Peo v. Gurule

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23CA1701 Peo v Gurule 02-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1701
Adams County District Court No. 22CR861
Honorable Jeffrey Smith, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Gino Manuel Gurule,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Tow and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 5, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Yaried A. Hailu, Assistant Attorney General
Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Robin Rheiner, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Gino Manuel Gurule, appeals his conviction for

one count of assault with a deadly weapon. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In February 2021, a delivery driver, Reinaldo Padilla, parked

in an alley to make a delivery to a deli. While Padilla and the deli

owner unloaded the truck, an SUV driven by Gurule pulled into the

alley. Padilla and the deli owner motioned for Gurule to back out of

the alley and go a different way. But Gurule didn’t move and

instead waited in his SUV in the alley for twenty to thirty minutes.

¶3 Once Padilla and the deli owner had finished unloading the

truck, they went inside to complete paperwork and confirm the

delivery count. Soon after, Padilla exited through the back of the

deli, then he walked around to the front of the deli to use the

restroom and buy a drink.

¶4 Gurule followed Padilla into the deli and began yelling at him

to move his truck. The two yelled back and forth at each other for

less than a minute before Gurule exited the deli. Padilla left the deli

soon after to move his truck.

¶5 As Padilla made his way to his truck, Gurule quickly moved

towards him, drawing a sword and holding it over his head. Padilla

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ducked and drove his head into Gurule’s chest, dropping the items

he had been holding. When the two collided, Padilla felt something

cut his ear and the side of his head. Also during the collision,

Padilla pulled a knife from his pocket and stabbed Gurule.

¶6 After the altercation, Gurule put the sword in the back of his

SUV, got in, and left the scene. Gurule drove home, where his

mother called 911. One of the deli customers also called 911 at the

scene. Gurule was transported to a hospital, where officers

interviewed him.

¶7 After obtaining a search warrant for Gurule’s SUV, police

recovered a sword from the driver’s side backseat of the SUV.

Gurule was arrested and charged with second degree assault (bodily

injury caused by a deadly weapon) pursuant to section 18-3-

203(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025.

¶8 At trial, Gurule argued that he had acted in self-defense. The

prosecution asserted that Gurule was the initial aggressor and that

it was Padilla who had acted in self-defense.

¶9 During trial, Padilla testified that after Gurule had confronted

him in the deli, he went to move his truck and that’s when Gurule

came at him, wielding a sword above his head. He further testified

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that once the two collided, “some part of the sword” made contact

with him, and that afterwards he was bleeding and felt pain:

PROSECUTION: [W]ell, first of all, did the
sword actually contact you?

PADILLA: Some part of the sword did. It got
my ear, got the back of my head. I was sore on
the back of my neck for a few days, but I don’t
know what part of the sword hit me. There
was some blood on my ear and a little scrape
down the side of my head.

¶ 10 On cross-examination, Padilla clarified that he wasn’t certain

what had caused his injuries:

PADILLA: Something hit me back here.
Whether it was the butt of the knife, or a
sword, or whether it was he just nicked me, I
have no idea. It could have been his fingernail
for all I know. Whatever cut me, cut me. It
felt — it was a stinging effect.

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: You just said that . . .
you don’t know what you were hit with, right?

PADILLA: I know the sword was right here . . .
[a]nd I was in his chest.

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Sure. But you don’t
know what connected to your ear?

PADILLA: Correct.

¶ 11 Padilla described the sword Gurule used as being between

twenty-seven and thirty inches long with a curved blade and a

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brown wooden handle. When presented with the sword that had

been seized pursuant to the search warrant, however, Padilla

testified that it wasn’t the sword Gurule had used during the

altercation.

¶ 12 Jeffrey Bebout, a bystander who had observed the incident

from across a parking lot, testified that, although his view had been

partially obstructed, he saw Gurule move towards Padilla with his

arms raised and strike Padilla, and that Padilla dropped his

belongings on impact. Bebout further testified that, after the

altercation, he walked closer and saw that Gurule was bleeding.

