Peo v. Woods

22CA1631 Peo v Woods 11-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1631
Jefferson County District Court No. 22CR215
Honorable Russell Klein, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Paul A. Woods,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 20, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Gina M. Nykerk, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Casey Mark Klekas, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Paul A. Woods, appeals his convictions for second

degree assault-strangulation and knowing or reckless child abuse.

We affirm the judgment, but we remand for correction of the

mittimus to reflect that the child abuse conviction did not involve

genital mutilation.

I. Background

¶2 On the evening of January 14, 2022, Woods and his mother

argued about a telephone battery. At the time, Woods and his

juvenile daughter, N.W., were living with his mother in her home.

Around 7:00 p.m., Woods’s mother spoke with Woods’s brother on

the phone. During the call, Woods attacked and strangled his

mother, causing the call to disconnect. Woods’s brother called 911

after he had called her back and received no response.

¶3 Having heard the commotion, N.W. went into Woods’s

mother’s bedroom and found Woods strangling her. N.W. pleaded

with her father to stop. N.W. attempted to pull her father off of his

mother. Woods then turned his attention to N.W. and began to

strangle her. He ultimately pushed her outside to the upstairs

balcony and suspended her over the balcony. After Woods let N.W.

return inside, N.W. called 911 and then told Woods the police were

1
coming. Woods fled the scene and was later apprehended by the

police at a friend’s house.

¶4 Woods’s mother and N.W. were taken to the hospital for

evaluation and treatment of their injuries. The State charged

Woods with one count of second degree-assault–strangulation, and

one count of misdemeanor child abuse and a jury convicted him as

charged.

¶5 On appeal, Woods contends the court reversibly erred by (1)

denying his motion for new trial and allowing a late-endorsed

prosecution expert to testify; and (2) cumulatively allowing the

erroneous admission of evidence, exhibits, and testimony. He also

contends that the mittimus contains an error requiring correction.

We reject his first two contentions, but we agree that the mittimus

needs to be corrected.

II. Motion for a New Trial

¶6 Woods contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

allowing a late-endorsed expert witness to testify during trial and

denying his motion for a new trial after the verdicts. We discern no

error.

2
A. Additional Facts

¶7 Woods and his counsel first became aware of forensic nurse

examiner Trisha Park in January 2022 when the prosecution

endorsed her as a lay witness. Park worked at the hospital where

Woods’s mother and daughter were treated for their injuries.

Thirteen days after the expert witness disclosure window under

Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(3) closed and twenty two days before trial, the

prosecution endorsed Park as an expert. Woods moved to strike

this endorsement as untimely and noncompliant with the discovery

rules for expert witnesses. The trial court held a hearing on the

motion.

¶8 At the hearing, the prosecution confessed its violation of Crim.

P. 16(I)(b)(3), attributing it to an oversight. After hearing from both

parties, the trial court found that the late disclosure was neither

intentional nor part of a pattern of neglect by the prosecution. It

directed the prosecution to remedy the oversight by facilitating an

interview between Park and Woods’s defense team. After several

failed attempts to schedule an interview, Woods renewed his

request to strike two days before the trial began.

3
¶9 After a second hearing, the trial court found that the oversight

could still be remedied and that Woods and his counsel’s inability

to connect with Park was not the prosecution’s fault. The

prosecutor suggested that the trial court grant a continuance, but

defense counsel said the defense was not requesting one.

¶ 10 The trial court ordered the prosecution to make Park available

to be interviewed by the defense on the first day of trial. Defense

counsel interviewed Park at the end of the first day of trial and Park

testified as an expert witness the following day over defense

counsel’s renewed objection. After the verdicts, Woods filed a

motion for new trial, arguing that the court’s remedy — allowing

only a midtrial interview — precluded him from adequately

investigating or cross-examining Park.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 We review a court’s resolution of discovery issues for an abuse

of discretion. People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82, ¶ 10. A court abuses

its discretion when its discovery order is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Tippet, 2023 CO 61, ¶ 35.

¶ 12 Crim. P. 16 and other discovery rules protect criminal

defendants’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.

4
See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 25; and

Crim. P. 16(I). Under Crim. P. 16(1)(a)(1)(III), prosecution expert

reports and statements must be disclosed to the defense. The

prosecution should perform disclosures “as soon as practicable but

not later than 35 days before trial.” Crim. P. 16(1)(b)(3). Missed

deadlines may undermine a defendant’s ability to effectively cross-

examine a witness — a fundamental constitutional right. Pointer v.

Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).

¶ 13 For an error to require reversal, a defendant must establish

prejudice by showing that the late endorsement was a surprise, that

it provided an inadequate opportunity for him to interview the

witness before trial, and that the court denied a timely request for a

continuance. People v. Bailey, 552 P.2d 1014, 1017 (Colo. 1976);

see also People v. Cevallos-Acosta, 140 P.3d 116, 125 (Colo. App.

2005) (“In fashioning a remedy, the court must weigh ‘the reasons

for the [People’s] delay in affording the required discovery, the

extent of prejudice, if any, that the defendant has suffered because

of the delay, and the feasibility of curing such prejudice by granting

a continuance . . . .’” (quoting People v. Dist. Court, 793 P.2d 163,

168 (Colo. 1990))).

5
¶ 14 When a discovery violation occurs, the trial court has broad

discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy. Cevallos-Acosta,

140 P.3d at 125. However, the court should impose the least severe

sanction that will ensure full compliance with its orders. People v.

Dist. Court, 664 P.2d 247, 253 (Colo. 1983).

C. Analysis

¶ 15 Woods contends that the late expert endorsement surprised

him and prejudiced his ability to adequately prepare for trial. We

are not convinced and discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s

remedy for the Rule 16 violation, for three reasons.

¶ 16 First, the record shows that the prosecution endorsed Park as

a witness on January 19, 2022, almost six months before the trial.

The prosecution also provided the defense with Park’s reports at

that time, and Park produced no additional reports before testifying.

Thus, we conclude the defense was aware of Park, and the

substance of her testimony, well before trial. The formality of

changing her endorsement twenty-two days before the trial did not

prejudice Woods. See People v. Loscutoff, 661 P.2d 274, 278 (Colo.

1983) (finding no prejudice from late endorsement when witness

was known to the defense).

6
¶ 17 Second, the record shows that Woods had numerous

opportunities to interview Park before trial and it was defense

counsel’s own scheduling difficulties and miscommunications that

prevented it. Acknowledging these difficulties, the trial court

ordered the prosecution to make Park available on the first day of

trial. While this arrangement might not have been ideal for the

defense, the record shows that the interview occurred and that

defense counsel was able to effectively cross-examined Park.

Moreover, the trial court limited Park’s testimony to information

originally disclosed. And, critically, Woods has not identified any

additional information he would have presented, or any prejudice

suffered, as a result of the late endorsement. Under these

circumstances, we discern no prejudice resulting from the court’s

remedy for the late disclosure.

¶ 18 Third, the defense had the opportunity to seek a continuance,

but it declined to do so. See People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 931

(Colo. App. 2011) (noting that the defendant’s failure to move for a

continuance “discredited” his claim of prejudice); People v.

Castango, 674 P.2d 978, 980 (Colo. App. 1983) (considering

7
defendant’s failure to request a continuance in response to late

endorsement of lay witnesses as evidence of lack of prejudice).

¶ 19 Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s remedy for the discovery violation.

III. Cumulative Error

¶ 20 Woods contends that the cumulative effect of six errors

requires reversal. These alleged errors include (1) the admission of

a 911 call; (2) the admission of strangulation diagrams; (3) a

challenge to Park’s expert qualification; (4) a CRE 404(b) violation;

(5) a police officer’s testimony concerning probable cause to arrest;

and (6) the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law in closing

argument. We disagree.

A. 911 Call

¶ 21 Woods first contends that the trial court erroneously admitted

the 911 call made by Woods’s brother under the excited utterance

exception when his brother had not observed the events first-hand.

During trial, the prosecution sought admission of the call into

evidence, over defense counsel’s objections. Woods’s brother told

the 911 operator:

8
I was talking to my mom and I’m pretty sure
my brother is hitting her. Please send
someone there now . . . it’s an emergency . . . it
sounded like he was choking her, ma’am. I
was on the phone with her and then she just
started screaming and stuff and I heard
someone in the background saying, “leave her
alone.” Please, please, it’s an emergency.
Please. . . . I heard him yelling, he’s all drunk
or something, they were yelling about
something stupid and then all of the sudden I
heard him come in and he said “you!” and then
I heard my mom, it sounded like she was
struggling, I hope she’s not choking. I need
someone there now. . . . His name is Paul
Woods. Paul Anthony Woods.

