Peo in Interest of Depatie

25CA2161 Peo in Interest of Depatie 01-22-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2161
Pueblo County District Court No. 25MH30109
Honorable Amiel Markenson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Andrew Jason Depatie,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN*
Román, C.J., and Graham*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 22, 2026

Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County
Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado for Respondent-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Respondent, Andrew Jason Depatie, appeals the district

court’s order authorizing staff at the Colorado Mental Health

Hospital in Pueblo (the hospital) to medicate him involuntarily. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Depatie was committed to the hospital after being found

incompetent to proceed in a criminal case. He was diagnosed with

unspecified mood disorder and presented with symptoms that

included grandiose delusions, paranoia, impulsivity, agitation, and

threatening behavior. After Depatie became verbally aggressive and

physically assaultive to a peer in his unit and was observed

engaging in self-harming behavior, the hospital staff placed him on

suicide precautions and began giving him emergency medication.

¶3 The People then petitioned the district court for authorization

to treat Depatie against his will with various antipsychotic and

mood stabilizing medications. The district court held an evidentiary

hearing, at which Dr. Hareesh Pillai, Depatie’s psychiatrist, and

Depatie testified. Dr. Pillai described Depatie’s disorder and

accompanying symptoms. He also described the requested

medications — valproic acid (Depakote), lithium, risperidone

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(Risperdal), and olanzapine (Zyprexa) — and explained their

possible side effects. He opined that the medications were

necessary to treat Depatie’s symptoms.

¶4 Depatie denied having a mental illness but agreed that he had

previously been diagnosed with a mental illness in 2007. He

testified that he was unwilling to take Depakote and lithium due to

side effects that “put [him] on the floor” — namely, extreme

drowsiness, slurred speech, dry mouth, and shaking. However, he

also testified that he would be willing to take risperidone — “a

miracle drug” that had worked for him in the past. Depatie further

agreed to take Zyprexa, to the extent it was needed to cross titrate

to risperidone alone.

¶5 The district court granted the petition. It found that Dr. Pillai

testified “credibly and persuasively” and that the People had proved

all four elements of the test for involuntary medication of drugs in

People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985). The court issued

an order authorizing the involuntary administration of the

requested medications.

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II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 A district court may order the involuntary administration of

medication if the People prove by clear and convincing evidence that

(1) the patient is incompetent to effectively participate in the

treatment decision; (2) the treatment is necessary to prevent a

significant and likely long-term deterioration in the patient’s mental

health condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient causing

serious harm to himself, herself, or others at the institution; (3) a

less intrusive treatment alternative is not available; and (4) the

patient’s need for treatment is sufficiently compelling to override

any bona fide and legitimate interest of the patient in refusing

treatment. Id.

¶7 Application of the Medina test involves mixed questions of fact

and law. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8, 364 P.3d 499, 502.

We defer to the district court’s factual findings if they have record

support and review its legal conclusions de novo. Id. It is for the

district court, as the fact finder, to determine the credibility of

witnesses; the sufficiency, probative effect, and the weight of the

evidence; and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the

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evidence. People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7, 451 P.3d

1229, 1231.

¶8 When a patient challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting an involuntary medication order, we must affirm if the

evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

People, is sufficient to support the order. People in Interest of

R.K.L., 2016 COA 84, ¶ 13, 412 P.3d 827, 832. The testimony of

the treating psychiatrist alone may suffice. Id. at ¶ 30, 412 P.3d at

834.

III. Analysis

¶9 Depatie challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the order. In particular, he contends that the evidence was

insufficient to support the district court’s findings that the third

and fourth Medina elements were met. We address each contention

in turn.

