Peo v. Teague

24CA1219 Peo v Teague 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1219
Boulder County District Court No. 23CR827
Honorable Thomas F. Mulvahill, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Aiesha Amjed Teague,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN*
Lipinsky and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 24, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jillian J. Price, Deputy Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

William Peters, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Aiesha Amjed Teague, appeals the trial court’s

order that she could not set off against the restitution award

entered against her in this criminal case when she paid the victim

$95,000 under a settlement in a civil action. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Teague worked as a bookkeeper at Ripple Frozen Yogurt

(Ripple), a business in Boulder. She was accused of stealing

$115,562.30 from Ripple over a period of ten years. She was

ultimately charged with theft, identity theft, and forgery. Teague

pleaded guilty to one count of theft, and the remaining charges were

dismissed. The court later ordered her on December 4, 2023, to

pay $95,000 in restitution.

¶3 Ripple had also filed a civil suit against Teague in 2023. The

parties resolved the case and entered into a settlement agreement

on January 15, 2024 — two months before Teague’s sentencing in

the criminal case. The agreement provided that Teague would pay

Ripple a total of $350,000 as follows: (1) an initial payment of

$75,000 no later than seven days after the effective date of the

agreement; (2) an annual payment of $25,000 no later than 365

days after the effective date of the agreement; and (3) $1,500

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monthly payments until Ripple has received the remaining

$250,000, with payments beginning on the third business day after

the effective date of the agreement.

¶4 Significantly, the settlement agreement did not mention the

restitution award or how Teague’s payments would be apportioned.

It did not say that any of Teague’s settlement payments would be

applied toward the amount of restitution the court ordered her to

pay Ripple in the criminal case.

¶5 On January 16, 2024, Teague mailed a $95,000 check to

Ripple. This was Teague’s first payment to Ripple after the

settlement agreement became effective, and before restitution was

ordered. The memo line of the check referred to “Teague

settlement” and did not mention “restitution.” In the accompanying

cover letter to Ripple’s civil counsel, Teague’s civil counsel wrote,

“Enclosed please find a settlement check for $95,000.” The letter

said nothing about restitution.

¶6 Teague’s and Ripple’s civil attorneys subsequently exchanged

emails regarding whether the $95,000 payment satisfied Teague’s

restitution obligation. Teague’s civil attorney asked Ripple’s civil

attorney to “confirm[] whether . . . Teague paid the entire amount of

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restitution.” Ripple’s civil attorney said the $95,000 payment was

“consistent with . . . Teague’s negotiations with the DA’s office.”

However, he did not say that the $95,000 should be applied toward

Teague’s restitution obligation.

¶7 Teague and her civil attorney took the position that the parties

had “agreed that the settlement payment would be treated as

‘restitution,’” and the presentence investigation report noted

Teague’s statement that she planned to pay “restitution in full

before sentencing.” The court conducted Teague’s sentencing

hearing on March 29, 2024, and April 29, 2024.

¶8 On the first day of the sentencing hearing, the trial court

asked the prosecution about Teague’s statement in the presentence

investigation report that restitution would be paid in full before

sentencing. The prosecution denied that Teague had paid

restitution in full with the $95,000 payment because she owed

Ripple an initial settlement payment of $75,000 “anyway” and the

burden was on the defense “to show how the costs are attributable

and the setoff.” Defense counsel argued that “the restitution in this

case was to be subsumed in [the settlement agreement], meaning as

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long as she paid $95,000 in restitution[,] . . . it would satisfy the

damages provision in the civil case.”

¶9 The trial court issued a written order concluding that Teague

had met her burden “of showing that the settlement agreement is

clearly intended to cover all categories of loss for which restitution

could be imposed.” The trial court also found that the prosecution

had “not yet rebutted the inference of double recovery” and said

that it could rebut the inference if it presented evidence on this

issue at the April 29 continued sentencing hearing.

¶ 10 At that hearing, Ripple’s civil attorney testified that the

$95,000 payment and the additional payments that Ripple had

received from Teague had been apportioned to attorney fees,

disgorgement of Teague’s compensation, court costs, and

prejudgment interest. He further testified that no funds received

from Teague had been apportioned to the $114,425 in actual

damages attributable to Teague’s actions.1 During cross-

examination, Ripple’s civil attorney confirmed that the settlement

agreement required an initial payment of $75,000 within seven days

1 Although accused of stealing $115,562.30, Teague confessed to a

judgment that included $114,425 in actual damages.

