Peo in Interest of BW

25CA0286 Peo in Interest of BW 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0286
Arapahoe County District Court No. 22JV30171
Honorable Bonnie H. McLean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of B.W., S.W., and J.W., Children,

and Concerning T.W.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Freyre and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 26, 2025

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Tamra White, Assistant County Attorney, Sarah
Simchowitz, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado,
for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, T.W. (father)

appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child legal

relationships with B.W., S.W., and J.W. (the children). He

challenges the juvenile court’s determinations that (1) the Arapahoe

County Department of Human Services made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate him and reunite his family; (2) his treatment plan was

appropriate; and (3) no less drastic alternative to termination was

available. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2022, the Department filed a petition in

dependency and neglect concerning then-two-year-old, one-year-

old, and two-month-old children. The Department alleged that in

the two years prior to filing the petition, it had received numerous

reports that the children had been subjected to an injurious

environment, neglect, and physical abuse. The Department had

also received referrals concerning the parents’ mental health and

substance use.

¶3 By the time it filed the petition, the family had been working

with the Department on a voluntary basis for around five months.

About three weeks before the petition was filed, the youngest child

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was injured and taken to the hospital by ambulance. The parents

agreed to a safety plan in which the children could remain in the

parents’ home.

¶4 When the parents did not comply with the safety plan and

father stopped communicating with the Department, the

Department filed the petition. Additionally, the court ordered the

parents to complete skeletal surveys of all three children.

¶5 After the youngest child’s survey revealed three healing rib

fractures, the Department requested a verbal removal order, which

the juvenile court granted. The children were briefly placed with

kin before being placed in foster care.

¶6 Two months later, the juvenile court adjudicated the children

dependent or neglected. The court adopted a treatment plan that

required father to communicate with the Department, create and

maintain financial stability, address mental health and substance

use issues, develop protective parenting skills, and maintain a legal

lifestyle.

¶7 The court later amended father’s treatment plan to require

child-parent psychotherapy (CPP).

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¶8 Almost two years after filing the petition, the Department

moved to terminate the parents’ rights. The court held a three-day

termination hearing in January 2025 and granted the motion.

¶9 Both parents appealed the termination judgment. But

unfortunately, mother passed away during the pendency of the

appeal, and this court granted her counsel’s motion to dismiss her

appeal. Thus, we address only father’s appeal.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 10 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by determining

that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him

and reunite him with the children. We are not persuaded.

A. Preservation

¶ 11 The Department and guardian ad litem argue that father’s

reasonable efforts claim is unpreserved, and therefore, we should

not address it. However, we need not decide if father’s challenge to

the court’s reasonable efforts determination is properly before us

because, even assuming it is, we discern no reversible error.1

1 Because we address the merits of father’s reasonable efforts claim,

we need not address his secondary argument that, if the challenge
is unpreserved, it is due to his counsel’s ineffective assistance.

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B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 12 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. As pertinent here, to determine

whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court must consider whether

“[r]easonable efforts by child-caring agencies . . . have been unable

to rehabilitate the parent.” § 19-3-604(2)(h); People in Interest of

S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). Thus, the

determination that the department made reasonable efforts is

implicit in a court’s determination that a parent is unfit.

¶ 13 “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and care”

for children who are in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114),

C.R.S. 2025. Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-

208, C.R.S. 2025, satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-

103(114).

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¶ 14 Under section 19-3-208, a department must provide

screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the

provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;

information and referral services to available public and private

assistance resources; family time services; and placement services.

§ 19-3-208(2)(b). And, if funding is available, section 19-3-208

requires a department to provide services such as transportation,

diagnostic and mental health services, and drug and alcohol

services. § 19-3-208(2)(d). However, services must be provided only

if they are determined to be necessary and appropriate based on the

individual case plan. § 19-3-208(2)(b), (d).

¶ 15 In analyzing whether a department made reasonable efforts, a

juvenile court should consider the totality of the circumstances and

account for all services and resources provided to a parent to

ensure the completion of the entire treatment plan. People in

Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. A juvenile court

may consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment as

a factor in determining whether a department made reasonable

efforts. People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

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¶ 16 Whether a department of human services satisfied its

obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and

law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. Therefore, we

review the juvenile court’s factual findings on the issue for clear

error but review de novo the court’s legal determination as to

whether the department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation.

Id.

¶ 17 Nonetheless, a juvenile court does not need to make express

findings about the department’s specific efforts or lack thereof. And

failure of the court to make express findings, on its own, does not

establish a failure by the court to ensure that the department made

reasonable efforts. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 15;

see also People in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121, ¶ 37 (finding no

reversible error despite the absence of specific findings regarding

reasonable efforts). Rather, in reviewing de novo the ultimate

question of whether the department’s efforts satisfied its obligation,

we will not reverse if the record amply demonstrates that the

department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate a parent and

reunite them with their family. A.S.L., ¶ 15.