¶ 22 The call lasted approximately one minute and twenty-nine

seconds. Woods contends that the call was inadmissible under

CRE 602 and CRE 403 and that the call should have been

considered hearsay.

¶ 23 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Davis, 2012 COA 56, ¶ 38. A court abuses its

discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair. Id. CRE 602 provides:

A witness may not testify to a matter unless
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that [he] has personal knowledge of the
matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge
may, but need not, consist of the testimony of
the witness [himself].

9
¶ 24 We reject Woods’s argument regarding lack of personal

knowledge because the record shows that his brother was on the

phone with their mother and heard both Woods and the sounds of

his mother being attacked. Thus, although not physically present,

the brother was a percipient witness and did not lack personal

knowledge. The “threshold for satisfying the personal-knowledge

requirement is not very high and may be inferable” from the “total

circumstances surrounding the matter.” Curry v. Brewer, 2025

COA 28, ¶ 20 (citing Murray v. Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC,

2016 CO 47M, ¶ 33 (internal citation omitted)).

¶ 25 Woods also asserts that CRE 403 precludes the admission of

the 911 recording because the danger of unfair prejudice

substantially outweighed its probative value. “All relevant evidence

is admissible,” CRE 402, but it may be excluded under CRE 403 “if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice.” Unfair prejudice refers only to evidence that

tends to cause a decision to be made on an improper basis. People

v. Banks, 983 P.2d 102, 105 (Colo. App. 1999), aff’d on other

grounds, 9 P.3d 1125 (Colo. 2000). In reviewing whether such

evidence should have been excluded, we “must afford the evidence

10
the maximum probative value attributable by a reasonable fact

finder and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably

expected.” People v. Gibbens, 905 P.2d 604, 607 (Colo. 1995).

¶ 26 Here, the 911 recording was admitted with testimony from

Woods’s mother and N.W. “Rule 403’s ‘probative value’ is not

considered in isolation but signifies the ‘marginal’ or ‘incremental’

probative value of evidence relative to the probative force of other

evidence available in the case.” People v. Williams, 2020 CO 78,

¶ 14 (citations omitted). We conclude the 911 call was highly

relevant, and that its probative value exceeded any unfair prejudice.

¶ 27 Woods last argues that the language “I heard someone in the

background saying, ‘leave her alone,’” constitutes hearsay within

hearsay, to which no exceptions apply. We are not persuaded.

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered into evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted. CRE 801(c). Unless an exception

applies, hearsay statements are generally inadmissible because

they are presumptively untrustworthy. People v. Vanderpauye,

2023 CO 42, ¶ 26.

¶ 28 As relevant here, an excited utterance is a “statement relating

to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was

11
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”

CRE 803(2). A statement may qualify as an excited utterance if

(1) the occurrence or event was sufficiently
startling to render inoperative the normal
reflective thought processes of an observer;
(2) the declarant’s statement was a
spontaneous reaction to the event; and (3)
direct or circumstantial evidence supports
an inference that the declarant had the
opportunity to observe the startling event.

People v. King, 121 P.3d 234, 237-38 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 29 Woods’s brother called 911 immediately after his mother’s call

disconnected and he could not reach her. We therefore conclude

that that the statements in the 911 call were made in response to a

startling event, constituted a spontaneous reaction to that event,

and satisfied the requirements of an excited utterance. See CRE

803(2) (an excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling

event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of

excitement caused by the event or condition”); see, e.g., People v.

Martinez, 18 P.3d 831, 835 (Colo. App. 2000). Thus, we discern no

error in the admission of the 911 call.

12
B. Strangulation Diagrams

¶ 30 Woods next contends that the trial court erroneously admitted

Park’s strangulation diagrams under CRE 803(4) and argues that

Park acted as an extension of the police and prosecutor’s office

rather than as a neutral medical provider. We are not persuaded.

¶ 31 During trial, Park testified to her experience as a forensic

nurse examiner who examined Woods’s mother. Park conducted a

full body examination and noted her observations of strangulation

in a diagram. During cross examination, the following colloquy

occurred:

[Defense Counsel]: So your role as a forensic
nurse examiner is to conduct an assessment.

[Park]: Correct.

[Defense Counsel]: And collect evidence.

[Park]: Correct.

[Defense Counsel]: Part of your training is in
evidence collection?

[Park]: Correct.

[Defense Counsel]: Such as chain of custody?

