Marriage of Brown

24CA1954 Marriage of Brown 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1954
City and County of Broomfield District Court No. 22DR30023
Honorable Mark D. Warner, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Jason Matthew Brown,

Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

and

Kimberly Quigley Brown,

Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Pawar and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 5, 2026

Ciancio Ciancio Brown, P.C., Melinda S. Moses, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant and Cross-Appellee

Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, Mechelle Y. Faulk, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellee and Cross-Appellant
¶1 Jason Matthew Brown (husband) appeals and Kimberly

Quigley Brown (wife) cross-appeals the district court’s judgment

that dissolved their marriage. We affirm and remand the case for

further proceedings on the parties’ requests for appellate attorney

fees and costs under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 The parties married in 1996. During the marriage, husband

and his business partners started a construction company called

Basement Partners. Husband later expanded his business

operations to real estate development. He and other investors

purchased properties through separate entities, and they used

Basement Partners to construct homes on the properties. In 2013,

wife, who for the previous ten years had served as a homemaker for

the family, started a real estate brokerage company called 40th

Parallel. 40th Parallel worked exclusively with husband to sell the

homes constructed through his development ventures.

¶3 In 2024, the district court dissolved the marriage and entered

permanent orders. The court allocated the marital estate as follows

(with all figures rounded to the nearest hundred):

1
Marital Value Husband Wife

Real Estate $1,661,000 $475,800 $1,185,200

Bank Accounts1 $32,500 $7,400 $25,100

Retirement $1,746,000 $989,500 $756,500
Accounts
Investment $2,471,200 $1,153,200 $1,318,000
Accounts
Businesses and $1,051,500 $850,000 $201,500
Miscellaneous
Assets
Debts ($910,400) ($455,200) ($455,200)

Dissipated $186,000 $23,500 $162,500
Assets
TOTAL $6,237,800 $3,044,200 $3,193,600

¶4 Moving to maintenance, the court determined that husband’s

gross income was $36,000 per month, which represented a six-year

average of his adjusted income from Basement Partners and the

real estate development companies. The court determined that

wife’s gross income was $11,000 per month, using an average

salary for a comparable professional. It then directed husband to

pay wife $7,000 per month in maintenance for ten years.

1 The court’s calculation of the bank account division was slightly

off due to a math error. The court evenly split a bank account
worth $5,325, which equates to $2,662.50 each (which would
round to $2,663), but the spreadsheet lists $2,263 for each spouse.

2
II. Property Division

¶5 Both parties challenge aspects of the district court’s allocation

of marital property. We see no reversible error.

A. Standard of Review

¶6 The district court has latitude to equitably divide the marital

estate based on the facts and circumstances of the case. § 14-10-

113(1), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M,

¶ 19. We will not disturb the court’s allocation absent a showing

that it abused its discretion. Collins, ¶ 19. A court abuses its

discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unfair, or a misapplication of the law. In re Marriage of Medeiros,

2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28.

B. Overall Allocation

¶7 The district court divided the marital assets and debts

between the parties, resulting in wife receiving about $150,000

more than husband. Husband contends that the court’s

disproportionate allocation was inequitable. We disagree.

¶8 When dividing the marital estate, the district court considers

the relevant factors and allocates assets and debts in such

proportion as it deems just, ensuring an equitable, but not

3
necessarily equal, property division. See § 14-10-113(1); In re

Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 9.

¶9 The court recognized that “[t]he division of property must be

equitable, not equal” and, thus, that it was “not required to offset

for all marital property awarded to either party.” It also found that

“both parties contributed relatively equivalently to the marital

estate.” See § 14-10-113(1)(a). The court noted husband’s financial

contributions to the marriage and found that wife had contributed

both financially and as a homemaker. The court further recognized

that, at that time, husband’s financial circumstances surpassed

wife’s, noting his significantly higher income. See § 14-10-113(1)(c).

