Peo v. Kartabrata

22CA1020 Peo v Kartabrata 12-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1020
City and County of Denver District Court No. 19CR3876
Honorable Edward D. Bronfin, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Bustaman Kartabrata,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Lum and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 11, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Senior Counsel, Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Bustaman Kartabrata, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of three

counts of first degree murder and one count of felony menacing.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 At trial, the prosecution presented the following evidence.

¶3 J.M., then twelve years old, testified that Kartabrata and

J.M.’s paternal grandmother came to J.M.’s family’s house. After

leaving the home and sitting in the car for a while, Kartabrata

returned to the door. When J.M.’s father opened the door,

Kartabrata came inside and pulled a gun. Kartabrata first shot

J.M.’s father and then his mother. J.M. asked his mother if she

was okay, and she told him to run. He saw Kartabrata going

upstairs and into his sister’s room, where his sister and maternal

grandmother were. As he ran out of the house, he heard glass

break, which was the sound of his maternal grandmother escaping.

He ran to nearby apartments, knocked on the door, and Beatrice

Garcia answered.

¶4 Garcia testified that, after speaking briefly with J.M., she told

her children to call 911. J.M. testified that, after the police arrived,

1
he went back to the house with them and later got into a police car.

Finally, he testified that he was driven somewhere and was

interviewed.

¶5 Forensic interviewer Dulce Solis testified that she interviewed

J.M., and the video of the interview was admitted into evidence and

played for the jury.

¶6 The jury convicted Kartabrata of three counts of first degree

murder and one count of felony menacing. He was sentenced to

three terms of life in prison for the murders and an additional three

years in prison for felony menacing, with the sentences to be served

consecutively.

¶7 On appeal, Kartabrata contends that the trial court erred by

(1) admitting hearsay statements under the excited utterance

exception; (2) admitting evidence under the child hearsay statute,

section 13-25-129, C.R.S. 2025; (3) failing to give the required child

hearsay cautionary jury instruction; (4) allowing a lay witness to

identify Kartabrata in a video exhibit; and (5) failing to disqualify

one of the trial prosecutors, as well as the entire district attorney’s

office. We discern no reversible error.

2
II. Excited Utterances

¶8 Kartabrata contends that the trial court erred by admitting, as

excited utterances, statements J.M. made to Garcia and to officers.

We discern no error.

A. Additional Background

¶9 Garcia testified that after J.M. knocked on her door, he said,

“Help me, help me, someone just killed my family.” Defense

counsel objected, and the trial court ruled that this evidence was

admissible as an excited utterance under CRE 803(2) and a

statement of J.M.’s then-existing state of mind under Rule 803(3).

Garcia then testified,

He was screaming, “Please help me; someone’s
killed my family and he’s after me.” He was
very frantic. So my instinct was to grab him
and bring him in the house because I had no
idea if someone was chasing him or where it
was coming from. I just didn’t know, so I
grabbed him and brought him in the house to
ensure that he was okay.

She then said that she told her children to call 911, and as they

were doing so, she asked J.M. questions. Defense counsel objected

again on hearsay grounds, and the court again admitted the

3
evidence as an excited utterance and as a statement of J.M.’s state

of mind. Garcia then testified,

Okay. Like I said, I was questioning him. I
asked him his name and age and where he
lived. He was clear to his name and age [sic].
When we got to the address, he was just in
such hysterics that he was mixing up the
numbers. So he told me the street . . . and the
numbers for his street address. I was trying to
calm him down because I couldn’t get the
street address, and he just said there was a
red Jeep with a Broncos sticker in front of his
home, and that’s how I would find the
house . . . .

That [Kartabrata] was with [J.M.’s]
grandmother, but his grandmother wasn’t
shooting, just he was. And the way he was
able to get back in the home was that he said
he forgot something in there. He then shot his
dad in the neck and he knows he was dead,
and then he shot his mother. So he thought
his mother was playing dead when he took off
running . . . .

He said, My sister was running up the stairs
and she got shot as well, but I don’t know if
she’s dead . . . .

¶ 10 Officer Mark Hall testified that when he arrived on scene, he

placed J.M. in a police car because J.M. wanted to run back inside

the house and was crying. The People then moved for admission of

Officer Hall’s body camera footage. Defense counsel objected on

4
hearsay grounds, and the court overruled the objection, again

ruling this evidence admissible under the excited utterance

exception in light of the testimony regarding J.M.’s emotional state.1

The jury watched the body camera footage, and Officer Hall testified

that J.M. identified the shooter as “Bustaman” in the video.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 We review a trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Hulsing, 825 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Colo. App.

