Peo v. Mendez-Reyes

23CA0757 Peo v Mendez-Reyes 02-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0757
Jefferson County District Court No. 13CR1797
Honorable Lily W. Oeffler, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Alexis Aroldo Mendez-Reyes,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED
IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Gomez and Bernard*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 12, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kelly A. Corcoran, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Alexis Aroldo Mendez-Reyes, appeals his

convictions of first degree burglary, second degree kidnapping,

second degree assault, and felony menacing. We affirm in part,

vacate in part, and remand with directions.

I. Background

¶2 After midnight, Mendez-Reyes went to the townhome that T.T.,

his ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child, shared with her

cousin. T.T. was still out with friends. After T.T.’s cousin let him

in, Mendez-Reyes grabbed a knife from the kitchen and then went

outside and began cutting himself.

¶3 When T.T. arrived home, Mendez-Reyes broke back into the

townhome and chased her and her cousin with a knife. The two

women ran out the back door and into the courtyard, a common

space shared by all of the townhomes in the complex. Mendez-

Reyes grabbed T.T. by her hair and dragged her around the

courtyard, eventually pinning her against a wall of the courtyard

with his hand on her neck. Mendez-Reyes ran away when police

arrived a short time later.

¶4 Mendez-Reyes was charged with attempted second degree

murder, first degree burglary, two counts of second degree assault

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(T.T. and her cousin), two counts of felony menacing (T.T. and her

cousin), and second degree kidnapping. At trial, the jury found

Mendez-Reyes guilty of only first degree burglary, second degree

assault of T.T., second degree kidnapping, and misdemeanor

menacing of T.T. Mendez-Reyes was convicted and sentenced to a

controlling term of eleven years in prison for first degree burglary,

with sentences on the other convictions to run concurrently.

¶5 Mendez-Reyes appeals. He argues that (1) there was

insufficient evidence to support his second degree kidnapping

conviction and, alternatively, the court erroneously instructed the

jury on that offense; (2) the trial court erred by excluding testimony

from T.T.’s neighbor on hearsay grounds; (3) the prosecutor

engaged in misconduct during closing argument; and (4) the trial

court erred by sentencing him for felony menacing where the jury

found him guilty of misdemeanor menacing. We agree that there

was insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping conviction and

that the court erred by sentencing him for felony menacing. But we

conclude that his other assertions of error do not warrant relief.

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II. Second Degree Kidnapping Evidence Was Insufficient

¶6 We review de novo whether the evidence was sufficient to

support a conviction. People v. Donald, 2020 CO 24, ¶ 18. We view

the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable

inferences that might be fairly drawn from the evidence. Id. at

¶¶ 18-19. Viewing the evidence this way, we ask whether it is

sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 18.

¶7 As relevant here, second degree kidnapping requires that a

defendant “seize[] and carr[y] any person from one place to

another.” § 18-3-302(1), C.R.S. 2013. To qualify as movement from

one place to another, the movement need not be substantial.

Garcia v. People, 2022 CO 6, ¶ 28. At the same time, not all

movement qualifies as movement from one place to another. Id. at

¶ 29. If there is movement, but the movement is not substantial,

the movement will qualify as being from one place to another if the

movement substantially increases the victim’s risk of harm. See id.

at ¶ 42; People v. Owens, 97 P.3d 227, 235 (Colo. App. 2004),

overruled on other grounds by Garcia, 2022 CO 6.

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¶8 Mendez-Reyes was convicted of second degree kidnapping for

having moved T.T. within the courtyard, which was an open, grassy

area that had at least one light, onto which all the back doors of the

townhomes directly opened. Viewed in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, the evidence showed the following. Mendez-Reyes

seized control of T.T. at some place within the courtyard near a

light. He then moved her around the courtyard, either by grabbing

her hair or placing her in a headlock. Ultimately, he pinned her up

against a wall in the courtyard with his hand on her neck, holding a

knife to her temple. Although Mendez-Reyes initially grabbed T.T.

near a light, there was no evidence about the lighting where he

pinned her against the wall. Similarly, nothing about the evidence

suggested that where he pinned her against the wall was a more

secluded area than where he initially grabbed her.

¶9 This evidence was sufficient to establish that Mendez-Reyes

seized T.T. and carried her some distance. But we conclude it was

insufficient to establish that he carried her from one place to

another.

¶ 10 The alleged kidnapping occurred in a single place: the

courtyard. The evidence does not show that the movement within

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that place was substantial. Nevertheless, insubstantial movement

can substantially increase the risk of harm if the victim is moved to

an area that is more secluded, less public, or harder to escape from.

People v. Rogers, 220 P.3d 931, 936 (Colo. App. 2008), overruled on

other grounds by Garcia, 2022 CO 6. But there was no evidence

that Mendez-Reyes’s movement of T.T. did any of these things.

