Sysco Denver v. White Winston

24CA2071 Sysco Denver v White Winston 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2071
City and County of Denver District Court No. 20CV31668
Honorable Jon J. Olafson, Judge

Sysco Denver, Inc., a division of Sysco USA I, Inc., and Sysco Kansas City, Inc.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

White Winston Select Asset Funds, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
Fox and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 26, 2025

S&D Law, R. Stephen Hall, Michael L. Schlepp, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-
Appellees

Coan, Payton, & Payne, LLC, Brett Payton, Greeley, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 After White Winston Select Assent Funds, LLC (White

Winston), failed to make timely payments under an agreement

between it and Sysco Denver, Inc. (Sysco), Sysco moved to enforce

the agreement. The trial court entered judgment in Sysco’s favor.

White Winston appeals, and we affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2014, Sysco agreed to supply food and restaurant supplies

to various restaurants operated by Larkburger of Colorado, LLC;

Larkburger, Inc.; Larkburger of Kansas, LLC; and Larkburger of

Missouri, LLC (collectively, Larkburger). As of February 2019,

Larkburger owed Sysco approximately $240,000 for past deliveries

to several Larkburger locations. Because Larkburger failed to

comply with its contract with Sysco, White Winston — Larkburger’s

first position secured lender — assumed control over Larkburger’s

operations. White Winston made a few payments to Sysco but

ultimately failed to pay Sysco the amount that Larkburger owed.

¶3 Sysco sued Larkburger and White Winston, seeking

$802,297.26 in damages. Larkburger never entered an appearance

in the case, so Sysco moved for default judgment against

Larkburger. The court ordered the clerk to enter default against

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Larkburger under C.R.C.P. 55(a), but it denied Sysco’s motion for

default judgment “at this time.”

¶4 Three days before trial was set to begin, Sysco and White

Winston entered into a “Purchase, Sale and Settlement Agreement

and Mutual Release” (the Agreement). Per the Agreement, White

Winston agreed to pay Sysco $600,000, over two installments, for

any default judgment entered against Larkburger in the underlying

case (the Judgment), which Sysco would assign to White Winston.

If White Winston failed to timely and successfully pay the $600,000

purchase price, that would trigger the Agreement’s default

provision, which required White Winston to pay Sysco one-third of

the unpaid amount plus interest in addition to the original

$600,000.

¶5 Sysco and White Winston filed a signed “Notice of Settlement

and Stipulation” (the Notice) with the court on February 25, 2022.

The Notice informed the court that the parties (1) had reached an

agreement resolving the pending claims between them; (2) agreed

that if either party defaulted under the Agreement, the

nondefaulting party could file a motion to enforce the Agreement

with the court; and (3) requested that the court enter a default

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judgment against Larkburger. The Notice also asked the court to

vacate the trial and indicated that the parties anticipated filing a

“Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice” (the Stipulation) within

seven days after Sysco received payment in full but no later than

October 6, 2023. The Notice and the Stipulation were attached as

exhibits to the Agreement. On February 28, 2022, the court

vacated the trial and entered default judgment against Larkburger.

¶6 Consistent with the Agreement, White Winston paid Sysco the

first $300,000 installment, but it did not pay the second $300,000

installment. Sysco notified White Winston that White Winston had

breached the Agreement by failing to make the second $300,000

payment. Sysco demanded the payment plus $100,000 in

liquidated damages as detailed in the Agreement’s default provision.

Sysco also advised White Winston that if it failed to pay the

$400,000 within ten days, the Judgment would not be released to it

and would instead be released back to Sysco. Sysco filed a motion

to enforce the Agreement and for an entry of judgment against

White Winston.

¶7 The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing where two

witnesses testified. At the hearing, Mark Kane, Sysco’s director of

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credit and collections, testified that the purpose of the Agreement

was to settle the litigation between the parties and allow White

Winston to purchase the Judgment. In contrast, Todd Enright, a

partner with White Winston, testified that the Agreement’s sole

purpose was for White Winston to purchase the Judgment.

¶8 The trial court concluded that the Agreement operated as a

binding settlement agreement and that White Winston was required

to pay the remaining $300,000 installment with the accrued

interest detailed in the Agreement’s default provision. The trial

court also found that Sysco was entitled to interest accruing at the

rate of 12% per annum from October 2, 2023, and ordered White

Winston to pay Sysco the amounts due in accordance with the

Agreement.

II. Analysis

¶9 White Winston claims that (1) the trial court erred by

interpreting the Agreement as a settlement agreement, which

required it to pay the second installment; (2) the trial court erred by

requiring it to pay the second installment without Sysco’s

assignment of the Judgment; and (3) the trial court’s findings and

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analysis of the Agreement were not supported by the evidence

presented. We disagree with each contention.

