the evidence and issued orders concerning the parties’ ability to

make decisions cooperatively in a safe manner, we discern no abuse

of discretion.

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V. Disposition

¶ 29 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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