Nettles v. ICAO

25CA1835 Nettles v ICAO 02-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1835
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
DD No. 17961-2025

Rashaud Nettles,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado

Respondent.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 19, 2026

Rashaud Nettles, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent
¶1 Rashaud Nettles appeals the denial of his claim for

unemployment benefits. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Nettles worked as a maintenance specialist for General Shale

Brick, Inc. (Employer). Employer discharged Nettles, and he

applied for unemployment insurance benefits. After a deputy for

the Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) denied his

claim, he appealed that decision, and the Division scheduled the

matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding the reasons for Nettles’s

job separation.

¶3 Upon reviewing the evidence, the hearing officer found that

Employer terminated Nettles because he “fail[ed] to report to work

without prior notice on May 6, 2024, after he had failed to report to

work without prior notice on two previous dates.” As a result, the

hearing officer found, Nettles failed to meet the established job

standard of “inform[ing] his supervisor before the start of [his] shift

if he was going to be late or absent.” The hearing officer also found

that, per Employer’s policy, three such failures would result in

termination. Thus, Nettles was disqualified from receiving

unemployment benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX), C.R.S.

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2025 (disqualifying claimants terminated for failure to meet

“established job performance or other defined standards”). Finally,

the hearing officer found that Nettles was “at fault” for his

termination and was thus not otherwise entitled to benefits.

¶4 Nettles appealed to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel),

which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.

II. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶5 Under section 8-74-107, C.R.S. 2025, we may not disturb

factual findings “supported by substantial evidence” and may only

set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in

excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the

factual findings don’t support its decision; or (4) the decision is

erroneous as a matter of law. Substantial evidence is “probative,

credible, and competent, of a character which would warrant a

reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular

finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory testimony

or contrary inferences.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372,

373 (Colo. App. 1977).

¶6 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) disqualifies a claimant from

receiving benefits if his “failure to meet established job performance

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or other defined standards” caused his job separation. To evaluate

cause, the hearing officer considers the totality of the evidence and

determines the motivating factors in the employee’s separation.

Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App.

1989). “All that is required to establish a disqualification pursuant

to [section] 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) is that claimant did not do the job for

which he was hired and which he knew was expected of him.”

Pabst v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 833 P.2d 64, 64-65 (Colo. App.

1992).

¶7 The disqualifying provisions of section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX)

“must be read in light of the express legislative intent . . . to provide

benefits to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’ of their

own.” Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo.

App. 1998) (quoting § 8-73-108(1)(a)). Thus, even if the hearing

officer’s findings may support a disqualification under that

subsection, a claimant may still be entitled to benefits if the totality

of the circumstances establishes that his job separation occurred

through no fault of his own. Id. In this context, “fault” requires a

volitional act or “the exercise of some control or choice by the

claimant in the circumstances resulting in the separation such that

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the claimant can be said to be responsible for the separation.” Id.

A claimant’s responsibility or “fault” for his job separation is an

ultimate legal conclusion based on the established findings of

evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19.

III. Application

¶8 The hearing officer found (and the Panel affirmed) that

Employer’s job performance standards “required employees to

contact their direct supervisor via phone call, text message, or email

before their shift if they knew they would be late or absent.”

Substantial evidence in the record supports this finding, as well as

the finding that Nettles violated this policy. At the hearing,

Employer’s Plant Manager, Houston Walker, testified that Employer

requires employees to notify their supervisor in advance of tardiness

or absence. Walker further testified that he was Nettles’s direct

supervisor, and, by failing to notify Walker of his expected tardiness

or absence on May 6, 2024, as well as his absences on April 22 and

24, 2024, Nettles violated Employer’s notification policy. The

hearing officer reasonably inferred that the policy required

employees to notify their direct supervisor. Substantial evidence

also supports the hearing officer’s finding that Employer’s policy

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mandated termination after three failures to follow the notification

protocol. Indeed, Walker provided direct testimony on this point.

¶9 The hearing officer’s finding that Nettles knew about the

foregoing policy finds substantial support in the record.

Specifically, Walker testified that Nettles was made aware of this

policy through written guidelines, which he received upon starting

his position. According to Walker, Nettles signed a statement

affirming that he read and understood the guidelines. Nettles does

not dispute that he was aware of this policy.