1991). A trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling misconstrues

or misapplies the law or is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair. People v. Gee, 2015 COA 151, ¶ 23.

¶ 12 Hearsay is “a statement other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). Generally, hearsay

statements are presumptively inadmissible at trial, absent a

relevant court rule or statute. CRE 802.

¶ 13 An excited utterance, however, is an exception to the rule

against hearsay. CRE 803(2). An excited utterance is “[a]

1 The trial court also ruled that the evidence was admissible under

CRE 803(3).

5
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the

declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or

condition.” Id.

¶ 14 A statement may qualify under the excited utterance exception

if

(1) the occurrence or event was sufficiently
startling to render inoperative the normal
reflective thought processes of an observer;
(2) the declarant’s statement was a
spontaneous reaction to the event; and
(3) direct or circumstantial evidence supports
an inference that the declarant had the
opportunity to observe the startling event.

People v. King, 121 P.3d 234, 237-38 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 15 Factors to be considered in determining whether the statement

was spontaneous include the lapse of time between the startling

event and the out-of-court statement, whether the statement was

made in response to an inquiry, whether the statement was

accompanied by outward signs of excitement or emotional distress,

and the choice of words employed by the declarant to describe the

experience. People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533, 536 (Colo. App. 2004),

aff’d, 121 P.3d 876 (Colo. 2005), overruled on other grounds by,

Nicholls v. People, 2017 CO 71.

6
¶ 16 “This exception has been liberally interpreted so as to extend

to statements made following a lapse of time from the startling

event itself.” Hulsing, 825 P.2d at 1031. “And . . . the duration of

stress will obviously vary with the intensity of the experience and

the emotional endowment of the individual . . . .” Id.

C. Application

¶ 17 Kartabrata contends that J.M.’s statements to Garcia were not

admissible under the excited utterance exception because they

occurred after the shooting and in response to her questions. He

further contends that the event was not such as to render thought

processes inoperative and that the statements were not

spontaneous reactions.2 We disagree.

¶ 18 J.M. testified that after his mother was shot, she told him to

run; he ran out the back door, through the gate, went left twice,

and ended up at the apartments behind the house; he knocked on

the door of these apartments and Garcia answered. Based on this

testimony, no more than a few minutes could have passed between

the murders and J.M. talking to Garcia. We cannot say on these

2 Kartabrata does not dispute that the event was startling or that

J.M. had the opportunity to observe it.

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facts that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that

insufficient time had passed for “normal reflective thought

processes.” King, 121 P.3d at 237; see People v. Martinez, 18 P.3d

831, 835 (Colo. App. 2000) (victim’s statement, made within fifteen

or twenty minutes after she was removed from the scene, was an

excited utterance); People v. Fincham, 799 P.2d 419, 423 (Colo. App.

1990) (allowing excited utterances of children made less than two

hours after mother’s abduction). Garcia also testified that J.M. was

hysterical during their conversation.

¶ 19 Further, contrary to Kartabrata’s assertion, the fact that J.M.’s

statements were made in response to Garcia’s questions does not

preclude them from being excited utterances. See Hulsing, 825

P.2d at 1032 (“The excited utterance exception extends to

statements made in response to questioning. And, an inquiry,

especially when it is of a general nature and addressed to a young

child is not sufficient to undo the underlying basis in reliability for

the excited utterance exception.” (citation omitted)). Thus, the trial

court did not err by admitting J.M.’s statements to Garcia under

the excited utterance exception.

8
¶ 20 Kartabrata also contends that J.M.’s statement identifying

Kartabrata as the shooter on Officer Hall’s body camera video was

not admissible under the excited utterance exception because the

interaction took place after J.M. returned to the crime scene and

after he had been placed in the police car. He again contends that

the situation was not such as to render J.M.’s thought processes

inoperative and that the statements were not spontaneous

reactions.3 Again, we disagree.

¶ 21 Garcia’s children called 911 while she was talking to J.M.

Office Juan Gamboa testified that approximately five minutes

passed between the 911 call and when he first interacted with J.M.

