Peo v. Geerdes

23CA1740 Peo v Geerdes 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1740
Elbert County District Court No. 15CR67
Honorable Theresa Slade, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Shawn Edward Geerdes,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Fox and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 12, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

April M. Elliott, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Shawn Edward Geerdes, appeals the

postconviction court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for

postconviction relief. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2015, Geerdes shot and killed a business partner after

encountering him in Geerdes’ marijuana greenhouse. Geerdes then

put the body in the victim’s car, drove the car to Jefferson County,

and set the car on fire in a ravine. This led to a wildfire that

resulted in substantial property damage.

¶3 A jury found Geerdes guilty of second degree murder,

intentionally setting a wildfire, and second degree arson — all

felonies. Based on Geerdes’ five prior felony convictions, the trial

court adjudicated him a habitual criminal under Colorado’s

Habitual Criminal Act (the Act). See §§ 18-1.3-801 to -804, C.R.S.

2025. The Act provides that any person who is convicted of a felony

in Colorado and has also been convicted of at least three separate

prior felonies, referred to as predicate offenses, “shall be adjudged

an habitual criminal.” § 18-1.3-801(2)(a)(I). After a court

adjudicates a person a habitual criminal, the court must sentence

them to imprisonment for “four times the maximum of the

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presumptive range” for the underlying felony conviction, also called

a triggering offense. § 18-1.3-801(2)(a)(I)(A).

¶4 Citing the heightened penalties required by the Act, the

prosecution at sentencing requested that the court sentence

Geerdes to ninety-six years in prison for second degree murder,

forty-eight years for intentionally setting the wildfire, and twenty-

four years for arson, with the latter two sentences running

concurrently to one another but consecutively to the sentence for

murder. Geerdes argued that the combined sentences requested by

the prosecution would violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment because they would be

disproportionately long. He also contended that a forty-eight-year

prison sentence for the wildfire charge, by itself, would be

disproportionately long.

¶5 The trial court disagreed with Geerdes and concluded that the

sentences mandated by the Act were proportionate. It therefore

sentenced him to

(1) ninety-six years in the custody of the Department of

Corrections (DOC) with five years of mandatory parole for

second degree murder, a class 2 felony;

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(2) forty-eight years in the custody of DOC with five years of

mandatory parole for intentionally setting a wildfire, a

class 3 felony; and

(3) twenty-four years in the custody of DOC with three years

of mandatory parole for second degree arson, a class 4

felony.

¶6 The court ordered Geerdes to serve the wildfire and arson

sentences concurrently to each other but consecutively to the

murder sentence. In total, the court sentenced Geerdes to 144

years in the custody of DOC.

¶7 Geerdes appealed to this court, asserting evidentiary and jury

instruction errors. See People v. Geerdes, slip op. at ¶ 8 (Colo. App.

No. 17CA1906, June 11, 2020) (not published pursuant to C.A.R.

35(e)). He didn’t raise any proportionality argument. A division of

this court affirmed. Id.

¶8 Geerdes then filed a pro se motion for postconviction review.

The postconviction court appointed counsel, who filed a

supplemental motion for postconviction relief. In the supplemental

motion, Geerdes argued that he was entitled to relief under Crim. P.

35(c)(2)(I) because his sentences were disproportionately harsh.

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¶9 The postconviction court conducted an abbreviated

proportionality review and concluded that Geerdes’ sentences

weren’t grossly disproportionate. It therefore denied Geerdes’

motion.

¶ 10 Geerdes appeals, arguing that the postconviction court applied

an incorrect methodology in performing its abbreviated

proportionality review.

II. Successiveness

¶ 11 The People contend that Geerdes’ postconviction motion is

successive. See People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo.

2006) (“On appeal, a party may defend the trial court’s judgment on

any ground supported by the record, whether relied upon or even

considered by the trial court.”). We agree.

¶ 12 We have discretion to affirm a lower court’s judgment on

grounds different than those relied on by the lower court. See id. at

1277; People v. Hamm, 2019 COA 90, ¶ 23. We review de novo

whether a postconviction motion is successive. People v. Thompson,

2020 COA 117, ¶ 42.

¶ 13 With exceptions not applicable here, we are required to “deny

any claim that could have been presented in an appeal previously

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brought or postconviction proceeding previously brought.” Crim. P.

35(c)(3)(VII); see also People v. McDonald, 2023 COA 23, ¶¶ 7-8, 24

(a postconviction request for a proportionality review is subject to

Crim. P. 35(c)’s successiveness bar), aff’d, 2024 CO 75. Because

Geerdes could have argued that his sentence is grossly

disproportionate in his direct appeal, but didn’t, his claim is

successive. See People v. Isom, 2015 COA 89, ¶¶ 31-32

(constitutional claim that could have been raised on direct appeal

denied as successive), aff’d, 2017 CO 110; see also People v. Loris,

2018 COA 101, ¶¶ 7-32 (analyzing contention, raised for the first

time on direct appeal, that the defendant’s sentence was grossly

disproportionate).