A. Willful Misconduct

¶ 10 Nettles argues that he “provided timely, documented notice of

all absences and delays.” Thus, he argues, the hearing officer erred

by finding (and the Panel erred in affirming) “willful misconduct” by

Nettles. We are not persuaded. First, “willful misconduct” is a legal

term of art with no application in this case, and neither the hearing

officer nor the Panel invoked it. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1193

(12th ed. 2024). Though Nettles cites section 8-73-108(4) as

requiring “willful misconduct,” that term does not appear in that

subsection, nor anywhere else in section 8-73-108. To the extent

Nettles argues that the hearing officer erred by finding that he

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violated Employer’s notification policy, we discern no reversible

error. As noted above, Walker testified that he was Nettles’s direct

supervisor and that Nettles did not provide him advanced notice

that he would miss his shift on May 6. It is undisputed that Nettles

texted Walker before his shift on May 6 stating that he was at the

Department of Motor Vehicles. It is further undisputed that Walker

called Nettles at or around 11:00 a.m. that day. And it is

undisputed that at no point in those communications did Nettles

tell Walker that he would miss his shift. It appears the point of

contention lies in whether Walker was Nettles’s direct supervisor.

At the hearing, Nettles contradicted Walker’s testimony by stating

that another person was his direct supervisor, not Walker.

However, the hearing officer, alone, resolves conflicts in the

evidence. Like the Panel, we may not do so. Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr.

Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2016 COA 96, ¶ 19. Nor may we

second-guess the hearing officer’s credibility determinations.

Sanchez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 COA 71, ¶ 57.

B. Due Process

¶ 11 Next, Nettles appears to argue that the Panel should have

considered documentary evidence Nettles attached to his briefing to

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the Panel but did not present at the hearing.1 By declining to

consider these documents, Nettles argues, the Panel violated his

due process rights. Though he cites section 8-74-102(2), C.R.S.

2025, and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), neither authority

supports his argument. Section 8-74-102(2) discusses

reconsideration of the Division’s monetary determinations (e.g.,

“arithmetic computations, wage amounts, and dates of wage

payments”). We perceive no application to the issues before us.

Goldberg is similarly inapposite. In Goldberg, the Supreme Court

held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

requires that public assistance recipients be provided an

evidentiary hearing before terminating their benefits. Id. at 264,

267. To the extent Goldberg applies in the context of

unemployment benefits, it does not affect the issues before us, as

Nettles received an evidentiary hearing and the opportunity to

1 Nettles references documents (including a May 1, 2025, notice,

and documentation regarding Gilberto Espino-Perez’s role as
Assistant Plant Manager) he provided at “the second hearing.”
However, the agency only held one hearing. By “the second
hearing,” Nettles apparently intends to reference the Panel’s review,
as he attached the foregoing documents to his briefing for the
Panel.

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present all the documents he attached to his Panel briefing. That

he did not do so does not mean the agency denied him due process.

¶ 12 Moreover, as the Panel noted, section 8-74-104(2), C.R.S.

2025, limits its review to evidence presented to the hearing officer.

Nettles does not challenge section 8-74-104(2)’s constitutionality.

C. Espino-Perez

¶ 13 Next, Nettles contends that “the agency’s mischaracterization

of [Gilberto] Espino-Perez fatally undermines its finding regarding

April 22, 2025.” Again, we disagree. Significantly, we note that the

Panel set aside the hearing officer’s finding that Espino-Perez was a

coworker. Nettles does not acknowledge this, nor does he explain

how the Panel erred by nonetheless affirming his disqualification.

We perceive no error. As discussed above, substantial evidence

supports the hearing officer’s finding that the policy required

Nettles to notify his direct supervisor when he would miss a shift.

Walker was his direct supervisor, and Nettles failed to notify Walker

of his absence on April 22. Whether Espino-Perez worked as a

manager is immaterial.

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D. Evidence of Contact

¶ 14 Finally, Nettles contends that “[Walker] admitted under oath

that [Nettles] communicated on all three disputed dates”; yet, the

hearing officer “falsely stated there was ‘no credible evidence’ of

contact.” According to Nettles, “[t]his contradiction invalidates the

ruling.” We note that Nettles provides no record citations, in

violation of C.A.R. 28, and we see no finding of “‘no credible

evidence’ of contact” in either the hearing officer’s or Panel’s orders.

To the contrary, the hearing officer expressly found that Nettles

contacted Walker on the morning of May 6 and that Nettles notified

Espino-Perez regarding his absences on April 22 and 24. However,

mere “contact” is not dispositive here. As discussed above, the

hearing officer found, with supporting substantial evidence, that

Employer’s policy required that Nettles notify his direct supervisor

of any absence before the subject shift. It is undisputed that, as

the hearing officer found, Nettles did not inform Walker that he

would miss his shift on May 6. And the hearing officer found that

Walker, not Espino-Perez, was Nettles’s direct supervisor. It is

undisputed that Nettles did not communicate with Walker on April

22 or 24.

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IV. Disposition

¶ 15 We affirm the Panel’s order.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.

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