People v. Wilson

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
December 24, 2025

2025COA94

No. 22CA1977, People v. Wilson — Crimes — Violation of
Custody Order or Order Relating to Parental Responsibilities —
Unit of Prosecution; Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment —
Double Jeopardy — Multiplicity

As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of

appeals considers whether the unit of prosecution for violating a

child custody order under section 18-3-304(2), C.R.S. 2025, is the

number of custody orders violated or the number of children

affected. Based on the plain language of the statute, the division

concludes that the unit of prosecution is the number of children

affected. The division further concludes that no evidentiary error

occurred here and that sufficient evidence supports the violation of

a child custody order and child abuse convictions. Accordingly, the

judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded for the trial court to

merge the separate knowing or reckless and negligent child abuse
convictions into a single conviction and to amend the mittimus

accordingly.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA94

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1977
Mesa County District Court No. 21CR982
Honorable Matthew D. Barrett, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Tiffany Jean Wilson,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

Announced December 24, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Emily Hessler, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Tiffany Jean Wilson, appeals her convictions on

four counts of violation of a custody order, one count of child abuse

(no injury, knowing or reckless), one count of child abuse (no

injury, negligence), one count of resisting arrest, and one count of

obstructing government operations.

¶2 Wilson raises three challenges on appeal. She contends that

(1) insufficient evidence supports her convictions for violating a

child custody order and child abuse; (2) extrinsic bad character

evidence was erroneously admitted; and (3) her four convictions for

violation of a custody order are multiplicitous because the unit of

prosecution under section 18-3-304(2), C.R.S. 2025, is the number

of custody orders violated, not the number of children affected.

Wilson also contends, and the People agree, that merging her

negligent child abuse conviction into her knowing or reckless child

abuse conviction is required.

¶3 Wilson’s section 18-3-304(2) argument raises a novel issue of

statutory interpretation. Based on the statute’s plain language, we

conclude that the unit of prosecution for violating a child custody

order is the number of children affected, not the number of custody

orders violated. Accordingly, we reject Wilson’s argument and,

1
because we disagree with her evidentiary arguments, affirm the

judgment. We remand the case for the trial court to merge Wilson’s

child abuse convictions into a single conviction and to amend the

mittimus accordingly.

I. Background

¶4 In June 2021, Maggie Hellard, a social caseworker with the

Mesa County Department of Human Services (MCDHS), received an

emergency custody and pickup order (the Order) for Wilson’s four

children. Hellard and another MCDHS caseworker, Erica Sebring,

along with Grand Junction Police Officers Kaelyn Dennis and Travis

Wright, approached Wilson in the driveway of her then boyfriend’s

house. Wilson and her oldest child, J.W., were standing outside

her car, while the remaining three children were inside her car.

¶5 Hellard identified herself as a caseworker with MCDHS, read

the Order to Wilson, said that the children were required to come

with her, and said that a shelter hearing would take place in two

days. Hellard did not show Wilson the Order.

¶6 Initially, Wilson was calm and said she understood. After

Hellard and Sebring repeated the Order, Wilson grew agitated and

said that she was done “playing games” and that she would see

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MCDHS in court. Wilson got in her car, instructed J.W. to get in

the car, and began backing out of the driveway with the passenger

side door open. Wilson then left with her children.

¶7 Approximately thirty minutes later, Hellard received a tip from

B.P., a former foster parent of two of Wilson’s children and a friend

of Wilson, that Wilson was at her own house. When B.P. arrived at

Wilson’s house, she found Wilson in a back bedroom. Wilson was

holding her eighteen-month-old son, C.S., while smoking

marijuana. Wilson was very upset, threatened to “effing kill

herself,” and grabbed a pair of scissors. Wilson was “elevated” and

crying, and she told B.P. that she was not going to lose her

children. When Dennis and Wright knocked on the front door,

Wilson began stabbing herself in the head with the scissors.

¶8 Shortly thereafter, J.W. let Dennis and Wright into Wilson’s

house and they entered the back bedroom. Wilson was still sitting

on the bed with C.S. in her left arm and a pair of scissors in her

right hand. B.P. was lying on the bed, trying to restrain Wilson’s

right arm. B.P. told the officers that Wilson had attempted to stab

herself. Dennis jumped on the bed to retrieve the scissors. After a

struggle, Wilson was arrested.