¶ 10 The court weighed these factors and evidently determined that

an allocation slightly increased for wife was equitable. Although the

court didn’t expressly address its slightly unequal allocation, we are

not convinced that it failed to sufficiently explain its decision. See

In re Marriage of Bookout, 833 P.2d 800, 805 (Colo. App. 1991).

And we conclude that, under the circumstances, the court’s

decision was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. See

In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 538 (Colo. 1995) (“[A]n

appellate court must not disturb the delicate balance achieved by

4
the [district] court in [its] division of property . . . unless there has

been a clear abuse of discretion.”).

C. 40th Parallel’s Marital Value

¶ 11 Husband contends that the district court erred by finding that

40th Parallel, wife’s real estate brokerage company, had a value of

$25,500. We see no error.

¶ 12 Valuing a marital asset is within the district court’s discretion.

In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23. The court may select

one party’s valuation over the other party’s, or it may make its own

determination. Id. If the court’s value is reasonable in light of the

evidence as a whole, we will not disturb it. Id.

¶ 13 The parties’ joint expert reported that 40th Parallel was

established with the sole intent of acting as the exclusive listing

agency for husband’s real estate projects with the development

companies. The joint expert said that if husband ended that

relationship, the value of 40th Parallel would be limited to the value

of its tangible assets. Wife claimed that this was the most

appropriate way to value 40th Parallel. She also testified that

husband could terminate their listing agreement at any time.

5
¶ 14 The court found that 40th Parallel’s business relationship with

husband “will end,” and it determined that, in accordance with the

present value of the company’s tangible assets, 40th Parallel was

worth $25,500.

¶ 15 Husband nonetheless argues that, when determining 40th

Parallel’s value, the court failed to consider the potential

commissions wife could earn from her listing agreement with

husband for the homes constructed by his real estate development

company, which could be about $650,000 over the next four to six

years. But, as discussed below, the court declined to include wife’s

potential future commissions in 40th Parallel’s value because it

found, with record support, that the business relationship with

husband would not continue.

¶ 16 The court thus acted within its discretion in valuing 40th

Parallel based solely on its tangible assets. And husband directs us

to no legal authority that required the court to include the potential

future commissions in 40th Parallel’s value (or in wife’s income).

See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105,

¶ 29 (declining to address an undeveloped argument); see also

6
§ 14-10-113(5) (requiring the court to value property as of the date

of the permanent orders hearing if it precedes the decree).

D. Other Alleged Property Division Errors

¶ 17 The parties also raise other challenges to the district court’s

property division. Husband claims the court erred by finding that

he dissipated $23,500 from the marital estate, allocating 40th

Parallel to both parties, misallocating a bank account, and not

allocating wife’s $38,000 in cash. And wife claims the court erred

by omitting the parties’ interests in RFID, a startup software

company, and JSLP, a build-for-rent development company. We

disagree with many of the parties’ contentions, but even if the court

erred in some respects, we conclude that any errors, individually

and collectively, are harmless.

1. Husband’s Dissipation

¶ 18 The district court found that husband dissipated $23,500

from the marital estate for his improper spending during the

dissolution proceedings on trips with his new significant other.

Husband contends that this was error because no evidence showed

that he spent this money improperly or for illegitimate purposes.

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¶ 19 In extreme cases, the court may consider a party’s economic

fault when dividing the marital estate. § 14-10-113(1); In re

Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 75. Economic fault may include

a party’s dissipation of marital assets for an improper or illegitimate

purpose in contemplation of divorce. Smith, ¶ 75.

¶ 20 The court did little to explain how husband’s spending rose to

the level of economic fault. However, even if we were to assume

that the court erred by finding that husband dissipated $23,500, as

we explain in more detail below, any error by the court amounted to

such a small portion of the marital estate that it was harmless. See

C.A.R. 35(c).