Again, there was no evidence that where Mendez-Reyes pinned T.T.

was any less well-lit or more secluded than where Mendez-Reyes

initially grabbed her. And we cannot say that it is substantially

harder to escape from being pinned up against a wall compared to

being held in a headlock or by the hair when not pinned against a

wall. To be sure, the risks of harm present at the initial seizure

compared to those at the end of the movement may have been

different. But we cannot say that either risk was substantially

greater than the other.

¶ 11 The Attorney General relies on T.T.’s cousin’s testimony that

Mendez-Reyes dragged T.T. to “the concrete wall in the back” of the

courtyard as evidence that he moved her to a more secluded area.

But viewed in context, even in the light most favorable to the

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prosecution, the testimony does not support that inference. T.T.’s

cousin testified that Mendez-Reyes

grabbed [T.T.] by her hair, and . . . dragged her
through the courtyard through — from like the
neighbor’s back door, she was standing maybe
like around right here, and he grabbed her by
her hair and was dragging her like this
through the grass area, and then that’s when
he went and picked her back up and he put
her against the wall, the concrete wall in the
back, and he had the knife to her temple.

It is not reasonable to infer from this testimony that “the concrete

wall in the back” was any more secluded than any other part of the

courtyard, especially where this movement apparently did not

obstruct T.T.’s cousin’s view of the incident.

¶ 12 In sum, the evidence did not establish that Mendez-Reyes’s

movement of T.T. was substantial, nor did the evidence establish

that the movement substantially increased her risk of harm.

Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to show that Mendez-

Reyes carried T.T. from one place to another for purposes of second

degree kidnapping. We must therefore vacate the second degree

kidnapping conviction and need not address Mendez-Reyes’s

argument that the court’s jury instruction on that offense was

erroneous.

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III. Excluded Hearsay

¶ 13 Mendez-Reyes argues that the trial court erred by excluding as

hearsay T.T.’s neighbor’s testimony that T.T. told her on the night of

the attack that bruises on T.T.’s neck were hickeys and not caused

by Mendez-Reyes. Mendez-Reyes now argues that excluding this

testimony was error because it fell within an exception to hearsay or

was not hearsay in the first place because it would not have been

admitted for its truth (to show the cause of the bruising). Because

Mendez-Reyes did not assert these (or any) arguments against the

exclusion of this testimony at trial, these arguments are

unpreserved and we will reverse only if the exclusion was plain

error. See People v. Zubiate, 2013 COA 69, ¶ 23, aff’d, 2017 CO 17,

overruled on other grounds by, People v. Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42.

¶ 14 Plain error must be both obvious and substantial. Hagos v.

People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. An error is substantial only if it so

undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial that it casts

serious doubt on the reliability of the conviction. Id. We conclude

that any error in excluding the neighbor’s testimony was not

substantial because it was entirely cumulative of T.T.’s testimony.

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¶ 15 T.T.’s neighbor’s testimony established two things: (1) the

bruises on T.T.’s neck were caused by hickeys, not by Mendez-

Reyes’s attack; and (2) T.T. knew this on the night of the attack.

T.T. admitted both of these facts in her own trial testimony. She

testified that the bruises were hickeys and not caused by Mendez-

Reyes. She also testified that she believed she shared this

information with officers at the scene. The only way she could have

done this was if she had known the bruises were hickeys at that

time. Thus, T.T. effectively admitted that she knew this on the

night of the attack. Because T.T. testified to the only two things

that her neighbor’s excluded testimony could have established, we

conclude that any error in excluding the neighbor’s testimony was

not substantial, was not plain, and does not warrant relief.

IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 16 Mendez-Reyes next argues that several of the prosecutor’s

statements during closing argument constituted misconduct. We

review claims of prosecutorial misconduct using a two-step

analysis. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo. 2010). First,

we determine whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct based

on the totality of the circumstances. Id. Second, if there was

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misconduct, we determine whether reversal is warranted under the

proper standard of review. Id. Here, the alleged misconduct was

unpreserved, so plain error applies, and we will reverse only if the

misconduct was both obvious and substantial. See Hagos, ¶ 14.

¶ 17 Under step one, we afford prosecutors wide latitude in their

choice of language, style, and how to respond to arguments by the

defense. People v. Samson, 2012 COA 167, ¶ 30. We give them the

benefit of the doubt when their remarks are ambiguous or inartful

because arguments delivered in the heat of trial are not always

perfectly scripted. Id.

¶ 18 Prosecutors are allowed to comment on the evidence admitted

at trial and the reasonable inferences therefrom. Id. at ¶ 31. They

may also “engage in oratorical embellishment.” Id. They cannot,

however, misstate the evidence, use arguments intended to inflame

the jury’s passions and prejudices, or assert a personal opinion

about the defendant’s guilt. Id. at ¶ 32.