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C. Analysis

¶ 18 The juvenile court heard expert testimony from the caseworker

and the CPP therapist. Crediting their testimony, the court found

that that the Department offered “multiple treatments” to father,

but he failed to engage in them. It also found that the caseworker

“worked really hard on this case.” The court noted that the

caseworker’s attempts to engage with the parents and provide

services were well documented. Thus, the court concluded that the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father.

¶ 19 Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there is ample

support for the court’s findings and its ultimate determination that

the Department made reasonable efforts. First, the caseworker

testified that at the outset of the case, the Department had

significant safety concerns because there appeared to be “an

ongoing pattern of non-accidental trauma” while the children were

with the parents. To that end, the Department was concerned that

father was not being honest or taking accountability for the

children’s injuries discovered by medical providers. Moreover, the

caseworker testified that, at the time the case opened, the

Department was concerned about father’s substance use for several

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reasons: He had an open warrant related to a drug charge; he

initially refused to take a hair follicle or urinalysis test; and he

tested positive for “several substances,” including

methamphetamine, when he finally submitted a urinalysis test.

Further, the Department was concerned about father’s ability to

provide protective parenting and a stable home for the children.

¶ 20 Next, the caseworker testified about the Department’s ongoing

efforts to help father address those concerns. She testified that she

regularly reached out to father throughout the case and attempted

to meet with him on numerous occasions, but father’s

communication with her was inconsistent, as he often cancelled

their meetings at the last minute. The caseworker said that when

she was able to communicate with father, he typically focused on

denying any fault and questioning why he was included in this

case.

¶ 21 The caseworker continued to explain that when she learned

that father may have lacked housing, she texted him to provide

housing resources, but father said that he did not need help with

housing. However, father never allowed the caseworker to inspect

his home. And, although the caseworker attempted to verify

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father’s claim that he was employed throughout the case, father

never provided her with any paystubs or other verification. The

caseworker also asked father to sign a release of information for her

to speak to his probation officer, but father refused to sign it.

¶ 22 The caseworker testified that she referred father for three

different dual diagnosis evaluations to assess his mental health and

substance use issues. When the third evaluator recommended

substance abuse treatment and mental health treatment, the

caseworker ensured father scheduled an intake appointment for

that treatment. But father testified that he did not go to that

appointment or engage in treatment because he did not believe that

the third evaluator’s recommendations were valid or that he needed

substance abuse and mental health treatment.

¶ 23 The Department also set up weekly supervised family time for

father to visit the children. And the caseworker referred father to

CPP. Although the CPP referral came later in the case, the CPP

therapist testified that the delay did not impact her ability to engage

with the family. She testified father “had a lot of missed

appointments,” and when she tried to determine if there were

barriers preventing father from attending, he stated that

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transportation was not an issue and “reaffirmed that the park was a

good place for him to meet.” But, ultimately, she discharged father

from CPP for failing to attend the therapy sessions.

¶ 24 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the record amply

supports the juvenile court’s determination that, based on the

totality of the circumstances and considering father’s unwillingness

to engage in services, the Department made reasonable efforts. See

My.K.M., ¶ 33; A.V., ¶ 12.

¶ 25 Father points to several specific alleged deficiencies in the

Department’s efforts as evidence that it did not meet its reasonable

efforts obligation. Specifically, he argues that the Department did

not make reasonable efforts because it (1) delayed its referrals for

dual diagnosis evaluations; (2) failed to provide sufficient family

time; (3) failed to refer him to parenting classes; (4) delayed its

referral for CPP; (5) failed to provide housing, transportation, and

phone assistance; and (6) failed to provide family preservation

services to kin. We are not persuaded.

¶ 26 First, we note that the juvenile court did not make specific

findings about each of these alleged deficiencies, nor was it required

to do so. See A.S.L., ¶ 15. And we cannot fault the juvenile court

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for failing to do so because father never told the juvenile court

about the alleged deficiencies or asked the court to make findings

about them.

¶ 27 To that end, we can only review the findings that the juvenile

court made. For example, father argues that the Department failed

to refer him to parenting classes. If father had alerted the court to

this alleged deficiency, then it could have made findings about

whether parenting classes were necessary to rehabilitate father and

whether the Department failed to refer father to those classes. And

we could have reviewed those findings for clear error. See People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10 (we review findings of fact

for clear error). But we cannot make those findings, which is

essentially what father asks us to do. See Carousel Farms Metro.