He testified that after a quick back and forth with J.M., they ran

over to the house, he got the exact address and aired it over the

radio, and within seconds multiple police cars arrived. He then

testified that after talking to another officer, they decided to put

J.M. in the back of a police car. The body camera video shows J.M.

emotionally interacting with police officers before he was put in the

police car.

3 Again, Kartabrata does not dispute that the event was startling or

that J.M. had the opportunity to observe it.

9
¶ 22 Again, based on this evidence, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by determining that insufficient time had passed between

the murders and J.M. talking to officers on the body camera video

for J.M. to have had “normal reflective thought processes.” The

record also reflects that J.M. was crying and emotional while

interacting with officers. Thus, the trial court did not err by

admitting this evidence under the excited utterance exception. See

Hulsing, 825 P.2d at 1032 (concluding that evidence of police

questioning children “within 15-20 minutes of the time the police

first arrived at the scene and within less than an hour after the

children had witnessed or heard the incident occur,” as well as

children’s emotional condition, was more than sufficient for the trial

court to have admitted the statements under the excited utterance

exception).4

III. Child Hearsay Statute

¶ 23 Kartabrata also contends that the trial court erred by

admitting J.M.’s hearsay statements made during his forensic

4 Because we conclude J.M.’s statements were admissible under the

excited utterance exception, we do not need to address Kartabrata’s
challenge to their admission under CRE 803(3).

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interview with Solis. He further contends that the court’s failure to

instruct the jury as required by the child hearsay statute, section

13-25-129(6), constitutes plain error and requires reversal of his

conviction. We discern no reversible error.

A. Additional Background

¶ 24 Before trial, the prosecution sought admission of J.M.’s

statements to Solis under section 13-25-129, and the trial court

held a hearing and made the necessary findings for admitting the

child hearsay statements.5

¶ 25 At trial, Solis, who was qualified as an expert in child forensic

interviewing, testified generally about how she conducts forensic

interviews and said that she interviewed J.M. hours after the

incident. During the forensic interview, presented in full to the

jury, J.M. recounted the murders and identified Kartabrata as the

murderer. J.M. told Solis that Kartabrata shot his father and

mother and then went upstairs, where his sister and grandmother

5 J.M.’s testimony fell within the child hearsay statute because he

was the named victim of the felony menacing charge.
§ 13-25-129(1), C.R.S. 2025 (addressing testimony of a child
witness who is alleged to have been the victim of the crime).
Kartabrata does not challenge the applicability of the statute or the
trial court’s findings.

11
were; J.M. heard glass break; J.M.’s grandmother escaped; and

J.M. ran to a nearby apartment, where he knocked on the door and

asked someone to call 911.

¶ 26 The trial court did not provide the jury with a child hearsay

cautionary instruction.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 27 We review the trial court’s decision to admit child hearsay

under section 13-25-129 for an abuse of discretion. People v.

Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 91.

¶ 28 Section 13-25-129(1) provides that “[a]n out-of-court

statement made by a person under thirteen years of age, not

otherwise admissible by a statute or court rule that provides an

exception to the hearsay objection, is admissible in any criminal . . .

proceeding in which the person is alleged to have been a victim.”

¶ 29 Certain procedures must be followed when admitting such

statements, including that the trial court give a cautionary jury

instruction:

If a statement is admitted pursuant to this
section, the court shall instruct the jury in the
final written instructions that during the
proceeding the jury heard evidence repeating a
child’s out-of-court statement and that it is for

12
the jury to determine the weight and credit to
be given the statement and that, in making the
determination, the jury shall consider the age
and maturity of the child, the nature of the
statement, the circumstances under which the
statement was made, and any other relevant
factor.

§ 13-25-129(6).

¶ 30 Even if out-of-court statements satisfy the hearsay rules,

though, a court may still exclude the testimony under CRE 403.

That rule permits a court to exclude relevant evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by (1) “considerations of

. . . needless presentation of cumulative evidence” or (2) “the danger

of unfair prejudice.” CRE 403. But “[t]he fact that evidence is

cumulative does not, by itself, render the evidence inadmissible.”

People v. Pahlavan, 83 P.3d 1138, 1140 (Colo. App. 2003). Instead,

admitting cumulative evidence amounts to an abuse of discretion

only if the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair. Id. And evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it suggests a

decision based on the jury’s bias, sympathy, anger, or shock.

