Peo in Interest of VS-J

25CA1832 Peo in Interest of VS-J 04-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1832
Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV30165
Honorable Bonnie McLean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of V.S-J., a Child,

and Concerning M.H. and D.J.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 16, 2026

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Alison A. Bettenberg, Assistant County Attorney,
Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant M.H.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant D.J.
¶1 D.J. (father) and M.H. (mother) appeal the judgment

terminating their parent-child legal relationships with V.S-J. (the

child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In July 2021, the Arapahoe County Department of Human

Services received a report that mother was using illicit substances

while caring for the child and exposing the child to unsafe

individuals. The Department opened a voluntary case and enacted

a safety plan in which the child was placed with father and C.J.

(paternal grandmother). More than a year later, the Department

filed a petition in dependency or neglect because father was not

adequately engaging in the case and mother continued to use illicit

substances.

¶3 In November 2022, the parents made no-fault admissions to

the petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent

or neglected. The court then adopted treatment plans for the

parents. Mother’s treatment plan required her to address

substance abuse and mental health and abstain from criminal

activity, while father’s treatment plan required him to provide for

the child’s mental health and medical needs and demonstrate

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protective parenting. Both plans also required the parents to

provide the child with a safe and stable home, attend family time,

participate in parenting education, and cooperate with the

Department and the professionals in the case.

¶4 In September 2023, the Department moved to terminate the

parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held an evidentiary

hearing, after which it denied the motion to terminate because the

Department did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that

the parents were unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time.

¶5 More than a year later, the Department again moved to

terminate the parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held an

evidentiary hearing over three days between April and August 2025.

After hearing the evidence, the court terminated the parent-child

legal relationships between the parents and the child.

II. Termination of Parental Rights

¶6 The parents assert that the juvenile court erred by terminating

their parental rights. We disagree.

A. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶7 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

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adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not

reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan

has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶8 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s

factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶9 The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value,

and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions

drawn therefrom are within the juvenile court’s discretion. People

in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). We

therefore cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment

for that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA

133, ¶ 29.

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B. Treatment Plan

¶ 10 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

he failed to successfully comply with his treatment plan. We are

not persuaded.

¶ 11 Under section 19-3-604(1)(c)(I), the juvenile court must find

that the parent (1) did not reasonably comply with the treatment

plan or (2) the treatment plan was not successful. In a case subject

to the expedited permanency planning provisions, such as this one,

a court may not find that a parent reasonably complied with or was

successful at a treatment plan when the parent “exhibits the same

problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate

improvement.” § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B). Although absolute

compliance with a treatment plan is not required, even substantial

compliance may be insufficient to correct or improve the parent’s

conduct or condition, or to render the parent fit. People in Interest

of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 12 The juvenile court determined that father had not reasonably

complied with his treatment plan and that the treatment plan was

not successful in rehabilitating him. Specifically, the court found

that father could “check the boxes” on his treatment plan, but he

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did not “have the deeper understanding to actually care full time

and long term for a very high-needs child.”

¶ 13 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred because the

evidence shows that he complied with every aspect of his treatment

plan. In support, he points to the caseworker’s testimony, in which

she agreed that father had complied with many of the treatment

plan’s requirements, including cooperating with the Department,

having a stable home, and participating in family time.

¶ 14 True, the record indicates that father participated in the case

and engaged in many of the treatment plan’s actions steps. But the

juvenile court found — and the record shows — that despite father’s

participation, the treatment plan was not successful in rendering

him a fit parent because he could not provide for the child’s

significant needs. See People in Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46,

¶¶ 30-31 (concluding that the treatment plan was not successful

where the parent had not resolved the protective concerns

addressed in the plan and did not have a healthy relationship with

the child); People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 354-55 (Colo.

App. 2007) (The evidence supported the court’s finding that the

parent had not successfully complied with the treatment plan

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because “[h]e had difficulty applying what he had learned and,

therefore, could not meet [the child’s] needs.”).

