Marriage of Cooper

25CA0869 Marriage of Cooper 01-22-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0869
Pueblo County District Court No. 18DR98
Honorable Dorothy A. Radakovich, Magistrate
Honorable Tayler M. Thomas, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Evelynn Harmes,

Appellee,

and

Harry Cooper,

Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Brown and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 22, 2026

No Appearance for Appellee

Harry Cooper, Pro Se
¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case between Harry

Cooper (father) and Evelynn Harmes (mother), father appeals the

district court’s adoption of the magistrate’s denial of his motion to

modify parental responsibilities. We dismiss the appeal in part and

affirm the order.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 The parties’ marriage ended in 2018. At that time, the district

court designated mother as the child’s primary residential parent

and granted father two overnights a week. The parties agreed that

mother would have sole decision-making responsibility.

¶3 Within a year, mother filed a motion to restrict father’s

parenting time. In it, she alleged, among other things, that he had

not exercised parenting time for several weeks, had failed to provide

her with a current address, and was “unreachable.”

¶4 A magistrate temporarily restricted father’s parenting time,

requiring that it be supervised by an unrelated third party. The

magistrate set an evidentiary hearing for October 11, 2019, and

directed mother to “properly serve” father with her motion and the

order.

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¶5 At the hearing, mother appeared, and father did not. The

magistrate found that

• father had an outstanding arrest warrant;

• father was evicted from his former residence and was

residing at a place that was unsafe for the child due to

unfinished floors with exposed nails and the presence of

asbestos;

• father failed to keep the court informed of his current

address;

• when the child returned from parenting time with father,

the child had numerous flea bites, and he had ignored

the child’s medical needs;

• father had arrived at parenting time exchanges driving

despite not having a valid license; and

• father had no parenting time with the child for

approximately one month.

¶6 From those findings, the magistrate determined that the child

was in imminent danger while in father’s care and restricted his

parenting time to supervised visits at a facility. Father never

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contacted the facility or scheduled any visits. Father did not appeal

the magistrate’s order.

¶7 About four years later, father filed a motion to modify, asking

the court to name him the sole residential parent for the

then-six-year-old child, order mother’s parenting time be

supervised, and grant him sole decision-making responsibility.

¶8 In February 2025, following an evidentiary hearing, the

magistrate denied the motion and continued the restriction on

father’s parenting time. The magistrate found that the child was

not endangered in mother’s care. The magistrate further found that

father had been largely absent from the child’s life for the last four

years, did not know how to take care of the child’s needs, and had

recently tested positive for methamphetamines.

¶9 Then, father, without timely providing a hearing transcript,

petitioned the district court for review of the magistrate’s order.

Unpersuaded by father’s arguments, the court adopted the

magistrate’s decision.

¶ 10 After filing his notice of appeal, father moved to supplement

the record to include the transcript. This court issued a limited

remand order, directing the district court to determine whether the

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absence of the transcript was through no fault of father and

whether the prior order should be amended.

¶ 11 On remand, the district court found that father was diligent in

trying to obtain the transcript and that its absence was not his

fault. The court found that “that the facts necessary for review

purposes are undisputed and within the court records” and

therefore a transcript [was] not necessary for review” of the

magistrate’s order. The court therefore declined to amend the prior

order.

¶ 12 This court, on its own initiative, added the transcript to the

appellate record.

II. Appellate Standard of Review

¶ 13 Our review of a district court’s adoption of a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review, and we

must accept a magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly

erroneous. In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 25; see

C.R.M. 7(a)(9). A court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only

if there is no record support for them. Thorburn, ¶ 25. Legal

conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. See In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 11.

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III. Discussion

A. Hearing Transcript

¶ 14 Normally, when reviewing a district court order adopting a

magistrate’s decision, we do not consider a hearing transcript that

was not submitted to the district court. See In re Marriage of Dean,

2017 COA 51, ¶ 14. Here, however, we elect to do so given the

additional proceedings on remand, the district court’s finding that

the absence of the transcript was not attributable to father, and our

inability to discern whether the court, in fact, reviewed the

transcript.