People v. Gibbens, 905 P.2d 604, 608 (Colo. 1995).

13
C. Kartabrata Has Not Demonstrated Plain Error

¶ 31 Kartabrata did not object to the admission of the forensic

interview. Nor did he object to the trial court’s omission of the

cautionary instruction or request that the instruction be given.

Thus, for us to reverse, any error must be both obvious and

substantial. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. An error is

obvious if the act or omission challenged on appeal contravenes a

clear statutory command, a well-settled legal principle, or Colorado

case law. People v. Walker, 2022 COA 15, ¶ 68. An error is

substantial if it “so undermines the fundamental fairness of the

trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment

of conviction.” Rail v. People, 2019 CO 99, ¶ 46.

1. Admission of the Forensic Interview

¶ 32 Kartabrata cites no statute, rule, or case clearly prohibiting

the admission of the forensic interview under the circumstances

here. And we are hard pressed to conclude — especially in the

absence of any objection from the defense — that admitting the

video was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair such that

its admission was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

14
¶ 33 Moreover, the entire substance of Kartabrata’s argument is

that the evidence was cumulative of J.M.’s trial testimony.6 But

cumulative evidence rarely, if ever, rises to the level of prejudice

necessary to constitute plain error. See People v. Joyce, 68 P.3d

521, 524 (Colo. App. 2002) (concluding that admitting hearsay

statements that were cumulative of trial testimony was not plain

error).

2. Failure to Give Cautionary Jury Instruction

¶ 34 As noted, the child hearsay statute requires the court to

provide the jury with a cautionary instruction on the nature of child

hearsay statements. § 13-25-129(6). Kartabrata contends, and we

agree, that the trial court’s omission was an obvious error. See

People v. McClure, 779 P.2d 864, 866 (Colo. 1989).7

6 Although Kartabrata phrases his challenge in terms of irrelevance

and improper bolstering, it is the cumulative nature of the evidence
that underlies each of his arguments.
7 We reject the People’s post hoc effort to characterize the

statements in the forensic interview as prior consistent statements
offered to rebut an assertion of recent fabrication under
CRE 801(d)(1). The evidence was offered at trial under the child
hearsay statute and, on this record, there are no grounds for
admission of the statements under that rule.

15
¶ 35 But Kartabrata has not shown that the error was substantial.

See People v. Boykins, 140 P.3d 87, 95 (Colo. App. 2005) (“In review

for plain error, the defendant has the burden of persuasion with

respect to prejudice.”).

¶ 36 Indeed, he does not develop any argument as to how the lack

of a cautionary instruction undermined the fundamental fairness of

the trial. See Hagos, ¶ 14. He merely argues in conclusory fashion

that “it cannot be said that the outcome of the trial was unaffected

by the trial court’s failure to provide this instruction.” In support of

this conclusory claim — which posits a level of prejudice far more

akin to a harmless error analysis than a plain error inquiry — he

again appears to rely solely on the cumulative nature of the

testimony, citing only two brief statements in the prosecutor’s

closing argument where she noted that J.M.’s testimony on the

stand was consistent with what he told Solis in the forensic

interview.

¶ 37 Significantly, as the People point out — and Kartabrata makes

no effort to rebut — there is overwhelming evidence of Kartabrata’s

guilt unrelated to J.M.’s forensic interview: a pistol found at

Kartabrata’s house that matched the description J.M. testified to at

16
trial; J.M.’s mother’s blood on Kartabrata’s pistol; gunshot residue

on Kartabrata’s hands and face; cartridge casings at the scene fired

by the pistol; Kartabrata’s ownership of silencers for his pistols

(thus explaining why neighbors did not hear gunshots); testimony

that the bullets fired did not match the barrel, suggesting that, after

the shooting, Kartabrata switched the barrel on his pistol for one

that could not accommodate a silencer; and evidence that

Kartabrata was preparing to flee the country when he was arrested.

Additionally, J.M. testified at trial and the court gave the standard

credibility instruction to the jury.8

¶ 38 Because Kartabrata has not demonstrated that either the

admission of the forensic interview or the omission of the

cautionary instruction rose to plain error, we will not disturb the

judgment on this ground.

8 The only significant factor the statutory instruction directs the

jury to consider that is not included in the general credibility
instruction is the age and maturity of the child.