Dist. v. Woodcrest Homes, Inc., 2019 CO 51, ¶ 18 (noting that trial

courts make factual findings while appellate courts pronounce law);

see also People in Interest of J.L., 121 P.3d 315, 318 (Colo. App.

2005) (“[W]e cannot make factual findings of our own.”).

¶ 28 Last, even assuming that the Department’s efforts were

lacking in some of the ways that father describes, he does not

explain how the deficiencies, in the context of the totality of the

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circumstances, rendered the court’s reasonable efforts

determination erroneous. For example, father does not explain how

the alleged deficiencies — the referral delays; insufficient parenting

time; or lack of parenting classes, transportation, a phone, and

housing resources — prevented him from engaging in treatment

and addressing his substance use issues, which was one of the

primary reasons the Department was involved with the family. See

My.K.M., ¶ 33 (The department “retain[s] discretion to prioritize

certain services or resources to address a family’s most pressing

needs in a way that will assist the family’s overall completion of the

treatment plan.”). Given the ample support, discussed above, for

the court’s reasonable efforts determination, we cannot say that the

alleged deficiencies would have rendered that determination

erroneous.

¶ 29 In sum, we conclude that the juvenile court’s factual findings

about the Department’s reasonable efforts are supported by the

record. And those findings are sufficient to support the court’s

ultimate determination that the Department made reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate father and reunite his family. Accordingly,

reversal based on a lack of reasonable efforts is not warranted.

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III. Treatment Plan

¶ 30 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that his treatment plan was appropriate, that he failed to comply

with it, and that he was therefore unfit. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 31 An appropriate treatment plan is one that relates to the child’s

needs and is reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to

provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time.

§ 19-1-103(12). Appropriateness is measured by the likelihood of

success in reuniting the family and by the extent to which the

plan’s requirements were realistic in light of the facts existing at the

time it was adopted. People in Interest of S.L., 2017 COA 160, ¶ 10.

In determining whether a treatment plan is appropriate, the court

must consider whether the plan’s objectives adequately address the

safety concerns that led to the filing of the petition. People in

Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 14. The fact that a treatment plan

is ultimately unsuccessful does not mean that it was inappropriate.

Id.

¶ 32 The parent is responsible for assuring compliance with and

the success of the treatment plan. People in Interest of C.T.S., 140

13
P.3d 332, 335 (Colo. App. 2006). Absolute compliance with every

provision of the treatment plan is not required. Id. However,

partial compliance, or even substantial compliance, may not be

sufficient to render the parent fit. People in Interest of T.E.M., 124

P.3d 905, 909 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 33 In determining whether a juvenile court erred by terminating

parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), which necessarily

includes determining whether a parent’s treatment plan was

appropriate and whether the parent was fit, we review the court’s

factual findings for clear error but review its legal conclusions de

novo. S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10.

B. Analysis

1. Treatment Plan Was Appropriate

¶ 34 In its oral ruling, the juvenile court found that father’s

treatment plan addressed the “factors existing at the time [it] was

adopted” and was reasonably calculated to render father fit within a

reasonable period of time. Thus, the court concluded that the

treatment plan was appropriate. And the record supports the

court’s findings because it shows that the treatment plan objectives

addressed the Department’s specific concerns about father’s ability

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to parent the children at the time the petition was filed and during

the months leading up to the plan’s approval — it addressed

father’s substance use, stability, and protective parenting, which

were the primary reasons the Department became involved with the

family. See K.B., ¶ 14.

¶ 35 To the extent that father argues that the mental health and

substance use objectives were inappropriate because two dual

diagnosis evaluators did not recommend treatment, we disagree.

Because the evaluations were completed after the treatment plan

was adopted, the evaluator’s recommendations had no bearing on

the appropriateness of the treatment plan. See S.L., ¶ 10

(appropriateness of a treatment plan is assessed in light of the facts

existing at the time the plan was adopted). Moreover, the court

found that a third dual diagnosis evaluation was necessary because

father was not honest with the first two evaluators, and those

evaluators had not considered the collateral information provided

by the caseworker. In making that finding, the court specifically

weighed the evidence and credited the caseworker’s testimony. And

we cannot reweigh the evidence or make credibility determinations

on appeal. See People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62; see

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also People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010)

(the credibility of the witnesses, as well as the sufficiency, probative

effect, and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, are all subject to the

juvenile court’s discretion)

¶ 36 Accordingly, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s finding

that father’s treatment plan was appropriate and reasonably

calculated to render him fit.