2. 40th Parallel’s Allocation

¶ 21 Husband next contends that the court misallocated the

$25,500 value of 40th Parallel by attributing that value to both

husband and wife in its property division spreadsheet. While the

court mistakenly included the value of this asset under each party’s

column on the spreadsheet, the court unambiguously allocated

40th Parallel to wife in its written judgment. (The court adopted a

transcript of its oral ruling as its written permanent orders

judgment.) Husband doesn’t dispute that the court properly

8
allocated 40th Parallel to wife in its permanent orders, and to the

extent that the spreadsheet may conflict, the written judgment

prevails. Cf. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 16

(recognizing that a written order prevails when there is a conflict).

3. KeyBank Account

¶ 22 The court allocated a $17,600 KeyBank account to wife. This

bank account was associated with a limited liability company

created by the parties for their vacation property. Husband argues

that the court misallocated the bank account because the court

split the equity of the vacation property (allocating sixty percent to

husband and forty percent to wife) and should have adhered to the

same allocation for the bank account.

¶ 23 However, the court acted within its broad discretion in

allocating the vacation property separately from the KeyBank

account. Husband directs us to no legal authority that required the

court to allocate these two assets in the exact same manner. See

S.Z.S., ¶ 29. Nor does he show that the court abused its discretion

by allocating the KeyBank account entirely to wife. See Hunt, 909

P.2d at 538; Collins, ¶ 19.

9
4. $38,000 in Cash

¶ 24 Husband highlights that, at the hearing, wife admitted that

she had in her possession $38,000 in cash, and he argues that the

court failed to include this money in its allocation of the marital

estate. Although the court didn’t directly allocate that $38,000,

again, as we explain below, any error from the court’s omission

doesn’t rise to the level of reversible error. See C.A.R. 35(c).

5. RFID

¶ 25 Wife contends that the court erred by not allocating the

parties’ interest in RFID. Although the court didn’t mention RFID

in its written permanent orders, the court informed the parties that

it would send them a spreadsheet of its property division. And in

that spreadsheet, the court allocated RFID by directing the parties

to “SPLIT” the asset. While the court didn’t formally enter the

spreadsheet into the court file, wife doesn’t dispute the contents of

the court’s spreadsheet, and when, as here, the spreadsheet doesn’t

conflict with the written judgment, the spreadsheet may

supplement the judgment. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022

COA 80, ¶ 9 n.1. We therefore are not persuaded that the court’s

omission of RFID from its written permanent orders or its failure to

10
formally adopt the spreadsheet in the court file warrants reversing

the judgment.

6. JSLP

¶ 26 Wife also contends that the court failed to allocate the parties’

interest in JSLP. It is true that the court didn’t specifically mention

JSLP in its property division. But at the hearing, neither party

presented evidence on JSLP’s present value and husband explained

that it was just an income-generating asset. Importantly, the

parties also told the court that they agreed to split this asset.

¶ 27 In its permanent orders, the court acknowledged that the

parties had reached “many stipulated distributions,” and it

indicated that it wouldn’t disturb their stipulations. The court thus

implicitly accepted the parties’ agreement to split the equity from

JSLP and allocated the asset accordingly. See S.Z.S., ¶ 21

(recognizing that a court’s finding may be implicit); In re Marriage of

Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 815 (Colo. App. 2007) (noting that it’s the

parties’ duty to present the court with the data needed to make a

valuation).

11
7. Harmless Error

¶ 28 In any event, a court’s errors in the marital property division

are reversible only when the aggregate effect of the errors affects the

parties’ substantial rights. See C.A.R. 35(c); In re Marriage of

Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 36 (Colo. 2001). Therefore, errors that affect

only a small percentage of the overall marital estate are harmless

and don’t warrant reversing the court’s judgment. See Balanson,

25 P.3d at 38 (suggesting that property division errors affecting less

than two percent of the marital estate are harmless but errors

affecting over twenty percent are not); see also In re Marriage of

Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 957, 959 (Colo. App. 2009) (upholding the

district court’s refusal to use an expert’s valuation of property that

would have increased the marital estate by only 6.6%, in part

because it didn’t materially impact the property division).