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¶9 The People charged Wilson with four counts of violating a

custody order, two counts of child abuse, resisting arrest,

obstructing government operations, and reckless endangerment. A

jury acquitted her of reckless endangerment and convicted her of

the remaining charges. The court sentenced Wilson to forty-five

days in jail and two years of probation.

II. Sufficiency

¶ 10 Wilson contends that insufficient evidence supports her

convictions for violation of a custody order and child abuse. We

disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 “We review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence presented was sufficient in both quantity and quality to

sustain a defendant’s conviction.” McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44,

¶ 63. In doing so, we assess whether the evidence, viewed in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, supports a reasonable

conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Tomaske, 2022 COA 52, ¶ 17. We will overturn the verdict

only if, despite drawing every reasonable inference in favor of the

prosecution, the record is unsubstantial and insufficient to support

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a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark v. People, 232

P.3d 1287, 1291-92 (Colo. 2010).

B. Violation of a Child Custody Order

¶ 12 Under section 18-3-304(2),

any parent or other person who violates an
order of any district or juvenile court of this
state, granting the custody of a child or
parental responsibilities with respect to a child
under the age of eighteen years to any person,
agency, or institution, with the intent to
deprive the lawful custodian or person with
parental responsibilities of the custody or care
of a child under the age of eighteen years

violates a custody order.

¶ 13 Wilson contends that the prosecution failed to prove that

(1) she violated the Order; (2) she had the intent to deprive a lawful

custodian of custody; and (3) the Order was issued by a district or

juvenile court. We are not persuaded.

¶ 14 The evidence demonstrated that a judge ordered the children

to be placed in MCDHS’s temporary custody. Hellard testified that

she knew Wilson from previous interactions as a caseworker. Body

camera footage further showed that Hellard told Wilson that a judge

“signed over custody”; Wilson said she knew what to do about the

shelter hearing and was “not going to play your . . . charades

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anymore”; Sebring told Wilson the children had to come with

MCDHS and Wilson said “no, they are not”; and when Hellard

reiterated that MCDHS had custody of the children by court order,

Wilson replied that she was “not doing this with [MC]DHS anymore”

and drove away.

¶ 15 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, a jury could reasonably conclude that Wilson violated

the Order by leaving with the children after Hellard explained that it

required the children to come with her.

¶ 16 We reject Wilson’s argument that the prosecution did not

prove that she violated the Order because the Order required law

enforcement officers to take physical custody of the children before

transferring them to MCDHS. The Order said law enforcement

“shall accompany [MCDHS]” and law enforcement “may enter . . .

retrieve . . . and deliver the children to the [MCDHS’s] custody.”

See People v. Garcia, 2016 COA 124, ¶ 13 (“shall” is generally

mandatory, whereas “may” is generally indicative of a grant of

discretion or choice among alternatives). Moreover, it explicitly

stated that MCDHS shall exercise custody, not that law

enforcement shall exercise custody.

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¶ 17 To the extent Wilson contends that a defendant may only

violate section 18-3-304(2) by “taking” a child from a lawful

custodian, we disagree. When interpreting a statute, we focus on

legislative intent. Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 11. We may not

add or subtract words from a statute. Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d

563, 567 (Colo. 2007). Section 18-3-304(2) only requires “the intent

to deprive,” which can be committed by taking a child or by refusing

to surrender a child.

¶ 18 The evidence was also sufficient for the jury to reasonably

conclude that Wilson understood the Order and acted with the

intent to deprive MCDHS of custody. Insofar as Wilson argues that

conflicting evidence shows she did not understand the Order

because Hellard did not provide her with a copy or explain its

contents or her rights and remedies, it was up to the jury to resolve

such conflicts. See People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 31 (“A court

must not invade the province of the jury by second-guessing its

conclusion when the record supports the jury’s findings.”).

¶ 19 Finally, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support a

finding that the Order was issued by a district or juvenile court.

Wilson asserts that the prosecution failed to present evidence that

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the magistrate who issued the Order was properly appointed to

issue temporary protective custody orders acting as a district or

juvenile judge under sections 13-5-201(3) and 19-3-405(1), C.R.S.

