Peo v. Miller

24CA1566 Peo v Miller 12-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1566
Jefferson County District Court No. 22CR2894
Honorable Theresa M. Cisneros, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Eric Shane Miller,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Freyre and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 18, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Alonzi Pellow Beggan, LLC, Mike K. Pellow, Shana R. Beggan, Denver,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Eric Shane Miller, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of sexual assault on

a child as part of a pattern of abuse by one in a position of trust

and aggravated incest. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The prosecution charged Miller with the above offenses after

his stepdaughter, K.G., came forward with allegations that he had

repeatedly sexually assaulted her starting when she was nine years

old. It later added a third count of unlawful sexual contact

involving N.M., Miller’s stepson’s girlfriend, alleging that Miller held

N.M.’s waist and touched her bottom at a family gathering.

¶3 Before trial, Miller moved to suppress statements he made to

the police before his arrest, when he was contacted at work,

transported to the police station, and interviewed in a closed room.

Miller conceded his statements were voluntary but argued the

circumstances amounted to a custodial interrogation and he was

never advised of his Miranda rights. The trial court disagreed,

concluding Miller was not in custody, and denied the suppression

motion.

1
¶4 The prosecution also filed a pretrial motion to introduce K.G.’s

undated journal entries. The court held that some portions of the

journal entries were admissible under CRE 807, while the rest had

to be redacted.

¶5 At trial, Miller testified in his own defense, denying the

allegations and stating he was “shocked” when police told him K.G.

had accused him of touching her inappropriately. During cross-

examination, the prosecutor played the video of Miller’s police

interview to impeach his testimony — pointing out that Miller’s

initial and repeated response to the allegations was to focus on his

lack of intent and that he acknowledged the possibility of

inadvertently touching K.G.’s vagina and bottom during an athletic

massage.

¶6 The jury found Miller guilty of both charges involving K.G. but

acquitted him of the offense involving N.M. The court sentenced

him to an indeterminate term of eight years to life in prison.

¶7 Miller appeals, arguing the court reversibly erred by failing to

suppress the police interview, allowing the prosecution to add the

charge involving N.M., and admitting K.G.’s journal entries into

2
evidence. He further asserts he is entitled to a new trial based on

cumulative error. We disagree with Miller’s arguments and affirm.

II. Failure to Suppress

¶8 To safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination, Miranda prohibits the prosecution from introducing

any statement procured by custodial interrogation unless the police

preceded their questions with certain warnings. People v. Klinck,

259 P.3d 489, 493 (Colo. 2011). Because such unwarned custodial

statements are illegally obtained, they are inadmissible as direct

evidence of a suspect’s guilt. People v. Trujillo, 49 P.3d 316, 321

(Colo. 2002).

¶9 Critically, however, while “[s]tatements made by a defendant

that violate the parameters of Miranda are subject to suppression,

. . . so long as the defendant made those statements voluntarily, the

prosecution may use them for impeachment purposes.” Klinck, 259

P.3d at 495; see also Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 877 (Colo.

2010) (“[S]tatements made by a defendant in circumstances

violating the strictures of Miranda are subject to only partial

suppression . . . .”). That is, “[i]f the defendant testifies at trial and

his testimony is inconsistent with his unwarned, voluntary,

3
custodial statements, then the prior statements are admissible to

impeach his credibility.” Trujillo, 49 P.3d at 321.

¶ 10 Such is the case here. Before trial, Miller conceded that his

statements were voluntary, and the trial court agreed. Miller makes

no attempt to challenge the court’s voluntariness finding on appeal.

Instead, he argues only that the court improperly applied the

factors described in People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 465-66 (Colo.

2002), where our supreme court set forth a list of factors for

determining whether a police station interview is custodial for

purposes of Miranda. Perhaps because this was the basis for the

trial court’s initial suppression ruling, the parties spend most of

their briefs discussing how the Matheny factors apply to the issue of

custody.