¶ 29 Even if we were to assume that the court misallocated or

improperly omitted any of the marital assets discussed above, we

conclude that such errors were harmless. When we consider the

purported errors individually and in combination, they affect a

small percentage of the over $6.2 million marital estate.

Concerning the assets disputed by husband, the values of those

12
purported errors were $23,500 for his dissipation, $25,500 for 40th

Parallel, $17,600 for the KeyBank account, and $38,000 for wife’s

cash. This totals $104,600, which is only 1.7% of the marital

estate. And for the assets contested by wife, the record reveals that,

at most, RFID was worth $50,000 and JSLP was worth about

$162,000. Together, these assets amount to only 3.4% of the

marital estate.

¶ 30 In sum, the court allocated the marital estate within its

discretion, and any errors the court may have committed were

harmless.

III. Maintenance

¶ 31 Husband and wife both challenge the district court’s ruling on

maintenance. Husband contends that the court didn’t make

sufficient findings in support of its decision and incorrectly

determined the parties’ gross incomes. Wife contends that the

court erred by not ordering husband to secure his maintenance

obligation with a life insurance policy. We reject both parties’

contentions.

13
A. Standard of Review

¶ 32 We review a district court’s determination on maintenance for

an abuse of discretion and will not disturb the court’s decision

absent a showing that the court acted in a manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair manner or that it misapplied the law.

Medeiros, ¶¶ 28, 58.

B. Sufficient Findings

¶ 33 The district court made the necessary maintenance findings, it

sufficiently explained its decision, and the record supports that

decision. We therefore disagree with husband’s contention that

maintenance must be reversed for inadequate findings.

¶ 34 When a district court considers maintenance, it must first

make findings on the parties’ incomes, the distribution of marital

property, the parties’ financial resources, their reasonable financial

needs established during the marriage, and the taxability of any

maintenance awarded. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A)-(E), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 35 Then, the court must consider an amount and term of

maintenance, if any, that is fair and equitable. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II).

To do so, the court considers a nonexclusive list of statutory

factors, and, as relevant here, it may consider the statutory

14
guidelines on the term of maintenance. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(B),

(3)(c); see also § 14-10-114(3.5) (describing the guideline

methodology for parties with combined annual adjusted gross

incomes exceeding $240,000). Before awarding maintenance, the

court must determine that the requesting party lacks sufficient

property to provide for their reasonable needs and is unable to

support themself through appropriate employment. § 14-10-

114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d).

¶ 36 In this case, the court found that

• wife’s gross income was $11,000 per month and

husband’s gross income was $36,000 per month, see

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (3)(a)(I)(C), (3)(c)(I)-(II);

• each party received “a fair amount” of the over $6.2

million marital estate, see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(B),

(3)(a)(I)(C), (3)(c)(I)-(II), (3)(c)(IV);

• the parties “lived comfortably,” “enjoyed stable housing in

a desirable neighborhood,” and were able to meet “the

needs of the family,” see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(D), (3)(c)(III);

and

15
• maintenance was not taxable or tax deductible, see

§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(E), (3)(c)(XII).

¶ 37 Then, addressing the additional relevant statutory factors, the

court found that

• the parties were in good health, roughly the same age,

and about ten years away from the typical age of

retirement, see § 14-10-114(3)(c)(IX);

• the parties contributed “relatively equivalently to the

marital estate,” see § 14-10-114(3)(c)(X);

• wife had reported “several inflated expenses,” see

§ 14-10-114(3)(c)(I); and

• the marital property allocated to wife didn’t eliminate her

need for maintenance, see § 14-10-114(3)(c)(IV), (3)(d).

¶ 38 Based on this record, we conclude that the court made the

required findings, addressed relevant statutory factors, and

provided us with a sufficient understanding of the basis of its

decision to award wife $7,000 per month in maintenance for ten

years. See § 14-10-114(3)(e); see also In re Marriage of Wright, 2020

COA 11, ¶ 20 (noting that the district court must give the reviewing

court a clear understanding of the basis of its maintenance order,

16
but it “has no obligation to make specific factual findings on every

factor listed in section 14-10-114(3)(c)”).