¶ 15 In this case, the juvenile court relied on the caseworker’s and

the parent-child interactional (PCI) evaluator’s opinions. The

caseworker testified that, despite the plethora of services provided

to father over nearly four years, he still had no ability to understand

the child’s developmental needs. She noted that, to the extent

father could navigate any of the child’s needs, he needed significant

assistance from his life skills coaches, who would not be there once

the case closed. The PCI evaluator testified that she observed a

significant impairment in the relationship between father and the

child, noting that father could not provide for the child’s basic

safety needs. In fact, the evaluator said that she had never

“observed such significant impairment in a parent-child

relationship,” which she described as “unintentional neglect.”

¶ 16 Father also asserts that the juvenile court erred because his

treatment plan did not require him “to have a thorough

understanding of his daughter’s therapeutic needs to be

successful.” But “[e]xplicit criteria for success need not be included

in the treatment plan itself.” People in Interest of L.D., 671 P.2d

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940, 946 (Colo. 1983). And in any event, father’s treatment plan

required him to “follow all the guidelines and recommendations

made by this child’s medical providers,” such as her occupational

and speech therapists, which necessarily required him to

understand his child’s therapeutic needs. We therefore reject

father’s argument.

¶ 17 In sum, because the record supports the juvenile court’s

finding that father’s treatment plan was not successful and its

finding comports with applicable law, we cannot disturb the court’s

determination. See People in Interest of C.T.S., 140 P.3d 332, 335-

36 (Colo. App. 2006).

C. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 18 Both parents argue that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them

and reunite the family. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 19 In determining fitness under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the

juvenile court must consider whether the county department of

human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent

and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),

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C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the “exercise of

diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children, and the

department’s reasonable efforts obligation is satisfied if it provides

services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 20 When determined “necessary and appropriate,” the

department must provide (1) screening, assessments, and

individual case plans; (2) home-based family and crisis counseling;

(3) information and referral services; (4) family time; and

(5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). The juvenile court should

consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support

the parent’s treatment plan, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d

911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by “considering the totality of the

circumstances and accounting for all services and resources

provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire

treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,

¶ 33.

2. Reasonable Accommodations Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act

¶ 21 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts by providing

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reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA). We disagree.

¶ 22 If a parent is a person with a qualifying disability under the

ADA, the juvenile court must consider whether the department

made reasonable accommodations for the parent’s disability when

determining if the department made reasonable efforts. See People

in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 34; see also § 19-3-208(2)(g)

(noting that services provided under section 19-3-208 must comply

with the ADA). A parent may be a qualified individual with a

disability if the parent has a “physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(1)(A). “[W]hat constitutes a reasonable accommodation will

vary from case to case based on the child’s health and safety needs,

the nature of the parent’s disability, and the available resources.”

S.K., ¶ 39.

¶ 23 In the dependency or neglect petition, the Department noted

that there were “ongoing concerns” related to father’s “cognitive

functioning” and mother’s “functioning and emotional regulation,”

as well as her substance dependence. However, neither parent

asserted that they had qualifying disabilities under the ADA or that

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they needed accommodations before the juvenile court adopted

treatment plans for them in November and December 2022. See

S.Z.S., ¶ 16 (noting that “if the parent knows or has reason to know

she has an ADA-cognizable disability, the issue should be raised

before the court adopts a treatment plan and enters a dispositional

order”).

¶ 24 A few months after the juvenile court adopted father’s

treatment plan, the caseworker noted in her report that there had

been discussions “about a possibl[e] psychological evaluation for

[father] to get [a] better understanding of his cognitive capacities . . .

and also provide him some other services if he were to qualify.” In

the next report, the caseworker stated that father was scheduled for

a psychological evaluation in May 2023. Thereafter, there is no

mention in the court file about whether father completed the

psychological evaluation or if he was diagnosed with any cognitive

impairment that would qualify him to receive accommodations

under the ADA.