¶ 11 But we need not apply Matheny or decide whether Miller was

in custody for purposes of Miranda because the prosecution did not

admit his statements as substantive evidence of guilt. The video of

Miller’s interview was neither introduced as an exhibit during the

prosecution’s case-in-chief nor admitted into evidence for the jury’s

consideration. Instead, the prosecution played portions of it only

during cross-examination, after Miller testified — inconsistently

4
with his prior statements — that he “was shocked more than

anything” upon hearing about the allegations and had never

touched K.G. inappropriately.

¶ 12 Because Miller testified, and his testimony was inconsistent

with his prior statements to police, the prosecution was entitled to

use those voluntary statements for impeachment purposes. See

Effland, 240 P.3d at 877; see also § 16-10-201, C.R.S. 2025 (the

jury is permitted to consider prior inconsistent statements both for

impeachment purposes and as substantive evidence). Therefore,

whether Miller was in custody when he made his voluntary

statements is irrelevant. That is, even if we were to assume without

deciding that Miller’s voluntary statements were custodial in nature

and a Miranda advisement was therefore required, we nevertheless

discern no error. See People v. Thompson, 2020 COA 117, ¶ 55 n.7

(we may affirm on any ground supported by the record).

III. Added Charge Involving N.M.

¶ 13 Miller also asserts he is entitled to a new trial because the trial

court improperly allowed the prosecution to add the charge

involving N.M. He argues the court abused its discretion by

5
allowing joinder of the offenses under Crim. P. 8 because they were

not part of a schematic whole.

¶ 14 But when the prosecution moved to add the charge involving

N.M., defense counsel objected only on the grounds that the statute

of limitations had run. Although counsel later indicated he may

want to file a motion to sever the charges, he never did so. We

therefore review this issue for plain error. See People v. Ujaama,

2012 COA 36, ¶ 37 (an issue is unpreserved for appeal when an

objection at trial was made on grounds different from those raised

on appeal). Under this standard, we will only reverse if the error is

obvious, is substantial, and so undermines the fundamental

fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the judgment

of conviction. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14.

¶ 15 Even if we assume, without deciding, that the trial court erred

by allowing the prosecution to join the charges in this case, and

that the error was obvious, we conclude any error does not cast

serious doubt on the reliability of Miller’s convictions. The

prosecution did not use the charge involving N.M. to argue that

Miller was guilty of the offenses against K.G. In fact, the prosecutor

did not reference the charge involving N.M. at all during closing

6
argument. The jury was also properly instructed to consider the

evidence for each offense separately and not to let its verdict on one

offense influence its verdict on another. We presume the jury

understood and followed this instruction. Washington v. People,

2024 CO 26, ¶ 31.

¶ 16 Moreover, the jury acquitted Miller of unlawful sexual contact,

demonstrating that it could disentangle the facts and legal

principles of each offense. See id. at ¶ 33 (any misjoinder was

harmless where a split verdict indicated jurors exercised discretion

in their deliberations); see also Hagos, ¶ 14 (reversal for plain error

requires that the error impair the reliability of the judgment of

conviction to a greater degree than harmless error). Accordingly,

reversal is not warranted.

IV. Admission of K.G.’s Journal Entries

¶ 17 Next, we reject Miller’s challenge to the trial court’s pretrial

ruling that portions of K.G.’s journal entries were admissible

pursuant to CRE 807. While the court initially based its ruling on

CRE 807, it decided midtrial that K.G.’s journal entries were

admissible in their entirety because they were prior consistent

statements and the defense implied K.G. was lying. Miller does not

7
challenge that alternative ground for admitting this evidence. We

are therefore required to conclude the evidence was properly

admitted. See People v. Archer, 2022 COA 71, ¶ 42 (an appellant’s

failure to challenge all of the court’s reasons for a decision requires

affirmance).

V. Cumulative Error

¶ 18 “For reversal to occur based on cumulative error, a reviewing

court must identify multiple errors that collectively prejudice the

substantial rights of the defendant, even if any single error does

not.” Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25. Because we

have assumed only one error and concluded it does not warrant

reversal, we necessarily reject Miller’s cumulative error argument.

VI. Disposition

¶ 19 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE YUN concur.

8