McBride v. Johnson

24CA1918 McBride v Johnson 11-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1918
Arapahoe County District Court No. 19CV32302
Honorable J. Steven Patrick, Judge

Steven R. McBride d/b/a McBride QDRO Services,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Maurice A. Johnson,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART
AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Freyre and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 13, 2025

Richard K. Rufner, Maineville, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Maurice A. Johnson, Centennial, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 The defendant, Maurice A. Johnson, appeals the trial court’s

judgment and order (1) dismissing his deceptive trade practices

counterclaim; and (2) awarding attorney fees to the plaintiff,

Steven R. McBride. We affirm the dismissal of Johnson’s

counterclaim, reverse the award of attorney fees, and remand the

case for a hearing on McBride’s fees request.

I. Background

¶2 The factual background of this case is taken from a prior

opinion of a division of this court. See McBride v. Johnson, (Colo.

App. No. 22CA1074, Aug. 3, 2023) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶3 Johnson is a licensed Colorado attorney who specializes in the

preparation of qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs). Id., slip

op. at ¶ 3. McBride, who is not a licensed attorney, is trained and

experienced in preparing, filing, and obtaining approval of QDROs.

Id.

¶4 In November 2016, Johnson filed a complaint with the Office

of Attorney Regulation Counsel alleging that McBride was engaged

in the unauthorized practice of law by preparing QDROs on behalf

of clients. Id. at ¶ 4. In April 2017, regulatory counsel concluded

1
that McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law

when preparing QDROs. Id. Specifically, regulatory counsel

determined,

[W]hile [McBride’s] preparation of QDROs
involves some exercise of legal discretion, he
has caused no harm. Rather, it appears his
work benefits the family law bar and divorcing
parties. He charges modest fees, increasing
access to justice. Under these circumstances,
we decline to investigate further.

Id. at ¶ 15.

¶5 In 2019, Johnson contacted several individuals, including a

client who had hired McBride to prepare QDROs for a dissolution of

marriage, to tell them that McBride was an “unlicensed QDRO

template salesman” engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Id. at ¶¶ 5-8. McBride filed a lawsuit against Johnson, claiming

that Johnson had defamed him, and Johnson filed (as relevant

here) a counterclaim alleging that McBride had violated the

Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) by engaging in deceptive

trade practices. Id. at ¶ 10. After a jury trial that was converted

into a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of McBride on both

claims. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Johnson then appealed.

2
¶6 On appeal, a division of this court upheld the trial court’s

findings that (1) Johnson had received regulatory counsel’s April

2017 letter determining that McBride was not engaged in the

unauthorized practice of law, and (2) Johnson’s statements that

McBride was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law were

defamatory per se. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. But the division held that the

trial court had erred by granting McBride’s motion in limine to

exclude evidence of Johnson’s deceptive trade practices

counterclaim, and it remanded the case for the court to resolve the

counterclaim. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 57.

¶7 On remand, the trial court held a second bench trial at which

only McBride and Johnson testified. Following this trial, the court

ruled that McBride was not engaged in a deceptive trade practice.

¶8 Johnson now appeals.

II. Deceptive Trade Practices Counterclaim

¶9 Johnson contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his

deceptive trade practices counterclaim. We disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 10 At the start of the second trial, Johnson attempted to argue

that McBride’s work preparing QDROs on behalf of clients was a

3
deceptive trade practice because it constituted the unauthorized

practice of law. Specifically, Johnson argued that McBride’s QDRO

work violated section 6-1-105(1)(z), C.R.S. 2025, which provides

that a person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the

course of the person’s business, the person “[r]efuses or fails to

obtain all governmental licenses or permits required to perform the

services . . . as agreed to or contracted for with a consumer.”

“[P]racticing law without a license,” he argued, “is a deceptive trade

practice.”

¶ 11 McBride objected, noting that regulatory counsel, the trial

court, and a division of this court had already determined that

McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The

trial court sustained the objection, ruling that “we’re not going to

revisit the issue of whether there’s an unauthorized practice of law.”

B. Governing Law and Standard of Review

¶ 12 To prove a private claim for relief under the CCPA, a plaintiff

must establish

(1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair or
deceptive trade practice; (2) that the
challenged practice occurred in the course of
defendant’s business, vocation, or occupation;
(3) that it significantly impacts the public as

4
actual or potential consumers of the
defendant’s goods, services, or property;
(4) that the plaintiff suffered injury in fact to a
legally protected interest; and (5) that the
challenged practice caused the plaintiff’s
injury.

Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 201 (Colo. 2006) (citation omitted).

¶ 13 “When a court enters a judgment following a bench trial, that

judgment presents a mixed question of law and fact.” May v.