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of the settlement agreement’s effective date. He also confirmed that

the settlement agreement did not address how Teague’s settlement

payments were to be apportioned.

¶ 11 Teague’s civil attorney then testified that it was both parties’

understanding that “the money that was paid in the settlement

agreement would be applied to the restitution with the [c]ourt.” He

also disagreed with the prosecution that Ripple could apportion the

money it had received, arguing that the agreement stated the

amount and timing of the payments. The prosecution then stated

that the settlement agreement “simply says on what days and how

much the payments are to be,” and Teague’s civil attorney agreed.

¶ 12 The court found that Teague was not entitled to a setoff

because “of the amount that’s been paid by [Teague], none of that

has been used by the victim or applied to cover actual damages.”

¶ 13 Teague now appeals.

II. Analysis

¶ 14 Teague contends that the trial court erred in concluding that

she was not entitled to a setoff after paying Ripple $95,000. She

asserts that the trial court did not properly apply contract

interpretation rules to the settlement agreement. More specifically,

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she contends that because the settlement agreement was

ambiguous, extrinsic evidence was admissible to determine the

parties’ intent. She also asserts that extrinsic evidence proved the

parties’ intent that restitution was addressed in the settlement

agreement. We are not convinced.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 15 Restitution in criminal cases is “‘a mechanism for the

rehabilitation of offenders,’ ‘a deterrent to future criminality,’ and a

means ‘to lessen the financial burdens inflicted upon [victims and

their immediate families], to compensate them for their suffering

and hardship, and to preserve the individual dignity of victims.’”

People v. Lassek, 122 P.3d 1029, 1034 (Colo. App. 2005) (alteration

in original) (quoting § 18-1.3-601(1)(c)-(e), C.R.S. 2025), overruled

on other grounds by, Sullivan v. People, 2020 CO 58, ¶ 18, 465 P.3d

25, 30. Restitution can be decreased “[i]f the defendant has

otherwise compensated the victim or victims for the pecuniary

losses suffered.” § 18-1.3-603(3)(b)(II), C.R.S. 2025. Also, “[a]ny

amount paid to a victim under an order of restitution shall be set off

against any amount later recovered as compensatory damages by

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such victim in any federal or state civil proceeding.” § 18-1.3-

603(6).

¶ 16 We review a trial court’s restitution award for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Gregory, 2019 COA 184, ¶ 21, 469 P.3d 507,

511. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it misconstrues or

misapplies the law, or when its decision fixing the amount of

restitution is not supported by the record . . . .” Id. (citation

omitted).

¶ 17 “A settlement agreement is a contract.” People v. Stanley,

2017 COA 121, ¶ 27, 405 P.3d 518, 524. To determine the parties’

intent, we look to the “plain and generally accepted meaning of the

contractual language.” Id. If the contractual language is

unambiguous, the “document cannot be explained by extrinsic

evidence so as to dispute its plain meaning.” Denv. Found. v. Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A., 163 P.3d 1116, 1126 (Colo. 2007). Extrinsic

evidence is “only admissible to prove intent when there is an

ambiguity in the terms of the contract.” Gagne v. Gagne, 2014 COA

127, ¶ 52, 338 P.3d 1152, 1163. “We review and interpret . . .

contracts de novo.” Gregory, ¶ 22, 469 P.3d at 511.

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B. Ambiguity and Merger Clause

¶ 18 Teague contends that the settlement agreement is ambiguous

because it is “silent as to the apportionment of any payments.” She

maintains that the prosecution and Ripple interpreted the silence

as Ripple’s “right to apportion any payment as [it] saw fit,” while

defense counsel asserted that the $95,000 payment “had been

agreed to be applied to the criminal restitution order.”

¶ 19 We agree with the People that silence usually does not create

ambiguity in a contract. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Meadow Island

Ditch Co. No. 2, 132 P.3d 333, 339 (Colo. 2006). However, “[s]ilence

does create ambiguity . . . when it involves a matter naturally within

the scope of the contract.” Id. (quoting Cheyenne Mountain Sch.

Dist. No. 12 v. Thompson, 861 P.2d 711, 715 (Colo. 1993)).

