Boulder Valley v. Roetto

25CA1269 Boulder Valley v Roetto 04-09-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1269
Office of Administrative Courts No. TC 2024-0002

Rebecca Roetto,

Respondent-Appellant,

v.

Boulder Valley School District,

Petitioner-Appellee,

and

Office of Administrative Courts,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Pawar and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 9, 2026

Euell Thomas, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant

Semple, Farrington, Everall & Case, P.C., Holly Ortiz, Denver, Colorado, for
Petitioner-Appellee

No Appearance for Appellee
¶1 Rebecca Roetto, who was employed for fifteen years as a

teacher with the Boulder Valley School District, appeals the district

school board’s decision dismissing her for insubordination, neglect

of duty, immorality, and other good and just cause. Roetto argues

that (1) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise legally

impermissible and (2) the admission of hearsay evidence at her

administrative hearing requires reversal. We disagree with her

arguments and therefore affirm the school board’s decision.

I. Background

¶2 The following facts are undisputed.

¶3 Roetto was a teacher at Fairview High School from 2009 to

2024. During the 2023-2024 school year, she taught health and

physical education classes. At some point during the previous

school year, she had received an informal discipline for failing to

maintain appropriate student boundaries.

¶4 All Fairview graduating seniors were required to have their

teachers sign a senior clearance form — an official school

document — verifying that they had turned in all equipment, had

paid all fees, and were cleared to graduate. Teachers could verify

1
that a student met the graduation requirements for their class by

signing the sheet or using a stamp.

¶5 During the last week of school in 2024, Roetto was signing

senior clearance forms during an informal study hall. Roetto asked

her student aide to get a stamp from the office; the aide returned

upset because she was unable to obtain one. To ease the tension,

Roetto asked the student if she could draw a picture instead. The

student requested a penis, and Roetto drew one.

¶6 Roetto then gave other seniors the option of having her draw a

flower, a sunshine, a star, or a penis on their forms. Roetto

admitted to drawing a penis on nine students’ senior clearance

forms and in one student’s yearbook.

¶7 One student reported the drawing on her senior clearance

form to a staff member, who made a report to the administration.

The student discussed the incident with school personnel and

submitted a written report about it. She said she felt

uncomfortable after the incident, and, upon her request, she was

excused from her last three days of classes with Roetto.

¶8 On the day of the incident, Dr. Scarlett Chopin, the principal

at Fairview, was made aware of the drawings and immediately went

2
to Roetto’s office. Before Dr. Chopin could speak, Roetto admitted

to the drawings, apologized, and said she wouldn’t do it again.

Dr. Chopin verbally directed Roetto not to make any more penis

drawings, and she didn’t make any more after that.

¶9 A few days later, Dr. Chopin gave Roetto a nondisciplinary

letter of expectation regarding the incident. Roetto completed the

school year, receiving an award for her “tireless[] support[]” and

service as “a trusted adult” for her students. No investigation was

initiated before or during the summer break.

¶ 10 Just before the start of the next school year, Roetto was placed

on administrative leave pending an investigation into the incident.

That investigation included interviewing Roetto, Dr. Chopin, and

five other staff members. Although the staff interviews included

summaries of their conversations with the complaining student and

other students, no students were interviewed as part of the

investigation. In her interview, Roetto admitted to making the penis

drawings, but she denied being aware of any student who was

uncomfortable with them. Roetto also confirmed that she was

aware of school district policies GBEB-R, JBB, and GBAA.

3
¶ 11 District policy GBEB-R pertains to professional boundaries

with students. It provides, in relevant part:

All district employees are expected to observe
and maintain proper professional boundaries,
in accordance with this regulation and
accompanying policy.

....

Prohibited communication[] . . . by a staff
member with a student includes, but is not
limited to . . . sexual jokes, notes,
drawings, . . . or pictures [and] displaying or
transmitting sexual pictures, objects or
depictions . . . .

....

In determining whether a violation of
professional boundaries has occurred, the
district shall consider the totality of the
circumstances, including the nature and
extent of the conduct involved, the job
description and duties of the employee, the
employee’s intent or purpose in engaging in
the conduct, and whether the conduct caused
harm to the student or adversely affected the
education of students.

¶ 12 District policy JBB pertains to sexual harassment. As relevant

here, it provides the following:

It shall be a violation of policy for any staff
member to harass students . . . through
conduct or communications of a sexual
nature . . . .

4
....