¶ 13 While Bebout didn’t “note” seeing a sword before the

altercation, he said that he saw Gurule holding one afterward. He

also testified that he watched Gurule put the sword into the

backseat of his SUV. Bebout described the blade of the sword as

straight and measuring between ten and twenty-four inches long.

¶ 14 The responding officer, Detective Troy Gordanier, testified that,

based on Bebout’s report, he searched the backseat of Gurule’s

SUV for a sword — where he retrieved the sword that was admitted

into evidence. This was the sword that Padilla didn’t recognize

during his testimony. Detective Gordanier testified that he ended

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his search of the SUV once he found the sword because it matched

the description he was given of a “decorative-type sword” and he

had no reason to believe there would be more swords in the vehicle.

¶ 15 The prosecution presented body camera footage of the

responding officers’ interview with Gurule at the hospital. In the

footage, Gurule states that he used a “hobbit sword” in self-defense

against Padilla. During that interview, Gurule said, “It’s not a real

sword, it’s not sharp.”

¶ 16 The prosecution also introduced photos of Padilla’s injuries.

The photos show a red mark above Padilla’s eye, two cuts, and

dried blood on Padilla’s left ear. Padilla testified that none of these

injuries were present before the altercation with Gurule.

¶ 17 The jury found Gurule guilty of second degree assault with a

deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Gurule to eight years in

the custody of the Department of Corrections.

II. Analysis

¶ 18 On appeal, Gurule contends that the prosecution presented

insufficient evidence that he committed second degree assault.

Specifically, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to

establish that (1) Gurule carried out the attack “by means of a

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deadly weapon” and (2) the sword (or any deadly weapon) actually

caused any of Padilla’s injuries. We reject both contentions and,

therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 19 In addition, in a footnote in his opening brief, Gurule requests

that his case be remanded to the trial court for correction of the

mittimus. As discussed infra Part II.B, we agree and remand on

this issue only.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

1. Standard of Review

¶ 20 We review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence was both substantial and sufficient to support the

conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant was guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 8. We

look at all the evidence — both direct and circumstantial — as a

whole to make this determination. People v. Baker, 178 P.3d 1225,

1233 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 21 We give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable

inference that can be fairly drawn from the evidence. Perez, ¶ 25.

While those inferences “must be supported by a ‘logical and

convincing connection between the facts established and the

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conclusion inferred,’” we don’t “serve as a thirteenth juror or invade

the province of the jury.” Id. (citations omitted). “[I]t is the fact

finder’s function in a criminal case to consider and determine what

weight should be given to all parts of the evidence and to resolve

conflicts, testimonial inconsistencies, and disputes in the evidence.”

People v. McIntier, 134 P.3d 467, 471 (Colo. App. 2005).

2. Application

¶ 22 Gurule was charged with and convicted of second degree

assault in violation of section 18-3-203(1)(b). Thus, at trial, the

prosecution had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gurule,

“[w]ith intent to cause bodily injury to another person, . . . cause[d]

such injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon.” § 18-3-

203(1)(b).

¶ 23 A “[d]eadly weapon” is defined, in relevant part, as “[a] knife,

bludgeon, or any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or

substance, whether animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is

used or intended to be used, is capable of producing death or

serious bodily injury.” § 18-1-901(e)(II), C.R.S. 2025 (emphasis

added). In turn, “[i]n common usage, . . . a ‘weapon’ is defined as

‘an instrument of offensive or defensive combat: something to fight

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with: something (as a club, sword, gun, or grenade) used in

destroying, defeating, or physically injuring an enemy.’” People v.

Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d 471, 476 (Colo. App. 2011) (quoting

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2589 (2002)).

¶ 24 Determining whether an instrument is a deadly weapon is a

two-step inquiry. People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 117 (Colo. 2002).

First, was the object used or intended to be used as a weapon? Id.;

Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d at 476. Second, did the defendant use the

object in a manner capable of causing serious bodily injury?

