Peo in Interest of EA

25CA0860 Peo In Interest of EA 11-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0860
Boulder County District Court No. 23JV30182
Honorable Dea M. Lindsey, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of E.A., a Child,

and Concerning R.O. and G.S.A.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Fox and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 13, 2025

Ben Pearlman, County Attorney, Cheryl Koh-Sicotte, Assistant County
Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Elizabeth A. McClintock, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, for Appellant R.O.

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant G.S.A.
¶1 In this dependency or neglect action, R.O. (mother) and G.S.A.

(father) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child legal

relationships with E.A. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Boulder County Department of Housing and Human

Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency and

neglect, alleging that the child tested positive for illegal substances

at birth and was experiencing withdrawals. The juvenile court

granted temporary custody to the Department, and the child was

placed with paternal cousins. The court adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected and adopted treatment plans for both

parents. One year later, the Department moved to terminate both

parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court granted the motion

following a contested hearing.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶3 Both parents contend that the Department failed to provide

reasonable efforts. We are not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶4 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, a department must make

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reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2025. Reasonable efforts means the “exercise of diligence and care”

for a child who is in out-of-home placement, and the reasonable

efforts standard is satisfied when services are provided in

accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-103(114).

¶5 To evaluate whether a department made reasonable efforts,

the court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan. People in

Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). A

department has discretion to prioritize certain services to address a

family’s most pressing needs; therefore, whether a department

made reasonable efforts should be “measured holistically.” People

in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 11. A parent is ultimately

responsible for using the services offered by a department, and the

juvenile court “may therefore consider a parent’s unwillingness to

participate in treatment when determining whether a department

made reasonable efforts.” Id. at ¶ 12.

¶6 The juvenile court, as the trier of fact, determines the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence and

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assesses witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d

244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). We review the juvenile court’s factual

findings for clear error but review de novo its legal determination,

based on those findings, as to whether a department satisfied its

reasonable efforts obligation. E.D., ¶ 13.

B. Mother’s Reasonable Efforts Contention

¶7 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding the

Department made reasonable efforts because the Department failed

to amend her treatment plan to “address the cycle of domestic

violence between mother and father.” Mother asserts that this is a

reasonable efforts issue — and not a claim that the court erred by

finding that the treatment plan was appropriate — because issues

of domestic violence “would have to be addressed before the child

could be safe with either of the parents.”

¶8 We are not persuaded. The caseworker’s unchallenged

testimony was that the Department offered mother services and

support after she reported a domestic violence incident between

herself and father, even though the treatment plan did not require

mother to address domestic violence.

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¶9 Importantly, the court disagreed with mother’s contention that

domestic violence was a child protection concern. Instead, the

court found that substance dependance was the primary barrier to

mother’s ability to meet the child’s emotional, physical, and mental

health needs. The record supports this finding. The caseworker

testified that domestic violence was not a safety concern for the

Department because mother gave conflicting reports about what

happened with father, never reported the incident to law

enforcement, and separated from father soon after. Furthermore,

the caseworker testified that the treatment plan was “primarily

focused on mother’s ongoing substance use,” which was the safety

concern requiring the Department and the court’s intervention. The

court found that despite the structure and support of the

dependency or neglect case, mother failed to engage in treatment in

a sustained and meaningful way.

¶ 10 Moreover, the court found, with record support, that the

Department provided reasonable efforts to mother by offering

assessments, individual and group mental health and substance

abuse treatment, withdrawal management, in-patient treatment,

supervised family time, substance use monitoring, assistance with

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housing, financial supports, early intervention evaluations,

transportation assistance, kinship care, family engagement

meetings, domestic violence support, and ongoing caseworker

support. Mother does not challenge these parts of the court’s

reasonable efforts findings.

¶ 11 We discern no error in the court’s finding that the Department

provided reasonable efforts to mother.

C. Father’s Reasonable Efforts Contentions

¶ 12 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department provided reasonable efforts because the

Department allegedly failed to contact certain relatives and provide

them with information as required by section

19-3-403(3.6)(a)(IV)(A)-(D), C.R.S. 2025. Under this provision,

within thirty days of the removal of a child, the Department must

send family members a particular notice informing them about

placement possibilities, including financial assistance.

§ 19-3-403(3.6)(a)(IV). The statute also provides that the notice

shall be developed by the state department of human services, the

office of the child’s representative, the office of respondent parents’

counsel, and “other interested stakeholders.”

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§ 19-3-403(3.6)(a)(IV)(C). These provisions took effect in August

2023. Ch. 367, sec. 4, § 19-3-403, 2023 Colo. Sess. Laws 367.

¶ 13 There is no indication in the record to suggest that the notice

mandated by the statute had been developed or was available at the

time the Department’s diligent search team sent out notices to the

child’s family. And father does not explain, and we cannot discern,

why the juvenile court should have considered the notices required

by section 19-3-403(3.6)(a)(IV) as part of its evaluation of the

Department’s provision of reasonable efforts. Instead, the court

relied on section 19-3-103(114), which directs the court to consider

the provision of services listed in section 19-3-208 and does not

address placement of the child. Thus, we discern no error.

¶ 14 In any event, any alleged error is harmless. Father’s concern

is that the child’s paternal uncle never received the notice and

therefore was not aware of possible benefits of becoming a

placement provider. But the paternal uncle testified that he

received a notice in connection with the dependency or neglect case

for the child’s older sibling and was in contact with the Department

at the beginning of this case. The paternal uncle appeared at court

hearings and told the Department that he was willing to be a

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placement provider, even without being informed about possible

economic support.