2025. But the Order said “District Court, Mesa County, Colorado,”

provided the court’s address, and was signed “By the Court.” From

this evidence, a rational jury could reasonably infer that the Order

was issued by a Colorado district court. Again, to the extent the

evidence could have supported a contrary conclusion, the issue was

for the jury to decide. Perez, ¶ 31.

C. Child Abuse

¶ 20 A person commits child abuse if she “permits a child to be

unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of injury to

the child’s life or health.” § 18-6-401(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 21 Wilson argues that the prosecution failed to prove that she

permitted C.S. to be unreasonably placed in a situation that posed

a threat to his life or health and, to the extent C.S. was in danger, it

was due to B.P. and the officers confronting her and wrestling with

her while she was holding him. We disagree.

¶ 22 B.P. testified that Wilson held C.S. while smoking marijuana

and stabbed herself in the head before B.P. or the police officers

8
physically engaged with her. Viewing this evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, we conclude it was sufficient for a

reasonable jury to conclude that Wilson, not B.P. or the police

officers, permitted C.S. to be unreasonably placed in a situation

that posed a threat of injury to his life.

¶ 23 Wilson also argues that the prosecution failed to prove that

she acted with any of the requisite mental states. Again, we

disagree. Wilson was charged with two counts of child abuse: one

committed knowingly or recklessly, and one committed with

criminal negligence. A person acts knowingly when “[s]he is aware

that h[er] conduct is practically certain to cause the result.” § 18-1-

501(6), C.R.S. 2025. Acting knowingly necessarily includes acting

recklessly and acting with criminal negligence. People v. Rigsby,

2020 CO 74, ¶ 22.

¶ 24 As discussed, B.P. testified that Wilson stabbed herself in the

head while holding C.S. The evidence also showed that Wilson

continued to resist even when B.P. and the police officers began to

wrestle with her to remove the scissors and C.S. This evidence is

sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Wilson was aware

that her conduct was “practically certain” to place C.S. in a

9
situation that posed a threat of injury to his life. See People v.

Robinson, 226 P.3d 1145, 1154 (Colo. App. 2009) (“In assessing the

sufficiency of the evidence, . . . a defendant’s mental state may be

inferred from his or her conduct and other evidence, including the

circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime . . . .”).

¶ 25 We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to

support Wilson’s convictions.

III. CRE 404(b)

¶ 26 Wilson next contends that the trial court erroneously admitted

extrinsic bad character evidence that her children had previously

been placed in foster care. We disagree.

¶ 27 We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Abad, 2021 COA 6, ¶ 8. A court abuses its

discretion when it misapplies the law or when its ruling is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v.

Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42, ¶ 23.

¶ 28 CRE 404(b)(1) prohibits the admission of evidence of

uncharged misconduct for the purpose of proving that a defendant

acted in conformity with a character trait on a particular occasion.

It governs admissibility “when the trial court determines that

10
uncharged misconduct evidence supports an improper inference of

the defendant’s character.” Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 43. If

extrinsic evidence does not suggest bad character, CRE 404(b) does

not apply, and the evidence is admissible if it is relevant and its

probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice. Id. at ¶ 52; CRE 401-403.

¶ 29 Before trial, Wilson filed a motion in limine to preclude the

introduction of “any statements or evidence alluding to prior

[MC]DHS or child abuse cases.” Specifically, she argued that her

statement about killing herself and “not going through this again”

while stabbing herself in the head was inadmissible because it

alluded to a prior instance where she lost her children and could

only be used for propensity purposes. The trial court ruled that

Wilson’s statement was irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and not

admissible at trial.

¶ 30 At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that Wilson’s

children were previously in foster care. During opening and closing

statements, it referenced the fact that B.P. fostered Wilson’s

children, and it also elicited testimony from B.P. and Hellard that

B.P. had fostered two of Wilson’s other children, M.J. and N.F.

11
¶ 31 Importantly, however, the prosecution did not introduce

evidence that Wilson said she was “not going through this again.”

So despite Wilson’s arguments, no evidence was admitted in

violation of the trial court’s pretrial ruling.