Stewart, 55 P.3d at 117; People v. Saleh, 45 P.3d 1272, 1275 (Colo.

2002). With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of

Gurule’s sufficiency of the evidence challenges.

a. By Means of a Deadly Weapon

¶ 25 Gurule first contends that the prosecution presented

insufficient evidence that he carried out the attack “by means of a

deadly weapon.” His argument is twofold. First, he argues that the

record doesn’t “clearly establish” what he used to attack Padilla.

Second, he argues that the evidence regarding the weapon that he

allegedly used failed to satisfy the statutory definition of a “deadly

weapon.” We disagree on both fronts.

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¶ 26 First, the direct and circumstantial evidence admitted at trial

amply supports that Gurule used a sword to attack Padilla. This

includes testimony from Padilla, Bebout, and Detective Gordanier,

as well as Gurule’s own statements to police.

¶ 27 Padilla testified that Gurule came towards him with a sword

raised over his head. Similarly, Bebout testified that he observed

Gurule approach Padilla with his arms raised. While Bebout didn’t

“note” Gurule holding a sword before the altercation, he observed

Gurule holding a sword immediately after. Bebout also testified

that shortly after the altercation he saw Gurule put the sword in the

backseat of his SUV — exactly where Detective Gordanier found a

sword while executing a search warrant of Gurule’s SUV. Finally,

Gurule told police that he had used a sword in the altercation,

albeit, according to him, in self-defense.

¶ 28 As Gurule points out, the witnesses offered inconsistent

descriptions of the sword at trial. Padilla described a curved-blade

sword with the blade measuring between twenty-seven and thirty

inches, while Bebout described a straight-blade sword with a blade

measuring between ten and twenty-four inches. Additionally, the

sword Detective Gordanier seized, and that was presented at trial,

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appears to have a slightly curved blade, with the blade measuring

approximately twenty-six and a half inches long. Padilla also

denied that the sword produced at trial was the sword Gurule used

during the altercation.

¶ 29 But these inconsistencies in the description of the sword don’t

support the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence for the

jury to conclude that Gurule used one during the altercation

because “evidence is not insufficient simply because it conflicts.”

People v. Lawrence, 2019 COA 84, ¶ 23, aff’d, 2021 CO 28. Indeed,

there was ample evidence — both direct and circumstantial — to

support a finding that Gurule used a sword in the attack on Padilla.

¶ 30 Second, Gurule argues that even if there was sufficient

evidence to establish that he used a sword, there was insufficient

evidence to prove that the sword met the definition of a “deadly

weapon.” Gurule argues that, instead, the evidence shows that the

sword he used was a decorative “hobbit” sword that wasn’t sharp.

Further, he argues that because Padilla testified that the sword

produced at trial wasn’t the sword Gurule had used, the

prosecution didn’t satisfy its burden to prove that the sword Gurule

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wielded was a deadly weapon. Again, we disagree with both

contentions.

¶ 31 The mere fact that evidence permits more than one reasonable

inference doesn’t mean it’s insufficient to sustain a conviction. See

Perez, ¶ 31. Instead, we must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution. Id. Doing so here, we conclude that

there is sufficient support in the record for a jury to reasonably find

that the sword used was a deadly weapon.

¶ 32 To begin, we reject the implied premise that a decorative item

can’t meet the definition of a deadly weapon. The law is clear that

whether an item is a deadly weapon doesn’t turn on what the item

is, but instead how it is used. Saleh, 45 P.3d at 1275 (“Any object

can be a deadly weapon if it is used in a manner capable of

producing death or serious bodily injury.”). For example, a fist with

rings, People v. Hayes, 923 P.2d 221, 227 (Colo. App. 1995); a

whiskey bottle, People v. Bowers, 600 P.2d 95, 96 (Colo. App. 1979),

aff’d, 617 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1980), superseded by statute on other

grounds, Ch. 212, sec. 2, § 18-1-903(3)(e), 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws

972; and even a shoe, Grass v. People, 471 P.2d 602, 605 (Colo.

