Marriage of Farrell

25CA0348 Marriage of Farrell 01-29-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0348
Douglas County District Court No. 22DR676
Honorable Daniel Warhola, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Brian Thomas Farrell,

Appellant,

and

Candace Rae Farrell,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 29, 2026

Márquez Law, Jason A. Márquez, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

Epstein Patierno, LLP, John C. Haas, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case involving Brian Thomas

Farrell (father) and Candace Rae Farrell (mother), father appeals the

allocation of sole decision-making responsibility to mother, the

property division, and the award of spousal maintenance to mother.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for additional

proceedings.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 The parties married in 2013 and share a daughter. They

separated in June 2022 after father was arrested and charged with

domestic violence based on his alleged assault of mother in the

child’s presence. A few months later, a jury acquitted him on the

criminal charges.

¶3 In November, father petitioned to dissolve the marriage. The

district court appointed a parental responsibilities evaluator (PRE)

to make recommendations regarding an allocation of decision-

making responsibility and parenting time.

¶4 In late 2024, the district court held an evidentiary hearing,

after which it dissolved the marriage and entered permanent orders.

1
The court

• granted mother sole decision-making responsibility for

the then-ten-year-old child based on findings that father

had committed domestic violence and that the parties

could not make decisions together;

• named mother the child’s primary residential parent;

• allocated the marital residence to mother because the

child was living primarily with her and it was the only

home the child had ever known;

• awarded most of the retirement accounts to father; and

• directed father to pay mother spousal maintenance of

$3,257 per month for sixty-seven months.

The following table summarizes the district court’s overall property

division:

2
Marital Marital Value Mother’s Portion Father’s Portion
Asset/Debt
Marital Residence $825,000 $825,000
Mortgage ($270,734) ($270,734)
Vehicles $12,305 $10,000 $2,305
Bank Accounts $7,150 $3,662 $3,488
Investment $147,455 $52,103 $95,352
Accounts
Retirement $945,697 $175,106 $770,591
Accounts
Personal Property $50,000 $25,000 $25,000
Other Debts ($53,944) ($53,944)
Total $1,662,929 $820,137 $842,792

II. Decision-Making Responsibility

¶5 Father contends that the district court erred by allocating sole

decision-making responsibility to mother. We disagree.

¶6 A district court has broad discretion over the allocation of

decision-making responsibility. In re Marriage of Wenciker, 2022

COA 74, ¶ 26. We will not disturb the court’s decision absent a

showing that the court misapplied the law or acted in a manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner. In re Marriage of

Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 45. We must defer to the district court’s

3
factual findings if they are supported by the record. In re Marriage

of Garrett, 2018 COA 154, ¶ 9.

¶7 The district court must allocate decision-making responsibility

in accordance with the child’s best interests and consider all

relevant factors. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a), (b), C.R.S. 2025; In re

Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶ 21.

¶8 When the district court finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that a party has committed domestic violence, it shall not

be in the child’s best interests to allocate joint decision-making

responsibility over a party’s objection, “unless the court finds that

there is credible evidence of the ability of the parties to make

decisions cooperatively in the best interest of the child in a manner

that is safe for the abused party and the child.” § 14-10-

124(4)(a)(II)(A); see also § 14-10-124(4)(d) (“[T]he court shall

consider, as the primary concern, the safety and well-being of the

child[ren] and the abused party.”).

¶9 For purposes of the domestic code, domestic violence “means

an act of violence or a threatened act of violence upon a person with

whom the actor is or has been involved in an intimate relationship

. . . and may include any act or threatened act against a person . . .

4
when used as a method of coercion, control, punishment,

intimidation, or revenge.” § 14-10-124(1.3)(b); see Pawelec, ¶ 54.

Coercive control is defined as “a pattern of threatening, humiliating,

or intimidating actions,” including “[n]ame-calling, degrading, or

demeaning the individual . . . on a frequent basis.” § 14-10-

124(1.3)(a)(IV).

¶ 10 The district court made the following findings in support of its

order regarding decision making:

• Father was arrested and charged with misdemeanor

“physical assault” as an act of domestic violence against

mother. The criminal case indicated that the child was

present during the incident. A jury later acquitted him.

• While the court’s finding that father committed domestic

violence could have been made more expressly, read in

context the court’s findings clearly indicate that it

concluded the domestic violence incident with which

father was criminally charged was established by a

preponderance of the evidence, despite the criminal jury’s

finding that it was not established beyond a reasonable

doubt.

5
• There was a history of domestic violence in the child’s

presence.

• The child manifested significant trauma from domestic

violence she had witnessed “at the hands of [father]

against [mother],” was scared that father would hurt

mother, and believed that father might take the child and

not return. The child’s fears were based in reality, and

she was currently “struggling” with father. In fact, she

recently became physically aggressive toward him due to

her trauma.

