Peo v. Beddingfield

23CA0321 Peo v Beddingfield 11-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0321
El Paso County District Court No. 20CR2658
Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Christopher Paul Beddingfield,

Defendant-Appellant.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Freyre and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 13, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Adrienne R. Teodorovic, Alternate Defense Counsel, Windsor, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Christopher Paul Beddingfield, appeals the

sentence entered by the district court after he pled guilty to

possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Beddingfield was charged with possession with intent to

distribute a controlled substance and other offenses after police saw

him driving a vehicle that had been reported stolen and

subsequently found 14.9 grams of methamphetamine in his pocket.

In a separate case a year and a half later, he was charged with

felony menacing based on allegations that he and another man

went to a victim’s home and the other man pointed a handgun at

the victim.

¶3 Beddingfield pled guilty to both crimes in a global plea

disposition — he stipulated to an open sentence of six to sixteen

years in the custody of the Department of Corrections for

possession and six years in custody for menacing. The prosecution

dismissed multiple other charges in exchange for Beddingfield’s

guilty pleas, and the parties agreed that the sentences would run

concurrently.

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¶4 The district court heard argument and entered sentences in

both cases during a single hearing. Based on Beddingfield’s

extensive criminal history, the prosecution requested a fourteen-

year sentence for possession with intent to distribute. Defense

counsel argued that Beddingfield’s prior offenses were a result of

his addiction and argued for a six-year sentence.

¶5 The district court accepted the stipulated six-year sentence for

menacing and sentenced Beddingfield to a concurrent term of

twelve years in prison for possession with intent to distribute.

Beddingfield appeals this latter sentence, arguing that the court

imposed it in an illegal manner because it relied exclusively on

information related to his menacing conviction rather than the facts

related to the possession offense. Beddingfield also argues that the

court imposed multiple punishments for menacing in violation of

double jeopardy. We disagree with Beddingfield’s arguments and

affirm.

II. Standard of Review

¶6 A district court has broad discretion when imposing a

sentence, and we will not overturn the sentence imposed absent a

clear abuse of that discretion. People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702, 708

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(Colo. 1990). While the court need only state on the record the

basic reasons for the sentence, it must consider the nature of the

offense, the character and rehabilitative potential of the offender,

the development of respect for the law and the deterrence of crime,

and the protection of the public. Id. The court is “largely

unlimited” as to other information it may also consider, including

the defendant’s criminal history. People v. Hernandez-Clavel, 186

P.3d 96, 98 (Colo. App. 2008) (citation omitted); see People v.

Tallwhiteman, 124 P.3d 827, 837 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶7 “If the sentence is within the range required by law, is based

on appropriate considerations as reflected in the record, and is

factually supported by the circumstances of the case,” we must

uphold it. Fuller, 791 P.2d at 708.

III. Discussion

¶8 Because Beddingfield was sentenced within the range to which

he stipulated in his plea agreement, he has no right to appeal the

propriety of the sentence itself. § 18-1-409(1), C.R.S. 2025. He

may, however, appeal the manner in which his sentence was

imposed, including by challenging the sufficiency and accuracy of

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the information on which the sentence was based. Sullivan v.

People, 2020 CO 58, ¶¶ 3-4.

¶9 Beddingfield argues that the court imposed his twelve-year

possession sentence in an illegal manner by basing it solely on the

facts of an unrelated, subsequent crime for which he stipulated to a

lesser six-year sentence. But the court’s sentence for possession

was not based exclusively on the menacing conviction. For

instance, the court noted that Beddingfield was remorseful and

accountable to some extent, but it expressed concern about “some

minimization” of the possession offense in the presentence

investigation report. It also expressed concern about Beddingfield’s

criminal history, which included nine prior felony convictions.

¶ 10 Beddingfield argues that the court could not have based his

sentence for possession on his criminal history because it viewed

his prior felonies, which were primarily drug and property-related

offenses, as a mitigator. In other words, according to Beddingfield,

because his nine prior felonies served only to mitigate his sentence,

the only way the court could have reached such a high sentence for

possession was based on the menacing conviction. But while the

court considered the nature of his prior felonies as a mitigator, it

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also took into account the large number of them as a reason to

impose a harsher sentence. As we read the record, it appears the

court properly balanced the competing considerations before it,

recognizing that while much of Beddingfield’s criminal history was

nonviolent, it was also extensive. The fact that the court considered

not just Beddingfield’s latest menacing conviction but all of his

criminal history defeats his double jeopardy argument.

¶ 11 We take Beddingfield’s point that the court considered the

severity of his menacing conviction when deciding a sentence for

possession. But despite his arguments, the court was within its

rights to do so. See Tallwhiteman, 124 P.3d at 837 (a sentencing

court may even consider conduct for which the offender was never

charged, for which charges were filed but later dismissed as part of

a plea agreement, or for which the offender was charged and

subsequently acquitted). Far from being unconstitutional, we

conclude that the court’s reference to the gravity and severity of

Beddingfield’s menacing conviction, particularly in view of the

nonviolent crimes that preceded it, suggests an appropriate

consideration for Beddingfield’s developing character, rehabilitative

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potential, and respect for the law, as well as the need for protection

of the public. See Fuller, 791 P.2d at 708.

¶ 12 Ultimately, the court found that it “want[ed] to acknowledge

the accountability and the remorse. But to simply run co-equal

sentences concurrently doesn’t reflect the serious and separate

nature of the offenses.” To the extent these comments suggest that

the court was improperly considering Beddingfield’s overall

sentences for both charges together, they are insufficient to warrant

reversal. When a sentencing court finds that several factors justify

a sentence, “only one of those factors need be legitimate to support

[the] court’s decision.” People v. Eurioste, 12 P.3d 847, 851 (Colo.

App. 2000) (citing People v. Broga, 750 P.2d 59, 62 (Colo. 1988)).

¶ 13 Because the record as a whole — including Beddingfield’s

minimization of his offense, extensive criminal history, and

progression from drug and property-related offenses to violent

offenses — supports Beddingfield’s sentence, we will not disturb it.

IV. Disposition

¶ 14 The sentence is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE YUN concur.

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