¶ 20 The scope of the settlement agreement at issue here outlined

the amount of money owed in each listed category (e.g., damages,

reasonable attorney fees, recoverable costs), indicated when

payments were due, and explained how payments were to be

received. It did not address whether any of the payments were to be

applied to Teague’s restitution obligation to Ripple. Also, Teague’s

civil attorney confirmed as much in his testimony at the April 29

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sentencing hearing when the prosecution asked him, “So . . . the

settlement agreement . . . simply says on what days and how much

the payments are to be?” and he responded in the affirmative. If the

parties had intended to address in the settlement agreement the

apportionment of Teague’s payments toward her restitution

obligation, they could have specified in the agreement whether

Teague would satisfy her restitution obligation by making her

settlement payments.

¶ 21 We also conclude that the merger clause in Section 5.0 of the

settlement agreement defeats Teague’s contention. A merger clause

in an unambiguous contract prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence

to prove the parties’ intent. Nelson v. Elway, 908 P.2d 102, 107

(Colo. 1995). “Therefore, the terms of a contract intended to

represent a final and complete integration of the agreement between

the parties are enforceable, and extrinsic evidence offered to prove

the existence of prior agreements is inadmissible.” Id.

¶ 22 Section 5.0 of the settlement agreement stated, “This

agreement constitutes the complete, final, and entire agreement

between the Parties and supersedes all prior written or oral

negotiations, representations, or agreements between the Parties

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relating in any way to the subject matter of this Agreement.” While

Teague relies on the civil attorneys’ discussions above detailing

whether her $95,000 settlement payment to Ripple should be

applied to her restitution obligation, this evidence is also precluded

by the merger clause.

¶ 23 Because the settlement agreement is unambiguous and

includes a clear merger clause, the trial court did not err by

interpreting its plain language.2

C. Setoff

¶ 24 “[A] defendant is entitled to a setoff against [a] restitution order

for any money actually paid to the victim for the same damages

covered by the order.” Gregory, ¶ 24, 469 P.3d at 512. When a civil

claim precedes a restitution order, “the court must first determine

the total amount of the victim’s pecuniary damages subject to

restitution and then subtract ‘any proceeds attributable to those

2 Teague also argued that “the only” evidence of Ripple’s intent as to

the apportionment was Ripple’s civil attorney’s testimony that
Ripple had the right to apportion money as it saw fit, and therefore
the trial court’s finding was not supported by sufficient evidence.
This extrinsic evidence is inadmissible because a party cannot vary
an unambiguous contract through such evidence, so we will not
address this argument.

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damages received by the victim’ from the civil claim.” Id. (citation

omitted). If the trial court finds that there is insufficient evidence

“on the apportionment of actual damages for which the defendant

compensated the victim,” the defendant is not entitled to a setoff.

Stanley, ¶ 23, 405 P.3d at 524.

¶ 25 A defendant claiming entitlement to a setoff has the burden of

showing that “a civil settlement includes the same categories of

losses or expenses . . . awarded as restitution.” Id. at ¶ 34, 405

P.3d at 526. Once the defendant has met that burden, the

prosecution can “rebut the inference that a double recovery has

occurred” by showing that the victim used or allocated the proceeds

in a way that is not “covered by the restitution order.” Id.

¶ 26 Teague argues that “[Ripple] cannot simultaneously claim the

same theft caused $95,000 in restitution as well as $114,425 in

damages because the law is designed to prevent unjust

enrichment.” We agree.

¶ 27 Section 18-1.3-603(6) is designed to prevent double recovery

in that restitution can be set off “against any amount later

recovered as compensatory damages by [the] victim in any federal or

state civil proceeding.” The damages category in the settlement

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agreement compensates Ripple for its economic loss. The

restitution order covers the same type of pecuniary loss. Therefore,

Teague met her burden.

¶ 28 However, the prosecution also met its burden and rebutted the

inference of double recovery through Ripple’s civil attorney’s

testimony and the settlement agreement’s unambiguous language.

The civil attorney testified that Ripple had apportioned the

settlement payments that Teague had made thus far to attorney

fees, disgorgement of Teague’s compensation, court costs, and

prejudgment interest. The prosecution asked Ripple’s civil attorney,

“And then $114,425 is the amount of actual damages, and no

payment has been attributed to that; is that correct?” Ripple’s civil

attorney replied, “That’s correct.”

¶ 29 Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that Teague’s

$95,000 settlement payment did not reduce her restitution

obligation to Ripple because, under the settlement agreement,

Ripple was not required to apply any portion of that payment to the

amount of restitution the court ordered Teague to pay Ripple.

Accordingly, no double recovery occurred.

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III. Disposition

¶ 30 The restitution order is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE BERGER concur.

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