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1970), can be considered a deadly weapon if used in a deadly

manner.

¶ 33 Here, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Gurule used

a sword. Whether the sword’s primary purpose was decorative or

for use in combat doesn’t change the way it was used. According to

the evidence presented at trial, Gurule quickly moved toward

Padilla with the sword raised above his head and then struck him

with it. Furthermore, the jury could reasonably infer that striking

someone with a metal blade from above can cause serious bodily

injury, no matter how sharp the blade is. Thus, there was sufficient

evidence to support a conclusion that Gurule’s use of the sword

made it a deadly weapon, regardless of its sharpness or whether its

primary purpose was decorative.

¶ 34 Finally, Gurule’s contention that the evidence was insufficient

because the prosecution may have produced and admitted into

evidence the wrong sword is a red herring. To sustain a conviction,

the prosecution isn’t required to introduce into evidence the actual

weapon, so long as there is other sufficient evidence that the

defendant used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense.

See People v. Saltray, 969 P.2d 729, 732 (Colo. App. 1998). And as

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discussed above, even without considering the sword recovered

from Gurule’s vehicle, the evidence is sufficient to show that Gurule

used a sword, and his use of that sword meets the definition of a

deadly weapon.

¶ 35 In sum, viewing the totality of the evidence admitted at trial in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a jury

could reasonably find that Gurule carried out the attack against

Padilla by means of a deadly weapon.

b. Causation

¶ 36 Gurule next contends that the prosecution presented

insufficient evidence to show that a deadly weapon — namely, the

sword — caused any of Padilla’s injuries. Again, we disagree.

¶ 37 Gurule argues that Padilla’s testimony — which was later

impeached — was the only evidence linking Gurule’s sword to

Padilla’s injuries. Gurule is correct that, although Padilla initially

testified that some part of the sword hit him and caused his

injuries, on cross-examination he testified that he couldn’t be

certain what hit him because of his ducked position. This, however,

isn’t the only evidence the jury had to consider when determining

whether Gurule’s sword caused Padilla’s bodily injuries.

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¶ 38 While there is no direct evidence of the point of contact aside

from Padilla’s impeached testimony, there is ample circumstantial

evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the

sword caused Padilla’s injuries. In addition to Padilla’s testimony,

Bebout testified that he observed Gurule move towards Padilla with

his arms raised and strike Padilla. And after the altercation,

Bebout saw Gurule holding a sword and Padilla bleeding from the

head. The prosecution also admitted photographs of Padilla’s

injuries after the incident that showed a red mark above Padilla’s

eye, two cuts, and dried blood on Padilla’s left ear. It was the jury’s

task, as the fact finder, to determine what caused those injuries.

¶ 39 Just because a reasonable mind could conclude differently

doesn’t mean there is insufficient evidence to satisfy the causation

element. See People v. Carlson, 72 P.3d 411, 416 (Colo. App. 2003).

Simply put, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, there was substantial and sufficient evidence to

support a conclusion that Gurule’s sword caused Padilla’s injuries.

B. Mittimus

¶ 40 Finally, Gurule contends that the mittimus needs to be

corrected. The mittimus states that Gurule pleaded guilty to the

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sole count of the information. Gurule, however, pleaded not guilty

and was found guilty following a jury trial.

¶ 41 “Clerical mistakes in judgments . . . may be corrected by the

court at any time . . . .” Crim. P. 36. “When the mittimus is

incorrect, we must remand to allow the trial court to correct it.”

Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d at 480. Because the mittimus incorrectly

characterizes Gurule’s plea, we remand this case with instructions

that the trial court correct the mittimus to reflect that Gurule was

found guilty after trial.

III. Disposition

¶ 42 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of

conviction and remand the case to the trial court to correct the

mittimus to reflect that Gurule was found guilty after trial.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.

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