• The child frequently resisted spending time with father.

There had been no overnight visits for a long time, and

their relationship was “strained.”

• It was important for father to have a healthy role in the

child’s life.

• There was ongoing frustration between the parties, along

with anger and possible bitterness.

• The family therapist credibly testified that those feelings

were difficult for the parties to hide from the child.

6
¶ 11 From those findings, the court determined that allocating

mother sole decision-making responsibility served the child’s best

interests. However, the court also ordered mother to consult with

father before exercising her decision-making with respect to the

child.

¶ 12 Father maintains that there was no evidence to support the

district court’s findings of domestic violence and the parties’

inability to make joint decisions. He is mistaken.

¶ 13 Mother testified that she experienced emotional and verbal

abuse by father during the marriage. She added that there were

multiple times when he had threatened to kill her or “put [her] head

through glass.” She recalled that when he was unhappy about

something she had done or said, he would sometimes back her into

a closet, leaving “fingerprint bruises.” She said that the child was

exposed to the “domestic abuse.” Moreover, while father denied

causing physical harm to mother, he admitted to saying things that

he should not have said.

¶ 14 As for the parties’ difficulty making decisions together, the

family therapist testified that the child did not consistently receive

much-needed individual therapy, a problem the therapist attributed

7
to both parties. The therapist explained that there had been

tension in the home for years, that it impacted the child, and that

the parties were unable to keep their feelings about each other and

the dissolution from the child. Moreover, in closing argument,

mother asked for sole decision-making responsibility to avoid

further abuse.

¶ 15 Because the district court made the findings required by

section 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A), and those findings have record

support, we will not disturb them. See Garrett, ¶ 9. And in view of

those findings, we discern no error in the court’s legal conclusion.

See § 14-10-124(4)(a)(II).

¶ 16 To the extent that father argues that the district court erred by

not following the PRE’s recommendation that the parties share

decision-making responsibility, the court was not required to do so;

rather, it was free to reach its own conclusions. See In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning B.J., 242 P.3d 1128, 1133 (Colo. 2010);

In re Marriage of Chester, 907 P.2d 726, 731 (Colo. App. 1995)

(“[R]ecommendations made by evaluators appointed in custody

matters are merely suggestions to the trial court.”).

8
¶ 17 Father also argues that the district court could not find

domestic violence without proof of bodily injury under the criminal

third-degree assault statute, section 18-3-204(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025,

which was the underlying basis for his arrest. We decline to

address the issue because it was not preserved for our review.

Father never made this argument in the district court, and the

court did not rule on it. See Pawelec, ¶ 38 (stating that to preserve

an issue for appeal, it must be presented in such a way that the

district court has an opportunity to rule on it); see also Core-Mark

Midcontinent Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 2016 COA 22, ¶ 26 (only specific

arguments made to the district court are preserved for appeal); In re

Marriage of Fabos, 2019 COA 80, ¶ 31 n.4 (appellate court will not

address an argument raised for the first time on appeal).

¶ 18 Last, father suggests that the district court improperly relied

on hearsay statements from the child when it found that domestic

violence had occurred. We decline to address this undeveloped

issue. See In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (appellate

court will not consider an argument not supported by legal

authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12; see

also In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31 (appellate court will

9
not consider arguments in a reply brief that seek to expand on

contentions raised in an opening brief).

III. Property Division

A. Tax Implications

¶ 19 Father contends that the property division was unfair because

he received most of the retirement accounts and would have to pay

taxes and penalties to use those funds. He asserts that the court

should have divided the retirement accounts evenly and ordered the

marital residence sold, with the proceeds to be split evenly to avoid

any concerns regarding the comparative liquidity of these assets.

Alternatively, he contends the court should have discounted the

retirement accounts to account for tax consequences. Had the

court done so, he argues, it would have seen that the allocation was

inequitable because mother received more assets than father. We

see no error.

¶ 20 A district court has great latitude to equitably divide the

marital estate based on the facts and circumstances of each case,

and we may not disturb its property division unless the court

abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M,

¶ 19.

10
¶ 21 Father does not identify where in the record he presented

specific evidence showing tax consequences or penalties he would

incur if he had to liquidate some or all of the retirement accounts.

See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) (arguments must contain citations to parts of

the record on which the appellant relies); see also O’Quinn v. Baca,

250 P.3d 629, 631-32 (Colo. App. 2010) (parties should not expect

an appellate court to peruse the record without the help of

appropriate citations). We have nevertheless reviewed the record

and conclude that neither party presented the court with specific

evidence on the issue of tax consequences or penalties, and the

district court did not have an opportunity to consider and rule on

those issues. See In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23

(parties’ failure to present sufficient evidence to the district court

does not provide grounds for reversal); see also In re Marriage of

Eisenhuth, 976 P.2d 896, 901 (Colo. App. 1999) (the district court is

required to consider the evidence presented to it; it does not act as

a surrogate attorney).

