Peo in Interest of Baskerville

25CA1594 Peo in Interest of Baskerville 12-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1594
Pueblo County District Court No. 25MH30077
Honorable Amiel Markenson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Christon Baskerville,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Gomez and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 4, 2025

Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, Kate H. Shafer, Special Assistant County
Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant
¶1 Respondent, Christon Baskerville, appeals the district court

order authorizing staff at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in

Pueblo (CMHHIP) to medicate him against his will. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Baskerville, also known as Christon X, was admitted to

CMHHIP after being found incompetent to proceed on criminal

charges. According to the affidavit of Dr. Hareesh Pillai,

Baskerville’s treating physician, Baskerville has a history of

psychiatric hospitalizations and suffers from psychosis – not

otherwise specified.

¶3 CMHHIP began administering psychiatric medications to

Baskerville against his will on an emergency basis after he

challenged a peer to a fight, posturing with his fists up and

threatening “I’ll fuck you up.” The People then petitioned for a six-

month order authorizing the continued involuntary administration

of Zyprexa, Depakote, and Thorazine — Zyprexa and Depakote on a

scheduled basis, and Thorazine only as needed for episodes of acute

agitation or refusals of oral Depakote.

¶4 Both Dr. Pillai and Baskerville testified at the evidentiary

hearing. Dr. Pillai testified about each of the four elements required

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for involuntary administration of medication under People v.

Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985).1 Dr. Pillai described

Baskerville’s symptoms, his agitated and aggressive behavior

toward his peers in CMHHIP, and the need for an order authorizing

the involuntary administration of both antipsychotic and mood-

stabilizing medications. Baskerville testified that he objected to

taking psychiatric medications because, among other reasons listed

in Part III.B below, he didn’t need them, doing so is against his

religious beliefs, and they cause sedation. He preferred to treat

himself with yoga and dancing.

¶5 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found

Dr. Pillai’s testimony to be credible and persuasive. It found that

the People had provided clear and convincing evidence for each of

the Medina elements, and it issued an order authorizing CMHHIP

1 When the state seeks to administer antipsychotic drugs to a

mentally ill criminal defendant involuntarily so that he can stand
trial, a reviewing court applies the Supreme Court’s test in Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178 (2003). However, reviewing courts
apply state law tests if the state, as here, seeks to administer
antipsychotics involuntarily for “a different purpose,” including a
purpose “related to the individual’s dangerousness, or . . . the
individual’s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts his
health gravely at risk.” Id. at 181-82.

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staff to administer all of the requested medications for a period of

six months.

¶6 On appeal, Baskerville challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the court’s order.

II. Legal Authority and Standard of Review

¶7 A district court may authorize the involuntary administration

of medication to a patient if the treating facility establishes each of

the following Medina elements by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) the patient is incompetent to participate effectively in the

treatment decision; (2) treatment by medication is necessary either

to prevent a significant and likely long-term deterioration in the

patient’s mental condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient

causing serious harm to himself or others in the institution; (3) a

less intrusive treatment alternative is not available; and (4) the

patient’s need for treatment with medication is sufficiently

compelling to override his bona fide and legitimate interest in

refusing medication. Id.; see People in Interest of Strodtman, 293

P.3d 123, 131 (Colo. App. 2011). A physician’s testimony alone

may constitute clear and convincing evidence. See People v.

Pflugbeil, 834 P.2d 843, 846-47 (Colo. App. 1992).

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¶8 When, as here, a patient challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence, we review the record as a whole and, viewing it in the light

most favorable to the People, determine whether the evidence is

sufficient to support the court’s decision. People in Interest of

Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 23. We review the court’s conclusions of

law de novo and defer to its findings of fact if supported by evidence

in the record. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8. We also defer

to the district court’s resolution of evidentiary conflicts and its

determinations of witness credibility, the weight of the evidence,

and the inferences to be drawn from it. See People in Interest of

R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7.

III. Analysis

¶9 Baskerville challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for only

the first and fourth Medina elements. He argues that Dr. Pillai’s

testimony didn’t show (1) that he was incapable of effectively

participating in treatment decisions; or (2) a sufficiently compelling

need to override his interests in refusing the requested medications.

See Medina, 705 P.2d at 973-74. We conclude that the record

provides ample support for the court’s findings.