[N]on-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature may constitute sexual harassment . . .
when . . . [s]uch conduct is sufficiently severe,
persistent or pervasive such that it limits a
student’s ability to participate in or benefit
from an education program . . . or it creates a
hostile or abusive educational environment.
For a one-time incident to rise to the level of
harassment, it must be severe.

Any conduct of a sexual nature directed . . . by
a staff member to a student is presumed to be
unwelcome and shall constitute sexual
harassment.

....

In determining whether [particular] conduct
constitutes sexual harassment, [the district
shall investigate] the totality of the
circumstances, the nature of the conduct, and
the context in which the . . . conduct occurred
....

¶ 13 District policy GBAA provides, in part:

It shall be a violation of policy for any member
of the district staff to harass . . . [a] student
through conduct or communications of a
sexual nature. . . .

....

[U]nwelcome conduct of a sexual nature
constitutes sexual harassment if . . . [s]uch
conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an
individual’s . . . educational performance or

5
creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive . . . educational environment.

....

Sexual harassment . . . may include but is not
limited to . . . [s]ex-oriented verbal “kidding,”
abuse or harassment.

....

All reports of sexual harassment received by
any district employee shall be promptly
forwarded to the compliance officer . . . [who]
shall ensure that every complaint is promptly
investigated . . . .

¶ 14 Another district policy — policy AC — also requires the district

to “promptly . . . investigate allegations of . . . harassment.”

¶ 15 After the investigation, the district superintendent

recommended Roetto’s dismissal on the grounds of insubordination,

neglect of duty, immorality, and other good and just cause. Roetto

objected, and the matter proceeded to a hearing before an

administrative law judge (ALJ) pursuant to section 22-63-302(4)(a),

C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 16 Following a three-day hearing, the ALJ entered an order

detailing his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ALJ

recommended that Roetto be retained as a teacher because the

6
school district had failed to meet its burden to establish any of the

four cited grounds for dismissal.

¶ 17 Disagreeing with the ALJ’s recommendation, the school board

adopted the ALJ’s findings but determined that Roetto’s conduct

met all four grounds for dismissal — insubordination, neglect of

duty, immorality, and other good and just cause. Accordingly, the

school board discharged Roetto.

II. Grounds for Dismissal

¶ 18 Roetto first contends that the school board’s decision

dismissing her was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise legally

impermissible. We aren’t persuaded. In our review, we first set

forth the relevant legal standards and then consider each of the

four grounds the board cited in its decision. The board asserts that

any of the four grounds can support the dismissal, so it is sufficient

if they prevail on only one of them. Nonetheless, because it’s not

clear to us whether the board based its dismissal decision on all

four grounds collectively, or whether it might have taken a different

action if it had considered only three or fewer of the grounds, we

consider all four of the cited grounds.

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A. Relevant Legal Standards

¶ 19 Under section 22-63-301, C.R.S. 2025, a teacher may be

dismissed for a number of reasons, including insubordination,

neglect of duty, immorality, and other good and just cause. If a

school administrator recommends dismissal on one or more of

these grounds and the teacher objects, the matter proceeds to a

hearing, at which the administrator has the burden of establishing

the grounds for dismissal. § 22-63-302(2)-(4), (8). Following the

hearing, the hearing officer or ALJ issues written factual findings

and a recommendation. § 22-63-302(8). The matter then goes to

the school district’s board of education for a final written decision.

§ 22-63-302(9). If, as in this case, the school board chooses to

dismiss the teacher over an ALJ’s retention recommendation, its

decision must include “a conclusion, giving its reasons therefor,

which must be supported by the [ALJ’s] findings of fact.” Id.

¶ 20 Any teacher dismissed under these provisions may file an

action for review of the school board’s decision in this court.

§ 22-63-302(10)(a). Our role then is to “determine whether the

action of the board was arbitrary or capricious or was legally

8
impermissible” based upon the record before the ALJ. § 22-63-

302(10)(c); see Ritzert v. Bd. of Educ., 2015 CO 66, ¶ 26.

¶ 21 While the school board is bound by the ALJ’s findings of

evidentiary fact so long as those findings are supported by the

record, it is not bound by the ALJ’s recommendation and may issue

its own findings of ultimate fact applying the facts to the law and

settling the parties’ rights and liabilities. Ritzert, ¶¶ 24, 30; Bd. of

Educ. v. Flaming, 938 P.2d 151, 157-58 (Colo. 1997). To survive

arbitrary and capricious review, a school board’s findings of

ultimate fact must be “fully warranted” by the ALJ’s findings of

evidentiary fact. Ritzert, ¶ 27 (citations omitted).