[Park]: Correct.

[….]

13
[Defense Counsel]: This collection of evidence
is for law enforcement?

[Park]: Yes.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay. Law enforcement
will pick up any, let’s say, DNA swabs you do?

[Park]: Correct.

[Defense Counsel]: Law enforcement will pick
up the forms that you complete?

[Park]: Correct.

[Defense Counsel]: And the use of that
evidence you collect can be used for the
prosecution of a crime, correct?

[Park]: That would be outside my area of
expertise.

[Defense Counsel]: Do you agree that law
enforcement collects evidence for alleged
crimes?

[Park]: I will hope they -- yes.

[Defense Counsel]: Okay. You testified that
you’re a member of The International
Association of Forensic Nursing, correct?

[Park]: That is correct.

[….]

[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And . . . forensic
nurse examiners collect evidence and give
testimony that can be used in a court of law to
apprehend or prosecute perpetrators who
commit violent and abusive acts.

14
[Park]: Say that again.

[Defense Counsel]: Do you agree that forensic
nurse examiners collect evidence?

[Park]: Yes.

[Defense Counsel]: And give testimony that can
be used in the court of law to apprehend or
prosecute perpetrators of crimes?

[Park]: Yes.

[Defense Counsel]: In your role as a forensic
nurse examiner, police will refer an alleged
victim to you.

[Park]: Or suspect.

[Defense Counsel]: It’s never your role to
investigate, correct?

[Park]: Correct.

¶ 32 Based on Park’s answers, Woods argues that the diagrams

constitute hearsay because they were made for law enforcement in

anticipation of litigation.

¶ 33 The prosecution argued that the diagrams were related to

Park’s treatment of Woods’s mother and disagreed with defense

counsel that Park was just an “evidence collector.” The court

agreed with the prosecution and reasoned that Park had sufficiently

15
testified that she had created the diagrams for the purpose of

medical care rather than evidence gathering.

¶ 34 We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence

for an abuse of discretion. In Interest of L.B., 2017 COA 5, ¶ 58. As

discussed above, hearsay statements “are out-of-court declarations

offered into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted.” Blecha v.

People, 962 P.2d 931, 937 (Colo. 1998) (citing CRE 801(c)). A

hearsay statement is not admissible unless it falls within an

exception to the hearsay rule. CRE 802; People v. Welsh, 176 P.3d

781, 790 (Colo. App. 2007). As relevant here, statements “(1) made

for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment; (2) that describe

medical history, symptoms, or the inception or cause of symptoms;

(3) insofar as they are reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or

treatment” are admissible under the medical diagnosis exception.

Kelly v. Haralampopoulos, 2014 CO 46, ¶ 20; see also CRE 803(4).

Because a declarant obtaining medical services “knows that a false

statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, [the statement]

carries special guarantees of credibility.” Kelly, ¶ 20 (quoting White

v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992)). The test for admissibility is

modified, however, when a declarant makes a statement to a

16
healthcare professional in preparation for litigation. See People v.

Tyme, 2013 COA 59, ¶ 20.

¶ 35 In King v. People, 785 P.2d 596, 599 n.3 (Colo. 1990), the

Colorado Supreme Court held that the medical diagnosis or

treatment exception does not require an independent showing of the

declarant’s trustworthiness, but instead, can be established by a

showing that it was reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and was

relied upon by the healthcare professional to arrive at a diagnosis.

Id. at 602; see also Kelly, ¶ 24 (“[I]f a statement is offered for the

purpose of determining the nature, source, or cause of a patient’s

medical condition, it falls within the language of Rule 803(4) . . . .”).

¶ 36 Here, Park examined Woods’s mother, who reported that she

had been strangled. As a professional nurse, Park testified that her

role was to assess injuries, provide treatment to patients, and triage

resources for the patient’s care. In carrying out these duties, she

conducted a head-to-toe medical examination and documented her

observations in a diagram, consistent with established protocol for

a forensic examination. Park further testified that she relied on her

specialized training in diagnosing and treating strangulation

injuries to diagnose the mother’s strangulation injuries.

17
Accordingly, we conclude that the strangulation diagram satisfies

the medical diagnosis exception to the rule against hearsay and

discern no error in its admission.

C. Expert Qualifications

¶ 37 Woods next contends that Park lacked the necessary

qualifications to be accepted as an expert witness. We disagree.