¶ 32 To the extent Wilson argues that other evidence showing her

children were in foster care violated the trial court’s pretrial ruling,

we disagree. B.P.’s and Hellard’s testimony that M.J. was

previously in foster care did not state or suggest that the foster

placement resulted from Wilson’s prior criminal conduct, prior

instances of child abuse, or even MCDHS’s involvement. To the

contrary, B.P. testified that she was Wilson’s family friend and was

trying to cultivate a good relationship with her. Because this

evidence did not suggest bad character, CRE 404(b) does not apply.

Rojas, ¶ 52. Evidence that Wilson had experience with the foster

care system was further relevant because it rebutted Wilson’s

assertion that she did not understand or was confused by Hellard’s

explanation of the Order. Given that there was no accompanying

suggestion of bad character, we conclude the probative value of this

evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Accordingly, we discern no error.

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IV. Unit of Prosecution for Violation of a Custody Order
Convictions

¶ 33 Wilson next contends that the unit of prosecution for violating

a custody order is per order, not per child, and asks us to vacate

three of her convictions. As a matter of first impression, we

conclude that the unit of prosecution is per child affected.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 34 We review de novo a claim that a conviction violates a

defendant’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

People v. Arzabala, 2012 COA 99, ¶ 19.

¶ 35 Multiplicity is the charging of the same offense in several

counts, culminating in multiple punishments. Multiplicitous

convictions are prohibited because they violate the constitutional

prohibition against double jeopardy. We analyze a multiplicity

claim in two steps. People v. Vigil, 251 P.3d 442, 448 (Colo. App.

2010). First, we examine the statute to determine the “unit of

prosecution.” People v. Bott, 2020 CO 86, ¶ 9. “The unit of

prosecution is the manner in which a criminal statute permits a

defendant’s conduct to be divided into discrete acts for purposes of

13
prosecuting multiple offenses.” Woellhaf v. People, 105 P.3d 209,

215 (Colo. 2005).

¶ 36 To determine the unit of prosecution, we look to the statute.

Arzabala, ¶ 23. In construing a statute, we must discern and

effectuate the intent of the legislature based primarily on the plain

and ordinary meaning of the language. Id. We read the language at

issue in the context of the statute as a whole and the context of the

entire statutory scheme. People v. Sexton, 2012 COA 26, ¶ 16. If

the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, we look no

further. People v. Valenzuela, 216 P.3d 588, 590 (Colo. 2009).

¶ 37 Second, we examine the “factual components of each

prosecution and the evidence in support thereof.” Woellhaf, 105

P.3d at 215 (citation omitted). At the second step, “we look to all of

the evidence introduced at trial to determine whether the evidence

was sufficient to support distinct and separate offenses.” People v.

McMinn, 2013 COA 94, ¶ 22.

¶ 38 In pertinent part, the violation of a custody order statute

provides as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(2.5) of this section, any parent or other person
who violates an order of any district or juvenile

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court of this state . . . with the intent to
deprive the lawful custodian or person with
parental responsibilities of the custody or care
of a child under the age of eighteen years,
commits a class 5 felony.

§ 18-3-304(2).

B. Analysis

¶ 39 Looking first to the words chosen by the legislature, we

observe that section 18-3-304(2) links violation of a custody order

to “a child,” using broad, indefinite terms. The statute provides

that “any parent or other person who violates an order . . . granting

the custody of a child . . . with the intent to deprive the lawful

custodian or person with parental responsibilities of the custody or

care of a child” violates a custody order. § 18-3-304(2) (emphasis

added). The legislature did not use the definite article “the” but

instead used the indefinite articles “an” and “a.” Cf. Coffey v. Colo.

Sch. of Mines, 870 P.2d 608, 610 (Colo. App. 1993) (use of the

definite article “the” particularizes the subject it precedes (citing

City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 787 (Colo. 1988))); see also

Brooks v. Zabka, 450 P.2d 653, 655 (Colo. 1969) (the definite article

“the” “is a word of limitation as opposed to the indefinite or

generalizing force of ‘a’ or ‘an’”). We conclude this language is

15
unambiguous and suggests that the legislature did not intend to

require a unique custody order for each individual child. Instead,

its repeated reference to “a child” in defining violation of a custody

order evinces an intent to criminalize violation of a custody order

with respect to each child identified in the order.