B. Sufficiency of Findings

¶ 15 Father contends that the magistrate did not make specific

findings when it denied his request to modify parental

responsibilities. We disagree.

¶ 16 A court has broad discretion when modifying parenting time

and decision-making responsibility, and “we exercise every

presumption in favor of upholding its decisions.” In re Marriage of

Wenciker, 2022 COA 74, ¶ 26. A court abuses its discretion when it

misapplies the law or acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or

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unreasonable manner. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶

45.

¶ 17 A modification of parenting time that substantially changes

parenting time and changes the parent with whom the child resides

the majority of the time requires a finding that there has been a

change in the circumstances of the child or of the party with whom

the child resides a majority of the time and that the modification is

necessary to serve the child’s best interests. § 14-10-129(2), C.R.S.

2025. In making this determination, a court must consider all

relevant factors, including those listed in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a),

C.R.S. 2025. The court need not make specific findings on all

statutory factors. Pawelec, ¶ 44. That said, the court’s findings

must be sufficiently explicit to give us a clear understanding of the

basis of the order. Id

¶ 18 Additionally, when considering such a modification, a court

must retain the existing parenting time order unless the child’s

present environment endangers the child’s physical health or

significantly impairs the child’s emotional development and the

harm likely to be caused by a change in residence is outweighed by

the advantage of the change. § 14-10-129(2)(d); see also In re

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Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶¶ 19-21

(describing required three-step analysis starting with presumption

that the prior order remains in effect).

¶ 19 Likewise, a court may modify an order of decision-making

responsibility if it finds that “a change has occurred in the

circumstances of the child” or the parent with decision-making

authority, and “the modification is necessary to serve the best

interests of the child.” § 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2025. The court

must also retain the existing decision-making responsibility order

unless doing so would endanger the child’s physical health or

significantly impair the child’s emotional development and the harm

likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the

advantage to the child. § 14-10-131(2)(c).

¶ 20 In denying father’s motion to modify, the magistrate made the

following findings:

• Currently, the child was receiving appropriate medical

treatment in mother’s care and was performing well in

school.

• The child was also participating in ongoing mental health

counseling.

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• Father decided not to show up for the restriction hearing

in October 2019 because he had an outstanding warrant

and feared that he would be arrested.

• Father chose to be estranged from the child for more

than four years rather than address the issues that led to

his parenting time restriction.

• Father had minimal interactions with the child since

2019, had one contact with the child after July 2020,

and never exercised supervised parenting time as ordered

by the court.

• Given this limited contact, father lacked knowledge of the

child’s current needs.

• Father tested positive for methamphetamines in October

2024 and had not attempted to undergo a substance

abuse evaluation to determine whether treatment was

appropriate.

• Father presented no evidence demonstrating that the

restriction on his parenting time should be lifted.

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• In 2021, mother was convicted of class one misdemeanor

child abuse, misdemeanor driving under the influence,

and felony vehicular assault.

• Mother served a jail sentence, had remained sober since

the car accident, was compliant with probation, and had

completed the required alcohol education and treatment.

• Father failed to prove that mother perpetrated domestic

violence.

¶ 21 So, contrary to father’s contention, the magistrate’s findings

are sufficient as they clearly explained the basis for denying his

request for sole parental responsibilities — that is, the child was not

endangered in mother’s care and father had not spent much time

with the child in the last four years, did not know the child’s needs,

and had recently tested positive for methamphetamines. Because

the record supports those findings, we cannot say that the court

erred in this regard. See Wenciker, ¶ 26.

¶ 22 Father relatedly asserts that the magistrate ignored evidence

and “minimalized” mother’s criminal history. We presume,

however, that the magistrate considered all the evidence admitted.