¶ 22 Because the district court had no way to evaluate the potential

tax consequences and penalties associated with any liquidation of

the retirement accounts, we discern no error in this regard. See In

11
re Marriage of Dale, 87 P.3d 219, 226 (Colo. App. 2003) (district

court need not consider capital gains taxes that are hypothetical);

see also In re Marriage of Bayer, 687 P.2d 537, 539 (Colo. App.

1984) (district court properly declined to account for capital gains

tax implications when there was no evidence of a potential sale of

the property).

¶ 23 We further note that the estate consisted of only two items of

significant value: the marital residence and the retirement

accounts. Contrary to father’s statements, both assets are illiquid

and could trigger potential tax consequences if liquidated. The

court therefore had limited options for dividing the estate in a way

that minimized those consequences.

¶ 24 Against that backdrop, the district court determined that

awarding the residence to mother was necessary because it was the

only home the child had ever known. See § 14-10-113(1)(c), C.R.S.

2025 (the district court should consider the desirability of awarding

the family residence to the spouse with whom any child resides

most of the time). So, father’s assertion is little more than a

disagreement with how the court exercised its broad discretion in

dividing the marital estate, and that is not a basis for reversal. See

12
Collins, ¶ 19; see also In re Marriage of Payne, 897 P.2d 888, 889

(Colo. App. 1995) (“The mechanism employed to effect an equitable

division rests within the sound discretion of the [district] court, and

the court may enter a variety of orders to implement its decision.”).

B. Marital Debts

¶ 25 Father insists that the district court erred by assigning him all

the marital debts despite the parties’ stipulation to keep the debts

in their names. He points to $20,284 owed in mother’s name that

the court allocated to him. We disagree.

¶ 26 In their joint trial management certificate, the parties agreed

that each would retain the “debt accounts held, respectively, in his

or her individual name although the monetary balances therein

shall be allocated by the [c]ourt.” At the start of the hearing,

mother’s attorney reiterated that understanding, saying that each

party would “keep[] what’s in their names, keep[] that account,” but

that “money can move around accordingly.”

¶ 27 The parties agreed that two credit card accounts were held in

mother’s name: a Costco Citi credit card with a balance of $9,316

plus a Chase credit card with a balance of $10,968. In the

permanent orders, after acknowledging both the stipulation and the

13
fact that those debt accounts were mother’s, the district court

directed father to pay off the balances.

¶ 28 We conclude that the district court honored the parties’

stipulation. The stipulation addressed ownership of the debt

accounts, not who would ultimately be responsible for the balances.

Consistent with that, the court left the debt accounts in mother’s

name and exercised its discretion to allocate the outstanding

balances to father. In other words, the court did not transfer

ownership of the debt accounts; it simply required father to pay the

balances. Thus, we discern no error in this regard.1

IV. Maintenance

A. Bonus Income

¶ 29 Father contends that the district court improperly included his

bonuses when calculating his income. We are not persuaded.

¶ 30 In calculating maintenance, income means a party’s actual

gross income if the party is fully employed. § 14-10-114(8)(a)(II),

1 We decline to address father’s assertion, raised for the first time in

his reply brief, that a court cannot assign marital liabilities
disproportionately to one spouse. See Pena v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins.
Co., 2018 COA 56, ¶ 21, n.4 (“We do not . . . consider arguments
raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).

14
C.R.S. 2025. Generally, gross income means income from any

source, including bonuses. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(E). But, unless

guaranteed, the receipt of a future bonus is always speculative to

some degree and necessarily becomes a question of fact for the

district court. See In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 329 (Colo.

App. 1996).

¶ 31 Father testified that he received annual bonuses of $14,847 in

2021, $23,735 in 2022, $17,796 in 2023, and $18,180 in 2024. He

also testified that future bonuses were not guaranteed.

¶ 32 The district court determined that father’s monthly income

was $19,756, which included an average of his bonus income over

the past four years. See In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA

103M, ¶ 32 (“In situations where a party’s income fluctuates or

there is conflicting evidence regarding the income amount, the

district court may, in its discretion, consider and use an average of

the party’s past income.”).

¶ 33 The court explained that given father’s recent bonus history, it

did not find credible father’s assertion that he would suddenly

receive no bonus at all. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA

80, ¶ 49 (credibility determinations and the weight, probative force,

15
and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are matters within the district

court’s sole discretion); see also In re Marriage of Wollert, 2020 CO

47, ¶ 23 (The district court’s ability to observe and evaluate the

witnesses’ credibility deserves deference because a “cold record is a

poor substitute for live testimony.” (quoting People v. Scott, 600

P.2d 68, 69 (Colo. 1979))); In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422,

424 (Colo. App. 2007) (it is the district court’s prerogative to believe

all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted).