¶ 40 The plain language of section 18-3-304 focuses on protecting

the child, criminalizing the taking or enticing of any child from

another’s rightful custody, and creating an affirmative defense for

doing so when it is reasonably believed necessary to protect the

child from danger.1 The statute’s placement in article 3 of the

Criminal Code, entitled “Offenses Against the Person,” further

shows that the intent of the statute is to protect each individual

child. For such victim-based offenses “defined in terms of

committing an act causing harm to another person,” the unit of

prosecution is defined by the impact of the defendant’s actions, not

1 In reaching this conclusion, we note that the Colorado Supreme

Court has affirmed a defendant’s conviction on two counts of
violation of a custody order — one for each child involved. See
People v. Coyle, 654 P.2d 815, 817 (Colo. 1982). While the
legislature has since amended the violation of a custody order
statute, it has not changed the plain language focusing on the child
or otherwise evidenced disapproval of the supreme court’s
interpretation.

16
the defendant’s actions themselves. Magana v. People, 2022 CO 25,

¶¶ 25-26 (quoting People v. Espinoza, 2020 CO 43, ¶ 13); see also

People v. Snider, 2021 COA 19, ¶ 50 (by contrast, obstruction of a

peace officer is a non-victim-based crime, and its unit of

prosecution is defined in terms of discrete volitional acts of

obstruction, not the number of officers involved).

¶ 41 Based on the statute’s plain language and a reading of the

statutory scheme as a whole, we therefore conclude that the unit of

prosecution for violation of a custody order is the number of

children affected.

¶ 42 The out-of-state authority on which Wilson relies is

distinguishable.

¶ 43 In Llorens v. State, 520 S.W.3d 129, 139 (Tex. App. 2017) the

Texas court determined that the unit of prosecution for Texas’

interference with child custody statute is the order, not the child,

because the focus of the statute is on the order itself and the rights

of the person under the order who has legal control of the child

rather than on the child themselves. Further, the court determined

that the statutes placement in the criminal code under “Offenses

17
Against the Family” rather than “Offenses Against the Person”

supported their conclusion. Id.

¶ 44 Likewise, in State v. Hunter, 117 P.3d 254, 263-65 (N.M. Ct.

App. 2005), the court concluded that the relevant statute was

ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution. We have concluded that

the plain language of section 18-3-304 is unambiguous. And

despite Wilson’s attempt to distinguish the statute discussed in

People v. McCoy, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476, 478 (Ct. App. 1992)

(upholding multiple punishments for multiple violations of statute

prohibiting violation of child custody order), we conclude that the

California statute at issue in that case is like section 18-3-304 in

that it prohibits any person from violating a custody order with the

intent to deprive another of the custody and care of “a child.”

¶ 45 For these reasons, we conclude that the unit of prosecution for

violating a child custody order is the number of children affected.

We further conclude, at the second step of our multiplicity analysis,

that Wilson’s conduct constituted factually separate offenses

because each charge had a different victim. See People v. Harris,

2016 COA 159, ¶ 56. We therefore reject Wilson’s claim that

vacatur is required.

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V. Merger

¶ 46 Finally, Wilson contends and the People concede that her

convictions for knowing or reckless child abuse and negligent child

abuse must merge. We agree.

¶ 47 “Whether convictions for different offenses merge is a question

of law that we review de novo.” People v. Sims, 2020 COA 78, ¶ 37

(citing Page v. People, 2017 CO 88, ¶ 6). “[I]f one offense is included

in another offense, a defendant may not be convicted of both

offenses.” Friend v. People, 2018 CO 90, ¶ 32. An offense is a

lesser included one if it “is established by proof of the same or less

than all the facts required to establish the commission of the

offense charged.” § 18-1-408(5)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 48 Both of Wilson’s child abuse charges were based on identical

conduct — Wilson’s stabbing herself in the head while holding C.S.

Therefore, the criminal negligence charge was a lesser included

offense of the knowing or reckless abuse charge. Reyna-Abarca v.

People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 64; see Rigsby, ¶¶ 21-22. We therefore

remand the case for the trial court to merge Wilson’s child abuse

convictions and to amend the mittimus accordingly.

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VI. Disposition

¶ 49 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded with

directions.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.

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