A. The Court Properly Construed the Agreement, in Part, as a
Settlement Agreement

¶ 10 White Winston contends that the trial court erroneously

interpreted the Agreement as a settlement agreement that required

White Winston to pay, as an “absolute obligation,” the second

$300,000 installment to Sysco. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 The interpretation of a contract is a question of law we review

de novo. Ad Two, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 9 P.3d 373, 376

(Colo. 2000). When interpreting a contract, our primary goal is to

give effect to the parties’ intent. French v. Centura Health Corp.,

2022 CO 20, ¶ 25. We discern intent primarily from the language of

the contract itself. Id.

¶ 12 To determine intent, we must first determine if the contract

terms are ambiguous. Id. In doing so, we construe the contract’s

language based on the plain and generally accepted meaning of the

words. Id. If the contract is unambiguous, we will enforce it as

written. Id. The mere fact that the parties disagree about a

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contract’s interpretation doesn’t establish ambiguity itself; rather, a

contract is ambiguous when its terms are “susceptible of more than

one reasonable interpretation.” Id. Absent ambiguity, we will not

look beyond the four corners of the agreement to determine the

meaning intended by the parties. Ad Two, 9 P.3d at 376-77.

2. Discussion

¶ 13 White Winston argues that the Agreement’s plain language

“makes clear that the only transaction and exchange of

consideration were the payments in exchange for the Judgment.”

And because the Agreement does not expressly mention settling the

underlying case, the Agreement does not function as a settlement

agreement. We are unpersuaded.

¶ 14 The Agreement contains ample language evidencing the

parties’ intent to settle the claims between them. To begin, the

Agreement’s penultimate “whereas” clause, which sets the stage by

detailing the circumstances leading to the document’s creation,

indicates that, “to avoid the uncertainty of trial[,] the Parties to this

Agreement now wish to resolve all claims among them.”

¶ 15 The Agreement also contains “mutual release” provisions, in

which the parties agree

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to release, acquit and forever discharge [the
other party] from any and all damages, losses
obligations, indebtedness, demands, claims,
attorneys’ fees, causes of action, and
controversies whether in law or in equity . . .
whether presently known or unknown, direct
or indirect, that [the releasing party] now ha[s]
or may have against [the other party],
including but not limited to, any claims which
were or could have been asserted in the Civil
Action.

Likewise, the Agreement uses the term “settlement” several times,

including in section 4.0, which provides that the parties “agree not

to disclose the amount of this settlement and to keep said

information strictly confidential.”

¶ 16 Finally, the Notice filed with the court (and included as an

exhibit to the Agreement) refers to the Agreement as a settlement

agreement and explains that the parties have “reached a

confidential agreement resolving the pending claims between them”

and have stipulated to the court’s “continued jurisdiction . . . for

purposes of enforcement of the settlement agreement.”

¶ 17 The Agreement’s plain language is unambiguous. It was

drafted by sophisticated parties and demonstrates the parties’

intent to avoid trial, settle their claims, and mutually release each

other from current and future causes of action. We therefore

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conclude that the Agreement functions as a settlement agreement

and that the trial court did not err by interpreting it as such.

B. The Agreement Required Payment of the Second Installment

¶ 18 White Winston argues that the trial court erred when it

concluded that the Agreement required White Winston to pay the

second installment even after Sysco “terminated the assignment” of

the Judgment, and no “bargained-for consideration” existed. We

disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 19 As mentioned, contract interpretation is a question of law that

we review de novo, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fisher, 2013 CO 5, ¶ 9,

and our primary goal is to effectuate the parties’ intent. Ad Two, 9

P.3d at 376. We ascribe the ordinary meaning to the language

used, Weitz Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 181 P.3d 309, 312 (Colo.

App. 2007), and we will not read any term to be superfluous or

meaningless. Ctr. for Wound Healing & Hyperbaric Med., LLC v. Kit

Carson Cnty. Health Serv. Dist., 2024 COA 24, ¶ 17. When

interpreting a contract, we consider and give effect to all its

provisions. Newflower Mkt., Inc. v. Cook, 229 P.3d 1058, 1061

(Colo. App. 2010) (“Our primary obligation is to implement the

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contracting parties’ intent according to the contract’s plain

language and meaning by giving effect to all provisions so that none

is rendered meaningless.”).

2. The Agreement’s Relevant Provisions

¶ 20 The relevant purchase and sale provisions of the Agreement

are as follows:

1.0 Purchase and Sale: Settlement

1.1 Subject to the terms and conditions set
forth herein, Sysco . . . agrees to sell and
assign to White Winston, and White Winston
agrees to purchase from Sysco, Sysco’s default
judgment(s), if any, against Larkburger . . . in
the Civil Action (the “Judgment”).