Petersen, 2020 COA 75, ¶ 10 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co. v. Johnson, 2017 CO 68, ¶ 12). “While we review the court’s

application of the governing legal standards de novo, we review the

court’s factual findings for clear error.” Id.

C. Discussion

¶ 14 Johnson contends that the trial court erred by ruling that he

could not revisit the issue of whether McBride was engaged in the

unauthorized practice of law, which limited his ability to prove that

McBride was engaged in a deceptive trade practice in violation of

section 6-1-105(1)(z).

¶ 15 The trial court did not err. Regulatory counsel determined in

2017 that McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of

law when preparing QDROs and that, in fact, “his work benefits the

5
family law bar and divorcing parties” and “increas[es] access to

justice.” McBride, No. 22CA1074, slip op. at ¶ 15. After the first

trial, the court found that Johnson’s statements claiming that

McBride was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law were

“untrue,” and a division of this court upheld that finding.1 Id. at

¶ 67. The trial court thus had no discretion on remand to revisit

the question of whether McBride was engaged in the unauthorized

practice of law. See Owners Ins. Co. v. Dakota Station II Condo.

Ass’n, 2021 COA 114, ¶ 24 (“‘Conclusions of an appellate court on

issues presented to it as well as rulings logically necessary to

sustain such conclusions become the law of the case,’ which the

1 “To be actionable, an allegedly defamatory statement must contain

a material falsehood.” Fry v. Lee, 2013 COA 100, ¶ 50. The
McBride division reversed the trial court’s judgment in McBride’s
favor on his defamation claim only because the trial court had not
ruled on the legal issue of whether Johnson’s statements “about
[McBride] being engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
involved a matter of public concern.” McBride v. Johnson, slip op.
at ¶ 44 (Colo. App. No. 22CA1074, Aug. 3, 2023) (not published
pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). The division instructed that, “[i]f the
court concludes that the unauthorized practice of law was not a
matter of public concern in the context of this case, the court shall
reinstate its judgment in favor of [McBride].” Id. at ¶ 67. On
remand, the trial court determined that Johnson’s statements did
not involve a matter of public concern. Accordingly, it reinstated its
judgment in McBride’s favor on his defamation claim.

6
trial court must follow on remand.” (alteration and citation

omitted)).

¶ 16 Because Johnson’s claim that McBride was engaged in a

deceptive trade practice was premised on his argument that

McBride was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, we

conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that

McBride’s activities “do not constitute a deceptive trade practice.”2

¶ 17 Johnson further argues that the trial court erred by finding

that McBride’s activities had a minimal impact on the public at

large and that Johnson had not established any damages. But

because Johnson failed to prove the first element of a private

consumer protection claim under the CCPA — namely, that the

defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice — we

2 During oral argument, Johnson argued that his deceptive trade

practices counterclaim went beyond the allegation that McBride
was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when preparing
QDROs. However, the deceptive trade practices counterclaim
alleged in his answer, as well as his opening and closing arguments
at the bench trial on that counterclaim, referred only to McBride’s
QDRO work. The theme of his closing argument at trial was that
“the preparation of QDROS . . . is the practice of law” and that
“McBride’s deceptive trade practices are intended to divert business
from others who do QDROs.”

7
need not address his arguments concerning other elements. See

Crowe, 126 P.3d at 201.

¶ 18 We thus conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing

Johnson’s deceptive trade practices counterclaim.

III. Attorney Fees

¶ 19 Johnson contends that the trial court erred by granting

McBride’s motion for attorney fees without a hearing. We agree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 20 On May 17, 2022, after he prevailed in the first trial, McBride

filed a motion seeking $4,270.50 in attorney fees as a sanction for

Johnson’s “significant and serious failures to properly submit

timely jury instructions” — behavior that ultimately led the trial

court to dismiss the jury on the second day of trial and proceed

with a bench trial. In his response, filed on June 7, 2022, Johnson

defended his actions regarding the jury instructions, challenged the

reasonableness and necessity of McBride’s claimed fees, and

requested a hearing. The trial court did not rule on McBride’s

motion for attorney fees or Johnson’s request for a hearing.

¶ 21 Two years later, after McBride prevailed in the second trial, the

trial court invited him to submit a bill of costs and ordered that

8
Johnson would have fifteen days to respond thereto. On

September 12, 2024, McBride submitted a document titled

“Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs.” He requested $2,028.93 in costs for the

first trial and $570 in costs for the appeal and second trial, totaling

$2,598.93. On the second page of the same document, he noted

that he had previously requested $4,270.50 in attorney fees “as a

sanction for [Johnson’s] malfeasance related to his aborted jury

demand” in the first trial but that the court had never ruled on his

motion. He thus requested an “award of costs in the amount of

$2598.93 and an award of attorney fees in the amount of

$4270.50.”