¶ 38 We review the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of

discretion. Kutzly v. People, 2019 CO 55, ¶ 8. “[T]he standard of

review pertaining to the admissibility of expert testimony is highly

deferential.” People v. Jimenez, 217 P.3d 841, 866 (Colo. App.

2008) (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d

371, 380 (Colo. 2007)). “Trial courts are vested with broad

discretion to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, and

the exercise of that discretion will not be overturned unless

manifestly erroneous.” Ramirez, 155 P.3d at 380.

¶ 39 Under CRE 701, lay opinion testimony is testimony that is “(a)

rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a

clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination

of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”

18
¶ 40 In contrast, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or

to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify

thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” CRE 702. Expert

testimony “is that which goes beyond the realm of common

experience and requires experience, skills, or knowledge that the

ordinary person would not have.” Venalonzo v. People, 2017 CO 9,

¶ 22. “[T]he critical factor in distinguishing between lay and expert

testimony is the basis for the witness’s opinion.” Id.

If the witness provides testimony that could be
expected to be based on an ordinary person’s
experiences or knowledge, then the witness is
offering lay testimony. If, on the other hand,
the witness provides testimony that could not
be offered without specialized experiences,
knowledge, or training, then the witness is
offering expert testimony.

Id. at ¶ 23. “[T]estimony is not automatically considered expert

opinion testimony simply because the witness has extensive

training and experience — it is the basis of the witness’s opinion

that is determinative.” People v. Murphy, 2021 CO 22, ¶ 32.

19
¶ 41 Woods argues, without specific supporting authority, that

Park’s failure to become a certified nurse examiner, her lack of

experience testifying as an expert, and her return to work less than

a year earlier precluded her expert qualification. However, every

expert must be qualified for a first time, and beyond these

assertions, Woods provides no argument for why they should

constitute an abuse of discretion. Because we do not address

undeveloped and conclusory arguments, we do not further consider

this issue. See People v. Duran, 2025 COA 34, ¶ 14 n.3 (explaining

that appellate courts don’t address undeveloped arguments); see

also People v. Wallin, 167 P.3d 183, 187 (Colo. App. 2007) (declining

to address arguments presented in a perfunctory or conclusory

manner).

D. CRE 404(b)

¶ 42 During her direct examination, N.W. described how Woods

strangled her for “fifteen to [twenty] seconds.” Woods contends that

because the prosecution did not charge him for this alleged

conduct, the trial court erred in admitting it without conducting a

CRE 404(b) analysis. We disagree.

20
¶ 43 We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion under the standards set forth previously. See People v.

Gonzales-Quevedo, 203 P.3d 609, 612 (Colo. App. 2008). Only

relevant evidence is admissible. CRE 402. Relevant evidence is

“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

CRE 401. Evidence is probative if it has “a tendency to prove the

proposition for which it is offered.” Fletcher v. People, 179 P.3d 969,

974 (Colo. 2007).

¶ 44 In determining whether other acts evidence is admissible, our

supreme court has recognized a distinction between intrinsic acts,

which require only a relevance analysis, and extrinsic acts, which

require a CRE 404(b) analysis. Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 44.

Intrinsic acts are those that (1) directly prove the offense charged,

and (2) occur contemporaneously with the charged offense and

facilitate the commission of it. Id.

¶ 45 Recall, the prosecution charged Woods with child abuse —

causing an injury to N.W.’s life of health or permitting N.W. to be

unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of injury to

21
her life or health. N.W. testified that Woods briefly choked her

immediately before suspending her over the balcony. Thus, we

conclude that the act of choking occurred contemporaneously with

the charged act, facilitated the commission of that act, and was

properly admitted as intrinsic evidence.

E. Probable Cause to Arrest Testimony

¶ 46 Woods next contends the trial court erroneously admitted

testimony that officers had probable cause to arrest Woods. While

we agree that an error occurred, we conclude it was harmless.

Medina v. People, 114 P.3d 845, 857 (Colo. 2005) (an error is

deemed harmless where “viewing the evidence as a whole, the error

did not substantially influence the verdict or impair the fairness of

the trial”).

¶ 47 During trial, a police officer testified to the following:

[Officer]: When I arrived there I had
information from other officers over the radio
that the suspect was wearing all black, he had
left on a bicycle. And they established
probable cause—

[Defense counsel]: Objection, relevance.

[Court]: Overruled.

[Defense counsel]: Hearsay.