¶ 22 Findings of ultimate fact are the “exclusive prerogative” of the

school board, and “a reviewing court may not freely substitute its

comparatively uninformed judgment for the board’s experienced

appraisal of the harm inflicted on the school community by

particular instances of a teacher’s conduct.” Ricci v. Davis, 627

P.2d 1111, 1118 (Colo. 1981); accord Flaming, 938 P.2d at 158.

Thus, we will uphold a school board’s application of the dismissal

criteria to a specific instance of teacher conduct if its decision “is

9
warranted in the record and has a reasonable basis in law.” Ricci,

627 P.2d at 1119.

B. Insubordination

¶ 23 Insubordination within the meaning of section 22-63-301 is

the willful or intentional refusal to obey a superior’s reasonable

order. Ritzert, ¶ 29. It only requires intentional conduct in

violation of a superior’s directive — not a specific intent to violate

such a directive. Flaming, 938 P.2d at 159. Even a single instance

of violating a directive can amount to insubordination justifying

dismissal under the statute. Ware v. Morgan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No.

RE-3, 748 P.2d 1295, 1300 (Colo. 1988); Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Cornish,

58 P.3d 1091, 1095 (Colo. App. 2002).

¶ 24 In his recommendation, the ALJ suggested that Roetto’s

conduct didn’t amount to insubordination because there was no

evidence that she made the drawings with the conscious or willful

purpose of contravening district policies. Instead, the ALJ said, she

made them “to lighten the mood” and because she got “caught up in

the humor.” The ALJ also noted that Roetto didn’t violate any

specific directive not to draw penises on school documents and that

10
she didn’t draw any more penises after receiving Dr. Chopin’s verbal

directive and written letter of expectation.

¶ 25 The school board rejected that recommendation, determining

that Roetto’s conduct constituted insubordination because she

“knowingly drew penises on ten students’ official papers, including

one student’s yearbook,” and she was admittedly aware of the

relevant district policies and had in the past been informally

disciplined for failing to maintain appropriate student boundaries.

Thus, the board concluded, Roetto “engaged in insubordination by

knowingly violating [district] policies on professional boundaries

and harassment.”

¶ 26 Roetto argues that the ALJ got it right — that there was no

evidence that she willfully violated any policy or directive, as she

was merely aware of the relevant policies but didn’t actually intend

to violate any of them, she hadn’t received any specific directives

before she made the drawings, and she ceased the conduct as soon

as she was told to do so.

¶ 27 But specific intent to violate a directive isn’t necessary, so long

as the underlying conduct is intentional. Flaming, 938 P.2d at 159.

Indeed, in Flaming, the supreme court expressly rejected a standard

11
for insubordination that would’ve required the conduct to have been

“deliberately executed with the purpose of contravening prior

directives.” Id. at 158. Thus, in some instances, it is sufficient that

a teacher engaged in intentional conduct that violated a prior

directive or a known policy. See id. at 159 (the evidence supported

the school board’s finding of insubordination when, among other

things, a teacher engaged in conduct that violated school and

district policies, she’d previously been disciplined for violating such

policies, and she’d been told that failure to follow the policies would

be considered insubordination).

¶ 28 Whether a teacher’s conduct in a particular instance amounts

to insubordination is a question of ultimate fact for a school board

to resolve. Ritzert, ¶ 32. Thus, here, the school board was free to

reject the hearing officer’s recommendation that Roetto’s conduct

didn’t constitute insubordination. See Flaming, 938 P.2d at 158.

To be sure, the board was bound by the hearing officer’s findings of

evidentiary fact — such as the findings that Roetto drew penises on

nine students’ senior clearance forms and in one student’s

yearbook and that one student complained about the drawings.

See Ritzert, ¶ 24. Indeed, the board adopted all those findings.

12
¶ 29 And the board reasonably concluded, based on those findings,

that Roetto engaged in intentional conduct that violated district

policies. Roetto’s drawing of penises on student forms, leading one

student to express discomfort and ask to be excused from Roetto’s

class for the rest of the year, could constitute a violation of student

boundaries under policy GBEB-R, which prohibits communications

from a staff member to a student that include “sexual . . . drawings”

or “display[s] or transmi[ssion of] sexual pictures, objects or

depictions.” It also could constitute sexual harassment under

policy JBB, which prohibits “[a]ny conduct of a sexual nature” that

is “directed . . . by a staff member to a student” or that “limits a

student’s ability to participate in or benefit from an education

program” or “creates a hostile or abusive educational environment.”