1.2 In consideration for the Judgment, White
Winston agrees to pay to Sysco . . .
$600,000 . . . in two installments: . . .
$300,000 to be paid to Sysco no later than
April 1, 2022; and another . . . $300,000 to be
paid to Sysco no later than the earlier of:

(a) Ten (10) business days following receipt by
White Winston of payment in full for any
settlement or judgment in the unrelated civil
action captioned White Winston Select Asset
Funds, LLC and GT Acquisition Group v. Good
Times Restaurants, Inc. and assigned United
States District Court for the District of
Delaware Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-2092-SB; or

(b) October 2, 2023.

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3. Discussion

¶ 21 White Winston does not dispute that it failed to make the

second payment. Rather, it contends that because Sysco

“terminated the assignment of the Judgment,” White Winston was

not required to make the second $300,000 payment because the

bargained-for consideration was no longer available. And, in the

absence of any consideration, the Agreement was unenforceable.

Thus, according to White Winston, the trial court erred by allowing

Sysco to receive a total of $700,000 and to retain the Judgment

without providing White Winston anything in return.

¶ 22 In support of its argument, White Winston asks us to focus on

the language of section 1.2, providing that, “[i]n consideration for

the Judgment, [it] agree[d] to pay to Sysco . . . $600,000.” But

White Winston disregards the rest of section 1.2 and section 6.0,

which details the consequences of White Winston’s failure to pay.

Because we must construe the contract as a whole and cannot

consider specific phrases and terms in isolation, we decline White

Winston’s request to review a sentence in section 1.2 in a vacuum.

¶ 23 White Winston agreed to pay Sysco two installments of

$300,000 for the Judgment. It paid the first, and the second was

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due (1) within ten business days after White Winston received a full

settlement or judgment in an unrelated federal case; or (2) before

October 2, 2023, whichever came first. White Winston did not pay

the second installment by October 2, which triggered the

Agreement’s default provision. Under that provision,

[i]n the event White Winston fails for any
reason to timely and successfully pay the
settlement amounts identified in Section 1.2
above, in addition to the full [$600,000]
settlement sum less any amounts paid by or
on behalf of White Winston to Sysco, White
Winston agrees to immediately pay an
additional sum equal to one-third (1/3) of the
unpaid amount.

¶ 24 The Agreement’s plain language reflects that White Winston

would pay Sysco at least $600,000 for the Judgment; nowhere in

the Agreement does it indicate that Sysco had to assign the

Judgment to White Winston before any payment was made. Section

1.3 of the Agreement provides the opposite — that the “Escrow

Agent shall hold the Assignment Documents in escrow until receipt

by the Escrow Agent of written notice . . . that the Purchase Price

has been paid in full.” That section also provides that “[i]f White

Winston fails to make timely payment pursuant to paragraph 1.2

above, the Assignment Documents shall be released to Sysco

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pursuant to the Escrow Agreement and shall be void without the

need for further proceedings.”

¶ 25 White Winston’s failure to timely pay the second $300,000

installment triggered two contractual consequences under the

Agreement. First, White Winston was subject to the default

provision, which required it to pay Sysco the remaining $300,000

plus another $100,000 (one-third of the unpaid amount of

$300,000) in liquidated damages. Second, the escrowed

assignment documents conveying the Judgment to White Winston

were void. White Winston cannot argue that the trial court erred by

requiring payment of the second $300,000 because the Agreement

did not excuse White Winston’s obligation to make that payment

under any circumstance.

¶ 26 White Winston’s argument that the bargained-for

consideration wasn’t available because Sysco terminated the

assignment of the Judgment is misplaced. The Judgment was

available until White Winston failed to make the second payment in

a timely manner. Had White Winston timely made the second

payment, it would have triggered delivery of the Judgment under

section 1.3. Simply put, the plain language of the Agreement

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demonstrates that the parties intended to make the assignment of

the Judgment contingent on the timely receipt of full payment and

that full payment (plus penalty) was required regardless of whether

White Winston lost its claim to the Judgment.

¶ 27 Further, as provided in section 1.4 of the Agreement, neither

the Judgment nor its assignment were guaranteed:

White Winston expressly acknowledges and
agrees that the parties subject to the default
judgment(s), and the amounts of the default
judgment(s), are currently unknown. White
Winston expressly assumes the risk that the
default judgment(s), if any, ultimately entered
by the Denver County District Court in the
Civil Action may differ from the default
judgment(s) requested by Sysco in its Motion
for Entry of Default Judgments and Renewed
Motion for Entry of Default Judgments . . . .