In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 21 (an appellate court

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may presume that the district court considered all the evidence

admitted). And to the extent he challenges the weight the

magistrate accorded to the evidence in its best interests analysis

and asks us to reweigh it in his favor, we will not do so. See In re

Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When reviewing for an

abuse of discretion, even where “there is evidence in the record that

could have supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute

our judgment for that of the district court.”); see also Thorburn, ¶ 49

(it is for the district court to determine witness credibility and the

weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as

the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom).

C. Domestic Violence

¶ 23 Father contends that the magistrate erred by denying his

request for sole decision-making responsibility because the

magistrate did not consider certain evidence of mother’s alleged

domestic violence against him during the marriage in violation of

section 14-10-124(1.5)(4)(a)(II) (the district court must consider the

history of domestic violence when allocating decision-making

responsibility).

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¶ 24 We will not address the issue now because father did not

argue it before the magistrate. See Pawelec, ¶ 38 (stating that to

preserve an issue for appeal, it must be presented in such a way

that the district court has an opportunity to rule on it); see also

Core-Mark Midcontinent Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 2016 COA 22, ¶ 26

(only specific arguments made to the district court are preserved for

appeal).

¶ 25 At the modification hearing, father attempted to admit an

arrest record concerning mother. The magistrate questioned the

relevance of any allegations predating the 2018 dissolution decree

and explained that any domestic violence issue should have been

raised before the parties stipulated to joint decision-making

responsibility. He did not challenge the court’s view that the exhibit

was irrelevant. Instead, he responded, “Okay, I understand,” and,

“Absolutely Your Honor.” As well, when asked if he had any

witnesses with personal knowledge to testify that mother committed

domestic violence against him, he answered no.

D. Drug Test Results

¶ 26 Next, father contends that the magistrate erred by admitting

his drug test results without “foundation.” Specifically, he

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challenges the admission of the results based on chain of custody,

testing methodology, the absence of testimony from a supporting

witness, and hearsay. Again, because he did not raise those issues

before the magistrate, we will not consider them.

¶ 27 At the hearing, father did object to the admission of his drug

test results, yet his objection was limited to a different ground. He

asserted that the results should be excluded because mother

allegedly misrepresented that the magistrate had ordered him to

submit to testing. That is a different issue than what he is arguing

on appeal. Moreover, his appellate issues were not raised in his

petition for review. See People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402,

403 (Colo. App. 2006) (a party appealing a magistrate’s decision

must first raise a particular issue in the district court in a petition

for review and thereby allow the court to correct any error before

raising the issue on appeal).

¶ 28 We also decline to address father’s related argument that the

magistrate’s written order, which stated that the test was not court

ordered, created “confusion” about the “test’s validity.” He offers no

legal analysis explaining how this alleged error warrants reversal or

how it affected the admissibility of the evidence. See In re Marriage

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of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to

consider an argument not supported by legal authority or any

meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12. As a result, the

argument is undeveloped, and we do not address it.

E. Bias

¶ 29 Father contends that the magistrate was biased against him.

To get there, he says that the magistrate did not rule on his pretrial

motion to strike, issued contradictory orders, admitted mother’s

allegedly “unauthenticated” testimony, and excluded evidence he

claims was properly authenticated. But adverse legal rulings,

standing alone, do not establish grounds for prejudice or bias. In re

Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007); see People

v. Schupper, 124 P.3d 856, 859 (Colo. App. 2005) (the propriety of a

district court’s rulings, whether right or wrong, is not relevant in

determining recusal issues), aff’d, 157 P.3d 516 (Colo. 2007).

¶ 30 Father also points to the magistrate’s statement that “you were

trying to keep the court from seeing a hot drug test,” as evidence of

bias. Judicial comments made during the proceedings, however, do

not establish bias unless they show a deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible. See In re

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People In Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24, ¶ 31; see also Liteky v. United

States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial remarks during the

course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile

to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a

bias or partiality challenge.”).