17
IV. Identification in Video Footage

¶ 39 Kartabrata next contends that the trial court reversibly erred

by admitting a detective’s testimony identifying him in a video. We

again discern no reversible error.

¶ 40 Videos from a neighbor’s security camera taken the night of

the incident were admitted at trial, showing people getting in and

out of cars. Detective Jami Sisneros, the lead detective on the case,

identified Kartabrata in one of the videos both before and

immediately after the time of the murders. During

cross-examination, she said she identified Kartabrata in the video

on the basis of “the investigation [she] conducted in the case.” She

also testified that the video was black and white and taken “kinda

far away” and said that “you can’t definitively make out faces on

that video.” During closing statement, defense counsel argued,

You heard Detective Sisneros watch this video
and say that the person that she sees get out
of the car is this man right here. But she’s not
the determiner of fact; you are. So you have to
look at that video. And you have to look at its
blurry graininess and make a determination
that you can tell, not someone else, that you
can tell who is the individual in that picture.

18
¶ 41 Under CRE 701, a lay witness may offer an opinion. And a lay

witness may testify regarding the identity of a person depicted in a

surveillance photograph or video if there is some basis for

concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the

defendant from the photograph or video than the jury is. See

Robinson v. People, 927 P.2d 381, 382 (Colo. 1996). But a lay

witness’s opinion based on exactly the same information that the

jury has cannot be helpful to the jury. People v. McFee, 2016 COA

97, ¶ 76.

¶ 42 Because Kartabrata did not object to Detective Sisneros’s

testimony, we review for plain error. Hagos, ¶ 14.

¶ 43 Without deciding whether the trial court’s admission of the

testimony was error (or obvious error), we conclude that reversal is

not warranted because the admission of this evidence, even if

erroneous, does not “cast serious doubt on the reliability of the

judgment of conviction.” McFee, ¶ 71.

¶ 44 “Ordinarily, the risk of admitting improper lay opinion

testimony of this type is that the jurors will assume that the

witness is in a better position to interpret or understand the

evidence than they are . . . .” Id. at ¶ 78.

19
¶ 45 But defense counsel was able to cross-examine Detective

Sisneros regarding her identification, and Detective Sisneros

admitted that Kartabrata’s face was not discernible in the grainy

surveillance footage. See People v. Vasquez, 155 P.3d 588, 595

(Colo. App. 2006) (holding that admission of a police officer’s

testimony in which he identified a man in a photograph as the

defendant was harmless where the defendant had the opportunity

to cross-examine the officer on his testimony). The jurors also

watched the video and were given the general credibility instruction.

See id.; McFee, ¶ 79. Further, defense counsel reminded the jurors

in closing argument that they were the determiners of fact and

needed to identify the individual in the surveillance footage

themselves, irrespective of Detective Sisneros’s identification.

Accordingly, even if it was improper for Detective Sisneros to

identify Kartabrata in the footage, “the jury had no reason to accept

[her] opinion and could evaluate [the footage] for itself.” McFee,

¶ 79.

¶ 46 Nor are we persuaded otherwise by Kartabrata’s assertion that

Detective Sisneros’s interpretation of the surveillance footage

amounted to an opinion that Kartabrata was guilty and committed

20
the offense, thereby invading the province of the jury. Although

Detective Sisneros identified Kartabrata as the person in the

surveillance video, she did not take the additional step of stating

that, in her opinion, he committed the charged offenses. See People

v. Penn, 2016 CO 32, ¶ 31; Gallegos v. People, 403 P.2d 864, 873

(Colo. 1965) (“[T]o say [the witness] identified the defendants does

not give rise to the conclusion that they were, therefore, guilty of the

crime charged.”). Thus, any error does not warrant reversal.

V. Disqualification of Prosecutor and District Attorney’s Office

¶ 47 Finally, Kartabrata contends that the trial court erred by not

disqualifying one of the prosecutors assigned to Kartabrata’s case,

as well as the entire Denver District Attorney’s Office, from

prosecuting it. We discern no error.

¶ 48 Before trial, the prosecution gave notice to the trial court and

to defense counsel that one of the prosecutors assigned to the case

lived on the block where the murders occurred, had met the victims

at two neighborhood barbeques, had waved at them on the street,

and had attended their funerals. But she had no other contact with

the victims. The prosecutor had also never met Kartabrata and had

no knowledge about him. An officer’s body camera video showed

21
that, on the night of the murders, the prosecutor told a police

officer that she had heard screaming but had seen nothing. The

prosecutor was not on the prosecution’s or defense’s witness lists.9

And her knowledge of the case came entirely from the discovery in

the case.