¶ 28 Despite the uncertainties surrounding the Judgment and its

assignment, White Winston knowingly assumed that risk and the

inherent possibility that the Judgment, part of the “bargained-for

consideration,” was not guaranteed or might be less than what

White Winston expected. We conclude that per the terms of the

Agreement, White Winston was required to pay the full purchase

price before Sysco was required to assign the Judgment and even if

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it ultimately lost the right to receive the assignment due to its

failure to timely make the settlement payments.

¶ 29 Finally, we reject White Winston’s claim that, because Sysco

was not required to assign the Judgment, it would receive no

consideration for its payment of $700,000. When the Agreement is

read as a whole, the parties exchanged consideration beyond White

Winston’s payment for Sysco’s assignment of the Judgment. At the

parties’ request, the court vacated trial, and the parties agreed to

mutually release all claims against one another. Each party was

able to avoid additional litigation costs and the uncertainty of trial,

and each party was assured a mutually beneficial resolution.

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C. The Record Supports the Trial Court’s Findings and Analysis
of the Agreement

¶ 30 White Winston contends that the trial court’s findings and

analysis of the Agreement were not supported by the evidence

presented.1 Again, we disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 31 We defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 14.

This standard recognizes that, unlike us, the trier of fact is in the

best position to resolve disputed factual issues, determine witness

credibility, assign weight to testimony, and draw inferences from

the evidence. Target Corp. v. Prestige Maint. USA, Ltd., 2013 COA

12, ¶ 24. We review de novo the court’s conclusions of law, Premier

1 Sysco claims this issue was not preserved because White Winston

failed to identify “the precise location in the record where the issue
was raised.” C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A). We disagree. While the appellate
rules require parties to identify where in the record the issue was
raised, a citation (or lack thereof) is not indicative of preservation.
Rather, as long as a party presents to the trial court the sum and
substance of the argument made on appeal, we will consider it
properly preserved. Madalena v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2023 COA 32,
¶ 50. We admonish White Winston for not complying with C.A.R.
28(a)(7)(A) because it creates needless work for this division, but
whether the evidence supports the trial court’s order is an issue
that was preserved as reflected in the trial court’s order and the
evidentiary hearing’s transcript. Accordingly, we will review it.

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Members Fed. Credit Union v. Block, 2013 COA 128, ¶ 27, including

its conclusions on questions of contract interpretation, Gagne v.

Gagne, 2014 COA 127, ¶ 50.

2. Discussion

¶ 32 White Winston does not contend that the Agreement is

ambiguous. Nevertheless, White Winston claims that the trial court

should have relied on Enright’s testimony that the Agreement was

“a classic purchase and sale agreement where . . . earnest money is

at risk if you don’t perform” and that “the remedy for the other

party [was] to demand their collateral back, which they did.” We

disagree.

¶ 33 We look to extrinsic evidence only if a contract is ambiguous.

Having already concluded that the Agreement is unambiguous, we

likewise conclude that the trial court was not required to use

witness testimony to interpret the Agreement. And, based on what

we can discern from the record, it seems that the court did not rely

on any witness testimony in its analysis, instead focusing on the

language of the Agreement:

The purchase, sale, and settlement agreement
also states that the parties, both parties,
sought to avoid the uncertainty of trial in this

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dispute and wish to resolve all claims among
them.

....

By the express language of this agreement, the
parties clearly and unambiguously intended to
release the claims related to this dispute. To
be clear, both paragraphs of section two of the
agreement specifically reference[] this dispute.

While White Winston claims there was not enough evidence that

could lead the trial court to conclude that the Agreement required

White Winston pay the full purchase price in exchange for the

Judgment, the Agreement itself says otherwise.

D. Attorney Fees

¶ 34 Sysco requests an award of attorney fees under section 13.0 of

the Agreement.

¶ 35 Generally, the prevailing party in a contract or tort action may

not recover attorney fees from the other party, Harwig v. Downey,

56 P.3d 1220, 1221 (Colo. App. 2002), but parties to a contract may

agree to include a provision awarding fees and costs to the

prevailing party. S. Colo. Orthopaedic Clinic Sports Med. & Arthritis

Surgeons, P.C. v. Weinstein, 2014 COA 171, ¶ 10.

¶ 36 Section 13.0 of the Agreement provides that the prevailing

party “shall be entitled to recover its costs and reasonable

17
attorneys’ fees from the opposing party” in any legal action brought

to construe or enforce the Agreement’s provisions. But section 13.0

limits recovery of attorney fees up to $5,000 “with respect to any

action or other proceeding brought by Sysco to enforce payment of

the Purchase Price.” Accordingly, we remand the issue to the trial

court to determine Sysco’s appropriate attorney fees in accordance

with section 13.0 of the Agreement.

III. Disposition

¶ 37 We affirm the judgment and remand the case to the trial court

to determine the appropriate amount of attorney fees consistent

with this opinion.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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