A. Less Intrusive Alternative

¶ 10 First, we address Depatie’s contention that the evidence was

insufficient to prove the third Medina element — that a less

intrusive treatment alternative was not available. Medina, 705 P.2d

at 973. This element “encompasses not only the gravity of any

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harmful effects from the proposed treatment but also the existence,

feasibility, and efficacy of alternative methods of treating the

patient’s condition or of alleviating the danger created by that

condition.” Id. at 974. A less intrusive alternative is “an available

treatment that has less harmful side effects and is at least as

effective at alleviating a patient’s condition as the proposed

treatment.” People in Interest of Strodtman, 293 P.3d 123, 133

(Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 11 Depatie contends that a less intrusive alternative to the

proposed treatment exists because he had previously been treated

successfully with risperidone alone and the proposed addition of

Zyprexa, lithium, and Depakote is “unnecessarily intrusive.”

¶ 12 True, Dr. Pillai testified that after speaking with some family

members he learned that Depatie was prescribed risperidone

“earlier in his life” and was “compliant with that medication for the

majority of his adult life.” Based on this information, Dr. Pillai

hoped to “titrate [Depatie] off of Zyprexa and onto the risperidone,

continuing the lithium and Depakote.” Dr. Pillai also testified that

if Depatie were to attain his baseline on a combination of

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risperidone, Depakote, and lithium, the next step would be to slowly

taper off either Depakote or lithium.

¶ 13 However, Dr. Pillai also testified that while it might be possible

for Depatie to be managed with risperidone alone “once he returns

to his baseline,” right now, “in the midst of his acute mania, he

requires a higher dosage [of risperidone] along with mood

stabilizers, including Depakote and lithium.” And Dr Pillai further

testified that Depatie would need treatment with both antipsychotic

and mood stabilizing medications for “an extended period of time”

before he expects him to return to baseline. Dr. Pillai explained,

“when individuals suffer from acute manic episodes, the mood

stabilizer is the most important aspect of their outpatient treatment

regimen.”

¶ 14 Crediting this testimony, the district court found that while

treatment with risperidone alone would have fewer harmful side

effects than the proposed treatment plan, adequate evidence did not

support the conclusion that risperidone alone would be enough to

keep Depatie stable. Because the record supports the court’s

determination, we may not disturb it, and to the extent Depatie

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asks us to draw different inferences from the testimony, we decline

to do so. See R.C., ¶ 7, 451 P.3d at 1231.

B. Need for Treatment and Legitimate Interest in Refusing
Treatment

¶ 15 Next, we address Depatie’s contention that the evidence was

insufficient to prove the fourth Medina element — that his need for

the requested medications was sufficiently compelling to override

his bona fide and legitimate interest in refusing to take them. In

assessing this element, a court must first determine “whether the

patient’s refusal is bona fide and legitimate.” Medina, 705 P.2d at

974. If it is, the court must then determine “whether the prognosis

without treatment is so unfavorable that the patient’s personal

preference must yield to the legitimate interests of the state in

preserving the life and health of the patient placed in its charge and

in protecting the safety of those in the institution.” Id.

¶ 16 Pointing to the side effects he has experienced, Depatie

summarily asserts that “the benefits of treating him are clearly

outweighed by the risks to his health and well-being.” However,

Depatie does not address the other side of the equation — his need

for the requested medications. The district court accepted Depatie’s

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assertion that he had bona fide and legitimate reasons for refusing

to take the requested medications based on his avoidance of

unwanted side effects. Nevertheless, it found that Depatie’s need

for the medications outweighed those concerns.

¶ 17 The record supports the district court’s findings. Dr. Pillai

opined that the failure to medicate Depatie would be more harmful

than the risks posed by the requested medications. In support of

this opinion, Dr. Pillai testified that without the medications

Depatie would “likely suffer a significant deterioration and have

more severe symptoms of mania similar to how he presented when

he . . . initially arrived [at] the hospital.” At that point, Depatie’s

symptoms were “so severe” that he was “unable to adequately

control his behaviors in a manner that [was] safe.” And while Dr.

Pillai agreed that Depatie’s symptoms had “significantly improved”

since being placed on the emergency course of medications, he

testified that “this improvement . . . [was] extremely tenuous” and

Depatie could “rapidly deteriorate within a day or two or even a

week if he was not [medication] compliant.” Because the record

supports the court’s findings, we may not second-guess them. See

R.K.L., ¶ 13, 417 P.3d at 832.

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IV. Disposition

¶ 18 The order is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.

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