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A. The First Medina Element

¶ 10 Baskerville argues that the evidence offered by the People falls

short in light of his testimony acknowledging that he has a mental

illness. We disagree.

¶ 11 A patient is incompetent to effectively participate in treatment

decisions when his “mental illness has so impaired his judgment as

to render him ‘incapable of participating in decisions affecting his

health.’” Id. at 973 (citation omitted). Although the first Medina

element may be satisfied if a patient fails to recognize that he has a

mental illness, see People in Interest of C.J.R., 2016 COA 133, ¶ 32,

the converse isn’t necessarily true.

¶ 12 Dr. Pillai testified, and the district court found credible, that

Baskerville lacked insight into his mental illness and that he was

incompetent to effectively participate in his treatment decisions

because his mental illness causes paranoia, delusions, impulsivity,

and agitation.

¶ 13 Baskerville’s testimony provided support for Dr. Pillai’s

opinions. Although Baskerville acknowledged that he suffers from a

mental illness, his inconsistent assessment of his illness — when

first asked, he reported that he suffers from mild schizophrenia,

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and, on reconsideration a few minutes later, bipolar disorder —

demonstrated a lack of insight. Baskerville further demonstrated

how some of his symptoms may interfere with his treatment

decisions by (1) interrupting the hearing multiple times,

(2) objecting to taking psychiatric medications because “they’re DNA

altering chemical substances,” and (3) explaining that he was being

targeted for these medications by a “wicked cabal . . . blind[ly]

acquiescing to . . . the devil himself” because he is a very dangerous

“master teacher.” Moreover, despite his acknowledgement that he

suffers from some sort of mental illness causing “outbursts,”

Baskerville considered yoga and dance to be sufficient therapy.

¶ 14 We defer to the district court’s impressions at the evidentiary

hearing and decline to reconsider its assignment of weight to

certain evidence and its resolution of evidentiary conflicts. See

R.C., ¶ 7. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

People, we conclude that the foregoing evidence is more than

sufficient to support the court’s finding by clear and convincing

evidence that Baskerville is incompetent to effectively participate in

his treatment decisions. See Ramsey, ¶ 23. Thus, we won’t disturb

the court’s decision.

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B. The Fourth Medina Element

¶ 15 In assessing the sufficiency of evidence for the fourth Medina

element, a court must determine (1) “whether the patient’s refusal

is bona fide and legitimate” and, if so, (2) “whether the prognosis

without treatment is so unfavorable that the patient’s personal

preference must yield to the legitimate interests of the state in

preserving the life and health of the patient placed in its charge and

in protecting the safety of those in the institution.” Medina, 705

P.2d at 974.

¶ 16 The district court found that Baskerville’s interests in avoiding

sedation and observing his religious beliefs were bona fide and

legitimate. This finding is undisputed. Baskerville challenges only

the court’s finding that his prognosis without treatment is so

unfavorable that his interest in refusing medication must yield to

the State’s interests in preserving his health and in protecting the

safety of those in CMHHIP. He offers only a conclusory argument

that the court erred in finding that Baskerville’s interests were

outweighed by his need for treatment. We perceive no error.

¶ 17 Dr. Pillai testified that during his most recent visit to CMHHIP,

Baskerville had been agitated and attempted to incite fights with his

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peers on multiple occasions, requiring CMHHIP staff to intervene.

He further testified that the aggressive incidents were decreasing

with the administration of Depakote and that without psychiatric

medications, Baskerville was likely to suffer a significant and long-

term deterioration in his condition. As to the side effect concerns,

Dr. Pillai acknowledged that Baskerville had complained of sedation

and that some level of sedation could continue. But Dr. Pillai

opined that Baskerville’s need for medication to avoid more frequent

and intense agitation and aggressiveness toward his peers in

CMHHIP outweighed his interest in refusal.

¶ 18 Based on this evidence, the district court found that

Baskerville’s need for treatment was sufficiently compelling to

override his religious and side effect concerns. Because the record

supports the court’s finding on this element, we won’t disturb it,

see Ramsey, ¶ 23, and to the extent Baskerville asks us to re-weigh

the evidence, we decline to do so, see R.C., ¶ 7.

IV. Disposition

¶ 19 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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