¶ 34 Because the district court’s determination, including its

credibility assessments, were supported by the record, we perceive

no error. See Garrett, ¶ 9.

B. Sufficiency of Findings

¶ 35 Father asserts that the district court abused its discretion by

awarding maintenance to mother without making the necessary

factual findings. We agree.

¶ 36 The district court has broad discretion in deciding the amount

and duration of a maintenance award, and absent an abuse of

discretion, its decision will not be reversed. See § 14-10-114(2),

(3)(e); see also In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 14

16
(concluding that the revised statute intended “for the district court

to retain broad discretion” over maintenance). However, we review

de novo the court’s interpretation and application of the law. See

Vittetoe, ¶ 4.

¶ 37 Section 14-10-114(3) specifies the process the district court

must follow when considering a maintenance request. In re

Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶¶ 14-16. “[T]he court must first

make written or oral findings on each party’s gross income, the

marital property apportioned to each party, each party’s financial

resources, the reasonable financial need as established during the

marriage, and the taxability of the maintenance awarded.” In re

Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 25; § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I).

¶ 38 When, as here, the parties’ combined annual adjusted gross

income exceeds $240,000, the advisory guideline amount for

maintenance under section 14-10-114(3)(b)(I) “does not apply.”

§ 14-10-114(3.5); Herold, ¶ 26. The court must instead determine

the maintenance amount based on the statutory factors

enumerated in section 14-10-114(3)(c)(I)-(XIII). § 14-10-114(3.5);

Herold, ¶ 26. As for the maintenance term, the court may consider

the advisory guidelines. § 14-10-114(3.5).

17
¶ 39 Finally, the district court may award maintenance only if it

finds that the party seeking maintenance lacks sufficient property,

including marital property apportioned to them, to provide for their

reasonable needs and is unable to support themself through

appropriate employment before awarding maintenance. § 14-10-

114(3)(3)(d); Herold, ¶ 27.

¶ 40 In awarding mother maintenance, the district court made the

following findings:

• Father’s monthly income totaled $19,756, including

bonuses averaged from the last four years.

• Mother, a school counselor, was earning $5,416 per

month.

• Maintenance was not to be deductible for federal income

tax purposes or taxable income to the recipient.

• The parties have been married for over eleven and a half

years.

¶ 41 The district court did not make several statutorily mandated

findings under section 14-10-114(3)(a)(I), such as the financial

resources of each party or the reasonable financial need as

established during the marriage. Nor did the court make sufficient

18
findings pursuant to section 14-10-114(3)(c) to allow us to

understand the basis for its maintenance ruling. See Wright, ¶ 20

(“[W]hile a district court has no obligation to make specific factual

findings on every factor listed in section 14-10-114(3)(c), it must

‘make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court

a clear understanding of the basis of its order.’”) (quoting In re

Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9.”). Nor did the court address

whether mother “lacks sufficient property, including marital

property apportioned to . . . her, to provide for . . . her reasonable

needs and is unable to support himself or herself through

appropriate employment . . . . See § 14-10-114(3)(d)

¶ 42 Because the district court failed to make certain mandatory

findings and did not sufficiently explain the basis for the amount

and duration of the maintenance award, we reverse and remand the

case for complete findings. See § 14-10-114(3)(e); see also Wright,

¶ 20 (the district court must make sufficiently explicit findings of

fact to give us a clear understanding of the basis of its decision); In

re Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370, 1379 (Colo. 1997) (reversing

where the district court’s findings and “reasoning [were] unclear

and d[id] not permit meaningful appellate review”).

19
¶ 43 On remand, the district court must consider sections 14-10-

114(3) and 14-10-114(3.5), making findings where required and

addressing the factors relevant to its determination. See Herold,

¶¶ 29-32. The court must make sufficiently explicit findings of fact

to give us a clear understanding of the basis of its order. See

Wright, ¶ 20. And “[b]ecause maintenance is based on the parties’

financial circumstances at the time the order is entered, the district

court should consider the parties’ then existing circumstances on

remand.” Id. at ¶ 24.

¶ 44 Given our disposition, we decline to consider father’s claims

that the district court erred by not giving him credit for supporting

mother during the dissolution proceedings. See § 14-10-

114(3)(c)(VIII). Our decision to refrain from addressing that issue

does not preclude the court, on remand, from considering any

evidence the parties may present concerning it.

V. Disposition and Remand Instructions

¶ 45 The portion of the judgment awarding maintenance is

reversed. The case is remanded for the district court to reconsider

mother’s maintenance request, based on the parties’ current

financial circumstances, and to make specific findings in support of

20
any maintenance award. In all other respects, the judgment is

affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.

21