2. Treatment Plan Compliance

¶ 37 After considering the evidence presented at the termination

hearing, the court found, with record support, that father failed to

comply with several aspects of his treatment plan. Specifically, it

found that father had not consistently communicated with the

caseworker, that he did not sign required releases of information,

that he had not demonstrated sobriety, that he did not have stable

housing, and that he had not meaningfully engaged in CPP. Based

on those findings, the juvenile court concluded that father failed to

sufficiently comply with his treatment plan and was therefore unfit

because he had not addressed the issues that brought his family to

the Department’s attention.

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¶ 38 Father argues that the court erroneously concluded that he

failed to comply with his treatment plan and was unfit because he

complied with at least some of the treatment plan’s requirements.

But the juvenile court heard the evidence about father’s partial

compliance and still found that father was unfit. See T.E.M., 124

P.3d at 909 (partial or even substantial compliance may not be

sufficient to render the parent fit); see also In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15 (when there

is record support for the court’s findings, its resolution of

conflicting evidence is binding on review).

¶ 39 Accordingly, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s

determination that father’s failure to comply with several aspects of

his treatment plan rendered him unfit.

IV. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 40 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. He asserts

that the Department failed to sufficiently investigate the child’s

paternal kin and that the less drastic alternative of an allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) to father’s aunt was available. We

discern no error.

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 41 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives

is implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. People in Interest

of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 40. In considering less drastic

alternatives, a juvenile court must give primary consideration to the

child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.

People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 29.

¶ 42 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequate[ly]” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be the “best” option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27.

Long-term or permanent placement with a family member or foster

family, short of termination, may not be a viable less drastic

alternative if it does not provide adequate permanence that

adoption would provide or otherwise meet a child’s needs. People in

Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 41. If a juvenile court considers

a less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the

child’s best interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and

order termination. A.M., ¶ 32.

¶ 43 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings

for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34, aff’d

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sub nom., R.W. v. People in Interest of E.W., 2022 CO 51.

Accordingly, when a juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but instead finds that termination is in the child’s best

interests, we are bound to affirm the court’s decision so long as the

record supports its findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39,

¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶ 44 The juvenile court considered less drastic alternatives to

termination but ultimately concluded that termination was in the

children’s best interests. Specifically, the court found that the

children needed a safe, stable, and permanent home based on their

very young ages and the significant trauma they had already

experienced. The court acknowledged that father’s aunt was willing

to accept an APR for the children but found that an APR was not in

the children’s best interests because it would not provide the stable,

long-term home that the children needed. And the record supports

these findings.

¶ 45 We reject father’s assertion that the Department failed to

properly investigate father’s family members as potential

placements. True, in order to assist the juvenile court in

19
determining whether there is a less drastic alternative to

termination, a department must evaluate a reasonable number of

persons the parent identifies as placement options. People in

Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App. 2004). However, the

juvenile court specifically found that the Department “did a very

diligent search” to identify and investigate relative or kin

placements, which included father’s aunt.

¶ 46 The caseworker testified that she investigated all the relatives

identified in the Department’s September 2023 kinship search.

That investigation included a home study for a distant cousin in

Michigan, but the home study was denied. She also testified that,

at the time of the termination hearing, the Department was actively

investigating father’s aunt as a potential placement for the children.

¶ 47 We also reject father’s argument that the juvenile court erred

by finding that an APR to father’s aunt was not a viable less drastic

alternative to termination. Father asserts that the court’s findings

erroneously “echoed” the caseworker’s concerns about his aunt —

that she was unwilling to be a long-term placement option, was

unaware of the children’s appointments, and was unwilling to allow

the children’s grandfather to see them. But it was within the

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court’s discretion to credit the caseworker’s testimony and weigh its

probative value. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,

¶ 10.

¶ 48 Moreover, while the juvenile court acknowledged that father’s

aunt may be a future placement option, it categorically rejected an

APR to any placement because it found an APR could not meet the

children’s needs. See A.R., ¶ 44 (in considering less drastic

alternatives, placement preferences are not relevant; rather, the

court must consider “whether any placement, short of termination,

would be in the child’s best interest”).

¶ 49 Indeed, both the caseworker and the family time supervisor

opined that, regardless of who the children were placed with, an

APR was not in their best interests. And the caseworker stated that

although she had some concerns about placement with father’s

aunt, the Department was still considering father’s aunt as a future

placement option. In fact, father’s aunt testified that she recently

had a three-day visit with the children and that another visit was

scheduled for after the termination hearing.

¶ 50 Therefore, because the record supports the juvenile court’s

finding that no less drastic alternatives to termination were in the

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children’s best interests, we discern no basis for reversal. See B.H.,

¶ 80.

V. Disposition

¶ 51 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE YUN concur.

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