And it could constitute sexual harassment under policy GBAA,

which prohibits “[s]ex-oriented verbal ‘kidding,’ abuse or

harassment” as well as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature”

that “has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an

individual’s . . . educational performance or creating an

intimidating, hostile or offensive . . . educational environment.”

13
¶ 30 Because the board reasonably determined that Roetto violated

district policies and because, as the board noted, Roetto was aware

of those policies and had been informally disciplined for failing to

maintain professional boundaries in the past, the board’s ultimate

finding of insubordination is fully warranted by the ALJ’s findings of

evidentiary fact. Accordingly, we conclude that Roetto hasn’t shown

that the board’s ultimate insubordination finding was arbitrary,

capricious, or otherwise legally impermissible.

C. Neglect of Duty

¶ 31 Neglect of duty occurs when a teacher fails to carry out their

obligations and responsibilities in connection with classroom and

other school sponsored activities, including by failing to comply

with school policies. Flaming, 938 P.2d at 159; Blaine v. Moffat

Cnty. Sch. Dist. Re No. 1, 748 P.2d 1280, 1292-93 (Colo. 1988).

¶ 32 The ALJ recommended finding that there was no neglect of

duty because Roetto hadn’t violated the relevant policies. More

specifically, the ALJ suggested there was no violation of professional

boundaries and no sexual harassment when considering the totality

of the circumstances, including the facts that Roetto made her first

penis drawing because a student had requested it, she made the

14
other drawings after students who were given a choice asked for a

penis drawing, she intended the drawings to “lighten the mood” and

not to be sexual or harass any students, the drawings occurred over

a two-hour period near the end of the school year and involved

seventeen- and eighteen-year-old graduating seniors, and only one

student complained. The ALJ also submitted that the district

hadn’t promptly investigated the student complaint as required by

policies GBAA and AC.

¶ 33 The school board disagreed, concluding that Roetto’s conduct

constituted neglect of duty because she “fail[ed] to comply with

[district] policies” created to maintain a safe and secure learning

environment and, “by doing so[,] negatively impacted the learning

environments for [Fairview] students.” The board further reasoned,

“[It] expects that teachers will create learning environments that are

free of harassment, including sexual harassment, and that they will

maintain appropriate boundaries with students” and “expect[s] that

students of all ages served by the [district] will have teachers who

do not engage in conduct, like making drawings of genitalia, that is

specifically prohibited by [district] [p]olicy.”

15
¶ 34 As before, whether Roetto’s conduct amounted to neglect of

duty was a question of ultimate fact for the school board to resolve.

See Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1292. And, as before, the board’s

conclusion that Roetto violated district policies is both reasonable

and supported by the ALJ’s findings of evidentiary fact.

¶ 35 Roetto nonetheless raises two arguments challenging the

board’s decision. First, she argues that the board failed to consider

the totality of the circumstances, as required by policies GBEB-R

and JBB. But there is no indication that the board didn’t consider

the totality of the circumstances. It simply focused on facts

different from those the ALJ had highlighted, as was its prerogative.

See id. (concluding that a school board “properly exercised its

statutory prerogative when, after adopting the hearing officer’s

findings of evidentiary fact . . . , it nonetheless made a finding of

ultimate fact that [a teacher] was guilty of neglect of duty and

ordered her dismissal over the hearing officer’s recommendation of

retention”).

¶ 36 And second, Roetto argues that the school district violated its

own policies requiring a prompt investigation by delaying its

investigation until the following school year. But under the

16
circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the school board

was bound by the ALJ’s supposition that the district waited too long

to start its investigation. While the board was bound by the

underlying findings of evidentiary fact as to the timeline of events,

the issue of whether the timing of the investigation was sufficiently

“prompt” to comply with the policies is, at the very least, a mixed

question of law and fact properly determined by the board. See

Ritzert, ¶¶ 24, 30; Flaming, 938 P.2d at 157-58. And although we

sympathize with Roetto’s arguments that the district should have

begun the investigation more promptly and should have interviewed

the students involved, we cannot say as a matter of law that the

board’s resolution of this issue was arbitrary and capricious or

otherwise contrary to law. Nor does Roetto explain what impact the

district’s failure to conduct a more timely or more thorough

investigation might have had on the ultimate finding, based on the

investigative results, that Roetto was subject to dismissal.

¶ 37 Accordingly, we conclude that Roetto has not shown that the

school board’s ultimate finding as to neglect of duty was arbitrary,

capricious, or otherwise legally impermissible.