¶ 39 Moreover, because the record supports the court’s

maintenance award, we will not disturb it. See In re Marriage of

Atencio, 47 P.3d 718, 722 (Colo. App. 2002). The evidence showed

that the parties were married for twenty-eight years; wife stayed at

home to care for the family for over ten years; and while wife

returned to the work force in 2013, husband historically earned a

higher income and at the time still earned more than three times as

much as wife. And wife testified that she was unable to meet her

reasonable needs without maintenance. She also explained that

her earnings from 40th Parallel relied on the exclusive real estate

listing agreement she had with husband and that she was unsure

whether their business relationship could continue.

¶ 40 Husband disputes the ten-year maintenance term, but under

the statutory guidelines, when a marriage exceeds twenty years,

“the court shall not specify a maintenance term that is less than”

ten years, unless it makes specific findings to support a reduced

term. § 14-10-114(3)(b)(II)(A)-(B), (3.5). The parties’ marriage

17
exceeded twenty years, and the court made no findings to support

reducing the statutory ten-year term.

¶ 41 Husband also argues that wife didn’t meet the threshold need

for maintenance. See § 14-10-114(3)(d). However, it was for the

district court, not us, to evaluate the conflicting evidence on this

issue. See Thorburn, ¶ 49 (“[C]redibility determinations and the

weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as

the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are matters

within the sole discretion of the [district] court.” (alterations in

original) (quoting In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo.

App. 2003))). We may not reweigh that evidence and set aside the

court’s decision when, as here, it has record support. See In re

Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 45.

¶ 42 Husband further argues that the court’s maintenance

determination was inconsistent with its finding that wife had

“several inflated expenses” on her sworn financial statement, in

which she reported monthly expenses that totaled over $30,000.

But a party’s reasonable needs for purposes of maintenance are not

limited to an amount that merely satisfies their basic needs. In re

Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 313 (Colo. App. 2006). The court

18
liberally construed wife’s reasonable needs based on the facts and

circumstances, including the parties’ “comfortabl[e]” lifestyle, and it

determined that $7,000 per month was a fair and equitable

maintenance amount. See § 14-10-114(3)(e); Yates, 148 P.3d at

313; see also In re Marriage of Thornhill, 232 P.3d 782, 789 (Colo.

2010) (recognizing that the parties’ standard of living during the

marriage may be a “starting point” for the court’s determination of a

party’s reasonable needs). Even husband acknowledged that wife’s

needs were at least $13,000 per month.

¶ 43 Husband next claims that the court “did not address” the

future commissions wife could earn from her listing agreement with

husband for the homes being constructed for his present

development company. Not so. The court found that “[a]ssuming”

those homes sell “over the next four to six years,” wife could receive

“approximately $650,000” in commissions, which could be

attributed to the value of 40th Parallel or to wife’s future income.

But the court went on to find that, due to the divorce, the business

relationship with husband’s development company “will end,” and it

declined to speculate that the commissions would continue. The

court therefore addressed the potential future commissions and did

19
not find that they alleviated wife’s need for maintenance. See

§ 14-10-114(3)(c)(I), (V), (3)(d).

¶ 44 To the extent that husband further contests the court’s

consideration of the parties’ respective incomes, we discern no error

and will further address those contentions in our discussion below

on the court’s income determinations.

¶ 45 In sum, the court’s findings are supported by the record,

adhered to the statute, and sufficiently explained the court’s

maintenance decision.

C. Husband’s Income

¶ 46 Husband contends that the district court improperly

determined his gross income by including his total income from the

real estate development companies and using an average of his total

income over the past six years. We disagree.