¶ 25 As noted above, the Department moved to terminate the

parent’s parental rights in September 2023. In preparation for the

hearing, the parties filed a joint trial management certificate

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(JTMC); in the JTMC, both parents asserted for the first time in the

juvenile court that they had ADA-qualifying disabilities, which the

Department failed to accommodate. They did not, however, provide

any information related to their disabilities or what

accommodations they needed.

¶ 26 At the first termination hearing, the caseworker testified that

she thought that father had “some kind of cognitive disability” and

that mother was an “adult with a disability.” Yet she said that the

parents had not provided the Department with documentation

about any diagnoses or requested any accommodations. The

caseworker also testified that father completed the psychological

evaluation and that the evaluation noted some deficiencies in his

cognitive functioning, but she did not testify that he had been

diagnosed with any mental impairment that would qualify him for

accommodations under the ADA. Despite this record, the juvenile

court found that the ADA “clearly applie[d]” because of father’s

“developmental delays” and mother’s “mental health and substance

abuse.” The court determined that the Department had made

reasonable efforts to accommodate both parents’ disabilities but

still denied the motion to terminate as described above.

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¶ 27 At the second termination hearing, the caseworker testified

that the Department had accommodated father’s disability by

referring him to two different life skills providers who had

specializations in supporting parents with disabilities. She said

that the life skills workers aided father in navigating his various

appointments and understanding the child’s needs. The

caseworker also testified that mother lived in a “host home” that

provided “wraparound services” to accommodate her disability,

which included housing, transportation, medication management,

scheduling, and daily activities. Again, the caseworker noted that

neither parent made any specific requests for accommodations.

¶ 28 Based on this record, the juvenile court found that the

Department had made reasonable efforts to accommodate father’s

disability, pointing to the “high-level intensive life skills service

providers” that the Department had made available to father. The

court also found that the Department made reasonable

accommodations for mother by arranging for her to live at the host

home.

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¶ 29 Nevertheless, the parents assert, for the following three

reasons, that the Department failed to make reasonable

accommodations for their disabilities. We are not persuaded.

¶ 30 First, father asserts that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because it did not do enough to gather

information about his disability. Generally, it is the parent’s

responsibility to disclose information about a disability to the

department and juvenile court. See S.K., ¶ 21. But as the record

shows in this case, father never provided the Department with any

documentation about his disability. Still, the record indicates that

the Department made some efforts to gather more information

about father’s disability by referring him to a psychological

evaluation. But from what we can discern from the record before

us, this evaluation did not reveal that father had a disability that

would qualify him to receive funding for specialized services, so the

Department used its own funds to provide services, as noted above.

Because father does not assert that the services provided by the

Department were insufficient to accommodate his disability, nor

does he describe any other accommodations that he needed, we

discern no error.

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¶ 31 Second, father asserts that the Department failed to

reasonably accommodate his disability because the PCI evaluator

did not have any special training in assessing a cognitively-impaired

parent and was not told that father had a cognitive disability before

performing the PCI. But father does not direct us to anything in the

record supporting either of these points. As to the first point, we

see no testimony about the evaluator’s training (or lack thereof) in

assessing cognitively-impaired parents. In fact, father stipulated to

the evaluator’s expertise and did not conduct any voir dire about

her ability to assess cognitively-impaired parents. As to the second

point, the evaluator said that she spoke with father’s life skills

worker before the evaluation and that she knew that he was

receiving services for a developmental disability. In other words,

contrary to father’s assertion, the record indicates that the

evaluator was aware of father’s disability. We therefore cannot say

that the Department failed to make reasonable accommodations on

this basis.

¶ 32 Third, mother asserts that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because the “caseworker for much of the case”

had “absolutely no training on working with parents with

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disabilities” and “never put in any referrals for agencies that would

be good for parents with disabilities.” True, the caseworker that

testified at the first termination hearing said that she did not have

training working with disabled parents. But a new caseworker took

over the case a few months after the first termination hearing. And

mother does not direct us to anything in the record indicating that

this caseworker lacked training on working with parents with

disabilities or failed to make referrals to agencies experienced with

assisting parents who might need disability-related

accommodations. Nor does mother explain how the lack of training

on the caseworker’s part amounted to a lack of reasonable

accommodations when considering that the Department arranged

for mother to live in a host home that was specialized in providing

services to individuals with disabilities. We therefore reject her

assertion.