¶ 22 Johnson did not respond, and, on October 1, 2024, the trial

court entered an order with McBride’s “Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs”

attached, stating, “The motion/proposed order attached hereto:

APPROVED.”

B. Law and Discussion

¶ 23 “If a party requests a hearing concerning an award of fees, the

trial court must hold a hearing.” Walker v. Women’s Pro. Rodeo

Ass’n, 2021 COA 105M, ¶ 81 (quoting Shyanne Props., LLC v. Torp,

210 P.3d 490, 493 (Colo. App. 2009)); see C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-22(2)(c)

9
(“When required to do so by law, the court shall grant a party’s

timely request for a hearing” on a motion for attorney fees). “When

a hearing is requested to determine the reasonableness and

necessity of attorney fees, due process requires that the trial court

hold such a hearing.” Walker, ¶ 81 (quoting Roberts v. Adams,

47 P.3d 690, 700 (Colo. App. 2001)).

¶ 24 In its written order dismissing Johnson’s deceptive trade

practices counterclaim, the trial court invited McBride “to submit a

bill of costs.” Although McBride submitted a document titled

“Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs,” he also included in that document a

renewal of the motion for attorney fees he had filed two years

earlier. Because Johnson had already requested a hearing on

McBride’s original motion for attorney fees, the court erred by

granting the renewed motion without a hearing. See id.

¶ 25 We are not persuaded otherwise by McBride’s argument that,

because Johnson did not respond to McBride’s “Plaintiff’s Bill of

Costs” within fifteen days, as ordered by the trial court, he waived

10
any right to object to McBride’s renewed motion for attorney fees.3

First, Johnson had already filed a response opposing the motion for

sanctions and specifically requested a hearing. As a result, he was

entitled to a hearing. See id. Second, because McBride’s motion for

costs and fees was simply titled “Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs,” it was not

obvious that the document also included a renewed motion for

attorney fees. See Denner Enters., Inc. v. Barone, Inc., 87 P.3d 269,

274 (Colo. App. 2004) (When a party “did not file a separate motion

for the additional attorney fees,” the division was “unable to

ascertain from the record whether the [trial] court intended to deny

the request or merely overlooked it.”). And third, the trial court did

not explain the basis for the attorney fees award, nor did it make

any findings regarding the reasonableness of those fees. See

3 Johnson also argues that the trial court erred by permitting him

only fifteen days, instead of twenty-one days, to respond to
McBride’s “Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs.” We are not persuaded. C.R.C.P.
121, section 1-22(2)(b), provides that any response to a motion for
attorney fees “shall be filed within the time allowed in practice
standard [section] 1-15.” C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15(1)(b), in turn,
provides that “[t]he responding party shall have 21 days after the
filing of the motion or such lesser or greater time as the court may
allow in which to file a responsive brief.” (Emphasis added.) The
court thus did not err by permitting Johnson fifteen days to
respond.

11
Yaekle v. Andrews, 169 P.3d 196, 201 (Colo. App. 2007) (reversing

an attorney fees award when “the trial court did not identify the

basis for awarding fees [and] made no factual findings supporting

its determination of the reasonableness of defendants’ fees”), aff’d

on other grounds, 195 P.3d 1101 (Colo. 2008).

¶ 26 We thus reverse the award of attorney fees and remand the

case for a hearing on McBride’s fees request.

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 27 Both parties request an award of their attorney fees incurred

on appeal. Although neither party cites legal authority, we interpret

both fees requests as alleging that the other party’s arguments were

frivolous. See § 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2025 (permitting an award of

attorney fees if we find that a party brought or defended an action

lacking substantial justification, meaning it was substantially

frivolous, groundless, or vexatious). McBride has not shown that

Johnson’s appeal, as filed or argued, was frivolous. Johnson

prevailed on one of his claims, see Andres Trucking Co. v. United

Fire & Cas. Co., 2018 COA 144, ¶ 62 (declining to award appellate

attorney fees when the other party prevailed on appeal), and while

he did not prevail on the other, we do not agree that an award of

12
fees is warranted, see Glover v. Serratoga Falls LLC, 2021 CO 77,

¶ 70 (noting that the court awards appellate attorney fees only in

clear and unequivocal cases of egregious conduct when no rational

argument is presented). And Johnson has not demonstrated that

McBride’s arguments in defending against the appeal were frivolous

since McBride prevailed on the CCPA counterclaim. Accordingly,

we decline to award appellate attorney fees to either party.

V. Disposition

¶ 28 The trial court’s judgment dismissing Johnson’s CCPA

counterclaim is affirmed. The portion of its order awarding attorney

fees to McBride is reversed, and the case is remanded for a hearing

on McBride’s attorney fees request.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

13