17
D. Immorality

¶ 38 For purposes of section 22-63-301, immorality is conduct that

indicates a teacher’s unfitness to teach based on past harm or likely

future harm to the school community. Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1117. In

determining fitness to teach, a school board may consider the

factors set out in Weissman v. Board of Education, including the age

and maturity of the teacher’s students, the likelihood that the

teacher’s conduct had an adverse effect on those students, the

degree of that adversity, the proximity or remoteness in time of the

conduct, any extenuating or aggravating circumstances

surrounding the conduct, the likelihood the conduct may be

repeated, the motives underlying the conduct, and the extent to

which discipline may have a chilling effect upon the rights of the

teacher or other teachers. 547 P.2d 1267, 1273 (Colo. 1976).

¶ 39 The ALJ recommended finding that Roetto’s conduct didn’t

impact her fitness to teach. Considering the Weissman fitness-to-

teach factors, the ALJ noted, among other things, that Roetto only

offered the penis drawing to seniors who were seventeen or eighteen

years old; the conduct was unlikely to be repeated; Roetto’s intent

was to be humorous; Roetto had been a teacher for twenty years

18
with only one informal disciplinary issue; the adverse impact on the

complaining student was “minimal,” as she was excused from her

last three classes with Roetto before graduation; and there was no

indication the conduct had impacted anyone else.

¶ 40 Nonetheless, the school board concluded that “statutory

grounds exist[ed] to find [that Roetto] engaged in immorality by

failing to comply with [district] policies and engaging in misconduct

towards students that [wa]s likely to harm the school community.”

The board explained that, of the ten students who had Roetto draw

penises on their papers, one said he wasn’t bothered and one

reported the conduct the same day and never went back to that

class. The board further noted that it “[could] not assume that

none of the other students were or that future students would not

be adversely affected because of their age or because a teacher was

trying to be humorous.” The board also explained that “[s]tudents

are entitled to learning environments free of harassing and

potentially harmful conduct.”

¶ 41 As with the other cited grounds, whether Roetto’s conduct

constituted immorality was a question of ultimate fact for the school

board to resolve. See Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1118-19. And “[a]lthough

19
the determination . . . is subject to judicial review, considerable

discretion is left in the [school board] to define the limits of such

broad general grounds as . . . ‘immorality[]’ in the educational

context.” Blair v. Lovett, 582 P.2d 668, 672 (Colo. 1978).

¶ 42 Roetto contends that the school board failed to sufficiently

explain the basis for its ultimate finding and failed to demonstrate

that it considered the relevant factors. We disagree. The board

explained that its primary concern was ensuring that students have

a learning environment free of harassing and potentially harmful

conduct. And as part of its reasoning, it referenced almost all the

Weissman factors as follows:

• The age and maturity of the teacher’s students and the

likelihood that the teacher’s conduct had an adverse

effect on those students — The board said it couldn’t

assume that none of the eight students who received

penis drawings and didn’t say anything about them

weren’t adversely affected merely because of their age.

• The degree of any adversity — The board noted that while

one student said he wasn’t bothered by Roetto’s conduct,

20
another student reported it and never went back to

Roetto’s class.

• The proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct —

The board noted that the student who reported the

incident did so on the very same day.

• Any extenuating or aggravating circumstances

surrounding the conduct — The board highlighted that

Roetto’s conduct violated district policies.

• The likelihood the conduct may be repeated — The board

didn’t expressly consider whether Roetto might engage in

similar conduct in the future, but it alluded to the

potential harm that future students might suffer if she

were to do so.

• The motives underlying the conduct — The board found

that it couldn’t discount the adverse effects of Roetto’s

conduct just because she was trying to be humorous.

See Weissman, 547 P.2d at 1273.

¶ 43 Although we are troubled by the board’s speculation as to the

potential adverse impact Roetto’s conduct may have had on the

eight students who were never asked about the penis drawings, we

21
acknowledge that the board found the investigation to be sufficient

and that the board’s ultimate finding on the issue of immorality

relies on the relevant factors and is supported by the ALJ’s findings

of evidentiary fact. See Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1118; Flaming, 938 P.2d

at 158. Accordingly, we conclude that Roetto has not shown that

the board’s ultimate immorality finding was arbitrary, capricious, or

otherwise legally impermissible.

E. Other Good and Just Cause

¶ 44 Other good and just cause includes any cause for dismissal

that “bear[s] a reasonable relationship to [a] teacher’s fitness to

discharge [their] duties” or that “materially and substantially affects

performance.” Flaming, 938 P.2d at 159 (quoting Fredrickson v.