3. Other Contentions

¶ 33 The parents also assert, for three additional reasons described

below, that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts. We

are not persuaded.

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¶ 34 First, father argues that the Department did not arrange for

him to participate in the child’s therapeutic and educational

appointments. To begin, we note that father has not directed us to

anything in the record indicating that the Department or juvenile

court prevented him from attending these appointments. And the

record shows that the Department provided father with assistance

from life skills workers, who were tasked with helping father

understand the child’s needs and attend the meetings with the

providers. We therefore discern no error. See People in Interest of

J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011) (noting that, once the

department provides the necessary services, it is the “parent’s

responsibility to use those services to obtain the assistance that he

or she needs to comply with his or her treatment plan’s

requirements”).

¶ 35 Next, mother contends that the Department failed to provide

her with co-parenting services. But mother testified that the

Department provided her with a parenting education class that

focused on co-parenting skills. And in any event, mother’s inability

to co-parent with father was not the basis of mother’s unfitness.

We therefore discern no error.

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¶ 36 Finally, mother asserts that the Department failed to provide

father and paternal grandmother with housing services when they

lost their housing. Generally, a parent does not have standing to

raise an issue related to the other parent. See People in Interest of

J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 261 (Colo. App. 2007). Indeed, we cannot see

how the failure to provide father and paternal grandmother with

housing resources could have impacted mother’s rehabilitation.

Nor do we discern how, under the circumstances presented in this

case, providing father and paternal grandmother with housing

would have aided in reunifying the child with mother. We therefore

reject mother’s assertion.

D. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 37 Mother maintains that the juvenile court erred by finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.

¶ 38 Before terminating parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must

give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

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¶ 39 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately

meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.

A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best

interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order

termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we must

affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.

¶ 40 The juvenile court found that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination. Specifically, the court declined to grant

an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to paternal

grandmother because the child’s needs had not been met when she

previously lived with paternal grandmother and father continued to

live in the home with her. The court also noted that the child was

in a permanent home with her foster parents who could provide for

all her needs, and therefore termination and adoption was in the

child’s best interests.

¶ 41 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that it was in the child’s best interests that

mother’s parental rights be terminated because mother had made

18
minimal progress in addressing her substance abuse. The

caseworker opined that, based on the child’s age and how long the

case had been open, termination and adoption was the best option

for her because she needed permanency. The caseworker also said

that an APR would not be an appropriate option, and she was not

sure whether the foster parents would even be open to one. Finally,

the caseworker testified that placement with paternal grandmother

was not a viable option because she did not understand the child’s

needs, she had not shown that she could meet the child’s needs in

the past, and father continued to reside in the same home.

¶ 42 Despite this record, mother asserts that there was a less

drastic alternative to termination because she had a bond with the

child. To be sure, a juvenile court may consider the bond between

a child and parent when deciding if there is a viable less drastic

alternative to termination. See People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d

410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009). But this is just one relevant factor

among many. See A.R., ¶ 38. And as described above, the court

considered other factors in rejecting a less drastic alternative to

termination. Because the record supports those reasons, we cannot

disturb the court’s decision. See B.H., ¶ 80; S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

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¶ 43 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred in rejecting a

less drastic alternative because it applied the wrong legal test when

it focused on which placement option was better rather than on

whether termination was in the child’s best interests. We disagree.

The record indicates that the court properly considered whether

there were any less drastic alternatives to termination by

considering whether an APR was a viable option. See A.M., ¶ 32.

But because placement with paternal grandmother was not an

option, nor was an APR to the foster parents, the court had to

eliminate an APR as a less drastic alternative. See id. And as there

were no other alternatives, the court determined that termination

and adoption was in the child’s best interests. We therefore

conclude that the court applied the correct legal test.

III. Disposition

¶ 44 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

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