¶ 14 Geerdes nonetheless argues that his claim isn’t successive

because Colorado courts have recognized that proportionality

challenges are better raised and litigated before the district court

rather than on direct appeal. But Geerdes did raise his

proportionality contention before the trial court at sentencing. The

court rejected his argument and he declined to appeal the issue,

rendering his later proportionality claim successive. See Isom, ¶ 32.

Had Geerdes raised his proportionality challenge on direct appeal,

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the division could have remanded the case to the trial court if it

believed that further factual development was necessary. Indeed,

the court in Wells-Yates v. People, which Geerdes cites in support of

this argument, did just that. 2019 CO 90M, ¶ 75 (Wells-Yates I).

¶ 15 Accordingly, we conclude that Geerdes’ proportionality claim is

barred as successive under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII).

III. Proportionality

¶ 16 Even if Geerdes’ proportionality claim weren’t successive, we

would still conclude that his sentences aren’t grossly

disproportionate.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 17 The United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution

prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII;

Colo. Const. art. II, § 20. A criminal sentence constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment, and is therefore unconstitutional, when the

sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to the crime. Wells-Yates I,

¶¶ 5, 10.

¶ 18 To determine whether a habitual criminal sentence is grossly

disproportionate to the crime, a court must first conduct an

abbreviated proportionality review. See id. at ¶¶ 10, 21. The

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abbreviated proportionality review consists of two subparts:

(1) analyzing the gravity or seriousness of each triggering offense

and each predicate offense and (2) considering the harshness of the

sentence imposed on each triggering offense. Id. at ¶ 23. If the

defendant has multiple triggering offenses, the court must evaluate

each sentence individually. Id. at ¶ 24.

¶ 19 Under the first subpart of the abbreviated proportionality

review, a court should consider the harm caused to the victim or to

society and the defendant’s culpability. Id. at ¶ 12. But some

crimes are considered per se grave or serious, and a court need not

perform a fact-focused analysis for those crimes. Id. at ¶ 13; People

v. Crawley, 2024 COA 49, ¶ 11. A crime is per se grave or serious

if, “based on [its] statutory elements, [it] necessarily involve[s] grave

or serious conduct.” Wells-Yates I, ¶ 63.

¶ 20 In considering the harshness of the penalty under the second

subpart of the abbreviated proportionality review, the court may

consider the defendant’s parole eligibility since parole can reduce

the period of confinement and render the penalty less harsh. Id. at

¶ 14.

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¶ 21 Overall, “[t]he court must scrutinize the triggering offense and

the predicate offenses and determine whether in combination they

are so lacking in gravity or seriousness so as to suggest that the

sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the crime, taking

into account the defendant’s eligibility for parole.” Id. at ¶ 23.

¶ 22 If the abbreviated proportionality review gives rise to an

inference of gross disproportionality, the court must then conduct

an extended proportionality review. Id. at ¶ 15. But if the

abbreviated proportionality review doesn’t raise an inference of

gross disproportionality, the court need not (and shouldn’t) conduct

an extended proportionality review. Id.

¶ 23 We review de novo whether a sentence is grossly

disproportionate. Id. at ¶ 35. As a result, we may conduct our own

abbreviated proportionality review. See, e.g., Rutter v. People, 2015

CO 71, ¶¶ 24-25.

B. Additional Background

¶ 24 At sentencing, the trial court adjudicated Geerdes a habitual

criminal based on five prior felony convictions:

(1) second degree burglary in August 1993;

(2) second degree burglary in August 1993;

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(3) escape in August 1994;

(4) possession with intent to distribute a schedule II

controlled substance in October 1997; and

(5) second degree burglary in January 1998.

¶ 25 The postconviction court analyzed the gravity and seriousness

of each of Geerdes’ triggering and predicate offenses and concluded:

• second degree murder is a per se grave and serious offense;

• intentionally setting a wildfire is a per se grave and serious

offense;

• Geerdes’ second degree arson conviction is a grave and

serious offense under the facts of his case; and

• none of Geerdes’ predicate offenses are grave or serious.

The court then considered the offenses together and concluded that

Geerdes’ sentences weren’t grossly disproportionate.

C. Analysis

¶ 26 Geerdes contends the postconviction court erred by (1) relying

on the numerosity of his predicate offenses, even though they

weren’t grave or serious; and (2) failing to assess the harshness of

the penalty for each triggering offense.

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¶ 27 As to Geerdes’ first contention, we disagree that a court

conducting an abbreviated proportionality analysis is foreclosed

from considering the number of a defendant’s predicate offenses if

those offenses aren’t grave or serious. In Wells-Yates I, our

supreme court made clear that, “when the proportionality of a

habitual criminal sentence is challenged, the grave or serious

inquiry includes consideration of the defendant’s history of felony

recidivism.” Wells-Yates I, ¶ 23. This is so even when the

defendant’s predicate offenses aren’t particularly grave or serious.

See People v. Wells-Yates, 2023 COA 120, ¶ 58 (Wells-Yates II).