¶ 15 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department provided reasonable efforts because the child’s

placement provider expressed a preference for adoption without

fully understanding how an allocation of parental responsibilities

(APR) might work. Father asserts that the Department “failed to

explain to the placement provider what an APR was or how it

functioned.” But we are not aware of, and father does not provide,

any legal authority supporting his claim that the Department was

required to provide this information as part of its reasonable efforts

obligation. Consequently, we conclude that the court did not err in

its reasonable efforts finding.

III. Less Drastic Alternative to Termination

¶ 16 Mother and father contend that the juvenile court erred by

finding that there was no less drastic alternative to termination

because the court could have ordered an APR to the child’s

placement provider or the child’s paternal uncle. We disagree.

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A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶ 17 Before terminating parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must also consider and eliminate

less drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108,

1122 (Colo. 1986). The determination of a less drastic alternative is

not a separate criterion and is instead “implicit in, and thus

intertwined with, the statutory criteria for termination.” People in

Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24. In considering less drastic

alternatives, a court must give primary consideration to the child’s

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.

§ 19-3-604(3).

¶ 18 A juvenile court may consider and weigh various factors in

determining the viability of a less drastic alternative, including

whether the alternative placement option favors adoption rather

than an APR, People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 31, and

whether an ongoing relationship with the parent would be beneficial

or detrimental to the child, People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39,

¶ 81. Long-term placement may not be a viable alternative to

termination if the child needs a stable, permanent home that can be

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assured only by adoption. People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211,

214 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 19 Ultimately, for a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do

more than “adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be the “best” option for the child. People in Interest

of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27. Therefore, if the court considers

a less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the

child’s best interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and

order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. And under those circumstances, we

must affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. B.H., ¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶ 20 The juvenile court found there was no less drastic alternative

that would serve the best interests of the child. The court made

extensive findings including the following:

• the child had been placed with family members since his

birth, nineteen months before the termination hearing;

• mother and father had a difficult relationship “marred with

substance use,” which created a “potential pitfall in

considering an APR that include[d] both parents”;

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• mother and father’s “lack of engagement and

communication raises further doubts about the viability of

an APR arrangement with either parent”;

• an APR arrangement could result in “additional conflict with

[the child] caught in the middle”;

• there was a high likelihood of a future dependency or

neglect case if mother and father remained legally involved

with the child;

• an APR — regardless of the child’s placement provider —

was not in the child’s best interests; and

• termination of parental rights was necessary to ensure that

the child achieved the legal permanency and stability that

only adoption could provide.

¶ 21 The record supports these findings. The dependency or

neglect action opened when the child was a newborn. The

caseworker testified that neither parent complied with any portion

of their treatment plans, which required that parents improve their

relationship with the child and address substance dependance and

mental health. Despite liberal access to family time, the family time

facilitator testified that mother and father attended only seventy

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percent of family time offered for most of the case and reduced their

engagement even further in the last six months.

¶ 22 The caseworker, an expert in child protection casework,

opined that that termination and adoption was in the child’s best

interests given his age and needs, the capacity of the parents, and

the demonstrated inability of the parents to provide the child with

consistent care. The caseworker opined that an ongoing

relationship with either mother or father would be harmful because

there was a high risk of ongoing exposure to continued substance

use and the parents were unlikely to make the changes the child

needed within a reasonable time.

¶ 23 True, the paternal uncle testified that he was open to

becoming the child’s placement provider as part of an APR

agreement with mother and father. But as the juvenile court noted,

an APR “is not an appropriate, less drastic alternative merely

because it exists as a potential option.” See A.M., ¶ 27.

¶ 24 The child’s paternal cousin had been the child’s placement

provider since his release from the hospital. The paternal cousin

testified that she did not want to participate in an APR with mother

or father. Mother contends that the paternal cousin did not

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understand what limitations could be ordered and that an APR

“cannot be considered or eliminated as an option if the parties

governed by [an APR] order do not understand it.” Mother contends

that “accurately proving the current kin placement with all the

necessary information . . . is required for a placement to make an

informed decision about an APR.”

¶ 25 We are not persuaded because it is the juvenile court, not the

placement provider, that is required to consider and eliminate a less

drastic alternative. And while a court may consider a placement

provider’s stated preferences, there is no indication that the

placement provider’s preference was a factor in the court’s decision

here. See S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 920 (noting that a court may consider

whether a placement option prefers adoption rather than an APR in

its decision to reject less drastic alternatives); see also People in

Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38 (noting that the court may

consider “various factors”).

¶ 26 Mother and father conflate the juvenile court’s obligation to

consider a less drastic alternative before granting termination with

the court’s obligation to make placement determinations in the

child’s best interests. Compare § 19-3-604 (listing criteria for

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termination) and L.M., ¶ 24 (less drastic alternative is implicit in the

statutory criteria) with § 19-3-702(6) (listing considerations for

changing a child’s placement provider) and A.R., ¶ 44

(distinguishing the less drastic alternative analysis from statutory

placement preferences).1

IV. Disposition

¶ 27 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

1 Although the court found that neither parent formally requested a

change to the child’s placement, it nevertheless found — with
record support — that moving the child would be traumatic,
unnecessary, and not in the child’s best interests. The caseworker
testified that the Department assessed a change in placement but
that, “right now[,] we don’t have an identified benefit to” moving the
child. Therefore, to the extent that mother and father contend that
the juvenile court erred by declining to order a change in the child’s
placement, we discern no error.

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