¶ 19 Applying these standards, we conclude that none of the

alleged misconduct warrants reversal.

¶ 20 First, Mendez-Reyes challenges the prosecutor’s statement

that no other person had a reason to strangle T.T. except Mendez-

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Reyes. The prosecutor said this after referring to a CAT scan of

T.T.’s neck that showed bruising consistent with strangulation:

You also heard about the CAT scan, that scan
that showed bruising under the neck, under
the skin in the neck. That can’t be faked.
That was a physical finding by medical
professionals that corroborated exactly what
[T.T.] was saying happened. There’s no other
person that had a reason to strangle her or
was around her to strangle her. Think of the
testimony of those on scene. Again, you can’t
fake that bruising.

¶ 21 Mendez-Reyes suggests that this reference to the absence of

another person with motive and opportunity to strangle T.T. was

unsupported by the evidence, improperly shifted the burden of

proof, and expressed the prosecutor’s personal opinion that

Mendez-Reyes was guilty. We conclude it did none of those things.

Instead, it was a proper comment on the facts in evidence —

specifically the absence of any evidence that anyone but Mendez-

Reyes caused the bruising seen on the CAT scan.

¶ 22 Second, Mendez-Reyes argues that the first lines of the

prosecutor’s rebuttal closing were improper:

Defense counsel did a lot of things there. Let’s
take a look. First two minutes, points out to
you that his client was not identified at the
scene by [two witnesses]. Then he spent about

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the next ten minutes minimizing. [Mendez-
Reyes] was there. He was at the front door,
but [T.T.’s cousin] let him in. Put his client at
the scene. He had the knife, but the wounds
were only superficial. That is a minimization
of the highest order.

¶ 23 According to Mendez-Reyes, these comments and subsequent

ones characterizing the defense argument as minimizing Mendez-

Reyes’s behavior were improper. Again, we disagree. These

comments were proper comments on facts in evidence and fell

within the wide latitude prosecutors have to respond to defense

arguments.

¶ 24 Third, Mendez-Reyes contends that the prosecutor misstated

the evidence when he said that “a couple witnesses” testified that

Mendez-Reyes said during the attack that he was going to prison

that night. Mendez-Reyes is correct that only a single witness (T.T.)

testified to this statement. But we conclude that this impropriety

was neither obvious nor substantial. Although the prosecutor

repeatedly referred to Mendez-Reyes’s statement during closing, this

was the only time the prosecutor mischaracterized the evidence as

having been corroborated by a second witness. Therefore, it did not

constitute plain error.

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¶ 25 Fourth, Mendez-Reyes argues that the prosecutor’s reference

to nineteen-year-old T.T. and her fifteen-year-old cousin as “girls”

was improper, especially juxtaposed with the characterization of

twenty-one-year-old Mendez-Reyes as a “tough guy.” We perceive

no impropriety in the characterization of T.T. and her cousin — it is

not unreasonable, and certainly not outside the wide latitude

prosecutors get during closing argument, to refer to females aged

nineteen and under as girls.

¶ 26 Finally, Mendez-Reyes challenges the description of what he

did after he initially arrived at the townhome and found T.T. absent:

You know, you can make an argument that
most normal people are gone at that point.
They get the hint. [Mendez-Reyes] doesn’t.
Breaks the screen, jumps through the window.
Put his hand around [T.T.’s] neck, and he
didn’t hold her. He put his hand around her
neck and squeezed . . . . This is the mother of
his child, keep in mind.

¶ 27 The prosecutor’s references to what a normal person would do

and the fact that Mendez-Reyes and T.T. had a child together were

proper comments on facts in evidence and reasonable inferences

from them.

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¶ 28 We therefore conclude that none of the alleged prosecutorial

misconduct warrants reversal.

V. Menacing Conviction

¶ 29 Mendez-Reyes argues, and the Attorney General agrees, that

the trial court erred by sentencing him for felony menacing because

he was convicted of only misdemeanor menacing. We also agree.

¶ 30 As relevant here, menacing is a class 3 misdemeanor but

becomes a class 5 felony if committed by use of “a deadly weapon or

any article used or fashioned in a manner to cause a person to

reasonably believe that the article is a deadly weapon.” § 18-3-

206(1)(a), C.R.S. 2013.

¶ 31 The jury found that in committing menacing, Mendez-Reyes

did not “possess or use a deadly weapon.” Because the jury did not

find Mendez-Reyes guilty of possessing or using a deadly weapon,

or anything fashioned in a manner to create a reasonable belief that

it was a deadly weapon, the jury did not find Mendez-Reyes guilty of

felony menacing. He can therefore be convicted only of

misdemeanor menacing.

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VI. Disposition

¶ 32 Mendez-Reyes’s convictions for second degree kidnapping and

felony menacing are vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial

court with directions to resentence him for misdemeanor menacing.

The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE BERNARD concur.

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