¶ 31 The magistrate’s statement appeared to arise from an

evidentiary dispute and, by itself, does not reflect the sort of bias

that would prevent a fair decision. See Hatton, 160 P.3d at 330;

A.P., ¶ 31; see also People v. Jennings, 2021 COA 112, ¶ 28 (the

record must clearly demonstrate the judge’s actual bias).

¶ 32 Father insists that during the modification hearing, the

magistrate showed bias by playing an audio recording of a prior

ruling. We disagree. The magistrate played the recording to simply

clear up a disagreement over what the magistrate previously

ordered. Father never objected, and nothing about the magistrate’s

conduct suggests favoritism or hostility. See Jennings, ¶ 28.

F. Constitutional Claims

¶ 33 Father contends that the magistrate violated his due process

or fundament rights to present his case by (1) failing to rule on his

pretrial motions; (2) admitting mother’s “unauthenticated” evidence

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while excluding his properly “authenticated” evidence; (3) barring

his evidence of mother’s domestic violence; and (4) using “surprise

evidence tactics.” Because he did not raise those specific

complaints in his petition for review, we will not address them. See

K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403; Core-Mark Midcontinent Inc, ¶ 26.

¶ 34 True, he argued in his petition for review that the magistrate

denied him a “fair opportunity to present his case” by refusing to

hear evidence of domestic violence that occurred before the

dissolution decree. But that argument was framed narrowly and

factually. He did not mention a due process violation, invoke

fundamental rights, or otherwise alert the district court that he was

asserting a constitutional claim.

G. Fraud on the Appellate Court

¶ 35 Father contends that the “district court” committed fraud on

this court by falsely certifying the appellate record as complete and

stating that no transcripts had been prepared, even though,

according to him, the hearing transcript had been completed and

delivered to the district court. In other words, he asserts that this

misrepresentation was intended to prevent this court from

reviewing the full record of the proceedings below. He cites two

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cases for the general proposition that fraud on the court

undermines the integrity of the judicial process and requires

corrective action. However, he does not discuss any relevant facts

or provide any legal analysis applying the facts and law. See

Zander, ¶ 27; see also Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10 (an

appellate court will not comb the record for facts to support

undeveloped arguments). Thus, we decline to address the issue.

And we note that the transcript is part of the record, and we were

able to review the portions relevant to his contentions.

H. District Court Review

¶ 36 We reject father’s contention that the district court committed

“structural error” by merely “rubber-stamp[ing]” the magistrate’s

decision and failed to conduct an independent analysis. Our review

of the court’s order shows that it adequately considered and

addressed the alleged errors in his petition for review.

I. October 19, 2019, Order

¶ 37 Last, father contends that the October 19, 2019, order should

be void because he was not properly served, lacked notice of the

restriction hearings, and therefore the court did not have personal

jurisdiction over him. He maintains that mother allegedly engaged

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in fraudulent service of process by providing an incorrect address

for him despite knowing his true whereabouts. We conclude that

the issue is moot.

¶ 38 While an order entered without jurisdiction is void and may be

challenged on that basis at any time, an appellate court will not

address the merits of an issue when subsequent events have

rendered the issue moot. In re Marriage of Tibbetts, 2018 COA 117,

¶ 7. An issue is moot when the relief requested, if granted, would

have no practical effect on an existing controversy. See In re

Marriage of Thomas, 2021 COA 123, ¶ 21.

¶ 39 The restriction order father challenges has been superseded by

the district court’s current order, which we have already determined

is proper. The restriction order is no longer operative and does not

govern the parties’ present rights or responsibilities. Even if we

were to accept his contention that the restriction order was entered

based on defective service and should therefore be declared void,

that determination would not alter the existing order. Because the

restriction order has been replaced and no longer has any legal

effect, granting him the relief he seeks would have no practical

effect. See id. Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of the appeal.

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IV. Disposition

¶ 40 We dismiss the part of the appeal challenging the October 19,

2019, order. Otherwise, we affirm the district court’s order

adopting the magistrate’s denial of father’s motion to modify

parental responsibilities.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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