¶ 28 As to Geerdes’ second contention, our de novo review of the

proportionality of his sentences convinces us that the

postconviction court didn’t err by denying his motion.

¶ 29 At the outset, we note that Geerdes doesn’t challenge the

postconviction court’s conclusions that each of his three triggering

offenses, but none of his predicate offenses, is grave and serious.

We therefore dispense with the first subpart of the abbreviated

proportionality analysis and proceed to address only the second

subpart. See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 (“[C]ourts are

well-advised to ‘wait for cases to come’ to them and to ‘decide only

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questions presented by the parties.’” (quoting United States v.

Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 376 (2020))).

¶ 30 Turning to the second subpart — the harshness of the

penalty — we recognize that Geerdes’ 1994 escape conviction would

likely be classified as a misdemeanor if it occurred today because it

involved his unauthorized absence from a community corrections

facility. See § 18-8-208.2(1)(a), (2)(b), C.R.S. 2025. Such a

conviction couldn’t be used to adjudicate a person a habitual

criminal today. See § 18-1.3-801(5). We also recognize that “[t]he

General Assembly treats most drug felonies as substantially less

grave or serious today than it has in the past.” Wells-Yates I, ¶ 58.

But even considering these legislative changes as indicia of

“evolving standards of decency” in Colorado when evaluating

Geerdes’ predicate offenses, Wells-Yates II, ¶ 64 (quoting People v.

Oldright, 2017 COA 91, ¶ 16), we still conclude that Geerdes’

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sentences for his three triggering offenses aren’t grossly

disproportionate.1

¶ 31 Geerdes’ ninety-six-year sentence for second degree murder,

while harsh, isn’t so harsh as to raise an inference of gross

disproportionality. Geerdes doesn’t dispute that second degree

murder is a per se grave or serious offense. See Crawley, ¶ 22.

This designation renders Geerdes’ murder sentence “nearly

impervious to attack on proportionality grounds.” Wells-Yates I,

¶ 62 (citation omitted). And although the postconviction court

found that his five predicate offenses weren’t grave or serious, we

can’t conclude on this record that the legislature’s habitual criminal

sentencing determination for second degree murder raises an

inference of gross disproportionality. See id. at ¶ 21 (explaining

that an abbreviated proportionality review “will almost always yield

a finding that the sentence is not unconstitutionally

1 While we recognize that parole eligibility is a factor we must

consider, Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M, ¶ 14, Geerdes isn’t
currently eligible for parole for more than eighty years. By then,
Geerdes would be over 135 years old. So, practically speaking, his
parole eligibility can’t “reduce the actual period of confinement [or]
render the penalty less harsh.” Id. Our analysis therefore
presumes that Geerdes isn’t eligible for parole.

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disproportionate”); cf. Rutter, ¶ 25 (affirming ninety-six-year

sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine when the defendant

had three prior felony drug convictions).

¶ 32 Nor can we conclude that Geerdes’ forty-eight-year sentence

for intentionally setting a wildfire is so harsh as to raise an

inference of gross disproportionality. The postconviction court

determined that Geerdes’ wildfire conviction was a grave and

serious offense, and Geerdes doesn’t challenge that determination.

Further, the court complied with the Act when it imposed a forty-

eight-year sentence. See Wells-Yates I, ¶ 62 (Once a court

determines that an offense is grave or serious, “any review in the

second subpart is substantially circumscribed because the

legislature’s establishment of the harshness of the penalty deserves

great deference.”).

¶ 33 Even accepting that Geerdes’ five predicate offenses weren’t

grave or serious, Geerdes’ actions that led to the wildfire were

destructive and egregious. See Crawley, ¶ 26 (concluding the

defendant’s lack of prior felony convictions didn’t outweigh the fact

that his crime led to deaths and injuries). Geerdes set the car on

fire in an attempt to cover up his murder of the victim and, in doing

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so, started a wildfire that resulted in significant property damage.

Further, Geerdes’ demonstrated recidivism brings his conduct

squarely within the Act’s purpose of “punishing more severely ‘those

individuals who show a propensity toward repeated criminal

conduct.’” Wells-Yates, ¶ 1 (quoting People v. Dist. Ct., 711 P.2d

666, 670 (Colo. 1985)); see also Wells-Yates II, ¶¶ 66-68 (concluding

that quadrupled sentences weren’t grossly disproportionate, even

though predicate offenses weren’t especially grave or serious, given

the serious aspects of the triggering offenses and the defendant’s

history of recidivism).

¶ 34 For many of the same reasons, we reach the same conclusion

with respect to Geerdes’ twenty-four-year sentence for second

degree arson. As with his wildfire sentence, Geerdes doesn’t

challenge the postconviction court’s determination that his arson

offense was grave and serious. Moreover, the trial court sentenced

Geerdes in compliance with the Act. See Wells-Yates I, ¶ 62.

¶ 35 While we recognize that these sentences are long, this isn’t one

of the “exceedingly rare” cases in which the defendant can

successfully show an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence.

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,

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concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Solem

v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)).

IV. Disposition

¶ 36 We affirm the order.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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