¶ 47 When considering maintenance, the district court must

determine the parties’ gross income. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A),

(8)(a)(II). A party’s gross income may include income from

partnerships, closely held corporations, or limited liability

companies “except that, if a party is a passive investor, has a

minority interest in the company, and does not have any

20
managerial duties or input, then the income to be recognized may

be limited to actual cash distributions received.” § 14-10-

114(8)(c)(I)(W). If a party’s income fluctuates or there is conflicting

evidence regarding the amount, the court may, in its discretion, use

an average of the party’s past income. Capparelli, ¶ 32.

¶ 48 The court found that wife’s expert witness, Tiffany Nelson,

provided “the most credible” evidence on husband’s gross income,

and, in accordance with Nelson’s opinion, determined that his gross

income was $36,000 per month.

¶ 49 Nelson opined that husband’s income, which came from

Basement Partners and the development companies, should not be

limited to the actual cash distributions he received. Nelson

explained that husband was not a passive investor in the entities,

and she described that (1) husband was president and CEO at

Basement Partners; (2) he managed all of the development projects;

(3) Basement Partners and the development companies were

“commingled”; and (4) the parties’ income tax returns categorized

the income as “non-passive.” Nelson also opined that “the best

measurement” for determining husband’s income was an average of

“the last six years . . . of income [from] Basement Partners and the

21
real estate development companies,” and Nelson reported that this

six-year average was $36,000 per month.

¶ 50 In challenging the court’s determination and its reliance on

Nelson’s opinion, husband highlights that his expert witness

disagreed with Nelson. He notes that his expert opined that

husband was a passive investor and that the distributions from the

development companies should be split between husband and wife

because they jointly invested in the companies. However, the court

weighed the experts’ differing opinions, and it was persuaded that

the most credible amount for husband’s income was $36,000 per

month. We may not disturb its resolution of the conflicting

evidence. See Thorburn, ¶ 49; Evans, ¶ 45; see also Bookout, 833

P.2d at 804 (“The weight to be accorded to the valuation techniques

of an expert is for the [district] court’s determination . . . .”).

¶ 51 Nor do we agree with husband that the court abused its

discretion by using a six-year average of his income. Even

husband’s expert agreed that it was appropriate to use a six-year

average because it aligned with the “lifetime” of the real estate

development projects. See Capparelli, ¶ 32. We therefore will not

disturb the court’s income finding.

22
D. Wife’s Income

¶ 52 Husband next contends that the court reversibly erred by

determining that wife’s gross income was $11,000 per month

because it failed to include the earnings from the investment

accounts allocated to her. We see no basis to reverse.

¶ 53 To be sure, a party’s gross income may include dividends,

interest, and capital gains. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(F), (K), (N); In re

Marriage of Schaefer, 2022 COA 112, ¶ 15. But it is the parties’

duty to present the court with the requisite data, and their failure

to do so doesn’t provide them with grounds for reversal. See

Rodrick, 176 P.3d at 815.

¶ 54 Nelson’s report noted that, historically, the parties received

interest, dividends, and capital gains from their investment

accounts and that, in 2022, these earnings totaled over $236,000.

Beyond that report, the evidence on the parties’ investment

earnings was sparse, and neither party presented evidence on their

investment earnings in 2023 or 2024. Given the limited evidence

on the parties’ present earnings from their investment accounts, we

are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion by not

23
including interest, dividends, and capital gains in its determination

of wife’s gross income. See id.

¶ 55 In any event, husband received an approximately equal share

of the investment accounts, and the court, likewise, omitted

investment earnings from its determination of his gross income.

And husband doesn’t explain why any absence of investment

earnings in its determination of wife’s gross income (that were

equally absent from husband’s gross income) “substantially

influenced the outcome of the case.” In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning E.E.L-T., 2024 COA 12, ¶ 30.

¶ 56 We therefore will not disturb the court’s finding on wife’s gross

income.

E. Life Insurance as Security

¶ 57 For her part, wife contends that the district court erred by not

requiring that husband maintain a life insurance policy to secure

his maintenance obligation. We disagree.