Denv. Pub. Sch Dist. No. 1, 819 P.2d 1068, 1073 (Colo. App. 1991)).

School boards may apply the Weissman fitness-to-teach factors in

assessing other good and just cause. Id. at 160.

¶ 45 In his recommendation, the ALJ indicated his belief that

Roetto’s actions “d[id] not bear a reasonable relationship to her

fitness to discharge her duties” and “d[id] not materially or

substantially affect her performance.”

¶ 46 Rejecting that recommendation, the school board concluded,

22
It is hard to understand how a teacher can
discharge their duties to teach if a student
finds the conduct sufficiently offensive to
warrant not attending class for the rest of the
school year, even if that only means a few
days. All of our students deserve schools and
classrooms that challenge them intellectually
and academically, while supporting them
emotionally. At a minimum, this means not
being subjected to sexual harassment by a
teacher and adult misconduct. The [b]oard
finds that statutory grounds exist to find
[Roetto’s] conduct constitutes other good and
just cause.

¶ 47 Again deferring to the school board’s determination of the

ultimate issue, we conclude that the evidentiary facts and the

board’s reasoning sufficiently support its decision. See Flaming,

938 P.2d at 160. As before, the board was justified in concluding

that Roetto’s conduct constituted sexual harassment within the

meaning of district policy, in being concerned about the student

who found the conduct sufficiently offensive to ask to be excused

from Roetto’s class for the rest of the school year (even though that

was only a few days), and in endeavoring to create an environment

where students are supported emotionally without being subjected

to harassment and misconduct.

23
¶ 48 Therefore, we conclude Roetto has not shown that the school

board’s ultimate finding as to other good and just cause was

arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise legally impermissible.

III. Hearsay Evidence

¶ 49 Roetto also contends that the ALJ’s erroneous admission of

hearsay evidence at the hearing warrants reversal. We disagree.

¶ 50 “In a hearing of this nature, the rules of evidence are

somewhat relaxed and hearsay testimony may be allowed.”

Mondragon v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 696 P.2d 831, 834 (Colo. App.

1984). Moreover, “[r]eversal is proper only if . . . inadmissible

hearsay is the sole evidence relied upon by the finder of fact.” Id.

¶ 51 Roetto challenges the ALJ’s admission of (1) an investigative

report with summaries of witness interviews from the district’s

investigation and (2) an incident report written by the complaining

student — who did not testify at the hearing — stating that Roetto

drew a penis on her form and that she left the class afterward

because she found the situation “very random and awkward.” Even

assuming this evidence was erroneously admitted, Roetto hasn’t

shown that it warrants reversal.

24
¶ 52 In particular, as to the student’s incident report, there is

other, unchallenged evidence regarding the same facts. Specifically,

Dr. Chopin and the district employee relations investigator both

testified at the hearing that the student reported Roetto’s conduct

and, upon request, was allowed not to return to Roetto’s classroom

for the remainder of the year. Roetto also acknowledged that she

drew a penis on the complaining student’s paper and that the

student didn’t return to her class for the rest of the year. And

Roetto doesn’t cite any other facts that she claims were presented

through hearsay evidence that were not established through other

admissible evidence at the hearing.

¶ 53 Thus, even if the ALJ erred by admitting the challenged

evidence, there was substantial other evidence supporting the same

facts. Accordingly, Roetto hasn’t shown that any error warrants

reversal. See id.; see also Benke v. Neenan, 658 P.2d 860, 862

(Colo. 1983) (even if the hearing officer erred by allowing hearsay

25
evidence, it was harmless because “there was ample, direct and

substantial evidence to support” his factual findings).1

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 54 Roetto requests reimbursement of her reasonable attorney fees

and costs pursuant to section 22-63-302(e), which allows teachers

to recover their fees and costs if they are ordered reinstated by this

court and the nonprevailing party’s defense on appeal lacked

substantial justification. Because we affirm the school board’s

dismissal, Roetto isn’t entitled to an award of fees and costs under

the statute. Therefore, we deny her request.

V. Disposition

¶ 55 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

1 We decline to consider Roetto’s argument concerning violation of

the Confrontation Clause, as she neither develops the argument nor
cites any legal authority supporting it. See Galiant Homes, LLC v.
Herlik, 2025 COA 3, ¶ 14 (“We . . . will not ‘consider undeveloped
and unsupported arguments.’” (quoting Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v.
Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 41 n.12)).

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