22
[Court]: Overruled.

[Prosecutor]: You can finish your statement.

[Officer]: So they had established probable
cause to arrest the suspect for second degree
assault, and he was located. So I responded to
that address.

¶ 48 “Generally, when probable cause to arrest the defendant is not

at issue, it is improper to present evidence about obtaining an

arrest warrant or possessing probable cause.” People v. Salazar,

2023 COA 102, ¶ 39 (citing People v. Mullins, 104 P.3d 299, 301

(Colo. App. 2004)). But the rule is tempered by a number of factors,

including the length and detail of the testimony, whether the

testimony described how officers obtained probable cause, what

probable cause means, whether probable cause was argued in

closing, and whether the court provided a limiting instruction to the

jury concerning the use of the testimony. Salazar, ¶¶ 40-43.

¶ 49 Because the existence of probable cause was not at issue, we

conclude that the testimony was admitted in error. Nevertheless,

reversal is not required because the officer’s testimony was brief, it

did not describe how the officers determined probable cause, it did

not define probable cause, the prosecutor did not argue the

23
testimony in closing argument, and the court did not provide the

jury with a limiting instruction concerning its use. Id.

F. Closing Argument

¶ 50 Woods last contends that the prosecutor misstated the law

during closing arguments. We disagree.

¶ 51 During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated the following:

[Prosecutor]: That if you think that his intent,
in particular with the intent, that’s an element
of second-degree assault, wasn’t formed
because he was intoxicated by Fentanyl and
alcohol, that you should find him not guilty.
And you should. You all during voir dire
talked to me about this concept. We talked
about how you would follow the law. I’m
asking you to follow the law. But following
this law does not mean finding him not guilty.
Let’s talk about why.

[Defense counsel]: Objection, misstates the
laws and instructions.

[Court]: Overruled. But the jury will receive
the instructions, they will follow the rules that
are provided by the Court.

[Prosecutor]: Thank you, Judge. There are
tremendous, tremendous instances of him
exhibiting intent. Let’s start off with how this
started. As an argument. He didn’t run into a
room out of the blue. They’d been talking
about something . . . .

24
¶ 52 When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, “we

consider whether the prosecutor’s conduct was improper and

whether any impropriety requires reversal.” People v. Walker, 2022

COA 15, ¶ 27. “Whether a prosecutor’s statements constitute

misconduct is generally a matter left to the trial court’s discretion.”

Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1049 (Colo. 2005).

Claims of improper argument are evaluated “in the context of the

argument as a whole and in light of the evidence before the jury.”

People v. McMinn, 2013 COA 94, ¶ 60 (citation omitted). Because

arguments delivered in the heat of trial are not perfectly scripted,

courts afford prosecutors the benefit of the doubt when their

remarks are ambiguous or inartful. Id. at ¶ 61. We will not disturb

the trial court’s rulings on alleged misconduct absent a showing of

an abuse of discretion. Walker, ¶ 27.

¶ 53 To be sure, the prosecutor’s remark, when considered in

isolation, appears to be incorrect. However, when viewed in the

context of the entire argument, we conclude that no misconduct

occurred and that the remark was simply inartful. Accordingly, we

discern no basis for reversal.

25
¶ 54 The cumulative error doctrine applies when “the cumulative

effect of [multiple] errors and defects substantially affected the

fairness of the trial proceedings and the integrity of the fact-finding

process.” Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 24 (quoting

People v. Lucero, 615 P.2d 660, 666 (Colo. 1980)). “For reversal to

occur based on cumulative error, a reviewing court must identify

multiple errors that collectively prejudice the substantial rights of

the defendant, even if any single error does not.” Howard-Walker,

¶ 25 (citation omitted). However, we have only identified one error,

the erroneously admitted testimony that officers had probable

cause to arrest Woods. Because we conclude that this error was

harmless, we also conclude there was no cumulative error. See

People v. Villa, 240 P.3d 343, 359 (Colo. App. 2009) (cumulative

error analysis is required only when multiple errors have been

identified).

IV. Mittimus

¶ 55 Finally, Woods contends, and the People agree, that the

mittimus must be corrected to reflect that his child abuse

conviction did not include genital mutilation. Accordingly, we

remand the case for correction of the mittimus. See Crim. P. 36

26
(“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the

record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission

may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if

any, as the court orders.”).

V. Disposition

¶ 56 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded for

correction of the mittimus.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.

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