¶ 58 The district court may, in its discretion, order a party to

provide reasonable security for the payment of maintenance, which

may include directing a party to obtain life insurance. § 14-10-

114(6)(a)-(b); § 14-10-118(2), C.R.S. 2025; Evans, ¶ 68.

24
¶ 59 While wife generally asked the court to order husband to

maintain life insurance as security for his maintenance obligation,

she did little to develop a factual basis showing a need for such

security or the availability or rates of it. See § 14-10-114(6)(b)(I)-(VI)

(enumerating the factors the court must consider when entering an

order for life insurance). Moreover, the court found, with record

support, that the parties were about the same age and neither party

was in poor health. See § 14-10-114(6)(b)(I).

¶ 60 Given the limited evidence, the court reasonably determined,

albeit implicitly, that wife didn’t establish a valid basis to order that

husband maintain a life insurance policy to secure his maintenance

obligation. See S.Z.S., ¶ 21; Rodrick, 176 P.3d at 815.

IV. Attorney Fees and Costs in the District Court

¶ 61 We next reject husband’s contention that the district court

erred by denying his request to equalize the parties’ attorney fees

and costs under section 14-10-119.

¶ 62 Section 14-10-119 empowers the district court to equitably

apportion attorney fees and costs between the parties based on

their relative ability to pay. In re Marriage of Gutfreund, 148 P.3d

136, 141 (Colo. 2006); see also In re Marriage of Burford, 26 P.3d

25
550, 559 (Colo. App. 2001) (explaining that the court may apportion

attorney fees and costs under section 14-10-119 but not through its

property division). We will not disturb the court’s denial of a

request for attorney fees and costs absent a showing that the court

abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Aragon, 2019 COA 76, ¶ 8.

¶ 63 Husband argued that wife spent over $276,000 on attorney

fees and expert witnesses. He argued that her spending was

excessive, and that, given that he spent only $41,000 on his own

attorney fees and costs, the court should equalize their litigation

expenses. The court denied his request.

¶ 64 Husband focused on the difference in the amount of their

attorney fees and costs, but he didn’t establish that a disparity in

their financial circumstances warranted equalizing the litigation

expenses. The purpose of section 14-10-119 is to ensure that

neither party suffers undue economic hardship due to the divorce

proceedings. In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370, 1377-78

(Colo. 1997). The parties had significant financial resources, each

party used those resources to pay their own litigation expenses, and

husband acknowledges that “the parties were on equal footing

financially throughout the litigation.” The mere fact that wife spent

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more than husband did not establish a proper basis to equalize

their attorney fees and costs. See id.

¶ 65 Moreover, the court found, with record support, that wife’s

attorney fees and costs were not unreasonable under the

circumstances. It explained that the case presented “complex”

financial issues, husband’s business ventures contributed to that

complexity, and wife had “much at stake” in this litigation.

¶ 66 To the extent that husband suggests the court, in fact,

improperly awarded wife attorney fees and costs under section

14-10-119, the record does not reveal that the court entered such

an order. And husband fails to explain how the court’s denial of his

request to offset the attorney fees and costs meant that it awarded

attorney fees and costs to wife. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

¶ 67 The court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying

husband’s request to equalize attorney fees and costs.

V. Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶ 68 Husband and wife both request an award of appellate attorney

fees and costs based on the purported disparity in their present

financial circumstances. See § 14-10-119. The district court is

better equipped to address the factual issues associated with these

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requests, and we therefore remand this issue to the district court.

See C.A.R. 39.1; Collins, ¶ 86.

¶ 69 Wife also alleges that husband’s appeal lacked substantial

justification and requests attorney fees on that basis. We deny that

request. See Glover v. Serratoga Falls LLC, 2021 CO 77, ¶ 70

(noting that awards of appellate attorney fees for frivolous appeals

should be reserved for clear and unequivocal cases involving

egregious conduct).

VI. Disposition

¶ 70 We affirm the judgment and remand the case to the district

court to address the parties’ requests for appellate attorney fees

under section 14-10-119.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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