¶ 49 The trial court denied Kartabrata’s motion to disqualify the

prosecutor and the district attorney’s office. The court found that

the prosecutor’s knowledge of the facts of the case was minimal

since all she heard was screaming and she did not know why or see

anything, and she “had no contact or communication of any nature

with” Kartabrata. Further, neither party intended to call the

prosecutor or the officer who had the body camera footage of the

prosecutor to testify. The court also found that, even if it found

special circumstances justifying the disqualification of the

prosecutor — which it did not — it would still not require

disqualification of the entire district attorney’s office.

9 The People stated that the officer whose body camera footage

showed the prosecutor at the scene of the incident that night was
not going to be called as a witness at trial and that there was not
any reason to believe that the body camera video was going to be
introduced by either party.

22
¶ 50 We review a trial court’s decision to disqualify a district

attorney, or an entire office, for an abuse of discretion. People v.

Loper, 241 P.3d 543, 546 (Colo. 2010); People v. Chavez, 139 P.3d

649, 654 (Colo. 2006).

¶ 51 Disqualification of a district attorney from a case is governed

by section 20-1-107(2), C.R.S. 2025, which provides in relevant part

that “[t]he motion [to disqualify] shall not be granted unless . . .

special circumstances exist that would render it unlikely that the

defendant would receive a fair trial.” See People v. Chavez, 139

P.3d 649, 652 (Colo. 2006). The party moving to disqualify the

district attorney based on “special circumstances” bears the burden

of showing that, absent disqualification, they will not receive a fair

trial. Loper, 241 P.3d at 546. “To meet this burden, the moving

party must point to ‘actual facts and evidence in the record

supporting the contention.’” People v. Kent, 2020 CO 85, ¶ 19

(quoting Loper, 241 P.3d at 546).

¶ 52 To disqualify a district attorney’s office based on special

circumstances, the special circumstances “must be extreme,”

People v. Solis, 2022 CO 53, ¶ 26 (quoting Kent, ¶ 20), and only one

set of facts has been determined to be sufficiently extreme to

23
potentially disqualify an entire district attorney’s office. See

Chavez, 139 P.3d at 654-55. In Chavez, the prosecutor’s prior

attorney-client relationship with the defendant and his access to

confidential communications required that he be personally

disqualified. Id. at 654. But instead of automatically imputing the

conflict to the entire district attorney’s office, the supreme court

concluded that the analysis involved evaluating the efficacy of a

district attorney office’s screening policy, or lack thereof. Id. at

654-55.

¶ 53 Here, the trial court did not err by not disqualifying the

prosecutor because the prosecutor barely knew the victims, did not

know Kartabrata, was not an endorsed witness in the case, and did

not independently know any of the underlying facts of the case.

¶ 54 Nor are we persuaded by Kartabrata’s contention that the trial

court erred because it did not consider all the facts and

circumstances. Kartabrata contends that the trial court did not

consider the seriousness of the charges, but the court noted that

Kartabrata was charged with three counts of first degree murder,

one count of felony menacing, and one count of third degree

assault. Further, Kartabrata’s contention that the prosecutor did

24
not remember that she was a possible witness is entirely

speculative because Kartabrata has not shown any facts in the

record indicating that the prosecutor actually was a potential

witness. And though the court did not make findings with respect

to the prosecutor’s relationship with the victims or the fact that she

attended their funerals, the court noted the prosecutor’s peripheral

involvement as a neighbor on that night and that she did not know

Kartabrata.

¶ 55 Finally, there was no reason for the trial court to consider the

district attorney’s screening policy because the trial court properly

declined to disqualify the prosecutor; therefore there was no conflict

that could have been imputed to the entire office. Nor did

Kartabrata ever contend that the prosecutor had “confidential

information from a prior representation” that would need to be

“adequately screened from others actually prosecuting the case.”

Id. at 655.

¶ 56 Thus, the trial court did not err by not disqualifying the

prosecutor and the district attorney’s office.

VI. Disposition

¶ 57 The judgment is affirmed.

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JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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